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PREFACE 
Neighborhoods and municipalities just beyond my small second-floor office and front 
door are experiencing both the full-on biological assault of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and the 
ruthlessness of an unequal society founded on and maintained by brutal racist difference. One 
emergency colliding with another, but both expressive of who, what, and where we consider 
valuable. When we allow leaders to declare emergencies or invoke crisis language, we also allow 
them to narrow our available solutions. Emergencies are a way of acting, but also a way of 
forgetting. It intensifies trauma while erasing the past. Forces and histories fall away as political 
and corporate classes bend institutions to their agendas and wills. In these moments, successes 
and failures cease to be useful measures for public policies. These emergencies burden us with 
distorted glimpses on origins and outcomes: effects become causes; causes become inaccessible.  
In place of tired evaluations, we should focus on what these emergencies accomplish and 
for whom, what the emergency allows and why, when the emergency will end and what a return 
to normal really means. For planning and policy, any normal structured and maintained by 
inequality, violence, and insecurity should never be good enough. How do we resist the urge to 
call something a crisis when what we are facing is a feature of incrementalism? The challenge, 
then, is how our disciplines and professions confront and denounce acts of brutality, systems of 
domination, and practices of destruction. The carnage of novel coronavirus and the viciousness 
of racism are not bugs in the system; both depend on practitioners, academics, and policymakers 
modeling patience and performing compliance because progress has become reform. Rather than 
use our positions to allay conflict, we must commit ourselves to participation in these struggles.
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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation contributes to the study of the production of urban decline by examining 
the process of demolishing. Recent research on the production of urban decline, by focusing on 
the property and real estate practices of speculation, foreclosure, and eviction, has provided an 
analytical framework for identifying and interpreting the persistent shifts in capital accumulation 
strategies that produce blight. The property and real estate practices of demolition extend beyond 
the site of a demolished building and reinforce processes producing urban decline. Demolishing 
depends on environments, logistics, policies, and resources that preserve regional geographies of 
uneven development. 
 I investigate the Detroit Demolition Program (DDP) and efforts between 2013 and 2019 
to demolish over 40,000 houses in Detroit, MI. I study this city and its program to question and 
interpret relationships between demolition and urban decline. In existing research, local public 
policy authorizes and pays contractors to deliver on-demand demolition to an abandoned 
building. Based on interviews and my analysis of public documents, DDP data, and sites, I show 
this focus on the practice of demolition erases the processes and effects of demolishing that 
extend beyond an address. Demolition is part of the production of urban decline and includes 
supply chains, forms of value, resources, property relations, and environments that conflict with 
demolition as an intervention against decline. 
 The process of demolishing Detroit depended on the emergence of a consensus turning 
blight into an emergency and removal into a necessity. Public, private, and philanthropic 
interests linked demolition to revitalization but also used it served regulatory, political, and 
xiv 
 
financial goals. The urgency around demolishing provided justification for DDP policies that 
accommodated the income-generation priorities of contractors. The DDP depended on 
contractors sourcing millions of cubic yards of dirt and rock to grade holes after basement 
excavation. Shifting DDP regulation on backfill ensured demolition was lucrative for wreckers 
and their networks. Backfilling Detroit meant millions of dollars in transactions that served 
contractors and suburban development agendas. Contractors sourced material from 444 unique 
sources, including luxury condos and retailer parking lots. The transformation of Detroit's built 
environment through demolition relied on continued regional expansion that converted wastes of 
growth into assets for destruction. 
 Demolishing Detroit was not an intervention slotted between periods of decline and 
development. Instead, demolishing was a value-extraction process manifesting land uses and 
property practices that generated income without redevelopment. Contractors engendered a 
regional land regime that could produce and sustain demolition. Instead of an interruption in the 
production of urban decline, making land vacant and ready for profitable intensification, 
demolishing Detroit was the continuation of decline by a different means.  
 This dissertation shows the limits of research on demolition that relies on the potential for 
reuse to evaluate consequences for neighborhoods. These dichotomies separate demolishing 
from the conditions and contradictions of its creation. By illustrating how demolishing is part of 
the process of decline I provide an alternative to research that conceals the operations of capital 
by relying on divides between global and local, between causes and interventions. Rather than 
managing decline or prompting redevelopment, demolishing is one process by which capitalist 
urbanization achieves the extraction of value in shrinking cities. Extending these insights beyond 
Detroit and demolition can identify local responses that may appear to manage decline but 
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through their environmental and logistical processes reinforce regional segregation and produce 
decline.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
From the Demolition of Detroit to Demolishing Detroit 
 
On 10/13/2015, the Detroit Demolition Program (DDP) wrecked 29 vacant houses. The 
DDP – a partnership between the Mayor’s Office, Detroit Land Bank Authority (DLBA) and 
Detroit Building Authority (DBA) – awarded $467,132.00 to seven contractors for the 
demolitions. Rickman Enterprise Group, a firm based in the Martin Park neighborhood, tore 
down fourteen properties and received $212,680.00 in Hardest Hit Funds (HHF), an anti-
foreclosure program of the US Department of the Treasury (DOT) partly redirected towards 
blight removal. By the time DLBA awarded the contract to Rickman, contractors with the DDP 
had demolished 6,949 vacant buildings in just under two years.  
The most expensive of Rickman’s demolitions that day was 3206 Bassett. The contractor 
tore down the far-southwest property for $22,170. The house had been vacant for ten years. 
Standard Federal Bank, the largest bank in Michigan until a 2008 purchase 
by Bank of America, foreclosed on the 3206 Bassett in 2005. In 1/2014, the Wayne County 
Treasurer conveyed the property to the DLBA. The property had sat empty for over 10 years 
before a Rickman crew with its wrecking equipment in tow arrived twenty-two months later.  
Rickman, no doubt, made quick work of the modest stick-frame house. A towering 
excavator would have punched through the roof and then veered into the remaining walls, 
scooping the innards into an idling truck with dump trailer. Previous encroachment by scrappers 
would have mined the house of metal. A laborer would have stood a few dozen feet away hosing 
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debris to suppress dust and contain local exposure to lead and asbestos. Perhaps neighbors stood 
on porches observing the choreography. Smash. Scoop. Spray. Rickman would perform this 
dungy routine until the empty house at 3206 Bassett faded foot-by-foot to reveal an empty hole.  
That phase of emptiness, unlike the house’s vacancy, will be brief. Soon, another 
Rickman truck would have arrived hauling a trailer of material. Its driver unloaded the 240 yd3 
of dirt and rock until any remnants of 3206 Bassett disappeared into vacant land. What was once 
an impairment to Detroit’s future is now an asset (Williams, 2018; Butcher, 2018). For many, 
demolition will have allowed 3206 Bassett to escape one pipeline – Detroit’s decline – and enter 
a new pipeline: Detroit’s redevelopment. For its part, Rickman Enterprises will also vanish, its 
presence at 3206 Bassett catalogued in a single cell in a DDP spreadsheet. A day of destruction 
now providing space and time for the creativity of developers, builders, and new inhabitants. 
Boosters and critics of demolition continue to debate the ways it can transform vacant 
liabilities into developable assets. In a white paper for the Brookings Institution, Mallach (2012) 
argued, “Large-scale demolition, thoughtfully and responsibly carried out, is a necessary step in 
the process of rebuilding the nation’s distressed older cities (3).” For him, demolition’s return on 
investment is clear. “It may,” he imagined, “clear the ground for redevelopment projects that can 
potentially make the city more competitive, including construction of housing more suited to 
existing market demand, or of infrastructure and buildings to grow and attract new firms (22).” 
Demolition’s relationship to redevelopment has found its way into the agendas of DDP leaders. 
Brian Farkas, special projects director for the DBA, told Michigan officials, “The reason we’re 
tearing down is to rebuild (2016, 33).” The optimism climbed to the upper levels of government. 
In late 2015, Mark McArdle, the DOT’s deputy assistant secretary for financial stability, 
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conveyed the Obama administration’s outlook for the DDP, “We recently visited Detroit, and 
you can see the real impact the blight program is having on communities (McKinney, 2015).” 
Those sanguine takes on the consequences of demolition conflict with scholars critical of 
how a rebooted built environment will affect long-term inhabitants. In a recent history of class 
struggle in the city, Jay & Conklin (2020) imagine a less equitable future for Detroit’s vacant 
land. They depict the city as a place married to decay but flirting with total gentrification. For 
them, demolition signals capital’s tendency to reset declining neighborhoods for a new round of 
development to serve the wealthy. They write, “Detroit is being re-everything: revitalized, 
rebuilt, reborn, renewed, refurbished, revamped, restored, redeveloped. It is a ‘blank slate, an 
‘investor’s playground.’ Detroit’s derelict landscape, an ‘American Acropolis,’ is marketed as its 
greatest asset. (2020, 11)” That “blank slate” is more than physical space, it is also profitable. 
Campbell, Newman, Safransky, & Stallmann (2020) point to demolition as a major force behind 
that transformation, arguing, “federal money from the Hardest Hit Fund program has been routed 
to cities throughout Michigan to demolish houses and clear land for private development (84).” 
Dan Gilbert, the Chairman of Quicken Loans, told an audience in 2013, demolition would make 
Detroit, “very cheap for a builder/developer to develop a residential unit, and they are going to 
develop them and develop them in mass as soon as we get the structures down (McGraw, 2013).” 
It would seem, then, the DDP and its goal of resetting Detroit is one in a long line of “re-
everything” processes first described by Marx (1967) in relation to the exploitation of the British 
working class, “’Improvement’ of towns,” he wrote then, “accompanying the increase of wealth, 
by the demolition of badly built quarters, the erection of palaces of banks, warehouses, etc., the 
widening of streets for business traffics, for the carriages of luxury, and for the introduction of 
tramways, etc., drive away the poor into even worse and more crowded hiding places (657).” 
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Using the improvement of Detroit to prioritize the needs of the wealthy was never an unintended 
consequence of revitalization for those that controlled the region’s economic development 
program. George Jackson, Jr, the former head of the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation 
(DEGC), considered class restructuring the price of progress. At a 2013 DEGC forum, Jackson 
said, “When I look at this city’s tax base, I say bring on more gentrification (Neavling, 2013b).” 
But while gentrification has remained at the tip of everyone’s tongues in Detroit, the role 
of vacant land in that process has been less than decisive. In 2018, Mallach dismissed the link 
between demolition and gentrification, claiming it was a myth that only served to disguise the 
city’s “persistence of concentrated, debilitating poverty and the decline of once-health, vital 
neighborhoods (Gallagher, 2018b).” Mallach’s colleagues at Brookings have presented similar 
arguments arguing concern about isolated gentrification ignores the real challenges facing 
American cities (Grabinsky & Butler, 2015; Berube, 2015). But that insistence on “two Detroits” 
(Moskowitz, 2015) – one a 7.2 square mile island of wealth and the other a 132 square mile sea 
of destitution – ignores the essential relationship between prosperity and poverty in the urban 
process under capitalism (Harvey, 1978). Decline and gentrification are not parallel currents of 
relative socioeconomic fortune but expressions of local, regional, and global strategies spawning 
multiple capitalisms by rearticulating regulation, accumulation, and rentiership (Boyer, 2005). 
Contra claims capitalism failed or it is returning to Detroit (Kurth, 2019; Larsen, 2017; 
Vande Panne, 2017; Wolff, 2013), its built environment is more accurately explained by iteration 
in the practices of capital accumulation (Akers & Seymour, 2018). While gentrification may not 
be an automatic outcome of clearance, empty urban space still fuels a revanchist imagination. 
Detroit’s overabundance of vacant land provides a terrain for performing the ethic and aesthetic 
of the pioneer. Each empty lot and abandoned building flows from an economic history of 
5 
 
disinvestment but, unerringly, gestures towards a future of redevelopment and profitability – the 
past provides but does not constrain. McKinney (2016) draws this raw resource of emptiness into 
conversation with the uniquely American fascination with the frontier. Despite Frederick Jackson 
Turner’s (1893) eulogy, the frontier remains a potent organizing device for capital’s reclamation 
of cities (Smith, 1996). McKinney writes, “This is seen in the hopeful descriptions of what will 
‘save’ this postindustrial city: revitalization, redevelopment, reuse, rebirth. In each case the 
underlying assumption is that space is being “underutilized” but that with the right new people, 
or new ideas, or infusion of cash, the city be returned to its former productivity. (xx)”  
 The perceived underutilization of land, housing, and terrain serves as a justification for a 
range of uses and interventions that would serve the goal of diversifying Detroit (Galster, 2002). 
For some, that diversification entails creating sustainable agri-hoods (Adams, 2019), developing 
art enclaves on empty streets (Aguilar, 2020), establishing innovation centers (Gallagher, 2019), 
putting the city’s land back to work (Nissen, 2019), and developing a renewed appreciation of 
undervalued homes (Mallach, 2018b). Notwithstanding the enthusiasm, in each instance, the 
space for action appears only after the demolition is finished. These interventions take place in 
the aftermath of destruction. Their boosters, like Dan Gilbert, only move forward once 
philanthropy, developers, and policymakers have eradicated “cancerous” blight (Pierog, 2014).  
 Demolition may spark new developments, but the demolition of blight in Detroit is 
primed to remedy everything. In 2017, Farkas insisted the DDP made it possible to solve 
Detroit’s broader social problems (Graves, 2017). For him, “blight flight” was at the core of the 
city’s decline. But making blight a cause and demolition the solution erases anti-Black racism 
and classism in public policy, banking, and real estate have created Detroit. As a policy solution, 
demolition is insufficient for transforming the city and its neighborhoods. Akers (2017a) writes, 
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“Contemporary blight remediation is a new urban medicine show, a spectacle built on false 
promises and negligible outcomes. It is an extension of long-running US urban policies that 
deploy instruments of displacement and demolition in the spatial reordering of urban economics 
and racial boundaries. (96)” Any evaluation of the DDP would obscure what made it appear 
necessary in the first place. Rather than “blight remediation,” Akers argues for an analysis of the 
production of blight. This entails probing and understanding the repertoire of real estate market 
practices – lending, foreclosure, public auctions, speculation, land contracts, and evictions - that 
extract value from Detroit’s built environment and by extension produce the city’s decline. 
 Turning attention to the production of blight denaturalizes the conditions that developers, 
speculators, and policymakers hope to exploit through demolition. Blight involves more than 
demolition schemes that “permanently altered the city’s landscape (Tighe & Ryberg-Webster, 
2020).” The abandoned building – whether a house, school, or factory – is and was a product of 
public policy and private investment. By shifting focus to the real estate practices materializing 
Detroit’s blight, demolition is no longer just phase one of a new (and potentially dispossessive) 
development process but the expression of near-constant accumulation. Where Jay & Conklin 
(2020), Mallach (2018c), Moskowitz (2017), and McKinney (2016) still entertain the possibility 
for the shocks of gentrification, concentrating on the production of decline converts that space of 
analysis to examining pathways and pipelines making the city what it is today (Akers, 2013a). 
Historicizing Detroit’s decline does not mean looking into the past for explanation. Rather, it 
provides a critical framework for demystifying and intervening in ongoing property practices in 
the post-crisis city (Seymour, 2020). Authors probing vacant land in the aftermath of demolition 
commit themselves to confronting one possible future shaped by value-extraction, dispossession, 
and displacement, rather than examining persistent local, regional, and global processes that 
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forced programs like DDP to rescue markets in the first place. Decline, then, is less a process 
occurring in Detroit than an urban process under capital happening to Detroit. As Akers & 
Seymour (2018, 138) write, “The geographies of the subprime mortgage crisis, speculative 
pipelines, land contracts, and rising evictions map on to geographies of racial exclusion and class 
separation in US cities, in large part because this economic unevenness is highly profitable.” 
  Despite efforts to ground Detroit in the extractive operations of investment and real 
estate, the production of decline approach still risks black boxing the demolition process. If some 
authors view demolition as the start of the next round of development, then positioning it as one 
instance amid accumulation can serve a separate mystification. Figure 1 below represents the 
placement of demolition between one period of value-extraction producing blight and a 
subsequent phase of value-extraction from owning, speculating, or redevelopment vacant land. 
Figure 1: Production of Blight leading to Demolition and the Redevelopment of Vacant Land11 
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Blight removal in Detroit may be freighted with false promises and negligible outcomes but the 
process of demolition is a powerful social, economic, and environmental force beyond a targeted 
address. The DDP was a destructive interlude made possible by mortgage foreclosure, 
speculation, and land banking. Yet, the demolition process itself was also the convergence of 
pathways and pipelines encompassing and surpassing the contractor, the street, and the 
neighborhood. The production of decline may exhaust a structure’s value to the housing market, 
but not the value-extraction potential of demolition. A reassessment of demolition within the 
broader production of decline can identify the processes and environments converging to achieve 
the DDP. By doing so, demolition becomes more than a precondition for the next phase of 
neighborhood change. Trucks, fuel, water, labor, and backfill become embedded in their own 
chains of valuation and accumulation. Tracing the production of demolition opens a line of 
inquiry that resists reducing blight removal to a bookmark or an on-demand delivered service. 
By returning to the house at 3206 Bassett, we can begin to see how addressing the 
production of demolition reveals a repertoire of relationships that complicate and contradict that 
flattened view of demolition. The 240 yd3 of material Rickman Enterprises hauled and dumped 
at 3206 Bassett did not simply appear in the truck’s trailer. DDP records reveal the precise 
process that allowed Rickman to fill and grade the site. In spring 2015, the DLBA contracted 
O’Brien Edwards Construction (OBECC) to provide clean-up services for 150 residential 
properties in its inventory. DLBA tasked O’Brien Edwards with preparing these properties for 
sale in its auction program. In a 5/2015 profile appearing in the Detroit Free Press, a reporter 
caught up with Steven Harris, OBECC’s Chief Operating Officer, and interviewed him about the 
company’s contract with the DLBA. “You go in and do what?” the reporter asked. Harris 
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responded, “Pretty much the auction-ready assessment (Schaefer, 2015).” Harris then detailed his 
run-ins with squatters, raccoons, marijuana grow houses, and skeptical neighborhood residents. 
Under ordinary circumstances, OBECC and Harris would be providing a uncomplicated 
service. Since 2014, the DLBA has auctioned properties on an online platform. Bids start at 
$1,000 and auction winners agree to renovate the property within six months. Over the last six 
years, the DLBA has closed 2,600 auctions totaling $18,960,770 in sales. DLBA keeps track of 
winner status and its records show 1,174 to owner-occupants, 530 to investors, and 897 without a 
designation. Firms like OBECC help DLBA preserve these properties, first by removing debris 
and then providing an estimate for renovation. “The one down the street was really bad,” he said, 
“I did the assessment and found it was a fire, but it could be repaired. It was just a ton of smoke 
damage, and it was probably 120 yards of debris that's all wet because of the weather.” His crews 
planned to load hundreds of dumpsters with the debris they collected from the DLBA contract. 
Six months later, that debris reappeared in the DDP’s official backfill records. Rickman 
Enterprises reported using 6,940 yd3 of material from a source the contractor called OBECC 
Detroit Residences. Rickman provided twelve source addresses1. Every address had been an 
OBECC project site during its clean-up contract in the spring. Following clean-up, DLBA had 
closed auctions on ten of the twelve properties for a total of $110,001. During that period, 
Rickman used material from this combined OBECC source for twenty-eight demolitions, for 
which DDP paid out $40,500 in HHF. Rickman is the only contractor to report using this 
material, suggesting it was not a DLBA-monitored source. Importantly, no renovation or 
excavation occurred at any of the OBECC sites to explain this reserve of material. Among 
 
1 1715 Atkinson St, 3611 Three Mile Dr, 5903 Kensington Ave, 2475 Calvert Ave, 2745 Collingwood, 6787 
Rutherford St, 14782 Rossini, 3951 Three Mile Dr, 1207 Longfellow, 6921 Forrer, 1936 W. Boston Blvd, 1936 
W.Boston Blvd, 1197 Longfellow-Detroit, MI 
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several possible interpretations one is the most straightforward. OBECC collected debris from 
the cleanup sites, stockpiled it for later use, and sold it in one transaction to Rickman Enterprises.  
Nearly two years after Rickman Enterprises dumped 240 yd3 of OBECC debris into the 
ground at 3206 Bassett, Jonathan Barlow purchased the lot for $100 from the DLBA. Viewed in 
this light, the demolition of 3206 Bassett is neither just the beginning of a new period of private 
investment and rebuilding nor is it a policy response with negligible outcomes. Stepping back 
from the isolated demolition site, OBECC and Rickman Enterprises were mobilizing the city’s 
demolition process to extract value through destruction and its supply chain. The former firm 
turned waste into a resource, the latter turned the resource into an asset for demolitions. In both 
instance, demolition provided space for generating income from Detroit’s land and property 
without relying on the production of blight or future development. By introducing the production 
of demolition as a pathway for extracting value from land, we can link the DDP to broader 
economies and geographies of property, development, and destruction. For researchers, 
narrowing the DDP to the practice of demolition is insufficient for capturing these relationships. 
In contrast, the process of demolishing – a logistical, environmental, and political operation 
embedded in regional patterns of change – illuminates the relationships making demolition a 
technical possibility, but also how contractors became formidable forces in the city’s land use 
and value by controlling the creation, circulation, market, and distribution of backfill material.  
On the same day Rickman Enterprises wrecked 3206 Bassett, Mayor Mike Duggan 
appeared before the Detroit City Council (DCC). A reporter had accused the DDP of colluding 
with contractors and rigging bid processes to favor major firms (LeDuff, 2015). “I have done 
everything I know to be transparent about this,” he said, “There is no confusion about what we 
are doing. We are reporting it publicly. (Ferretti, 2015)” Duggan dismissed any allegations of 
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misconduct, arguing the DDP’s rising costs were explained by his administration’s commitment 
to suppressing demolition dust and using uncontaminated backfill (Helms & Guillen, 2015).  
By the middle of 2016, Duggan and DDP officials relented to public pressure about 
transparency and released the Detroit Demolition Tracker, an online map of DDP’s progress 
(Helms, 2016). The interactive map provided the address, date, contractor, and cost for each 
completed DDP demolition. Visitors could also check the status of demolitions in the DDP 
pipeline. “Blight is very personal,” says Farkas. “If there’s a burned-out house on your street, 
you want to know when it’s coming down. Leveraging technology allows us to communicate this 
with citizens at scale. (Government Technology, 2017)” Farkas described the tracker as an 
example of a “bottom-up approach” that could rectify years of resident uncertainty about 
demolitions. Along with upgraded “data inputs and outputs” came an opportunity for Detroit 
residents to access information about the progress of demolitions in their neighborhood. Farkas 
stated, “We were striving to give citizens an understanding of what's happening in their 
neighborhood. This was best done through map images rather than raw data. (Graves, 2017)” 
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The DDP used the tracking platform to signal its fidelity to the DCC, city residents, and 
an ongoing probe by federal investigators (Burns, 2016). Council members had lashed out at the 
DDP after the revelation the program had not obtained formal DCC approval for demolitions 
over $25,000. Gabe Leland, representing Council District 7, chafed at Duggan’s commitment to 
transparency, “This is going to take a serious look at the process (Guillen, 2016c).” Despite 
national press describing the tracker as tool for “holding contractors accountable,” the map was 
not the serious regulatory tool that either the DDP described or the DCC demanded (Metcalfe, 
2016; Messner, 2016). The tracker provided little more than confirmation a DDP demolition had 
happened at a site. The available information excluded the funding source, names of 
subcontractors and haulers, time to complete the demolition, presence of lead or asbestos, dust 
suppression techniques, time to fill the hole, and the quality and source material used to fill the 
Figure 2: Detroit Demolition Tracker, 6/2016 (Lee, 2016) 
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hole2. Instead of providing this information, the DDP had stripped away the supply chains, 
interests, sources, regulatory violations, and materials to present a flat illustration of the practice 
of demolition. Similar to authors that slot demolition between blight and redevelopment, DDP 
officials had treated it as the intersection of X and Y coordinates rather than a process itself. 
DDP officials claimed they were “the first demolition agency in the nation to provide this 
level of transparency to people (WXYZ, 2016).” The Detroit Demolition Tracker, however, 
served as another example of the limits of transparency to inform, clarify, or educate. The 
platform constrained the geography of the DDP to include only past and future Detroit addresses, 
narrowing both how demolishing occurs but also which local and regional actors command and 
benefit from the production of demolition. But the map also privileges a conception of urban 
space in which demolition is an on-demand service delivered like an Amazon parcel at a 
doorstep. “Type in your address, it will zoom into your neighborhoods and you’ll see dots,” 
Farkas explained, “Click on those dots and it’ll tell you when the demo was completed and how 
much it cost and who the contractor was (WXYZ, 2017).”This representation erases the 
 
2 I reference these omissions because journalists and the DCC would scrutinize each over the subsequent four years. 
Figure 3: The demolition of 
3206 Bassett, according to the 
Detroit Demolition Tracker 
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embeddedness of demolishing. DDP created the platform to maintain transparency, but instead of 
revealing the program’s complexity, the DDP reduced demolishing Detroit into a conveyor belt. 
By privileging the practice of demolition instead of the process of demolishing, the DDP 
made political choices about transparency that do not fall neatly into concepts of misconduct or 
deception. Andrew Barry (2013) writes, “instead of having the effect of reducing the finite 
quantity of matters that are not made public, the operations of transparency have the potential to 
highlight the existence of a vast range of matters that never will be made public, including 
matters that will not even be accessed the most skillful social researchers (60).” Transparency, 
then, is not merely what is publicized and scrutinized but also what remains off the agenda and 
off the map. By disregarding the production of demolition, policymakers and researchers sideline 
another tangle of City of Detroit with its suburbs that produces uneven development through 
anti-Black and anti-poor geographies of growth and decline (Sugrue, 1996). Within these 
geographies, contractors coordinate environments, supply chains, real estate, and materials to 
ensure demolishing converges with Detroit in ways that prioritize their extractive interests. 
Since introducing the Detroit Demolition Tracker in 2016, the DDP has faced near-
constant allegations of discrimination, fraud, deception, and incompetence. In many cases, these 
have illuminated negligence by local, regional, and national contractors (Stafford, 2019e; 
Stafford, 2019g; Ferretti, 2019b; Ferretti, 2019g). However, the map’s representation of the 
DDP, remains unaltered. It is, then, an irony of recent history that revelations of contractor 
misconduct now serve the purpose of clarifying the demolition map. The operations absent from 
the map - the unseen relationships of backfill, land, and value – serve as reminders of the who, 
where, and what shaping the city, neighborhoods, and fortunes (Barry, 2013). As I illustrate and 
explain in the course of this dissertation, it is by recovering those absent operations of backfilling 
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as both pathways and pipelines of change that scholars can hold a renewed understanding of the 
production of demolition and the logistical and environment achievement of demolishing Detroit.     
 Placing and Planning Demolition 
In the modern US city, demolition is one tool among a repertoire of measures in public-
private redevelopment projects that signal capital’s return to the central cities and the 
demographic transformation of low-income neighborhoods (Slater, 2006; Smith, 1996). Despite 
those shifts, demolition is a mechanism behind dislocation and dispossession – the forceful 
transfer of assets, value, and wealth into the hands of a powerful few (Harvey, 2007). For many 
observers, demolition makes class restructuring possible as it eliminates low-income housing 
options, alters legacy and long-standing built environments, and creates blank slates for new 
construction (Goetz, 2013; Crump, 2002). On the one hand, demolition is a calamitous but 
clumsy form of state-driven displacement that enables redevelopment regardless of costs to 
existing inhabitants (Highsmith, 2016; Thomas, 1997). On the other, more recently, demolition 
signals a slow colonization by capital of neighborhoods now situated at the frontier of investment 
and profit-maximization (Rosenman & Walker, 2015). In both cases, critical approaches frame 
demolition as the engineering muscle behind dispossessive agendas of policy and real estate. 
Concerted social and legal opposition to eminent domain and the cataclysmic style of 
mid-century mass clearance transformed public opinion on demolition (Jacobs, 1961). The 
Urban Renewal vintage of redevelopment that shaped the American metropolis into the 1980s 
serves less as a frame of reference for scale than a shorthand that admonishes redevelopment 
campaigns (Gratz, 2010a). Today, logistical precision married with professional expertise has 
succeeded the bombardment approach that leveled neighborhoods and displaced thousands 
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(Ammon, 2016). While displacement and expropriation remain significant concerns in American 
cities, demolition in most redevelopment is now a scalpel, not a sledgehammer (Mallach, 2011). 
The dichotomy between state and capital leaves little room for addressing neighborhood 
change in cities where neither spectacular nor scattered forms of demolition provide a 
comprehensive account. Contemporary demolition cannot be folded into domicide – killing the 
home (Porteus & Smith, 2001) – or the root shock of dislocation (Fullilove, 2016). Most 
demolition taking place in American cities today is executed project-by-project rather than 
neighborhood-by-neighborhood (Weber, Doussard, Bhatta, & McGrath, 2006). Cities with large 
volumes of abandoned or publicly owned vacant properties frustrate conceptual frameworks in 
which demolition equals violent upheaval (Hackworth, 2015)3. While demolition can be a 
spectacular process shaping cities, it still has the potential to be an ordinary transaction cost 
within more traditional forms of real estate transformation – corporate expansion, downtown 
development, and unlocking potential land values – and a way of preserving spatial 
differentiation in declining cities (Akers, Beal, & Rousseau, 2020). As a result, a critical shift 
from the practice of demolition to the process of demolishing makes it possible to deepen 
popular and scholarly debates on the how and where of uneven development (Harvey, 2006).  
I argue the empirical distinction between practice and process provides a more 
analytically productive approach to demolition than prior work within the literature on Shrinking 
Cities. Over the last fifteen years, researchers within this current of geography, planning, and 
design have focused on the determinants of urban decline and the institutional dimensions of 
policy interventions to halt depopulation and attenuate economic uncertainty (Hollander, 
 
3 I address this at-length in the subsequent literature review and in Chapter 5. In the latter, I elaborate the argument 
here that scholars seal off the study of demolition by reducing it to cost/benefit or program evaluations that grade its 
success or failure. 
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Pallagst, Schwarz, & Popper, 2009). The Shrinking Cities perspective provided an alternative to 
research agendas centering growth and the subsequent policy prescriptions that prioritized 
growth and routinized economic expansion as the solution to past contraction (Pallagst, 2010). In 
early consideration of global and European experiences, scholars took on the challenge of 
analyzing post-socialist East German cities (Bontje, 2004). Within those contexts, strong national 
governments had partnered with local “grant coalitions” to remake cities in the wake of 
deindustrialization (Bernt, 2009). But initial attention to cities like Leipzig or Liverpool did little 
to capture the structural conditions in American cities (Couch, Karecha, Nuissl, & Rink 2005). 
Segregation and market-fundamentalism required amendments to the literature that could center 
anti-Black racism and capital’s dominance as the main drivers of decline. Recent research on 
Detroit, MI, Youngstown, OH, and Flint, MI, has modeled a version of Shrinking Cities 
literature where systemic inequality matters (Berglund, 2020; Rhodes, 2019; Morckel, 2017). 
Despite the renewed appreciation of the multi-dimensional character of urban decline and 
the drivers of depopulation, many of the major concepts up for debate within the main current of 
Shrinking Cities research remain static. For Oswalt and Reiniets (2006), the ubiquity of modern 
shrinking cities provided a window into the messy relationship between global processes and 
local conditions. The sheer volume of shrinking cities meant the phenomenon deserved attention 
from planning and urban scholars (6). Two currents of literature have emerged to address these 
frictions. First, researchers frequently situate Shrinking Cities within patterns of knowledge 
economy consolidation and the continued domination of financial centers in Europe, the United 
States, and, increasingly, Asia (Hartt, 2018; Shetty & Reid, 2013; Martinez-Fernandez, Audirac, 
Fol, & Cunningham-Sabot, 2012). This global network of investment and industry manifests and 
excludes peripheral cities that cannot serve as command sites in transnational commerce 
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(Silverman, 2020). In this current of work, capital’s tendency to transgress nation-state borders is 
an urbanization process that creates and erodes “backyards of globalization (Grossmann, Bontje, 
Haase, & Mykhenko, 2013)”. The uneven geography of this urban process creates winners and 
losers struggling to process these shifts locally (Sassen, 1991). Modern modes of production 
relied on new markets and new fixes that abandoned cities comprising aging populations, 
antiquated industries, derelict infrastructure, and weak public institutions (Weichmann, 2008).  
A parallel current of work highlights the presence or absence of local practices to address 
depopulation or decline. While labor and capital appear in those analyses connecting global 
shifts to local shrinkage, the same cannot be said of analyses focused on local approaches and 
potential solutions. In much of the Shrinking Cities literature, conceptualizations of residential 
blight and vacancy omit the property practices or policy regimes responsible for abandonment 
(Newman, Park, Bowman, & Lee, 2018; Lee & Newman, 2017; Deng & Ma, 2015; Schilling & 
Logan, 2008). As a result, each strategy for correcting the mismatch between a surplus built 
environment and decreasing population - whether “right-sizing,” “smart shrinkage,” or 
demolition - becomes a discrete treatment that can either succeed or fail to manage a city’s 
vacant property and decline (Weaver & Knight, 2017; Lima & Eischeid, 2017; Nemeth & 
Hollander, 2016; Hummel, 2015; Rhodes & Russo, 2013). These studies have not so much 
scrutinized these local practices or unmasked relationships making those practices possible as 
much as they have black boxed them into tools that are optimized, observed, and measured. 
Recent critiques have attempted to refresh Shrinking Cities approaches by prioritizing 
relationality and political economy. Bernt (2016) lobbied for a research agenda that investigated 
the scalar relations of urban decline and made visible the power and politics behind shrinkage 
and depopulation. Audirac (2018) has argued insufficient scrutiny of demolition and right-sizing 
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has served to reproduce social and spatial stigma in declining cities that can go on to rationalize 
“the repertoire of technical, political and discursive practices inherent in austerity urbanism 
(18).” Aalbers and Bernt (2019) also criticized the state of the Shrinking Cities literature, 
writing, “This situation calls for an approach that goes beyond a linear line of argument in which 
decline is naturalized and policies merely operationalized as a functionalist response to observed 
shrinking population and employment numbers (167).” These authors challenge scholars to 
investigate decline without reducing it to an unfortunate consequence of local political action. 
While these provocations are welcome additions to the literature on urban decline, each 
has called for a refocusing of research on pathways in markets and institutions that was or is 
already under way (Seymour & Akers, 2019; Akers & Seymour, 2018; Akers, 2017b; 
Hackworth, 2015; Dewar, 2015; Akers, 2013a). Critical appeals for an invigorated Shrinking 
Cities literature have erased major contributions considering the “production of decline” while 
simultaneously flattening concepts of land, value, and property. Aalbers and Bernt (2019) plug 
those constructs into a political economy of decline without addressing how local and regional 
operations of speculation, investment, and destruction persist in reshaping the basic elements of 
the built environment4. In their effort to defamiliarize or scale “place” in future analyses of 
decline, these critics of the Shrinking Cities literature have marginalized embedded processes 
that produce space and extract value. In this literature, scales of global and local have 
predetermined content and politics. Decline is global and demolition is local. Government actors 
and institutions “deal with the situation” by developing and deploying demolition, rightsizing, 
and other built-environment strategies to manage challenges posed by the broader global 
 
4 In Aalbers & Bernt (2019) the word “land” appears once and only in reference to abandonment. “Value” appears 
once alongside surplus and the word “property” appears only in the references. The phrase “deal with” appears six 
times. 
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economy (170). Capitalism arrives outside and pressures local leadership to respond or perish. A 
shift to the “production of decline,” however, provides grounds for a Shrinking Cities literature 
beyond local and global, or the self-evidence of place. That shift shows processes of decline 
serve as crucibles for environments, resources, markets, and institutions. Local responses are 
never independent of the material, political, and geographical conditions of their creation. 
Approaches to demolition in declining cities should both identify and address the 
processes enabling “local” policies while examining the broader relationships of these responses 
to the operations of capital that exclude and marginalize by race and class. In this project, I 
examine the relationship between demolition and urban decline. I investigate and interpret how 
the Detroit Demolition Program (DDP) has contributed to the transformation of institutions, 
investment, environments, valuation, and land-use. I provide an alternative to approaches within 
the Shrinking Cities literature by distinguishing contemporary demolition processes from past 
Urban Renewal and ad hoc policies while also theorizing land and value in declining cities. 
I start from the premise demolishing is an achievement itself, not just a policy tool for 
eliminating blight or redeveloping neighborhoods. By linking demolishing to the active process 
of decline, I scrutinize how demolition is produced politically and materially. Moreover, this 
project challenges approaches to demolition reducing it to a local intervention with dichotomous 
outcomes of success or failure. As I argue, Duggan’s goal of tearing down to rebuild (Raven, 
2016) does not clarify the production of demolition and its relationship to the city’s residential 
built environment. My research addresses the logistical, environmental, and financial dimensions 
of the DDP to illuminate and interpret the regional operations of intervening in and governing 
Detroit’s decline. I analyze the DDP and its relationship to policy, value, regional geography, 
and land by investigating its demolition backfill program. In this dissertation, I ask:  
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1) What is the relationship of demolition to urban decline? 
2) What is the process of demolishing Detroit? 
3) How did the Detroit Demolition Program emerge and what were its goals?  
4) What stance did the Detroit Demolition Program have towards backfilling and what 
regulatory relationship towards its demolition contractors? 
5) How did contractors develop and maintain their material and financial approaches to 
backfilling as part of the Detroit Demolition Program? 
6) What were the local and regional sources of the backfill material and what 
consequences did these sources and property practices have for demolishing Detroit? 
7) How did the backfilling process depend upon and shape the potential value and uses 
of land in Detroit and its region? 
Despite occasional revisions to the estimate of demolitions, Mayor Mike Duggan and his 
allies in Michigan and Washington, DC have maintained the belief the city could be stabilized 
and rebuilt by eradicating over 40,000 empty houses. The DDP has removed over 20,000 
publicly owned structures since 1/2014 drawing on local and federal sources of funds. Each of 
these demolitions has required a second intervention to fill the excavated basement site and 
stabilize the parcel in anticipation of future use or development. Consultants working for the 
DDP claimed excavated basement foundations required 250 yd3 of material of fill to grade. In 
2016, the DCC expressed concern to the Legislative Policy Division (LPD) that improper 
backfilling jeopardized the potential for the DDP to trigger the redevelopment of cleared space. 
For council members, backfill would have dramatic consequences for the “future development of 
the City’s land” if demolition left vacant land “in no condition to be cost-effectively redeveloped 
(2016, 2).” The volume of clean material required to assuage DCC doubts and meet DDP goals 
rivals the amount relocated to construct the 31.35-mile Channel Tunnel connecting London to 
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Paris5. Viewed by many American policy observers as the largest residential demolition program 
in the country’s history, the decentralized megaproject of demolishing Detroit triggered a second 
megaproject of identifying, extracting, and circulating over 10 million yd3 of backfill material. 
The planning and outcomes of megaprojects are essential to the model of cities as growth 
machines (Logan & Molotch, 1987). Real estate interests, policymakers, and construction 
companies may have competing agendas but the priority of growth through land-use 
intensification enables collaboration. Strategic positions established through speculation allow 
these coalitions to profit from megaprojects as fallow land is transformed through proximity to 
major investments. While these growth coalitions steered public intervention to shore up private 
interests, demolition holds a unique place as an intervention transforming the social significance 
of land into financial windfalls. Demolishing obsolete buildings provides the vacant land for new 
developments to intensify land use and renew the income-generation process (Metzger, 2000). 
Although mass clearance programs of the Urban Renewal era may more easily fit the 
descriptor “urban mega-projects,” the DDP bears some characteristics of these transformative 
interventions. Bent Flyvbjerg writes, “Megaprojects are large-scale, complex ventures that 
typically cost US$1 billion or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple 
public and private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of people (2014, 1).” 
These projects look to transform elemental aspects of cities and restructure the social and 
economic fabric through the modernization of infrastructure and logistical environments. 
Whether attempting to land a megaevent (Olympics, Super Bowl, World Cup) or a corporate 
behemoth (Google, Facebook, GM), the scale of megaprojects alters the fundamental physical 
and social traits of a city. For Flyvbjerg, these are vanity projects for arrogant politicians that 
 
5 The UK-France partnership required six years to complete at a cost of approximately $16.3 billion in 2018 US 
dollars. 
23 
 
exceed budgets, miss deadlines, and fail to meet their goals. The DDP is a largescale 
transformation, but as a variation its premises and outcomes rely on financial and logistical 
relationships that trouble cut-and-dry analysis of project performance (Altshuler & Luberoff, 
2004). Where these scholars highlight the gap between the project plan and its implementation, 
other scholars have probed how megaprojects establish planning procedures, skirt democratic 
participation, and rescale capitalist urbanization (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, & Rodrigues, 2002).  
Baptista’s (2013) research on redevelopment in Portugal illustrates how the political 
consequences of megaprojects serve governance beyond what Flyvbjerg sees as monuments to 
the powerful. The Polis Programme in Portugal clarifies how largescale infrastructural projects 
rely on transforming political and legal orders to redefine the operations of power and authority. 
Baptista scrutinizes private developers and public officials that bypass, suspend, and circumvent 
standard planning tools and controls to prioritize and preserve their own political-economic and 
accumulation interests. Baptista views these massive interventions as vehicles for growth but 
also for marginalizing the democratic rule of urban change. Judging their success or failure as 
redevelopment projects to trigger growth can serve to camouflage the environmental or political 
transformations enabled by the project. For Swyngedouw, the dangers of these bureaucratic 
contortions are exemplified by authorities and agencies that invoke the language of disorder, 
crisis, and emergency to fortify their administration of the city and undermine resistance to 
redevelopment agendas (2009). Only decisive action by the powerful can respond to those 
threats. Or, as Baptista points out, “Practices of exception present the (imagined) possibility of 
making a clean slate out of complex institutional contexts by flexing the law’s muscle (49).”  
The layering of these physical and institutional blank slates and the promise of the city’s 
everyday transformation through demolishing illustrate the DDP’s twist on the modern 
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megaproject agenda in which environmental intervention – both built and natural – serves to 
reinforce regulatory and valuation arrangements. Detroit’s unprecedent crisis of blight makes 
demolishing necessary, but the hundreds of millions in public money, millions of cubic yards of 
backfill material, and a sprawling geography activated by contractors and their networks makes 
demolishing possible. The scale of demolishing Detroit may recall classic megaprojects that 
transformed cities and environments but the outcomes as of 2020 suggest the DDP is a 
permutation of the ad hoc demolitions consistent with American urban policy between 1970 and 
2010 (Hackworth 2016). Like those practices, the DDP has thus far increased the supply of 
vacant land consonant with vague objectives of redevelopment, quality of life, and preserving 
property values. The DDP has a scale reminiscent of megaprojects but unlike stadia, sunken 
highway tunnels, and forests of skyscrapers, the effort underway in Detroit creates emptiness.  
However, the sprawl of backfilling provides an opportunity to abandon those reliable 
dichotomies that have simplified the consequences of ad hoc demolishing or misinterpreted 
recent projects as reincarnated urban renewal. Emptiness in the wake of DDP intervention is not 
the absence of production. Although its own tracking and mapping do not publicly represent this 
production, DDP’s reliance on millions of cubic yards of material has helped rescale demolishing 
to include regional interests and priorities that protect suburban wealth and undermine the DDP. 
Bringing backfilling into demolishing provides a pathway for reconfiguring environments and 
markets but it also serves as a framework for considering how land in Detroit is transformed. 
 Organization of the Dissertation 
Although I have conducted background research on the DDP since the beginning of 2015, 
I conducted formal research and fieldwork on backfilling between 1/2017 and 1/2019. As I 
address in my methods section, I employed qualitative, quantitative, and cartographic methods to 
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navigate the institutional, environmental, financial, and logistical aspects of DDP and its 
backfilling processes. The dissertation comprises five chapters addressing demolishing and 
backfilling Detroit, MI. The latter half of this chapter examines the academic literature on 
demolition. In that section, I present a typology of demolition research and show the limits of 
each approach. The chapter closes with a focus on key research questions, qualitative and mixed 
methodologies, and my approach to obtaining and analyzing data sources. In this section, I also 
narrate the sequence of events that enabled me to access DDP officials and its databases. 
In Chapter 2, I present a recent history of demolishing Detroit and how a medley of 
public and private interests collaborated to identify, justify, and intervene in the city’s 2013 
“blight emergency.” By doing so, these interests converted the politics, economics, and potential 
outcomes of demolition into various forms of blight discipline for governing, developing, and 
inhabiting the city. These strategies made Detroit and its problems demolishable. I show how 
Duggan and his lieutenants institutionalized an approach to demolishing Detroit that depended 
on a regional economy of scale, consensus, and strategic partnerships with demolition 
contractors. Demolishing provided engineering and spatial solutions to generational struggles 
over resources, segregation, and representation. Drawing on the work of Tania Li, Timothy 
Mitchell, James Ferguson, and Bonnie Honig, I illustrate how constellations of market-
fundamentalism, redevelopment agendas, and political authority established a space of 
intervention for demolition to preserve political, economic, and social asymmetries. 
However, the constructed political space for demolishing is one fragment of the DDP’s 
embrace of destruction. The production of demolition established backfill assets, regulations, and 
markets that contractors positioned themselves to exploit through valuation, real estate, and 
rentiership. Demolishing needed to happen, and the holes needed to be filled. Demolition 
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contractors that took advantage of opportunities to capture, command, and circumvent local 
regulatory controls. Contractors treated the backfill program as an opportunity to value-grab on 
the DDP. My findings show the yawning gap between the development of regulation and its 
application in steering or sanctioning contractor behavior. In Chapter 3, I focus on the formation 
of these secondary backfill markets to illustrate the extent and scope of rentiership within the 
DDP. I show how contractors captured both regulation and valuation in demolishing Detroit to 
command the backfill supply as a source of income without precedent in the region’s history. 
 In Chapter 4, I move from the political economy of demolition backfill to the regional 
and uneven geographies of backfilling Detroit. If Chapter 3 focused on the valuation and 
regulatory dimensions of managing and moving millions of cubic yards of backfill, this chapter 
addresses the regional space produced and implicated in the DDP. I show how public policy and 
contractor processes embedded the backfill program in metropolitan property practices of 
speculation, expansion, and development. In this section, I introduce and then amend the DDP’s 
official categorization of backfill sources. I reject the existing typology that reduced backfill to a 
topographic feature that contractors identified and mobilized for their demolitions. This chapter 
concludes by arguing backfilling relies on processes and investments that contradict DDP goals.  
In Chapter 5, I connect the DDP to broader considerations of land, property, and real 
estate and their relationship to the extraction of value from the built environment. I illustrate how 
demolishing Detroit relied on and produced land uses inconsistent with the accumulation 
strategies of austerity and gentrification. By analyzing sales of DLBA-owned property after an 
HHF demolition, I illustrate the limits of demolishing as a response to blight or the first moment 
of redevelopment. It is not that the current market-based approach is insufficiently neoliberal to 
restore the city’s property market, but that a decline machine in Detroit squeezed value from 
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places the real estate market considered exhausted of profit. The policies and procedures of the 
Hardest Hit Funds authorized DDP contractors to capture surplus value through demolishing and 
backfilling. I concentrate on specific interactions of property, value, and backfill in Detroit with 
a focus on six sources where the operations of contractors and landowners maximized returns. 
In sum, I draw on my findings to show how demolishing was both a tool for transforming 
Detroit and its neighborhoods, but also a pipeline for achieving political, environmental, and 
financial objectives. Existing work on demolition simplifies building removal as part of an 
ongoing redevelopment or disinvestment processes. Policymakers and developers see the old as 
an impediment to the new. In other currents, demolishing is an event that obliterates the vacant 
home and erases the evidence of the harsh reality of systemic social and economic inequalities. 
In both interpretations, demolition is the muscle supporting accumulation and administration for 
city-builders and developers. However, reframing demolishing as an active geographic and 
logistical process challenges the received wisdom that flattens it as the end of one phase or the 
beginning of another. Urban planning and geography scholars can draw on these findings to 
scrutinize the regional processes that provide opportunities for institutional blank slates, 
regulatory and valuation capture, uneven development, and land-uses beyond growth paradigms. 
 The History and Theory of Demolition: Review of the Literature 
 This section contains three subparts. First, I review and schematize the literature relevant 
to this research project. Second, I will describe and justify the research methods I used to 
complete the project. My aim to identify the gaps and lacuna within the relevant research and 
then present and defend my approach for satisfying these holes in the interpretation and 
explanation of demolition and urban decline. Finally, I connect the different components of the 
introduction and literature review to argue for a refreshed critical analysis of demolishing. 
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 Below, I present and interpret the state of the literature on demolition and blight removal. 
I proceed by dividing the work into two sections each with subsections of more focused 
literature. First, I create a typology based on how authors explain the purpose and outcomes of 
demolition. I use “demolition” instead of “demolishing” here because these approaches have 
historically simplified it as a discrete policy practice. Each current of research explains how 
demolition became an on-demand intervention for realizing the objectives of both public and 
private interests. I distinguish six approaches to describing and critiquing demolition: 1) 
Demolition as belief in progress; 2) Demolition as a backroom deal; 3) Demolition as a burial; 4) 
Demolition as a bailout; 5) Demolition as a bulwark; and, 6) Demolition as a banishment. These 
interpretations are historically connected, and in both the literature and in professional policy 
settings one approach will coincide with other goals and justifications for residential demolition. 
 Demolition as belief-in-progress 
The demolition as belief in progress perspective historicizes how 20th century public 
institutions imagined remaking American cities through mass clearance (Ammon, 2016). For 
progressives, local, state, and federal governments demolition of substandard housing provided 
spatial and social conditions for egalitarian cities. Early on, slum clearance initiatives sought to 
enable better housing and living environments for urban inhabitants and implement a progressive 
conception of the collective good. However, the hopefulness of the renewed and modern city 
culminated in demolition driving the mass displacement of undesirable inhabitants. The populist 
pathologizing of urban poverty and the racialization of slum neighborhoods polluted the initial 
optimism associated with government intervention to wreck its way to an improved society.  
This literature interprets demolition as a policy tool for clearing slum housing to allow 
space for improved and egalitarian urban living conditions (Klemek, 2011). As a way of making 
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land open and developable, demolition allowed local, state, and federal institutions to respond to 
public health, public safety, and economic challenges. A belief in progress justified widespread 
destruction because policymakers and leaders linked the social and economic problems of cities 
in the early and mid-20th centuries with neighborhood disorder, uncleanliness, and overcrowding 
(Berman 1982). For activists and leaders, these neighborhoods were expressions of incivility and 
an urban primitivism made necessary by explosive growth (Sennett, 1970). Wiping away those 
shambolic urban imperfections would liberate slum-dwelling inhabitants and allow progressive 
leaders to imagine and realize better, safer, and more prosperous American cities (Jacobs, 1961).  
However, implementation of this approach to demolition could not weather and survive 
institutionalized discrimination. The actual outcome of this belief-in-progress legislated and 
engineered the systematic dismantling of black and poor neighborhoods that stood in the way of 
real estate interests and their projects (Anderson, 1965). Demolition became a synonym of 
dispossession as the bulldozer roared through expendable neighborhoods and unlocked 
development potential near downtowns (Fullilove, 2016). While contemporary public and private 
interests within and beyond the United States continue to rely on demolition to create 
developable land, this approach too easily reduces demolition to a unilateral urban authority 
seizing property and emptying homes on behalf of private redevelopment. Moreover, this 
conceptualization of demolition does not provide insight into the complementary relationships 
beyond the demolished structures that allow the production of demolition to extract value.  
 Demolition as backroom-deal 
The demolition as backroom-deal perspective argues demolition is an attempt to 
maximize profit in a process that encourages governments to collude with regional construction 
industry. The backroom-deal approach to demolition has gained salience in Detroit since 2015, 
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where journalists and reporters have undertaken investigations into fraud and kickbacks in the 
demolition program (LeDuff, 2016). The Office of the Special Inspector General for the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program uncovered a pattern of waste in the HHF program (Burke, 2018). 
Federal investigations into bid-rigging and unexplained costs have provided reason to believe 
public officials accommodated contractor command over the DDP (Guillen, 2016a; Burns, 
2016). Whether tearing down the wrong home (Stafford, 2019d), using contaminated backfill 
material (Ferretti, 2019h), or manipulating pricing (Ferretti, 2019b), reporters have focused 
attention on wasted resources and the lack of accountability. Recent federal indictments of 
contractors and former DDP staff seem to confirm the suspicions of reporters (Stafford, 2019e).  
This approach views most demolition as an expression of corrupt institutions funneling 
public money into the hands of private interests, a claim that is also consistent with the failed 
belief-in-progress that once defined demolition. Despite evidence to support those accusations, 
employing this backroom-deal interpretation of demolition makes two critical errors. First, it 
focuses on individual behaviors and actions that corrupt demolition programs. Consequently, 
interpretations of demolition marginalize the relationship of contractors, policymakers, and real 
estate markets to broader agendas around land use and valuation. Zeroing in on a series of 
individual violations erases the way institutions shape regulation to accommodate industry 
practices. Second, the backroom-deal frame for demolition suggests that governments would 
invest these demolition dollars in other types of improvement if not for the pressures of 
contractors needing lucrative projects and developers seeking empty land. Policymakers and 
officials view demolition less as a burdensome cleanup than a capital investment (Frank, 2019). 
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 Demolition as burial  
The demolition as burial perspective argues that demolition is an orchestrated, strategic 
effort to eliminate deteriorated or disinvested neighborhoods (Hackworth, 2016). By accelerating 
municipal shrinking or right-sizing initiatives, demolition seals off residentials areas for a variety 
of infrastructural or environmental interventions seeking to reduce municipal fiscal responsibility 
for maintaining inhabitable, low-density neighborhoods (Hackworth, 2015). This interpretation 
suggests policymakers view demolition as a tool to create space for low-maintenance green and 
blue infrastructure: bioswales, rain gardens, parks. Vacant land becomes a community asset in 
the restructuring of the built environment. The consequent low- to no-population places reduce 
the costs associated with provisioning and managing public or social services (Butcher, 2018). 
However, the burial interpretation omits how these demolitions or managed decline 
processes play out in neighborhoods. The public implementation of green and blue infrastructure 
is slow and expensive. City governments and institutions might perceive neighborhoods as test 
sites for sustainable infrastructures, but remaining inhabitants contest the deployment of those 
infrastructures. In Detroit, Mayor Dave Bing struggled to launch a planning process that would 
have tailored interventions to neighborhoods based on their long-term viability (Lessenberry, 
2011). Using demolition in this “smart shrinkage” approach envisions reducing the footprint of 
serviced areas in depopulated neighborhoods while concentrating investment in other parts of the 
city (Newman, Park, Bowman, & Lee, 2018). As some authors have shown, the problem with 
this interpretation is it imagines public institutions possessing the authority to make those 
decisions without interference by inhabitants (Rhodes & Russo, 2013). Moreover, it can risk 
reinforcing decline as an issue of resource allocation at the local level rather than a consequence 
of regional, state, and federal priorities on the level of funding and assistance cities deserve. 
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 Demolition as bailout  
The demolition as bailout perspective contends that the urban process under capitalism 
uses residential demolition to the problem of abandonment caused by exhausting profitability or 
the predatory practices of financial institutions (Rosenman & Walker 2015). Demolition cleans 
up the past mess and then opens new land markets to stabilize capital. Demolition in this view 
aims to erase the evidence of housing crises to kickstart new periods of accumulation for 
property owners, developers, and speculators (who used a similar financial arrangement to 
precipitate the preceding displacement and dispossession) (Weber, 2002). For those adopting this 
interpretation, demolitions produce empty space newly attractive to the seesaw of regional 
capital (Smith, 2008). Demolition is a public intervention that enables private investment. 
What some scholars have termed “demolition for development” looks to link these 
policies and programs to revitalization through private property and gentrification (Mah, 2012). 
Even with elevated interest in the market potential for depopulated or declining neighborhoods, 
demolished properties are often scattered and difficult to assemble in schemes attractive to 
developers and investors. Authors have connected demolition programs to a backdoor 
regionalism that supported the growth machine but demolition’s ability to prepare land for 
intensified uses remains inconsistent. Recent research concluded property values in Detroit 
would need to increase by a factor of five to justify the costs of the demolition program (Paredes 
& Skidmore, 2017). Moreover, development on contaminated land is a lengthy and expensive 
process (McCarthy, 2002). Barring unpopular use of eminent domain, empty lots typically sit 
adjacent to occupied buildings and reduce the likelihood of largescale redevelopment plans.  
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 Demolition as bulwark 
The demolition as bulwark perspective argues that demolition at certain boundaries can 
serve a defensive purpose between desirable and deteriorating neighborhoods (Mallach, 2011). 
Demolition stabilizes particular “tipping point neighborhoods” in order to attract and sustain 
investment by incumbents maintaining/improving their own homes and outside property actors 
seeking windfalls for low-risk investments and improvements. This perspective relies on trickle-
down or spillover effects to stabilize adjacent neighborhoods in the long-term; demolition is part 
of a triage program to tailor interventions along neighborhood types (Marcuse 1982). Residents 
in stable neighborhoods draw benefit from demolition as a vacancy management policy (Weaver 
& Knight, 2018). Preserving these neighborhoods signals confidence in the market and leads to 
increased investor interest to maintain desirability. Governments commission and rely on market 
value analyses to structure investment decisions along these cost-benefit lines (Safransky, 2020). 
Faced with a variety of housing submarkets, city governments seek to protect the public 
investments they make in strong and tipping-point neighborhoods (Cohen, 2001). Neighborhoods 
become assets in a portfolio. Stabilizing resident morale helps justify expenditures on parks, 
streets, and services. However, evidence that demolition by itself staunches decline or stabilizes 
property value is inconclusive, notably findings from a previous statistical analysis of the DDP 
(Dynamo Metrics, 2015). These practices rest comfortably in the broken windows approach to 
neighborhood policy (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). For those supportive of this bulwark 
approach, demolition in part prevents the visual disorder accompanying economic or population 
instability (Branas, Kondo, Murphy, South, Polsky, & MacDonald, 2016). Despite the 
intellectual heft that treats these nuisance abatement programs as upstream interventions, the 
bulwark explanation for demolition fails to identify the structural, social, and political-economic 
34 
 
determinants that produce neighborhoods. By naturalizing inequality in these submarkets, public 
policies and property practices preserving regional and local uneven development go untouched.  
 Demolition as banishment  
The demolition as banishment perspective suggests demolition policies punish low-
income neighborhoods and communities of color for inhabiting urban zones with higher potential 
uses (Herscher, 2020). For planning and development officials, banishing those incumbent 
residents would open the potential for more revenues, more retail traffic, and more economic 
activity (Beckett & Herbert, 2009). Demolition, then, works to correct both a problem population 
– removing poor and non-white inhabitants – and an inefficiency in land use – eliminating an 
impediment to higher values. In this view, demolition is a powerful tool for racist or neoliberal 
institutions (working with and alongside speculative property interests) to clear space for 
potentially lucrative developments through dislocation. This approach interprets demolition as a 
weapon against low income and public housing (Goetz, 2010; Goetz, 2002). Capital descends on 
black spaces to reclaim the built environment for accumulation (McElroy & Werth, 2019). Local, 
state, and federal governments adopt demolition-by-neglect or eminent domain to forcibly 
relocate groups that do not fit investment schemes (Roy, 2019). Demolition represents another 
“possessive investment in whiteness” recasting non-white space as vacant land (Lipsitz, 1995).  
Although research on this racist and classist restructuring has drawn connections between 
demolition and dispossession (Markley & Sharma, 2016), the former is not a primary driver of 
displacement in US cities. Environmental destruction, evictions, mortgage foreclosures, and tax 
foreclosures remain the dominant pathways of banishment (Akers & Seymour, 2019; Desmond, 
2016; Pulido, Kohl, & Cotton, 2016). Expelling populations through demolition is also not a 
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straightforward response to undervalued land. Blight removal schemes that reshape submarkets 
do not depopulate these neighborhoods in one dramatic or swift intervention (Kirkpatrick, 2015).  
Employing eminent domain to accelerate banishment is litigious and provokes passionate 
distrust towards a city’s institutions (Becher, 2014). Even with minor successes, the most 
targeted neighborhoods are peppered with holdout owner-occupants that reject redevelopment 
agendas and are willing to deepen and prolong negotiations (Barker, 2018). Inhabitants inside 
and outside a neighborhood mobilize against public plans that may not serve their immediate or 
long-term interests. Even in the aftermath of banishment, increases in those property values do 
not have linear relationship with past displacement (Martin & Beck, 2016). Researchers focused 
on transformations and revaluations of the built environment should shift analyses of land and 
property upstream to scrutinize dispossession rather construing demolition as displacement.  
Table 1 below summarizes these six approaches to demolition and the limitations each 
category has for explaining contemporary demolition or in responding the urban decline. 
Table 1: Explanations of demolition and their limitations 
Category Interpretation Limitation 
Belief in Progress Revitalization and modernization 
through mass clearance 
Lack of mass clearance in 
contemporary policy 
 
Backroom Deal Collusion between policy institutions 
and real estate interests 
Flaws in demolition programs are 
isolated or individual 
 
Burial Eradication of depopulated 
neighborhoods 
Low population neighborhoods are 
not emptied at one time 
 
Bailout Preparation for reinvestment and 
redevelopment 
Vacant land is not immediately 
developed 
 
Bulwark Defense of stable neighborhoods and 
blocks from adjacent blight 
Vacant and abandoned properties are 
produced upstream 
 
Banishment Dislocation of undesirable residents in 
an undervalued neighborhood 
Foreclosure and eviction are more 
likely to dislocate residents 
 
 
36 
 
 Demolition as demolishing  
 The six approaches I have reviewed – summarized in Table 1 – reflect tendencies by 
researchers and authors to treat demolition as the state’s signal to outsiders and residents that 
neighborhood change is coming. Public institutions absorb thousands of abandoned buildings to 
remediate blight and produce vacant land. Contractors expand their demolition services to take 
advantage of a revived emphasis on wrecking. Real estate investors respond by purchasing 
swathes of underused property in hopes surrounding public and private investments will 
maximize values and profits. Owner-occupants renew commitments to their homes and blocks. 
Low-income residents and communities of color prepare for another cycle of insecurity. In each 
of these existing scenarios, the politics of demolition is found either in the false promises of 
revitalization or the conflicts over the meanings of value in the aftermath of destruction. 
Demolition is the end of one process of extraction and the beginning of another phase of 
investment. Conflicts over the distribution of gains and manner of participation in the city’s 
future determines who and what belongs on a street, a neighborhood, and a region. Those lacking 
power over property or investment are vulnerable to these interactions of policy and profit that 
transform their environments. For the above literature, it is the failure of inclusion within these 
processes that represents the regressive qualities of demolition. Demolition, viewed in these 
ways, serves as a reactionary practice of expelling undesirable groups, transferring public wealth, 
and liberating land values from the iron cage of past dereliction. The practice of demolition is an 
on-demand intervention in the built environment that eliminates impairment to future investment 
and signals the end of a previous period of property relations. Demolition is delivered. 
 In place of this flattened consideration of the practices of demolition, I propose an 
analytic framework focused on the process of demolishing. Demolishing is an expression of 
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pathways of construction, extraction, and destruction embedded in local and regional property 
practices. Demolishing is productive of its own property relations while relying on a broader 
geography of accumulation strategies. It is an income-generating operation enabled by supply 
chains, resources, industrial systems, and new assets. Demolishing is experienced in the time-
space of removal, but it is not coterminous with that moment. Demolishing is achieved. 
Recasting demolition as demolishing recovers contradictions and conflicts that representations 
like the Detroit Demolition Tracker, NOLA BlightSTAT6, and STL Vacancy Collaborative 
Demolition Tracker7 render invisible. This approach also makes possible analyses that confront 
how demolishing can preserve spatial differentiation in ways not made apparent by the 
demolition of a single vacant property. The regional embeddedness of demolishing Detroit is not 
one dimension of the DDP, it serves as a precondition for the material production of demolition. 
 Research Methods and Approach 
 Politicizing Grounded Theory Research 
 This project employs the Grounded Theory (GT) approach to social research to 
investigate and interpret the DDP and the processes of demolishing and backfilling Detroit. 
Grounded Theory is an inductive mixed-methods research method that seeks to identify and 
comprehend emergent themes within social settings and situations. GT stresses the relationship 
of practice to theory through the iterative production of codes and interpretations. Initially 
considered an objectivist epistemology, scholars of GT have pushed the approach into 
constructivist terrain and centered the construction of theory instead of the discovery of 
meanings by detecting the truth within data. GT provides a framework for the iterative 
 
6 https://data.nola.gov/Housing-Land-Use-and-Blight/BlightStatus-Demolitions-Map/rp4k-we3p 
7 https://www.stlvacancy.com/demo.html 
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development of codes, concepts, and explanations of social action. Researchers judge 
explanations on fit, workability, relevance, and modifiability (Lomborg & Kirkevold, 2003).  
More recently, some practitioners of GT have adopted principles of the critical realist 
tradition (Kempster & Parry, 2011; Oliver, 2012). Critical realist epistemology aids in 
developing explanations of complex social relations by balancing the real, actual, and empirical 
(Bhaskar, 1978). The real refers to the unobservable mechanisms shaping society. The actual 
refers to the outcomes of those mechanisms. Finally, the empirical describes how those outcomes 
are perceived and experienced. The objective of critical realism is to move beyond the 
observable and outcomes to identify and interpret structural drivers. Importantly, the critical 
realist approach to social phenomena and action is less about the uniformity of events or 
prediction than it is the construction of theory for explaining open systems. Critical realism 
provides an epistemology of “retroduction” to identify the social determinants. Combining 
iterative GT with critical realism can form the basis for transformational grounded theory 
(Redman-MacLaren & Mills, 2017).  
Despite a surfeit of warnings that critical orientations can contaminate GT findings, 
recent commentary on the epistemology has accommodated feminist, phenomenology, and even 
Marxist points of theoretical departure. Charmaz has suggested that grounded theory can be 
matched with “21st century methodological assumptions and approaches (2006, 9).” Seaman 
argues, “Constructing grounded theory is now a process more of careful interpretation than of 
discovery (2008, 3).” In order to anchor this inductive and reflexive approach, I have adopted 
one such critical orientation within the broader GT epistemology. My theoretical sensitivity to 
the factors of production - land, labor, and capital – centers inequality and structural power in the 
Neo-Marxian practice of critical urban research (Brenner, 2009). In my view, GT enhances its 
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value as an epistemology and approach to policy and institutions when researchers incorporate 
attention to institutional forms, contradiction, and accumulation in conceptual frameworks aimed 
at interpreting uneven urban geographies (Brenner, Madden, & Wachsmuth, 2011). GT provides 
an opportunity to expand and contract the unit of analysis depending on the strength and fit of an 
interpretation. As a result, GT maintains a unique sensitivity to relationality. Moreover, critical 
engagement with the factors of production and the forces of urbanization defamiliarizes the 
instrumental forms of policymaking and planning intervention reproducing exploitation. 
 Building Towards Research on Demolishing and Backfilling Detroit 
A recurring challenge of scholarship is no research project is linear in execution. In 
1/2015, I met with a staff member at the Detroit Land Bank Authority (DLBA) to discuss the 
DDP. The staff member shared professional concern over the program and the demolition 
backfill program. He suggested more public attention should concentrate on the cost and quantity 
of filling over 40,000 holes created through basement excavation. During our conversation, he 
disclosed that the prior year’s Detroit Blight Removal Task Force (DBRTF) and subsequently 
the DDP had not adequately accounted for the volume of material required to meet the demand 
of the demolitions. Public money could flow into a city program, but existing supply chains 
could only do so much to serve those objectives. Demolitions are not on-demand and the 
material inputs have inelastic demand – the city pays for backfill regardless of the price reported 
by contractors. Backfill material represented a particularly formidable challenge for the DDP and 
its contractors. At that time, he expressed to me over lunch, “Detroit needed all of northern 
Michigan’s timber to be built and it will need all of northern Michigan’s dirt to be unbuilt.” 
To make sense of the geography and logistics of the backfill program, I have adopted a 
“supply chain” approach to this project that prioritizes commodity and resource relationships 
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between institutions and contractors. Demolishing takes place. This attention to lifecycle allows 
me to pry open the black box of demolition and address the political and economic exchange that 
makes these programs possible in addition to the material relationships that produce demolition 
in declining cities. This research approach also probes demolition as an ongoing process, not an 
output or discrete intervention in a neighborhood. Supply chain as a research method – tracing 
the provisional, income-generating linkages – means abandoning the flat, Cartesian geographies 
of demolition that routinize demolition as an on-demand service delivered to a site.  
Towards the fall of 2015, I obtained the DLBA Request for Proposals (RFP) that initiated 
the search for a local environmental consultant to administer the DDP backfill program. The RFP 
contained contact information for staff at AKT Peerless, a consulting firm based in suburban 
Detroit. In late 9/2014, DLBA had selected AKT to construct soil guidance standards and run the 
backfill program. In 10/2015, I participated in a conference call with Julie Barton, AKT’s DBA 
Backfill Program Manager, and Tony Kashat, a principal and founder of AKT, to discuss the 
DDP. They discussed the history of the program, the variety of challenges faced by sourcing the 
necessary volumes of material, and how AKT and the DDP collaborated to monitor quality. 
Kashat remarked, “We’ve got to control costs. We’ve got to control quality. We need a system in 
place to manage this process.” Barton disclosed that as part of their contract with DLBA they 
maintained contractor-supplied records on sources, destinations, and volumes of backfill material 
for the DDP. These records enabled review and approval of material quality. At the conclusion 
of the conference call, I requested AKT Peerless’ list of approved backfill source locations. 
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On 11/2/2015, Barton shared a list of 27 backfill sources by email. This list contained 
only street names and municipalities. In response, I requested additional details about each of 
these sources. The following day, Paula Lancaster, an AKT staff member working with Barton, 
emailed me and expanded on the locations of the approved backfill sources in an attached PDF. 
Lancaster wrote, “Please see the attached. It was easier to just hand write the addresses on a copy 
of the email and get them to you. If you have any trouble with my handwriting, please let me 
know!” To satisfy my request for information, the official backfill manager for the DDP had 
printed, notated by hand, and then scanned the email to send to me. The resulting document was 
messy and imprecise. The interaction prompted me to reflect on the thoroughness and capacity of 
the regulatory practices providing oversight on demolition contractor practices in the DDP. 
 In early 2016, I contacted a suburban Detroit-based demolition contractor and inquired 
about the company’s backfill practices in the DDP. An administrator with the firm described the 
basics of their approach and then mentioned an online soil management platform. Created and  
Figure 4: Example of handwritten 
notation from AKT Peerless 
(Personal correspondence, 2015) 
Figure 5: Login page for the 
DBA backfill platform 
(DBA.AKTPeerless.com, 2019) 
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administered by AKT Peerless, the platform enabled contractors to submit backfill sources, 
destinations (demolished addresses), and the volume of material. The backfill program team at 
AKT would then review aerial imagery and any soil testing and approve the material for use in a 
demolition. In a follow-up email, the administrator at the demolition firm provided her unique 
login credentials for the online platform allowing me to view the approval process. AKT Peerless 
denied my subsequent attempts to contact their backfill program managers about the platform. 
 In 1/2017, I proceeded to the next stage of this research project by contacting public 
officials working within the DDP. However, ongoing concerns over the two federal 
investigations – FBI and SIGTARP within the Department of Treasury – frustrated early 
attempts to schedule interviews with staff with the Mayor’s Office, and at both the Detroit Land 
Bank Authority (DLBA) and Detroit Building Authority (DBA). Representatives from most of 
the administrator agencies would not schedule interviews. The DLBA demolition director 
cancelled four scheduled interviews and then resigned. However, AKT’s backfill recording 
practices and the existence of the online platform suggested the DDP was maintaining a dataset 
with backfill sources and transactions. In mid-2017, I initiated FOIA requests to the DBA and 
DLBA for their backfill records. After three denials, a former lawyer for the DBA casually 
provided me with a .CSV file including 8,500 transactions between 2015 and 2018. Later 
attempts to access these same records culminated in FOIA layers disputing the existence of the 
files. In 2018, MSHDA satisfied a FOIA request for costs records and provided me with a 
complete expense report of HHF-funded demolitions. The dataset included costs for each 
component of a demolition conducted in the DDP. The column labeled “Dirt Cost” provided a 
figure for the material purchased by contractors. By connecting these records with the DDP’s 
backfill records, I was able to create a regional profile of cost, volume, and location. This 
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allowed me to interpret the distribution of sources and flow of money within the Detroit metro. 
To establish histories of each source site I drew on land records with the Wayne County and 
Oakland County, property sales and building permits through City of Detroit records, state LLC 
documents, and assessor records through the BS&A platform for Michigan municipalities.  
 Finally, contractors hesitated to communicate with me based on a well-known fear their 
practices were unlawful or in violation of the DDP’s guidance. Repeated attempts to contact 
demolition contractors resulted in infrequent responses. Contractors that did provide insight into 
their processes – Den-Man and MCM – had already been sanctioned or removed from the 
program. EPA officials that did respond to interview requests often referred me to personnel in 
DBA or DLBA. DBA officials refused to meet with me and claimed I already possessed all 
available information. Tammy Daniels of the DLBA did meet but then referred me to DBA staff 
that scheduled and then cancelled a meeting. By working with Christine Ferretti of The Detroit 
News I was able to connect my research to the agencies and institutions administering the DDP. 
Leadership with MSHDA, DLBA, and DBA all commented on findings. The fieldwork for this 
project was taxing and required that I routinely adopt different strategies for accessing data. My 
window into the operations of the program ultimately depended on site visits, interviews with 
backfill suppliers, and data from FOIA requests. In sum, I sleuthed, probed, pried, and struggled 
against the supply chain of demolishing Detroit to conduct research and interpret the DDP.  
 Conclusion: Demolishing in the Production of Decline  
In this introduction, I have illustrated the limits of simplifying demolition to a technical 
intervention. Inserting demolition as a transaction with later social and economic consequences 
excludes how the process of demolishing in part creates the context of its operations. New 
valuations, new regulation, and new economies make demolishing appear as an on-demand 
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service. I have examined the existing body of literature on demolition and identified gaps where 
reduction of demolition to the violent restoration of capital accumulation concealed the 
production of demolition, its pipelines, and its convergence of regional economics of extraction 
and development. In Figure 6, I illustrate the relationship between two key processes important 
to the production of decline. The Production of Blight relies on property practices, banking, and 
public policies to extract value from the built environment until its potential for profit is 
exhausted (Akers, 2017). I leave blank spaces for those interests, actors, institutions, and 
practices that produce demolition in Detroit as well as those ensembles that use the process of 
demolishing to extract value. The Production of Demolition depends on public resources, local 
land uses, regional property practices. and supply chains to capture remaining value through 
Figure 6: The Production of Demolition and the Production of Blight within the Production of Decline 
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demolishing. I argue these processes provide part of the foundation for the Production of Decline 
and represent urban changes irreducible to gentrification or austerity (Seymour, 2020).  
Demolishing is not just what contractors and leaders can do, but how they proceed to 
command and coordinate institutions, environments, resources, and supply chains. In this 
introduction and literature review, I argued for an understanding of the production of demolition 
and the process of demolishing. The academic and public debate over the DDP and peer 
programs should attend to regressive aspects of demolishing and its benefits, but also how 
institutions, industries, land, and resources make a city politically and physically demolishable. I 
focus on the strategies, supply chains, and interventions enabling the largest residential 
demolition program in US history. Each chapter probes a different dimension of demolishing 
Detroit: public and private agendas of blight; rentiership and regulation; regional resources and 
real estate expansion; and a land regime of decline suggesting new forms of value in Detroit. By 
focusing on the backfill component of the DDP, I trace how demolition contractors controlled 
and commanded the production of demolition to serve their financial and material priorities.  
In this dissertation, I argue scholarly efforts to politicize blight and decline by privileging 
the property practices and geographic relationships behind both should expand to include the 
production of demolition. The interests and priorities of demolition contractors are embedded 
within supply chains, environments, and industrial systems that use the DDP to capture the 
remaining value from the city’s property. The Detroit Demolition Tracker represents how the 
DDP has relied on the practice of demolition to simplify wrecking as an on-demand service. 
DDP’s approach implies the blighted building existed, the backfill was available, and now vacant 
land is developable. In a televised interview from 2016, Farkas, declaimed, “In today’s day in 
age, you know, you can go online and track your package with FedEx, you can track your pizza 
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with Domino’s, now you can track your demolition in Detroit (WXYZ, 2016).” Farkas’ 
description camouflages the production of decline and the strategies of accumulation, valuation, 
and rentiership that have made demolishing necessary but also served to make it lucrative. 
This dissertation argues for a renewed understanding of demolition and consequences for 
cities, institutions, land, and value. In what follows, I have constructed a narrative to color in 
interpretive blind spots in one of fundamental political and physical responses to urban decline: 
demolishing. I have done so not to endorse or condemn demolition as a policy, but to expand the 
ways in which scholars, residents, and practitioners can address processes and accomplishments. 
The flattened local practice of demolition absolves contractors and their networks of 
responsibility within Detroit’s property market. Doing so continues the pattern of simplifying 
demolition into the preface of accumulation rather than a part of its operations. Demolishing is 
not the beginning of renewal nor the end of decline. The DDP, its backfilling processes, and its 
geographies, do not start and finish at a single residential address. To account for the 
achievements and significance of demolishing Detroit, this critical analysis follows the trail of 
DDP contractors and extends politically and geographically to suggest new ways forward for the 
study of decline that account for the environmental and logistical processes of its production. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Clearance Consensus: 
A (Recent) History of Demolishing the Motor City 
 
“This is a hard call, because the act of demolishing a lot of properties in a neighborhood, 
although improving quality of life in the short run, may work against the neighborhood’s long-
term prospects.” 
- Mallach, A. (2018a). The two vacancy crises in America’s cities. Shelterforce. 
 
 In this chapter, I examine the emergence of the political and institutional conditions that 
enabled demolishing Detroit. The subprime crisis of the mid-2000s preyed upon and intensified 
decades of population and economic instability in Detroit. The 2010 Census counts confirmed a 
city in jeopardy. Detroit’s neighborhoods bore the brunt of the devastation as foreclosure and 
eviction upended any stability. The mayor at the time proposed largescale demolition to 
transform the city’s neighborhoods. State leaders decided Detroit would not emerge from its 
financial insolvency without dramatic action. Governor Rick Snyder appointed Kevyn Orr to 
restructure the city’s finances and lead it out of financial disaster (at great cost to the people of 
Detroit). For powerful figures in the private, philanthropic, and public sectors, the city’s 
residential blight became an indicator of mismanagement and an inhibitor of redevelopment. The 
financial emergency provided an opportunity to reshape how the city approached governing its 
decline and neighborhoods. Blight removal and demolition became ways of administering 
change in Detroit. As a new generation of local leadership assumed command of Detroit, they 
battled to sustain their new authority by controlling and demolishing the city’s blight.
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 Wrecking to Revitalize 
 In the summer of 2011, Mayor Dave Bing announced the formation of three 
neighborhood demonstration areas on the westside of Detroit, MI8 (Wattrick, 2011). His 
administration’s statement explained, “In these areas the city is applying a market-based 
approach to how it delivers some services and leverages some of its resources; and is working 
closely with the CDCs, nonprofits, block clubs, and churches to gain greater knowledge about 
the specifics services and resources they feel are necessary and how to align them based on the
 market conditions.” Strained by cash shortages, billions in debts, and pension obligations, Bing 
and his administration resolved to take targeted approach to maintaining neighborhoods. A 
medley of public-private partnerships would deliver blight elimination, infrastructure 
improvements, beautification, and economic development in focused areas (Cwiek ,2011). Each 
demonstration area comprised neighborhoods fitting into one of three categories: Steady; 
Transitional; and Distressed. Steady described a stable market in good condition with high home 
values and majority owner-occupancy. Transitional designations signaled a residential area with 
a high volume of real-estate owned (REO) properties, rentals, and some vacant properties. 
Distressed areas in the city lacked conventional housing market activity and showed high rates of 
vacancy and abandonment (Detroit Works Project, 2011). The Detroit Works Project (DWP) – a 
neighborhood-by-neighborhood revision of land use in the city – would draw on results in these 
demonstration areas to inform a repertoire of short- and long-term strategies (Kaffer, 2011). 
 
8 “The Demonstration Areas are: 1.) Hubbard Farms / Southwest: This area is generally bounded to the north by 
Vernor and Toledo, to the east and south by I-75, and to the west by Woodmere; 2.) Boston Edison / North End/ 
Virginia Park: This area is generally bounded to the north by Boston Boulevard and Holbrook, to the east by I-75, to 
the south by West Grand Boulevard, the rail road and I-94, and to the west by Linwood; and 3.) Palmer Woods / 
Sherwood Forest / University District / Green Acres / Bagley:  This area is bounded to the north by Eight Mile to the 
east by Woodward, to the south by McNichols and to the west by Wyoming.” 
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The neighborhood categorization system helped determine the scope and scale of 
interventions in each area in the aftermath of the city’s mortgage foreclosure crisis9. Steady areas 
were to receive a light touch of code enforcement and infrastructure upgrades, the city would 
execute demolition plans in Distressed areas, and Transitional areas would see an assortment of 
strategies. Bing’s plan to leverage private investment alongside public resources drew partly 
from an eight-month community forum program. However, a Market Value Analysis (MVA) 
conducted by The Reinvestment Fund (TRF)10 furnished most of his administration’s 
demonstration area strategy. The MVA “assists government officials (sic) identify and 
comprehend the various elements of local real estate markets (TRF, 2011, 3).” TRF had 
previously conducted MVAs in other declining American cities and adopted a similar typological 
approach to Detroit. In its 2011 report, TRF divided Detroit’s neighborhoods amongst six market 
clusters – Regional Choice; High Value; Steady; Transitional; Distressed; and Reclamation – and 
identified eight priorities ranging from nuisance abatement to demolition that governments could 
tailor to each cluster. Additionally, MVA distinguished between nine market types in Detroit – A 
to I – with nearly 20% of the city’s block groups displaying reclamation market traits. 
In Reclamation markets, TRF encouraged Detroit to create conditions for market rebirth 
to respond to population loss, low property values, and widespread vacancy (TRF, 2011, 28). 
Demolition was the highest priority in these areas. The MVA concluded its report by designating 
three “Detroit Initial Target Areas” for experimenting with a new service delivery approach. In 
the months after TRF’s report, the MVAs target areas (with light revision) became Mayor Bing’s 
demonstration areas and a keystone in his neighborhood policy. Over the next eight months, 
 
9 In a 2009 report issued by Mayor Kenneth Cockrell Jr, the city estimated banks foreclosed on 67,000 homes in 
2005-2007. 
10 The Reinvestment Fund’s slogan is “Capital at the point of impact.” 
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long-term planning and short-term actions in these demonstration areas aligned TRF’s findings. 
Moreover, the city’s strategy for distributing successive allocations of federal funds echoed the 
strategic deployment approach laid out by the MVA report. In 6/2012, a month removed from a 
consent agreement between Detroit and Michigan that prevented a state takeover, Bing 
announced a “Summer 2012 Demolition Plan” committing to wrecking 1,500 properties before 
September (Wilson, 2012). The plan drew from Michigan’s $97,209,465 portion of a $25 billion 
settlement between states and federal governments and five major mortgage lenders11 culpable 
for the home foreclosure crisis. In addition to funds for homeowner refinance and community 
development programs, the state set aside $25 million12 for blight removal, awarding Detroit $10 
million. Bing and his administration used the state funds to accelerate residential demolitions. 
Bing’s commitment to remake Detroit through blight removal and demonstration areas 
stalled at the close of 2012. Locally, the DWP ran out of momentum after a long stretch of public 
derision for what was perceived as Bing and his lieutenants picking which Detroit neighborhoods 
would flourish or perish. With sustained pressure, the tailored intervention approach of DWP 
collapsed into a general strategic framework of Detroit Future City. For conservative leadership 
in Lansing, blight became less of a priority for a city with ballooning pension obligations, falling 
revenues, and continued population losses even after the record flight recorded by the 2010 US 
census. In hindsight, state government appeared displeased with the rate at which Bing was 
restructuring and reprioritizing. Unsatisfied with Bing’s progress in reshaping the city’s finances, 
Governor Rick Snyder announced a second state audit of Detroit (Reuters, 2012). Despite the 
 
11 Bank of America, Well Fargo, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, and GMAC/Ally. 
12 Foreclosure Rescue Scam Victim Restitution: $7.5 million; Assistance for Veterans: $5 million; Michigan 
Attorney General Home Protection Unit: $6 million; Blight Elimination: $25 million; Foreclosure Counseling for 
Homeowners: $20 million; Housing and Community Development Programs: $3.7 million; Grants to Help 
Homeowners Refinance: $5 million; Assistance to Homebuyers: $15 million; Education Achievement Authority: 
$10 million. 
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prior consent agreement that expanded Bing’s mayoral authority to address the fiscal crisis, the 
state concluded radical methods were necessary to transform the city and restore its financial 
footing. The largest municipal bankruptcy in US history seemed an ineluctable fate. 
For Snyder and his state finance team, $14 billion in long-term liabilities trumped Bing’s 
efforts to stabilize Detroit neighborhoods with TRF recommendations and targeted service 
delivery. Bing’s catalog of responses appeared out of place given the state’s cataclysmic 
diagnosis of the city’s deficits. Though far from the surgical aims of the MVA, Michigan’s 
approach to restoring the city’s market potential illustrated a muscularized version of the TRF 
principle that government “must be used to leverage, or clear the path, for private investment 
(2011, 5).” In the successive months, state-appointed emergency leadership proceeded to slash 
Detroit into procrustean fiscal stability. But by the middle of 2013, the investor and institutional 
spheres resurrected and revised Bing’s agenda linking blight to neighborhood stabilization.  
I argue philanthropists, political leaders, and private investors in Detroit turned 
demolition into an organizing principle for governing the city. In the aftermath of the subprime 
and predatory lending crisis, demolition became “easy politics” but also a way of doing politics 
in Detroit (Ikonomova, 2019). For businesspersons, community leaders, and elected officials, 
demolition was a means for restoring the property market but also an end made possible by 
constructing consensus, restructuring institutions, and transforming blight removal into social 
policy. More than a technical intervention clearing space for restoration, stabilization, or 
revitalization, demolition serves political and economic interests that make certain futures 
possible while foreclosing on others. I make this argument by tracing the history of demolition in 
Detroit with a large portion devoted to understanding how an ensemble of policymakers across 
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scales and a core of elites from across regional sectors and industries prioritized blight removal 
in the aftermath of the largest municipal bankruptcy in US history (Davey & Walsh, 2013). 
Bing’s “2012 Summer Demolition Plan” never fully materialized. Snyder and the 
Republic legislature saw to it bond ratings eclipsed stabilization agendas. Consequently, Bing’s 
administration did not meet the goal of 10,000 demolitions by December 201313 (AlHajal, 2015). 
Notwithstanding that disappointment, Bing’s tenure as mayor – and his push to conceptualize a 
citywide plan to remove blight - illustrates an intensified institutionalization of the “local 
response” to demolishing away urban decline and abandonment. Although his predecessors - 
Mayors Dennis Archer and Kwame Kilpatrick - both prioritized home demolition in their 
neighborhood policy, neither succeeded in reorganizing government to take on the challenge.  
In his single term, Bing had carried on the mayoral tradition of placing demolition as a 
key plank of a new administration. In 10/1997, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD)14 awarded Mayor Dennis Archer a $60 million loan guarantee from to 
undertake what would have been the largest residential demolition program in US history (Byles, 
2007). Despite federal and local enthusiasm for the Neighborhood Restoration Project (NRP), 
observers considered it a publicity stunt meant to curry favor with voters in the run-up to the 
mayoral election. If tearing down 10,000 buildings was indeed part of a campaign slogan, it 
worked. Voters reelected Archer over challenger Ed Vaughn in 1997. Archer’s critics, however, 
were vindicated by a 1998 report completed by David M Griffith & Associates and funded by 
Detroit Renaissance – a business group comprising corporate elites - identifying deep flaws in 
his administration’s approach to demolition. The authors of the “diagnostic benchmarking” study 
 
13 Bing claims his administration demolished over 9,000 properties before the end of his term. The succeeding 
Duggan administration claimed Bing oversaw only 5,702. Duggan’s team based this on approved demolition permits 
from 2010-2013. 
14 New York Governor Andrew Cuomo was the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.  
53 
 
advised Archer and city council to establish a separate quasi-governmental entity to centralize a 
“seriously fragmented administrative structure.” Archer’s promise to incorporate some of the 
study’s findings was overshadowed by his and his staff’s public dismissal of the case for a new 
agency. His Chief of Staff commented, “We are going as fast as we can (McConnell, 1998a).”  
In an 11/11/1998 editorial, The Detroit News criticized the council and administration’s 
responses as a signal of entrenched bureaucracy, “Under this strategy, demolition isn’t likely to 
outpace the rate of property abandonment in Detroit for years – if at all (The Detroit News, 
1998).” With the $60 million still available to the city, Archer doubled down on his pledge to 
eradicate Detroit’s blight. HUD’s loan guarantee provided financial stability and by the end of 
2000 Archer had awarded $43 million in contracts to wreck 6,211 structures (McWhirter, 2000). 
But progress was short-lived. Despite the Mayor’s commitment, city council refused to authorize 
the full amount without a plan for strengthening the supply of affordable housing (McConnell, 
1998b). Other officials demanded Archer and the NRP change focus to commercial demolitions 
(McConnell, 1998c). By the time Archer left office in 2001, a shortage of reputable demolition 
contractors and a persistent lack of agency coordination had sunk the NRP (McWhirter, 2001).  
In 11/2001, Kwame Kilpatrick – a state representative and heir to a Detroit political 
dynasty - defeated Gil Hill for mayor promising to demolish 5,000 properties before 2003 
(Wilgoren, 2002). By summer 2003, Kilpatrick’s administration barely passed 2,000 
demolitions. A top advisor admitted, “Can I tell you exactly where the money's going to come 
from? No.” (McConnell, 2002).” One group of reporters observed, “[Kilpatrick] found there 
wasn't enough money in the budget to fuel such a ravenous demolition machine (Long, Reardon, 
& Kamin, 2003).” In 2005, Kilpatrick overcame a primary defeat to Freman Hendrix to win a 
close reelection in a run-off later that year. The second-term Kilpatrick launched a citywide 
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cleanup effort with state funds to prepare Detroit for Super Bowl XL (Maynard, 2006). Despite 
the highs of televised national events and potential for higher office, revelations of misconduct 
forced city council to request Governor Jennifer Granholm remove Kilpatrick in spring 2008 
(Saulny, 2008). Two years later, federal convictions for perjury and misconduct contributed to a 
28-year prison sentence (Baldas, 2018). Kilpatrick’s political career spoiled plans, but the 
budding foreclosure crisis in Detroit kept demolition on the agendas of policymakers and press. 
A Detroit Free Press editorial at the time opined, “The health of Detroit’s neighborhoods 
depends on the city’s ability to tear down and redevelop vacant properties (2009).” 
Whether Bing, Kilpatrick, or Archer, demolition in Detroit illustrates a mayor’s authority 
over the city’s future. But dreams of empty land ready for redevelopment provide only one 
dimension of demolition and its influence on neighborhoods, institutions, and investment. 
Materially, demolition brings together machinery, infrastructure, authorities, jurisdictions, 
databases, and supply chains. Politically, the process of rendering Detroit demolishable has 
enabled different ways of imagining and institutionalizing authority in the city. Importantly, the 
state of being demolishable is not synonymous with the presence of blight. Rather, 
demolishability describes the political, financial, and material processes that make demolishing 
possible. Abandonment by itself does not mean demolishing will happen. Demolishing requires 
the convergence of policies, industries, and operations. In this chapter, I interpret the recent 
history of demolition in Detroit, MI to apprehend the relationship amongst power, profit, and 
wrecking the city. How did a popular and political focus on blight and demolition shape private, 
public, and philanthropic approaches to Detroit’s decline? How did the Detroit Demolition 
Program arise as a policy solution to abandonment and how did a consensus emerge within 
institutional, investment, and neighborhood settings to justify clearance as a solution to local 
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challenges? In sum, I concentrate on two major questions: 1) What processes converged to 
render Detroit demolishable? 2) How did this then shape the Detroit Demolition Program? 
This chapter analyzes an inflection point in the politics and administration of demolition 
in Detroit, MI. I begin with the 2013 declaration of financial emergency, when Governor Rick 
Snyder determined the city and its institutions could not escape insolvency without substantial 
political and economic transformation. The chapter then traces how a medley of Detroit leaders, 
investors, institutions, and organizations drew on and reproduced the climate of crisis to engineer 
a consensus that blight and abandonment were the defining challenges in the city and its 
neighborhoods. I concentrate on four disciplinary constellations within the broader local, state, 
and national campaign to demolish Detroit’s abandoned residential buildings and halt 
neighborhood decline: Kevyn Orr and the Blight Emergency; Bill Pulte and the Detroit Blight 
Authority; Dan Gilbert and the Detroit Blight Removal Task Force; and, Mayor Mike Duggan’s 
institutionalization of the Detroit Demolition Program (DDP). Each illustrates an attempt to 
mobilize and employ blightocracy to shape the possibility and future of Detroit’s neighborhoods. 
In the conclusion, I show how blight removal became a crucial tool for governing Detroit’s 
decline and narrowing what qualified as revitalization in the city and for its inhabitants. 
 Governing In and Through Emergency: Relevant Literature 
 In this review of relevant literature, I focus on the relationship between emergency and 
politics. I present five interrelated currents of research and theory examining the relationship 
between authority and exceptionalism: emergency, techno-politics, anti-politics, post-politics, 
and rendering technical. Much of the work on “emergency” and its consequences for authority 
follows Agamben’s (2005) interpretation of Schmitt’s (2004) analysis of political liberalism and 
sovereignty. As an affirmation of sovereign power, the emergency suspends the ordinary order of 
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things – policies, ordinances, laws, and protocols – to address threats and dangers: terrorism, 
disease, warfare, uprising, immigration. For authorities and administrators, the chance of survival 
depends on their capacity to transform governing and routinize those changes. But Agamben and 
many of those building conceptual frameworks from his theoretical conclusions have relied on 
grand statements about the geopolitical order (Humphreys, 2006; Santiago & Charles, 2006; 
Minca, 2007) or characterized any spatial or social difference as “exception” (Lloyd, 2012; 
Springer, 2013; Gray & Porter, 2015). For these authors, declaring and controlling “emergency” 
– and its human or demographic sacrifices - is the core of the democratic order and enables 
institutions to suspend norms of administration to resolve sporadic civic calamity (Sarat, 2007).  
Despite the attention tuned to these metanarratives of political zeitgeist, Agamben’s lack 
of specificity on the mechanics of the emergency has concealed the existing powers that format 
everyday life and structural relations. The abstraction of “the state of exception” means its self-
evidence makes it explanatory. But critiquing the colossus of the state risks marginalizing the 
common crises that make governing possible. Urban planning’s foundational relationship to 
“blight” – decay, ruin, slums - illustrates the material and discursive potency of placing urban 
decline at the core of institutions (Walker, 1939). This police power – providing for the public 
health, safety, and welfare - enables powerful interests to “elevate blight into a disease that 
would destroy the city (Pritchett, 2003, 3).” Despite the plastic nature of the term, the presence of 
blight delivers a legal justification for planning intervention: expropriation, condemnation, 
demolition (Eagle, 2007). Foregrounding “blight” in relation to power allows for an 
interpretation of urban or spatial authority more sensitive to geographies of uneven development 
– it is not a uniform emergency. Rather than reducing “blight” to another odious social 
construction, it is crucial to interpret how institutions mobilize blight to name expendable places 
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and people (Berman, 1988; Caro, 1974). Within late capitalist urbanization, expendability 
mediates the temporal dimension of past and future value (Harvey, 1975). The emergency, then, 
is less a signal of all-encompassing context than the constituent matter of producing urban space. 
  In place of lofty pronouncements about sovereignty, theorists have addressed emergency 
as a framing device for problem-solving and a policy intervention with material and political-
economic expressions. In Emergency Politics, legal scholar Bonnie Honig counters deliberative 
traditions in continental philosophy to probe and interpret the place of crisis in the democratic 
order. She writes of the “anti-political measures of emergency” that sustain and reproduce 
constructed crises (2009, 3). By invoking survival and urgency, governments establish consensus 
around problems that culminates in the “remainders of political and legal settlement:” the 
struggles that would never tolerate consensus. What the crisis omits is just as vital as its 
objectives. Under these conditions, governments and institutions insist “something must be 
done” and that “the people” is the unified agent of change. She writes, “Governments often claim 
to have no choice when the facts do not support the claim or when the sense of choicelessness 
seems to be a product of a lack of imagination rather than a lack in the situation (5).” As a 
theorist of radical democracy, Honig dismisses the conclusions of communicative action that 
treat democracy as a mystical journey and push integrating the remnants and leftovers of 
consensus – power imbalances, difference, history, identity – into an enlightened future (19).  
The invocations of crisis, disaster, and emergency not only structure political community 
but also narrow the possible paths available for policymakers, officials, and inhabitants. 
Swyngedouw (2009) analyzes how the production of consensus around the threat of climate 
change cataclysm has enabled management, agreement, and technical acumen to marginalize 
debate about the future of the urban environment. His approach does not deny the threat but 
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illustrates how settling on the dimensions of climate change forecloses a truly democratic 
transformation of urban life. For him, post-politics operates at a global scale consonant with the 
rise of American-style neoliberalism that prioritized centrist approaches to governing and sets the 
“machine” of the environment and nature outside of social processes (Hornborg, 2001). 
Struggles for equality give way to populist procedural efforts to optimize this machine with 
existing social relations. Swyngedouw writes, “There is no contestation over the givens of the 
situation, over the partition of the sensible; there is only debate over the technologies of 
management, the arrangements of policing and the configuration of those who already have a 
stake, whose voice is already recognized as legitimate (610).” Under these conditions, there are 
no asymmetrical adversaries – only stakeholders and policies that preserve the current balance. 
Ferguson (1990) illustrated in The Anti-politics Machine, his magisterial analysis of 
international development programs in Lesotho, how crisis chews political struggle and spits out 
technical problems. Of particular concern here is how the production and condition of a crisis or 
disruption establishes certain horizons and narrows the possibilities of politics. Ferguson writes, 
“By uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promising technical 
solutions to the sufferings of powerless and oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of 
‘development’ is the principal means through which the question of poverty is de-politicized in 
the world today (256).” Development, here, might be usefully interpreted as any policy or 
intervention with the objective of upgrading or improving a community – a global proxy for 
revitalization. In these circumstances, a political or economic crisis has the effect of neutralizing 
the central conflicts over resources and production at the heart of social problems. These frame 
the parameters of the problem and disqualify other interpretations or reforms that would provide 
different priorities for policy and intervention. These dynamics also appear in more mundane, 
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everyday social relations of the city. Baptista (2013) shows how the necessity of redevelopment 
enabled Portuguese leaders to reconfigure the state and its law. Threats to the future of a 
community or a risk to economic stability camouflage the structural determinants of a problem. 
But a focus on the politics of governing or the response to problems – those efforts to 
shape interventions without the weight of difference or inequality compromising action – can 
conceal how the self-evidence of a problem first came into being. In The Rule of Experts, 
Mitchell (2002) illustrates how an ascendant actuarial expertise took command of 20th century 
Egypt and transformed the country into a national economy. The process of engineering this 
intelligible space of markets, ownership, and commodity inaugurated a political system in which 
capital and technical acumen interacted to produce a legible Egyptian modernity. In his analysis 
of 19th century European cities, Joyce (2003) also addressed the production of unified space as 
an essential element of creating the image of governable space. Modernity, then, functions as a 
kind of myth that disguises the interactions of labor, land, and capital that enable profit and 
reinforce hierarchies (Ferguson, 1999). The ideology around the acumen and aptitude of the 
technicians masks the incompleteness of their expertise which enables decline, disorder, or 
deterioration to become evidence of public disobedience and not politically determined. 
Where Ferguson illustrates how institutions repose the political by prioritizing technical 
solutions, Li goes further by identifying the source and consequences of converting political 
struggle into a series of discrete problems compatible with expertise and calculation. Her work 
on forest management balances the twinned political efforts to frame problems and the 
possibilities of intervention. Those in command of these programs are not evicting or sidelining 
critical perspectives or radical politics – instead, these programs create and rely upon narratives 
in which private property, profit, and optimization are the commonsense (Li ,2007a). In other 
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words, programs focused on social improvement do not push aside structural change, they 
simply do not have a vocabulary for even integrating into their agendas. Li concentrates on the 
gaps, oversights, and failures that serve as features of schemes to enhance and upgrade 
communities or resources. That competing conceptions of community, resources, and property 
are omitted is not an instance of exclusion but an axiom of powerful market-fundamentalism. 
She writes, “Questions that are rendered technical are simultaneously rendered nonpolitical. For 
the most part, experts tasked with improvement exclude the structure of political-economic 
relations from their diagnoses and prescriptions. They focus on the capacities of the poor rather 
than on the practices through which one social group impoverishes another (Li, 2007b, 7).” This 
process of rendering technical serves to extract “from the messiness of the social world, with all 
the processes that run through it, a set of relations that can be formulated as a diagram in which 
problem (a) plus intervention (b) will produce (c), a beneficial result (Li, 2007a, 265).” Instead 
of market or state, institutions name “the community” as both the site of action and the solution. 
 For this chapter (and, throughout this project), I mobilize Li’s (2007b) critical approach 
to improvement and management to probe the “will to remove” that emerged and ascended 
during Kevyn Orr’s tenure and then entered a subsequent phase of institutionalization within 
Duggan’s administration. In the “will to remove,” profit, expertise, and political durability 
overshadow the social and political-economic struggles relative to the resources, representation, 
and the policy priorities that produce and enable decline. This “will to remove” is one dimension 
of making Detroit demolishable because it relies on narrow conceptions of the challenges faced 
by the city and its neighborhoods. However, where the “will to improve” arrives from outside in 
Li’s work, the “will to remove” in Detroit claims to have emerged from the very places that its 
managers sought to demolish. For inhabitants, demolishing made the city livable again (Uberti, 
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2014). For institutions, demolishing made the city governable (Financial Post, 2013). For 
investors, demolishing made the city developable (McGraw, 2013). Demolishing became a 
means and an end for interests looking to command Detroit’s decline and stabilization. Table 2 
shows how these different approaches to power describe authority and its consequences. 
As I will show, these claims about the objectives of demolishing cannot be taken at face 
value. To do so would reproduce the most consequential weakness of the literature on post-
politics and the post-ideological turn (Beveridge & Koch, 2017). Politics and economics are 
never exclusive domains of practice (Miller & Rose, 2008). Whether in nature (Mathew,s 2011), 
markets (Muellerleile & Akers, 2015), or decline (Hackworth 2019), expertise and struggle serve 
as engines, not cameras (MacKenzie, 2008). They are neither post-political nor post-ideological 
but ways of organizing land and value that can provide alternative, progressive paths forward or 
harden existing social relations. As Mieville (2018) encourages us to recognize, “We live in 
utopia; it just isn’t ours.” The “will to remove,” then, is not an absence of politics but another 
scaling of intervention that reproduces property as an instrument of local welfare and private 
development as the precondition for the restoration of community harmony in the post-crisis city.  
Table 2: Governing modes and how each addresses the politics of interventions and improvement 
Governing Mode Description Consequences 
Emergency  Government must act despite costs. 
 
Leftovers of political or legal 
settlement 
Techno-politics The focus of technical expertise 
precedes the existence of expertise. 
 
Technical expertise and economics 
create and control space. 
Anti-politics The available solution makes the 
problem solvable. 
 
Technical solutions to political 
problems.  
Post-politics The solution to the problem is 
contained in the current social 
relations. 
 
All stakeholders already participate 
in taken for granted consensus 
about social optimization. 
 
Rendering technical The problem and its solution are 
self-evident and comprehensive. 
 
Social relations responsible for 
inequality remain untouched. 
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 Research Methods 
For this chapter, I draw from media coverage, public documents and records, publicly 
available demolition data from the DDP, interviews with officials within the DDP, archival 
materials, and official responses to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. This work 
combines to show how different blight disciplines made demolishing a goal and an expedient. I 
have analyzed and interpreted this material to construct a narrative detailing how state leaders 
cornered Detroit into a financial emergency and how that coincides with a medley of public, 
private, and philanthropic actors transforming the fiscal crisis into ways of demolishing, 
developing, and inhabiting Detroit. Duggan launched the DDP to great fanfare in early 2014 and 
coverage by local, regional, national, and international news provided a play-by-play of efforts to 
develop the largest residential demolition program in US history. Over the years, glowing reports 
have given way to a mix a critical, combative, and speculative engagements that took the shine 
off demolition. I have benefitted from this coverage despite reluctance by most DDP officials, 
public servants, and private individuals mixed up in blight removal to share their observations.  
 Governing Blight, Governing through Blight 
War. Cancer. Battle. Urban leaders have long associated decay, slums, and ruins with 
violence – a cause of destruction or deserving destruction. Like any campaign, the process of 
delivering that violence relies on mobilizing and coordinating technology, knowledge, and 
resources. Unleashing that might ultimately depends as much on supply, transportation, and 
administration as the shared enthusiasm for the conflict (Van Creveld, 2004). Steering the 
destruction of demolition and monitoring its outcomes is a logistical and a political exercise. 
Those outcomes are tied closely to broader logics of discipline consonant with capital in a 
globalized economy (Roberts, 2009). In Detroit, discipline took shape (at different times) as an 
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authority, an emergency, a machine, and, currently, a regime. The urgency of removal served to 
justify an ongoing metamorphosis of political authority and neighborhood intervention. As I 
illustrate in the below, investors, officials, entrepreneurs, and policymakers deployed “blight” to 
make philosophical arguments, create institutions, and execute political agendas. Despite 
changes in leadership and finances, these factions used the existential threat of blight to foster a 
consensus that clearance was a precondition to governability, livability, and developability.  
However, each expression of governing blight with building removal and rehabilitation 
presented opportunities for governing through blight. Demolition and blight removal were both 
prominent policy levers and forms of policymaking. As the founder and chairman of the Detroit 
Blight Authority (DetBA), Bill Pulte created a private, non-governmental organization with the 
appearance of public blight authority. DetBA’s claims to authority were incorporated rather than 
representative. But tearing down vacant buildings in Detroit was one dimension of a broader 
project to normalize and deploy market fundamentalist approaches to governing Detroit. Pulte 
tasked himself and his organization with taking down blight and dismantling Detroit’s regulatory 
“blightocracy.” Blight removal could restore Detroit’s greatness by halting “blight flight,” but for 
Pulte and his top lieutenants – Brian Farkas and James Henderson – it also offered a market 
solution to the ineffectiveness and complacency of city’s executive and legislative institutions.  
For Orr, the blight emergency suspended local law around the rules and regulation of 
demolition, particularly on licensed contractors and backfill composition. As I suggest, Detroit’s 
EM viewed blight removal as a precondition of fiscal stability – it was an achievement of a 
functional government as well as a tool. For Gilbert’s blight machine, demolition organized 
local, state, and federal officials and assembled private interests because blight removal was a 
precondition to private reinvestment. Demolition could create opportunities for land use 
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intensification and re-valuation of the built environment. Finally, Duggan’s blight regime sought 
to structure local government to focus on demolition, while also consolidating mayoral power in 
Detroit. His recent focus on placing a $200 million demolition bond on a future ballot illustrates 
that demolishing Detroit may be easy politics but it is also a component of building a regime. 
To use the term “power,” however, depends on a clarification of definitions and 
parameters. Lukes’ and Gaventa’s interpretations and conclusions demystify the constitution and 
operations of power. Lukes’ work remains influential for its focus on the three faces of power 
(2005). In the first dimension of power, parties possessing greater means make decisions by 
pushing aside those with less resources. In the second, stronger parties narrow the agenda and 
police participation in the decision-making process by weaker parties. In the third dimension of 
power, stronger parties routinize a dominant ideology to constrain what is imaginable through 
decision-making. As a result, weaker parties come to identify with the interests of stronger 
parties. The reliance on consensus is clear, but the consensus is less a product of deliberation 
than it is a project of domination by stronger parties to determine the wants of the weaker ones: 
we all seek the same thing. Gaventa (1980) built on these dimensions of power by applying 
Lukes to a dispute between unions and corporate mining operations in the Clear Fork Valley of 
Appalachia. His research illuminated how powerful interests infiltrate and dominate weaker 
parties in ways that reframe political problems to be amenable to non-decisions. These non-
decisions change little because determinative structures go untouched. 
What Lukes and Gaventa possess for clarifying power relations they unfortunately lack in 
understanding the role of space and environment constituting and reinforcing that power. We 
might think then about the “three faces of power” as mediating thresholds on the representation 
and materialization of scale. It is not just the how of power, but the where of power and the ways 
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legitimacy is tethered to the frictions of micro meeting the macro. Gaventa argues the powerless 
must confront the powerful along every dimension of power. Redistributing resources, forcing 
participation in decision-making, and building class consciousness serve as essential constituents 
of resistance and revolutionary praxis. However, he and Lukes do not consider how spatial 
relations regulate the mobilization and achievement of power. For that, another tripartite 
framework is needed, sensitive to scales and geographies of uneven development. 
Lefebvre’s trialectics of space elucidates how hegemonic classes control the means of 
production of space to reinforce their domination of other classes. In his masterwork, The 
Production of Space, Lefebvre (1991) introduces three interactive dimensions of space: spatial 
practice; representations of space; and representational space. Spatial practice is perceived space 
– the physical and material. Representations of space is conceived space - the abstract and 
symbolic. Spaces of representation is lived space – the everyday experience of inhabitance. The 
cumulative, iterative interactions of this triad produce social space. The concern, then, is not 
simply that institutional approaches to demolition and blight in Detroit were wrong, incomplete, 
or prejudicial – that they excluded. Rather, it is how the three faces of power used and conveyed 
dimensions of blight and demolishing while also adopting it as a substrate to intervene. 
By synthesizing Lefebvre and Lukes, the three faces of power take on spatial dimensions. 
Imbalances in force and resources are not bound to deliberative processes but who and what has 
the authority to transform the city’s environment, as well as who has the means to imagine where 
those interventions take place. Processes remained inaccessible to communities in Detroit but so 
too the scale and geographies of what demolishing Detroit entailed or achieved. It was not that 
demolishing did not include Detroit inhabitants. The perceived space of DDP demolition showed 
precise, calculated strikes at sites instead of a sprawling process of political, logistical, and 
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environmental interventions. The conceived space of demolition presented a homogeneous 
Detroit ravaged by cancerous blight that impeded investment and impaired resident morale, 
instead of a downstream response to waves of disinvestment, regional segregation, and value 
extraction. The lived space of demolition crystallized the public’s elation at watching an 
immediate neighborhood nuisance disappear. In each, the local response required a local scale. 
These spaces of demolition and blight expressed the efforts by Pulte, Orr, Gilbert, and Duggan to 
link the achievement and deployment of demolition with a restored and revitalized Detroit.  
 Blight Authority: Bill Pulte and Demolishing to Make Detroit Great Again 
On 2/11/2014, Bill Pulte, the CEO of PulteCapital and a scion of the PulteGroup 
homebuilding empire once headquartered in metro Detroit, gave a spirited interview to a reporter 
with Yahoo! News (Bailey, 2014). In the preceding months, local and national media had heaped 
praise on Pulte for the Detroit Blight Authority (DetBA), a not-for-profit organization focused on 
streamlining and delivering residential demolition. Pulte and other leaders at DetBA insisted they 
could improve demolition processes by incorporating a variety of standard business principles, 
including specialization and division of labor. The reporter portrayed Pulte as an accomplished 
local businessman with unique, objective insight into regional patterns of urban growth and 
decline, an extensive expertise drawn from his family’s commitment to scale, speed, efficiency, 
and precision within residential construction. Pulte suggested the DetBA could take the 
administration of blight removal out from under government control. In his thinking, such a 
transfer of public authority into his private portfolio was to be viewed as an act of technical 
mastery and civic boosterism. The public institutions needed to get out of his path if any progress 
would be made. He opined, “What’s interesting is that the same principles that made a company 
and an industry great can also make a city great again. It’s all about reverse engineering.”  
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Beyond wrecking the city, Pulte’s method for restoring a city’s greatness is unclear15. 
Over three years before Donald Trump entered the presidential fray armed with revanchist 
slogans, the equally conservative Pulte was using the abstract language of lost greatness to 
suggest Detroit could be demolished into restoration. In a variety of interviews and features, he 
viewed residential blight as an inhibitor of growth, progress, and prosperity. He invoked DetBA 
as an innovative bundle of demolition industry best practices that addresses blight as a physical 
and economic impediment to the city’s rebirth – there are no people, no housing, and no social 
relations in Pulte’s conceptualization of Detroit. His vision of change centered impairments to 
private investment and anonymous masses burdened by the albatross of blight. In the case of the 
Yahoo! News article, the reporter did not look to press Pulte to elaborate or articulate the criteria 
by which a future “great” Detroit would be judged. For Pulte and his class of investors and 
entrepreneurs, the mere presence of blight impairs a city’s greatness and undermines its future. 
Pulte, the millennial venture capitalist, had concluded declining cities with large volumes 
of abandoned structures needed to capitulate to private sector demolition experts that could take 
a logistical approach to eliminating dereliction. Pulte treated this problem-solving approach as a 
natural extension of proven, military strategy and one uniquely personified by James Henderson, 
a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel and in 2013-2014 the CEO of the DetBA (AlHajal, 2013b). 
For Henderson and Pulte, a coordinated storming by laborers and bulldozers represented the only 
method for challenging the public system of fees, permits, and regulations that neglected or 
coveted the local blight problem. The DetBa represented a disruptive, entrepreneurial solution to 
governing blight. To rely on the conventional approach to regulating and conducting demolitions 
would amount to capitulating to what Pulte described as “blightocracy.” The Yahoo! News 
 
15 A trait of conservative political figures. 
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reporter elaborated, “[Blightocracy is] a word he uses to describe the enormous amount of red 
tape he says makes it hard for groups like his to demolish empty structures (Bailey 2014).” 
DetBA leadership wanted to smash empty houses but also abolish laws regulating demolition. 
DetBA was a product of Pulte’s broader political agenda to integrate market principles into the 
rationale of government. It was a neighborhood intervention and an institutional reformatting. 
Pulte employed his neologism to describe the rigid, antiquated, and obsolete bureaucratic 
barriers to accelerating the pace of demolition efforts. That government control was insufficient 
for dismantling empty houses was a refrain of Pulte and his deputies at the DetBA. In a 2013 
article appearing in National Review, Pulte suggested of Detroit policymakers, “They think they 
can do things better, and they can’t. The blight in Detroit is a [symptom] of the government’s not 
being able to perform in any way, shape, or form (Kay Melchior, 2013).” This is an anti-
government sentiment Henderson echoes in his own appraisal of Detroit’s blight, “I don’t know 
if government and government administrations are designed to solve problems. I think they’re 
designed to administer regulations and keep the status quo… But an undertaking of this 
magnitude will always overwhelm a city.” They conceive of blight both as producer of Detroit’s 
decline and an artifact of dysfunctional government or excessive regulation. Consequently, 
eradicating blight addresses two intractable conditions: 1) establishing neighborhood investment 
opportunities; 2) replacing sclerotic public institutions that relied on blight for their purposes.  
Dismantling the public management of collective problems sits at the heart of Pulte’s 
anti-blight campaign. It is a perspective he enthusiastically advocated at the 2013 Mackinac 
Policy Conference, an annual meeting of conservative and centrist thinkers and leaders. Pulte 
explained, “The main problem is the blight (AlHajal, 2013a).” But the popular sentiment 
required a bit more dramatic language and DetBA’s chairman provided a preview to language 
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that would come to dominant public discussions, “We're trying to raise the alarm bell and say 
'Guys, this is a cancer. We've got to fight the root cause instead of the symptoms.’” For Pulte, 
DetBA, and Mackinac, blight was a precondition of government’s authority.  It served to reason 
that eliminating residential blight would simultaneously eliminates government’s main purpose 
for being. The destruction agenda of Pulte was consistent with the deregulation platform and 
market-fundamentalism of Mackinac. Whether the demolition was driven by market solutions or 
public institutions, authority over Detroit’s future became synonymous with eliminating blight 
and upending the bureaucratic complacency that seemed to depend on it for its existence. 
The name Detroit Blight Authority evokes two relationships between discipline and 
demolishing. In the first, an institution or organization can wield power over blight to make 
money off the city’s destruction. Blight removal was an end. Pulte was unambiguous in 
approaching destruction as an emerging market in Detroit and the region. Pulte and his 
lieutenants imagined residential demolition as a natural extension of the market principles 
optimizing suburban subdivision construction. In a municipal government lacking the political 
will or resources to shut off the valve of tax foreclosures, every precarious residential property 
served as a potential pop-up shop for the region’s growth industry of demolition16. Like 
industries creating or maintaining the built environment, the destruction economy needed its 
logistical meshes to monopolize and control access to what proved to be a lucrative product: 
demolitions. Pulte saw a need for a disruptive merchant of destruction that could camouflage the 
bulldozer with the colorful language of efficiency and Detroit’s imminent ascendance.  
However, Pulte and his contemporaries also understood demolishing along a different 
dimension. Blight removal was a means. Demolishing and blight removal were political 
 
16 In Chapter 3, I address the relationship between rentiership and regulatory capture that placed command of the 
Detroit Demolition Program in the hands of contractors. 
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interventions and controlling this process was a testament to a person’s authority over the future 
of the city, its people, and its institutions. Blightocracy, then, takes on a new dimension that 
exceeds the presence of stifling bureaucracy. What Pulte was describing was not just barriers to 
demolishing Detroit but opportunities for governing and organizing Detroit using the urgency of 
blight removal. DetBa enabled Pulte and others in his circle to begin connecting demolishing to a 
retrenchment and privatization campaign eyeing the reconfiguration of local administrative 
power and public service delivery. Pulte’s enthusiastic claims about the city’s blight and its 
relationship to governmental transformation would ultimately prove a significant part of his 
demise. In early 2014, Mayor Duggan ended the city’s relationship with Pulte, save for a key 
staff member17. Pulte’s market-fundamentalist blight authority ran up against the better funded, 
better staffed, and more muscular blight regime of the Detroit Demolition Program (Buss, 2014). 
 Blight Emergency: Kevyn Orr and Threats to the Comeback City 
On 2/19/2013, the Detroit Financial Review Team – a state-level board comprised of the 
Michigan State Treasurer and finance industry executives - released a second report on the fiscal 
health of the city. Despite the “financial stability agreement” between Michigan and Detroit 
brought on by the team’s first review in early 2012, the second review intensified the state’s 
argument that Detroit was on the precipice of financial disaster (Williams, 2013). In a 23-page 
report, the review team cited a shortage of cash, general fund deficits, long-term liabilities, and 
ineffective bureaucracy to conclude, “a local government financial emergency exists within the 
City of Detroit because no satisfactory plan exists to resolve a serious financial problem.”  
 
17 Duggan tapped Brian Farkas, a former Assistant Attorney General for Michigan and DetBA’s Executive Director, 
as Special Projects Manager for the Detroit Building Authority and the DDP. I address this in a later section. 
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A week later, standing before a buzzing audience of lawmakers, officials, and journalists, 
Michigan Governor Rick Snyder was equally candid in his assessment of Detroit’s financial 
status, “I believe it's appropriate to declare the city of Detroit in financial emergency (Rushe & 
Moore, 2013).” Within a few days, Snyder nominated Kevyn Orr – a partner in the law firm 
Jones Day, an alum of the University of Michigan Law School, and a Michigan native – to be the 
city’s Emergency Financial Manager (EFM)18. The state’s EFM law permits state takeovers – 
superseding elected leaders – in municipalities showing signs of severe financial distress. The 
law enables the Michigan governor to appoint an EFM to any local governmental unit within the 
state. 19 Despite a 2012 statewide referendum20 that vetoed Public Act 4, Snyder moved quickly 
to replace the EFM law with Public Act 436, the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act21.  
Snyder persisted despite local and national accusations that his decision had 
disenfranchised Detroit voters (Fletcher, 2013). Community leaders across Detroit united in 
protest of Snyder’s move (Sands, 2013). Charles Williams II, a local pastor and community 
organizer, suggested a “Slowdown in Motown” involving highway blockades to disrupt the 
city’s traffic (Brush, 2013). Despite widespread outrage that the Michigan governor had stripped 
the country’s largest black-majority city of its political self-determination, Snyder appeared 
publicly on 3/14 and introduced Orr from a lectern festooned with a “Detroit Can’t Wait” poster. 
 
18 Snyder signed Public Act 4 – Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act - into law on 
March 16, 2011. PA 4 expanded the state’s power to intervene in municipal finance as outlined by Public Act 72, the 
Local Government Fiscal Accountability Act. 
19 At the time Snyder declared Detroit’s emergency, Benton Harbor, Flint, Ecorse, Pontiac, and Detroit Public 
Schools were also under emergency financial management. 
20 Michigan Emergency Manager Referendum, Proposal 1; No: 2,370,601 (53%); Yes: 2,130,354 (47%). 
21 PA 436 went into effect March 28, 2013. 
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Flanked by the governor and Mayor Dave Bing, Orr outlined the city’s significant social and 
economic challenges, which he described as “the Olympics of restructuring (Davey 2013).” The 
state’s new law on municipal emergency allowed Orr to broaden his power beyond fiscal matters 
and axe “financial" from his title. Two weeks later, Orr officially arrived as Emergency Manager 
of Detroit, a move that stripped the city’s executive and legislative bodies of authority and 
salary. The former was only temporary. In his first act as EM on 3/26/2013, Orr formally 
restored the salary and benefits of Mayor Bing and the city council (Orr, 2013a)22. Orr observed, 
“I wanted the first order issued to reaffirm how important the mayor and City Council members 
are to Detroit's turnaround (Pinho, 2013b).” By mid-April, Orr signed an order requiring Bing 
and council submit all “orders, ordinances, resolutions, appointments, approvals, terminations, 
appropriations, contracts, permits or other related actions” to him for approval (Orr, 2013b). 
Notwithstanding the show of goodwill, Orr acted unilaterally to reshape the city’s 
institutions. In his 5/12/2013 plan for addressing Detroit’s finances, Orr pointed to the bramble 
snaring the city in financial trouble. Without casting any significant blame, these included 
population loss, high unemployment, limits on state revenue sharing, and reductions in tax 
 
22 PA 436 eliminates salary for governing bodies under emergency. Orr’s decision to restore salary and benefits for 
the mayor and city council was met with derision by suburban and out-state observers (Murray 2013). Insiders 
suggested Orr viewed the restoration as a sign of goodwill and an acknowledgement of local voting rights. 
Figure 7: Mayor Bing (L) and Governor 
Snyder (R) at the 3/14/2013 introduction of 
Detroit Emergency Financial Manager 
nominee Kevyn Orr (C) (Davey, 2013) 
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collections. While Orr was unambiguous in holding those factors responsible, he does not 
hesitate to invoke blight and vacancy as determinants of Detroit’s decline. He wrote then:  
[Blight] presents enormous socio‐economic challenges and affects public health, crime 
rates, economic development and property values. All City services are less efficient, and 
under-resourced, because these services must be provided over a large geographic area 
with low population density. Indeed, blight adds to the strain on the City’s public safety 
resources. Despite significant population decreases and the widespread abandonment of 
properties throughout the metro area, the City still provides services to a geographic area 
larger than Boston, Manhattan and San Francisco combined. Falling levels of economic 
activity also feed into a smaller ratepayer base to support City services, including water, 
sewer and electricity. (Orr, 2013c, 9) 
For the newly minted Emergency Manager, the city’s blight and bonds traveled on two parallel 
but occasionally interfering tracks along the route to financial stability. Rather than risk 
continued interference between those priorities, Orr adopted Pulte’s view that blight was a cause 
and consequence of the budget crisis. Blight and bonds became of a piece when Orr proposed a 
4-hour blight tour with 25 creditors (Burns, 2013). However, Orr cancelled the tour after several 
creditors backed out (Cwiek, 2013). A law expert familiar with Detroit’s finances publicly 
ridiculed the plan, “If I’m a creditor, I’m looking numbers, not a tour of the city (KTAR, 2013).” 
 In 7/2013, Orr received Snyder’s approval to file the largest municipal bankruptcy in US 
history with the Eastern District of Michigan (Kaffer, Henderson, & Helms, 2013). During a 
press conference, the Governor argued, “Now’s our opportunity to stop 60 years of decline.” Orr, 
keeping a focus on abandonment, asked, “Does anybody thinks it’s OK to have 40-year-old tress 
growing through the roofs of dilapidated houses? (Isidore, 2013)” The courts assigned Judge 
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Steven Rhodes to preside over the trial to determine Detroit’s eligibility for bankruptcy. He 
moved quickly to halt lawsuits challenging the filing and begin mediation with creditors.  
Despite creditor disinterest in blight, Orr possessed the executive authority to transform 
dereliction from a nuisance into an institutional exigency. On 8/29/2013, Kevyn Orr released 
Emergency Order No. 15. The Order Suspending Certain City Wrecking Requirements to 
Address Blight unilaterally eased restrictions on licensing for demolition contractors to work in 
Detroit. While the order includes a fog of ordinances and certifications, Orr’s description of 
Detroit’s blight situation is crystal clear. Asserting the existence of a “blight emergency,” Orr 
compares Detroit’s residential abandonment as a cataclysm with the magnitude of an earthquake, 
tornado, or riot. Referencing 80,000 vacant homes, he explains, “This blight is an ongoing health 
and safety risk to every resident, fosters and facilitates crime and unemployment, encourages 
flight from the City, depresses property values and discourages investment (2013d, 3).” 
Drawing from the state’s existing emergency management laws, Orr reframed what many 
considered a formidable impairment to investment into a potentially lethal condition for the city. 
The only solution, then, was to lift regulatory burdens that presented obstacles to accelerating 
demolitions and making it a viable business opportunity for regional contractors (Vara, 2013)23. 
As Orr explained, these demolition regulations “needlessly prolong the Blight Emergency (4).” 
By waiving the requirement state-licensed demolition contractors also maintain an active city 
wrecking license, Orr predicted firms outside Detroit would swoop in for city contracts – funded 
by US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and eventually the Treasury’s 
Hardest Hits Fund (HHF) - and increase the pace of wrecking houses in neighborhoods. Less 
 
23 “Production demolition” 
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than a year later, on 8/21/2014, Orr reaffirmed his Blight Emergency to lift rules on the material 
allowed for demolition backfill – a minor modification with considerable consequences24. 
Orr spent the remainder of 2013 pushing his case for bankruptcy and reorganizing the 
city’s political-economic landscape through a series of agreements and declarations. Bing and 
the City Council never fully adjusted (Yaccino, 2013). In 11/2013, Detroit voters elected Mike 
Duggan, then-CEO of Detroit Medical Center and a former deputy County Executive for Wayne 
County, to succeed Bing as mayor – the first white mayor of Detroit in 40 years. A few weeks 
later, Judge Rhodes ruled in favor of Orr’s bankruptcy filing, explaining Detroit “has an 
opportunity for a fresh start (Bomey, Snavely, & Priddle, 2013).” In the aftermath of an election 
and Rhodes’ decision, Orr and Duggan settled on a power-sharing scheme to divide and portion 
executive authority between the Mayor’s Office and Emergency Manager. The arrangement was 
based on six weeks of negotiations (Lichterman, 2013). In Order No. 20 – Order Restoring the 
Salary and Benefits of the Mayor and Adopting the Agreement Between the Emergency Manager 
and Mayor Duggan Concerning Delegations of Authority and Transition Protocols – Orr wrote, 
“The EM has determined that the Mayor will play a vital role in the collaborative process of 
ensuring continuity of essential services and restoring financial stability (Orr, 2013, 2).”  
 
24 The backfill issue/problem/program is addressed in the next chapter. 
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In Exhibit A of the order, Orr describes the city’s new organizational structure (Figure 8). 
He will maintain control over major finance functions but cede daily financial management to 
the mayor. Orr only identifies one other specific responsibility for Duggan. He explains, 
“Primary reporting relationships relating the work of the Blight Task Force will be to the Mayor 
(Orr, 2013, 5).” Although blight removal does not appear within the organizational chart, the title 
Group Executive for Neighborhoods is closely aligned with the city’s demolition aspirations. At 
the time of Orr’s order, Duggan had already tapped Charlie Beckham25 as his Group Executive 
for Neighborhoods (Pinho, 2013a). In the month after negotiating power-sharing with Orr, 
Duggan delivered his first state of the city address and prioritized the newly-established 
Department of Neighborhoods (DON). Echoing a statement from late 201326, Duggan explained 
the DON would strategize and deliver neighborhood-based blight removal efforts. The city’s 
official description of the DON matches Duggan’s initial ambitions, “Their top responsibility is 
fighting blight and rebuilding and strengthening the fabric of the neighborhoods (Department of 
Neighborhoods, 2019).” The DON employs a team of District Managers27 and Deputy District 
 
25 Charlie Beckham has served in every Detroit mayoral administration since Coleman Young. 
26 "Through our district offices, we plan to immediately begin addressing the blight issue, as well as code 
enforcement. We expect residents to see visible change very quickly." 
27 At Blight Boot Camp 2015 on the campus of the University of Detroit Mercy, a District Manager described 
herself as a Blight Manager during a workshop on reporting neighborhood blight violations to the DON. 
Figure 8: Orr's power-sharing agreement with Mayor Duggan (Orr, 2013, 7) 
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Managers that work in each of Detroit’s seven council districts. The six weeks of negotiations 
between the two men had culminated in Duggan establishing and commanding a new department 
to address neighborhood blight. As I illustrate later, it would be only the beginning of Duggan’s 
move to assume complete authority over Detroit’s emergent demolition program. The full shape 
of his control over blight would come into view as Orr began winding down his appointment. 
With a power-sharing agreement with Duggan in place Orr submitted his first plan for 
Detroit’s bankruptcy on 2/14/2014. The Plan of Adjustment cut retirement packages for first 
responders by 10% with remaining pensioners receiving a 34% decrease (Helms, Bomey, & 
Snavely, 2014). The city proposed paying 20% of its debts to unsecured, non-retiree creditors 
with the potential for additional recovery from “any increased revenues realized by a revitalized 
City (Orr, 2014, 2).” Health insurance for pensioners would see a 90% reduction. By escaping its 
$18 billion in liabilities, the city government would look to invest $1.5 billion in services and 
improvements, including $520 million in blight removal over the succeeding six years28. 
Detroiters called it a “gut-punch” and Snyder called it a “comeback.” On a Tuesday in 9/2014, 
attorneys presented opening statements in Detroit’s bankruptcy trial. Court observers expected 
80 witnesses and anticipated Rhodes would wait to decide the city’s fate until winter. City 
Council did not hesitate to render its decision. With his 18-month appointment nearly complete, 
the council voted unanimously to remove Orr at the culmination of the trial (Resnikoff, 2014). 
On 11/7/2014, Judge Rhodes approved the Plan of Adjustment. He wrote, “The city is 
insolvent and desperately needs to fix its future (Bomey, Helms, & Guillen, 2014).” Five weeks 
later, the day after Detroit officially exited bankruptcy, Orr stepped down from the Emergency 
Manager position. The week prior, Snyder had declared the end of Detroit’s financial emergency 
 
28 An arrangement that depended on an annual budget surplus. 
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and applauded Orr for his 21-month term (AlHajal, 2014a). Duggan told Reuters, “We’re going 
to start fresh tomorrow and do the best we can to deliver the kind of services people deserve 
(Daniels, 2014).” The end of the financial emergency stabilized Detroit’s bond situation but the 
power-sharing agreement had loosened Orr’s hold on the blight emergency. Like Pulte, Orr had 
presented blight as a past failure of government that could justify restructuring regulation. While 
Orr had looked backward, a group of powerful development and philanthropic interests began to 
push eradicating Detroit’s blight as a synonym for reinventing the city’s real estate market.  
 Blight Machine: Dan Gilbert, Detroit Blight Removal Task Force, and Motor City 
Mapping Project 
In 9/2013, members of the Obama administration convened a meeting in Washington 
D.C. with Detroit political and business leaders (Bradley, 2013). The summit came on the heels 
of Obama publicizing the release of $300 million in federal funds for Detroit programs (public 
dollars already distributed but without prior fanfare and apportioned across commercial 
demolition, transportation, and public safety projects) (Calmes, 2013). In the lead up to the 
allocation, the Obama administration invited Dan Gilbert, Duggan, and other Detroit dignitaries 
to the White House to discuss the major issues faced by the city. Media accounts have suggested 
Obama used this gathering to appoint the Detroit Blight Removal Task Force (DBRTF) (Karoub, 
2014; Devito, 2014). By early October, the DBRTF convened its first meeting with three co-
chairs: Gilbert, the founder and Chairman of Quicken Loans, would join Glenda Pryce, the 
president of the Detroit Public Schools Foundation, and Linda Smith, the Executive Director of 
the Detroit non-profit U-SNAP-BAC. The DBRTF Steering Committee included representatives 
from government, philanthropy, and business, including DTE Energy and Skillman Foundation.  
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In an early mission statement, DBRTF leaders insisted it would develop and deploy a 
blight removal strategy to “focus on creating economic opportunities for the city and its people, 
as well as dramatically improving the safety of residents and first responders.” The co-chairs 
announced a plan and timeline for the “hunting and gathering” stage. Though this stage was 
meant to establish an executable strategy for government, it is unclear who or what was 
responsible for appointing the DBRTF co-chairs. The origins of the DBRTF are not as simple as 
Obama expressing an interest in demolishing Detroit or Gilbert persuading the president to open 
the public purse to address Detroit’s abandonment. Early on, local and national reporters claimed 
Obama considered it vital for the city to tackle its residential abandonment problem to prime the 
city for redevelopment; that any future investment hinged on a massive demolition project 
(Christoff & Niquette, 2013). Later news investigations and interviews hinted Gilbert exercised 
his trademark belligerence on the blight issue and insisted massive demolition efforts would 
serve as the foundation of Detroit’s exit from municipal bankruptcy29. Though unreported at the 
time, Gilbert had hijacked the White House meeting and demanded of Obama and cabinet 
secretaries, “The one thing you guys have to do is figure out how to help us do this blight work 
(Halperin, 2015).” For Gilbert, government efforts to eliminate the “cancer” of blight would 
 
29 Some observers suggested Gilbert viewed the DBRTF as a substitute for a de jure bailout because popular support 
for blight removal would encourage the federal government to allocate public funds for demolition in the city. 
Figure 9: Detroit Blight Removal Task Force 
Logo (DBRTF, 2020) 
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establish the physical and financial conditions essential to neighborhood development and long-
term improvements (Pierog, 2014). An archival report on his administration’s efforts in Detroit 
confirms President Obama had little to do with founding the DBRTF, noting, “Detroit’s Blight 
Removal Task Force was a privately-funded effort, announced alongside federal efforts in 
September 2013 (2016, 9).” Obama’s role was largely symbolic. Gilbert and his allies saw 
demolishing as a leadership tactic and an opportunity to ready Detroit for reinvestment. The 
emergent blight machine would formalize authority while enabling the revaluation of the city. 
Locally, Gilbert had taken on the role of spokesperson for linking citywide demolition 
with neighborhood revitalization. In published profile after profile, writers traveling to Detroit 
from across the US had centered the online mortgage mogul as a shadow chamber of commerce 
of the city (Nisen, 2013; Segal, 2013; Maynard, 2013; Rushe, 2013). Journalists spotlighted 
Gilbert for two reasons: 1) He relocated Quicken Loans and its 1,700 employees to Downtown 
Detroit in 2010 (Wayland 2011); 2) Bedrock, his real estate holding firm, owns dozens of 
downtown properties in what has become colloquially Detroit’s “Gilbertville” (Gallagher, 
2018a). For some, Gilbert is a protagonist of the urban renaissance, a tenacious billionaire using 
his workforce to fill neighborhoods and considerable wealth to stabilize Detroit’s central 
business district (Feloni & Lee, 2018). For others, Gilbert is another entitled developer building a 
“Detroit 2.0” without room for incumbent residents (Randolph, 2011) – a zone shaped by a 
private surveillance network and security team (Gallagher, 2015b).30 For Gilbert, the city’s blight 
presented a similar threat to profitable property investments - though insufficient to adjust 
business practices. In 2015, a Detroit News investigation probed Quicken Loans’ lending and 
concluded 52% of its foreclosures showed evidence of blight (MacDonald & Kurth 2015). 
 
30 In 2017, Bedrock nixed and apologized for a downtown advertising campaign that failed to include any persons of 
color. The slogan “See Detroit As We Do” splashed over hip white people unintentionally blurred the lines of satire. 
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Like Pulte and Orr, Gilbert used his formidable, unelected social and economic status to 
push for a citywide battle with residential blight. Gilbert made the implications of his anti-blight 
agenda amply clear when he appeared at the Techonomy Conference held in 9/2013 at Wayne 
State University in Midtown Detroit. The annual conference is a gathering of “thought leaders” 
propagating a Silicon Valley-esque disruptive relationship to economics, technology, and 
innovation (Techonomy, 2013). Though the itinerant conference takes a national focus, the 2013 
iteration foregrounded Detroit’s revitalization. Publicity materials stated, “Our urgent theme is 
the role of technology and innovation in boosting American economic growth, job creation, and 
urban revival.” In a mid-morning session entitled “City Re-Vision: Towards a Techonomic 
Detroit,” Gilbert and Bruce J. Katz, a Brookings Institution scholar specializing in urban 
innovation, aimed to answer the question: “In five years, will we look at Detroit as an example of 
how to bring a city back from the brink?” In his remarks, Gilbert (McGraw, 2013) explained how 
residential demolition needed to become a central feature of neighborhood regeneration: 
When that blight is gone, maybe we don’t have to be talking about shrinking cities 
because it will be such a rush of people who want to get into low-value housing — when 
all the utilities are there and the land is pretty much close to free— not exactly free, but 
close to it — and all the utilities are there, it becomes very cheap for a builder/developer 
to develop a residential unit, and they are going to develop them and develop them in 
mass as soon as we get the structures down and maybe we don’t have to worry about 
raising peas or corn or whatever it is you do in the farm.  
Gilbert and his lieutenants took the lead nurturing a multi-scalar consensus justifying a massive, 
coordinated blight removal effort that would sweep away the residential detritus of the mortgage 
crisis that deadened investor confidence and impaired development risk-taking. He predicted, 
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“You’re going to have developers saying, ‘What an opportunity, the old decrepit buildings are 
gone.” Gilbert derided dysfunctional public institutions and then shared his vision to erect a giant 
board counting down towards zero with each new demolition (Burke, 2013). In a muddled 
political climate in which Gilbert was free to seize on the demolition agenda, assent by 
corporate, philanthropic, and government leaders was ineluctable. The Obama Administration 
amplified Gilbert’s authority and provided the political legitimacy for the DBRTF to take root.  
After holding a series of public meetings with local leaders and civic organizations, the 
DBRTF determined insufficient data on abandoned housing in the city had frustrated establishing 
a comprehensive blight removal strategy31. How many buildings are blighted? Observing this 
gap in their actionable policy knowledge, the co-chairs commissioned the Motor City Mapping 
Project (MCMP). They envisioned this citywide survey of conditions for the over 380,000 
parcels comprising the city’s residential landscape would “digitize Detroit’s property information 
and create clear communication channels back and forth between the public, the government, 
and city service providers (MCMP 2018).” To design and implement the MCMP, the task force 
drew upon the financial and personnel resources of Gilbert’s Rock Ventures in addition to the 
mapping and project management acumen of local business and nonprofits: LOVELAND 
Technologies, Data Driven Detroit (D3), and Michigan Nonprofit Association (MNA).  
LOVELAND Technologies, an urban informatics outfit based in Detroit, MI, developed a 
mobile mapping application to crowdsource individual parcel details. Jerry Paffendorf, 
LOVELAND’s founder and a technologist with a degree in Future Studies, had arrived in Detroit 
six years prior after a succession of technology startup ventures in other cities. Detroit enticed 
Paffendorf because “[it] was a city of the future and is becoming a city of the future again 
 
31 Important to note that prior attempts to wreck these structures had been undermined by weak public institutions. 
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(Crain’s Detroit, 2011)." In the time leading up to the task force announcement, LOVELAND 
had a reputation for eccentric projects examining property and housing in Detroit. ‘Citizen-
surveyors’ would use LOVELAND’s application to create and submit a blext (blight text) for 
each residential parcel in the city. The app allowed “blexters” to survey lots and structures based 
on a variety of criteria and then conclude parcel condition: good; fair; poor; and suggest 
demolition. Each blext included an attached photo. Thousands of blexts would funnel into a 
central command center or “Mission Control” in Midtown Detroit where LOVELAND staff 
would vet, clean, and assemble the parcel details into a mappable format. For Paffendorf and 
LOVELAND, MCMP furnished an opportunity to push the boutique startup into professional 
terrain with a sustainable source of financial support for its mapping service (Stevenson, 2014). 
Alongside LOVELAND, DBRTF brought in support from MNA and D3 assist with 
executing the property survey. MNA is a statewide organization providing Michigan nonprofits 
with advocacy, training, and technology support. In its role within MCMP, MNA contributed 
expertise in volunteer management. For its part, D3 – formerly the Detroit-Area Community 
Information System – held responsibility for data quality, focusing its attention on cleaning and 
analyzing blexter submissions. From the view of D3 staff, MCMP represented a paradigm shift 
in the way the city and its residents collected and used data to address its other challenges. Like 
Paffendorf, D3 staff treated MCMP as an opportunity to experiment with governing. Diana 
Flora, a Detroit Revitalization Fellow serving with D3, explained, “We may see this type of 
project spark demand for more data transparency in other areas – like education, the city's 
budgetary information, and so on -- from both residents and city officials (Wasacz, 2015).” 
In his position as a co-chair of DBRTF, Gilbert matched LOVELAND, D3, and MNA 
with his own handpicked team of Rock Ventures executives and interns. He also allocated 
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Quicken Loans staff to support the citywide parcel survey as drivers. Despite those staffing 
commitments, MCMP remained firmly grassroots in guise (Clark 2014). On more than one 
occasion, LOVELAND and Rock Ventures leadership insisted the blexting application would 
encourage Detroit residents to seize control of the narratives surrounding their neighborhoods. 
Lauren Hood, then the Community Engagement Manager at LOVELAND, maintained that 
blexting was a more democratic approach to taking on the ubiquitous blight in Detroit. For her, 
using the app to document decay meant residents “can have the power (Klinefelter, 2014).” 
While the merits of downloading this responsibility to residents deserves critical scrutiny, the 
claim that blexting’s inherent decentralization enabled room for volunteerism and leveraged 
neighborhood pride is troubled by the contingent labor that largely handled data collection. 
Although LOVELAND and Kresge made the app widely available, the record on who conducted 
the mapping is blurry at best. In addition to a legion of technologists, community developers, and 
smart city wizards, MCMP hired 150 temporary workers through Detroit Employment Solutions 
Corporation to fill its “citizen-surveyor” needs. MCMP staff trained these workers to use the 
mobile devices and then compensated them at $10/hour (Muller, 2013). 
In a late-2015 article appearing in Next City, an urbanist website, Paffendorf summarized 
the 2013 MCMP mission, “The purity of the concept for Motor City Mapping was to end once 
Figure 10: Citizen-surveyor 
practices "blexting" in a MCMP 
training (Muller, 2013) 
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and for all the dark ages of misunderstanding about what was happening to Detroit’s properties 
(Bradley, 2015).” That sentiment suggests how LOVELAND envisioned MCMP as a mapping 
and data project that could transcend a simple inventory of empty buildings. At that time, MCMP 
flamed passions for data-driven everything. More than quantifying blight to streamline 
demolishing, MCMP could mobilize public and private dollars to build a new data infrastructure 
in which objective technical know-how was to supersede the irrationality of activist gut-feelings 
and the torpor of political class inner-circles. For many of those who established the MCM and 
administered its execution, the mapping survey served two major purposes: 1) present a Detroit 
population unified against the crisis and emergency of blight; 2) use the proof of concept of 
MCMP to steer future city government operations to prioritize data-driven decision-making. 
Sean Jackson, a Rock Ventures intern who Gilbert appointed to manage the daily 
operations of MCMP, shared Paffendorf’s perspective. In an NPR interview appearing in early 
2014 – as the surveying gained both footing and national notoriety – Jackson framed blight data 
in a way that fit right alongside Bill Pulte’s demolition agenda. He posited, “If you're going to 
send in a demo crew, instead of sending them in four different times, why don't you all put your 
properties together and do all four of them at the same time so you can help get some cost 
savings and be able to work together on solving these problems? (Klinefelter, 2014)” Not only 
could MCMP help eradicate abandoned housing in Detroit but it could also rationalize local 
government’s approach to problem solving. The effective management of blight harbored more 
significance than beautifying Detroit’s neighborhoods. For Jackson, blight removal in Detroit 
was not just a government activity; it could clarify and improve the business of governing. 
The precise origins of the DBRTF are overshadowed by the symbolic power the group 
wielded over Detroit’s blight problem and possible solutions to its ubiquity in its neighborhoods. 
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While it is crucial to chart the agents, agencies, and agendas at play in its initial formation, the 
DBRTF true potency is in mobilizing residential blight to reconsider the practice of governing a 
declining city like Detroit. Loveland and the DBRTF treated their collaborative effort as a far-
reaching intervention in how Detroit interpreted the state of its neighborhoods. Their leadership 
described the MCMP as a big data needs-assessment (Gallagher, 2015c). By participating in the 
project, residents could bring their experiences and understanding of neighborhoods to bear on 
the issue of abandonment and how institutions delivered a response. DBRTF members, city 
government, and the media considered a smartphone with the blexting app a tool for constructing 
data by organizing the grassroots and accumulating grounded expertise to make sense of blight. 
Despite enthusiasm for the lay knowledge of Detroiters, the concept of community 
control did not extend beyond marketing materials. While thousands of residents downloaded the 
mobile app and participated in the mapping project, public documents suggest public agencies 
had already determined how and where HHF demolition dollars would be spent. In 9/2013 – a 
full eight months before DBTRF released its findings - the DLBA had circulated the Hardest Hit 
Fund Strategic Plan explaining the importance of blight removal in transforming the city’s 
housing market conditions. Intent on directing “both bulldozers and dollars,” the authors wrote, 
“The new reality in summer 2013 is that we have now pushed a reset button at the government 
levels to stabilize and motivate the market to do what it does best. Catalytic change is possible, 
and the market needs the signal to perform (1)32.” Residential demolition appeared to be that 
indicator to the housing market. However, the authors stressed blight removal would be 
prioritized in “six strategic, strong neighborhoods”: Northend, Jefferson Chalmers, Southwest, 
Grandmont Rosedale, UDM/Marygrove, Morningside/EEV/Cornerstone (2). The plan’s authors 
 
32 This report is still accessible through the City of Detroit website. 
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base these six neighborhoods on prior DFC analysis of neighborhood conditions, an assessment 
largely informed by the TRF study commissioned by Mayor Bing in 2011. The DDP, comprising 
the Detroit Building Authority (DBA) and DLBA, had already decided where to focus resources. 
The eagerness to recruit Detroit residents into the MCMP to ground plans for blight 
removal is also not backed-up by the concurrent actions of Duggan’s newly fashioned DDP. 
Notwithstanding frequent references to the epistemic authority of residents and their role as 
“adjunct inspector support (City of Detroit, 2013, 11),” residential demolitions started months 
prior to the completion of the MCMP or the release of the DBTRF report. Duggan and his 
lieutenants had cited the mapping process as crucial to the DDP, but his administration launched 
the DDP before DBRTF made any findings available. Table 3 shows the amount of demolition 
dollars the DDP awarded to contractors during a period of time in which MCMP was conducting 
neighborhood surveys and residents were still submitting parcel conditions. Den-Man 
Contractors officially started the DDP by demolishing 18814 Caldwell on 1/2/2014 for 
$4,800.00. The demolition of 16763 Woodingham by ABC Demolition on 4/24/2014 was the 
first contract to draw on the DDP’s first allocation of HHF support. Between 1/2/2014 and 
5/23/2014, when the DBTRF was said to be finalizing a community-directed approach to 
demolishing Detroit, DDP awarded contracts to demolish 371 houses for $3,102,251.3333. 
Table 3: HHF and city demolition dollars awarded to contractors between 1/2014 and 5/23/2014 
Contractor Total Awarded ($) 
1 Way Service 19,500 
ABC Demolition 128,950 
Able Demolition 546,748.8 
 
33 On 5/24/2014, DBRTF released its report summarizing MCMP findings and proposing a blight removal strategy. 
No residential demolitions occurred on that day. 
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Adamo Group, Inc. 293,419.26 
Blue Star 153,600 
Brown Environmental Construction 80,301 
Den-Man Contractors 249,110 
DMC Consultants 622,939.27 
Farrow Group 12,589 
Futurenet Group 239,528 
Homrich 619,790 
RDC Construction Services 15,000 
Smalley 120,776 
Grand Total 3,102,251.33 
There are two interpretations for the DDP’s quick pace. First, the 10/7/2013 agreement 
between Orr and MSHDA setting aside $52.3 million for demolitions required the DDP to spend 
70% of HHF within a year and 100% within 18 months. The DDP simply did not have the staff, 
inventory, or processes in place in fall 2013 to begin demolitions. The power-sharing agreement 
between Duggan and Orr in December created conditions for the DDP to spend funds, but by 
3/2014 no buildings had come down. Five months on a 12-month clock had expired. The DDP 
had to move fast to make up for lost time and could not wait for public consumption and 
consideration of the DBRTF’s findings. Importantly, this interpretation does not rule out the 
second one: the MCMP and blexting process was less about data collection than converting the 
public’s frustration about vacancy and abandonment into cogent support for demolition. By 
channeling Detroiters through the process of DBRTF and MCMP, a single vocabulary of 
neighborhood blight elbowed out ongoing debates about money, time, location, and authority.   
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The MCMP and DBRTF may not have been crucial to demolition but both used blight to 
reframe how the process of problem-solving in Detroit. In various news features and profiles, 
Paffendorf has expressed fondness for an analysis of social problems that hinges on deploying 
engineering expertise to increase the volume and robustness of data available to residents and 
policymakers (Orton, 2016). In a 2015 profile appearing in the Detroit Free Press, the serial tech 
entrepreneur explained, "Underlying every other crisis that the city faces – it's got a fiscal crisis, 
social and racial and equality crises -- information crisis underlies all… The reason that a lot of 
those other symptoms express themselves is that nobody knows what's going on. (Gallagher, 
2015c)" Paffendorf used his platform to argue social problems are an outcome of epistemological 
inexactitude that can be resolved by technologies and investments. Blight may be an emergency, 
but it was also an opportunity for entrepreneurs to create and control markets for their ventures. 
Like Pulte, Orr, and Gilbert, Paffendorf’s historical reasoning for blight is linked to 
incompetence and ignorance. Considered in this light, MCMP exemplified one way of governing 
and inhabiting a city in decline: the imprecision of data serves as a formidable inhibitor of urban 
improvement and revitalization. Datafying blight would help in “unlocking the potential of 
Detroit’s neighborhoods (National Trust for Historic Preservation, 2016).” But locating blight in 
space is different than demolishing that blight. Systematic tallies of Detroit’s vacancy had come 
and gone in the preceding years. Gilbert’s machine was not the absence of politics – whether the 
post-political or anti-political varieties – but a proof of concept for a politics of redevelopment 
that restores Detroit as a constellation of valuable and undervalued properties: what belongs. 
Prior to sharing the results of the MCMP, Gilbert admitted the parcel survey would not provide 
“dramatically different” figures than those prior attempts to inventory blight (Aguilar, 2014). The 
signal to the market was not demolition, but the capacity to achieve Detroit’s demolishability. 
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MCMP staged a local consensus by presenting a local population united in combatting 
blight. At its conclusion, the MCMP was a strategy for obtaining the public’s authorization for 
demolishing to fight the city’s decline. The MCMP institutionalized alarm about Detroit’s blight 
and presented inhabitants, institutions, and investors as a united front against a crisis. Blight 
became the justification for new approaches to data collection, public policy, business 
development, and real estate investment. This seemingly collective and democratic campaign 
culminated in a celebratory spring release of the DBRTF’s strategic framework. On 5/24/2014, 
Detroit business, philanthropic, and government leaders gathered at Focus: HOPE. Initial reports 
confirmed Gilbert, Pryce, and Smith would present MCMP findings and their recommendations 
for confronting blight in the city. In a large second-floor conference room plastered with glossy 
poster versions of the guide’s key findings, Duggan, Kevyn Orr, Rock Ventures representatives, 
and members of the Obama administration held court before a standing room-only audience34.  
Matt Cullen, Rock Ventures CEO and a key Gilbert lieutenant involved in a variety of 
Detroit development projects, started the morning’s proceedings. In his introductory remarks, 
Cullen echoed the vigilant anti-blight sentiments of Orr, Duggan, and Gilbert, characterizing 
building decay as a formidable barrier to revitalization in the city and its neighborhoods. The 
DBRTF co-chairs and the medley of dignitaries proceeded to introduce the audience and public 
at large to a 300-page framework named “Every Neighborhood Has a Future…And It Doesn’t 
Include Blight.” Six-months of study and data collection confirmed what policymakers had 
already known. The DBRTF tallied 78,506 structures requiring intervention and predicted a 
successful demolition program would need at least $850 million to tear down the buildings.  
 
34 I attended the unveiling of the DBRTF report.  
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The DBRTF advised reforms to property tax foreclosure that would reduce the inventory 
of blighted buildings and proposed changes to the formal demolition process. A new working 
group of agency heads would manage the demolition program, incorporate tools for data-driven 
decision-making, and oversee at least two future phases of the MCMP parcel surve35y. Duggan’s 
Department of Neighborhoods would hire and distribute District Managers to handle resident 
concerns and complaints. In the framework’s introductory letter, the DBRTF co-chairs warned, 
“Blight is a cancer. Blight sucks the soul of anyone who gets near it, let alone those who are 
unfortunate enough to live with it all around them. Blight is radioactive. It is contagious. 
(DBRTF, 2014)” Blight’s contagiousness did not translate to enthusiasm for the DBRTF’s 
recommendations. Despite his attendance at the unveiling, Duggan’s administration was in the 
early stages of developing a regime that would mobilize blight and demolition to reshape the 
city’s institutions. Gilbert’s blight machine – making Detroit demolishable and its vacant land 
developable – performed and promoted public consensus about vacancy and abandonment in 
Detroit. But, like any other public emergency, the final decision remained with the executive.   
 Blight Regime: Mayor Duggan and the Detroit Demolition Program 
At the 2019 Mackinac Policy Conference, Mayor Mike Duggan admitted, “I am obsessed 
with a goal: To eliminate blight from the city of Detroit entirely by 2025 (Cwiek, 2019).” 
Duggan’s preoccupation with demolition is consistent with a local and state institutional agenda 
that connected demolition to every facet of administration and inhabitance in Detroit. In 2013, 
Duggan campaigned on the platform “Every Neighborhood Has a Future,” a slogan and brand 
that provided immediate contrast to Bing’s demonstration areas and baroque DFC framework. 
 
35 These have not occurred. Loveland moved on and the DDP now maintains the dated MCMP data. As if December 
2019, the official website for the DBTRF – www.timetoendblight.com – has a dead link for the final guide. 
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Duggan launched a write-in campaign for mayor that centered blight removal and demolition. 
His 10 Point Plan to Rebuild Our Neighborhoods brought together policy on code enforcement, 
vacant lot management, neighborhood cleanup, dangerous buildings, demolition, and block 
grants into one mayoral agenda. Duggan’s plan targeted what Pulte had called “blightocracy.” 
The proposal states, “A huge part of the problem is an inefficient bureaucracy – the city has a 36 
step, 5 phase demolition process that can take years to get an abandoned house demolished 
(Duggan, 2013, 9).” In fact, Duggan’s plan mentions DetBA as one of “14 different 
uncoordinated agencies” under command of his new Department of Neighborhoods (4).  
Although the title suggests an explicit connection to Duggan’s agenda, the DBRTF 
framework proposed within its “Every Neighborhood Has A Future…And it Doesn’t Include 
Blight” is notably light on mayoral authority. In Chapter 8, the authors describe the need for a 
new group to consolidate and manage blight operations within municipal government. This 
Blight Strike Force (BSF) would coordinate “overall blight tactical activities within the City of 
Detroit.” However, based on the power-sharing agreement with Orr, Duggan would oversee the 
arrangement of government agencies and authorities that would implement the DBRTF vision. 
The BSF would turn DBRTF’s recommendations into policy action. Such a group was vital 
because blight shaped every part of governing Detroit. In a 5/19/2014 report to the Detroit 
Building Authority (DBA), the Legislative Policy Division (LPD) introduced the BSF as 
“Detroit’s unified response to the blight crisis (10).” For LPD, the BSF was vital because blight 
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touched on all facets of Detroit. Figure 11 is an excerpt from that report. Blight provided the 
means for resetting government to focus on one challenge. BSF would aid in governing blight 
and developing strategy, but it also enabled governing through blight. Despite one mention in 
local press in six years (Laitner and Guillen, 2016), a response to the author’s 2016 FOIA request 
for public records on the BSF confirmed the group’s existence and its broad authority over the 
demolition process in Detroit. However, because the BSF is an internal working-group and not a 
public meeting, the city’s legal advisors have denied access to records because deliberations 
preliminary and exempt from any disclosure. Moreover, the presence of lawyers for each agency 
in attendance also means the deliberations are subject to attorney-client privilege.  
The BSF illustrates an early success by Duggan’s administration to consolidate control 
over residential demolition in Detroit. Even with the limited authority initially available to him 
through the power-sharing agreement, Duggan reshaped how the agencies under his control 
governed the city. Demolition became less a policy lever available to pull than an achievement of 
a reorganized and robust local state. Only a month prior to the DBRTF framework’s release in 
2014, Duggan had started putting this philosophy of consolidation into action by ending the 
Figure 11: Excerpt from LPD report to 
DBA on managing blight removal 
(LPD, 2014, 10) 
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previous, friendly relationship Bing developed with Pulte and DetBA. Pulte would no longer 
receive demolition contracts just as Duggan was intensifying the blight removal campaign. 
Initial interpretations of that ouster mirrored those of Duggan’s staff. Alexis Wiley, the 
mayor’s spokesperson, explained the move as an elimination competing plans for blight removal 
in the city (Finley, 2014). However, other local observers dismissed the efficiency rationale and 
suggested Duggan was taking command of the blight removal issue to reshape Detroit’s 
governing landscape. In his interpretation, Stephen Henderson, a WDET host and former editor 
at Detroit Free Press, said, “You know, that’s one of the things that Mayor Duggan says he 
doesn’t really like about city government is that there are these authorities now that have control 
over things that he would like to recentralize, I think, under his own control (Graham, 2014).” 
For Duggan, consolidating authority was vital to demolishing. His blight regime was not just an 
extension of Pulte’s blight authority, Orr’s blight emergency, or Gilbert blight machine. 
State records indicate a variation of these tensions that prompted the Pulte and Duggan 
divorce. In late 2013, Pulte and Farkas, the former DetBA Executive Director and current-DBA 
special projects director, applied for HHF funding from the Michigan State Housing 
Development Authority (MSHDA). MSHDA would furnish DetBA $249,900 to demolish 72 
single-family homes. Farkas would manage day-to-day operations and DetBA tapped Atwell, 
LLC – an environmental consultant that would go on to decline a DDP offer to run its project – 
to serve as “Construction Project Management team” and a local accounting firm would provide 
financial management. In their application, Pulte and Farkas presented a scenario in which 
DetBA would direct and conduct residential demolitions while the Detroit Economic Growth 
Association (DEGA) would serve as the lead organization and supervise the program. 
95 
 
DEGA’s role is notable because the group represents the political and economic muscle 
of Detroit. DEGA is a 501c3 nested within the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation (DEGC), 
the primary economic development agency in Detroit, and conducts project management for 
DEGC’s partners and their portfolios. As “Detroit’s economic catalyst,” DEGC and DEGA are a 
whose who of Detroit business and corporate leadership (DEGC, 2020). Both organizations 
exemplify key traits of the coalitions and regimes of economic and political actors that scholars 
claim dominate policy and development practice in cities (Stone, 1989; Elkin, 1987). DEGA 
leadership comprises executives from major banks, utilities, financial services, equity firms, law 
firms, and public institutions (Guidestar, 2020). The CEOs of both DTE Energy and Bedrock, 
LLC serve on the board. In Pulte’s proposal, MSHDA would award DEGA the funds and DetBA 
would execute the plan to demolish the vacant structures between 1/6/2014 and 4/7/2014.   
 DetBA and DEGA made their move only weeks after MSHDA had agreed to fund 
demolitions under Bing’s mayoralty and Orr’s emergency manager authority (10/2013). In the 
wake of federal and state approval to reallocate HHF mortgage assistance dollars for residential 
demolitions, the DLBA and DBA partnered to facilitate the local demolition program. Only a 
few weeks later, Detroit voters elected Mike Duggan to take over for Bing. Despite the 
considerable social, economic, and political heft of the DEGA and DetBA partnership, MSHDA 
denied their joint application for HHF funding in early 2014. Pulte had attempted to match his 
blight authority with the existing economic development power structure – the city’s growth 
machine – but MSHDA rejected the arrangement in favor of Duggan’s DDP that had the DBA 
serve in the DetBA role and the DLBA handle awarding contracts and managing finances. Mary 
Townley, the state official managing demolitions for MSHDA, confirmed in an interview Pulte 
and Farkas applied for HHF funds to provide an alternative to Duggan’s centralized approach. 
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In 2010, the US Congress authorized Hardest Hit Funds (HHF) - $7.6 billion in relief for 
18 state governments - to assist owner-occupants struggling with mortgage payments after the 
collapse of the US housing market. However, HHF eligibility rules proved too strict for many 
desperate homeowners coping with the consequences of delinquency (Neavling, 2017). Facing 
the prospect of underutilization, a delegation of congresspersons from Midwestern states 
persuaded the Treasury to permit state housing development agencies to steer hundreds of 
millions in HHF foreclosure prevention towards financing residential demolition programs 
(Carmody, 2016). Michigan was the first state to receive approval to redirect the funds (Jayyousi, 
2019). Blight removal became neighborhood stabilization. Money initially earmarked for 
protecting owner-occupancy mutated into the public sector’s broom for sweeping away evidence 
of prior subprime and predatory lending. In 2013, following forceful congressional lobbying, 
Treasury gave permission to MSHDA to divert part of its HHF allocation to demolition of vacant 
and publicly owned properties (Mallach, 2014). Demolition programs based in Flint, MI and 
Detroit would be the primary beneficiaries of the reallocation. In the latter, the DLBA was the 
local MSHDA partner agency distributing those public dollars to eliminate neighborhood blight.  
Under Duggan’s watch, the DLBA matured from 5 employees in 3/2014 to 140 at the end 
of 2018. Established in 2008, the DLBA is responsible for absorbing derelict properties and 
returning them to productive use through sale, rehabilitation, and demolition (Dewar, 2015). In 
April 2014, Duggan placed DLBA at the center of his blight regime when his administration 
persuaded the Detroit City Council to transfer 16,399 properties to the land bank’s inventory 
(Cwiek, 2014). A second transfer of properties in 9/2014 pushed the inventory to over 27,000 
(Weiner, 2014). With DLBA directing HHF allocations from MSHDA and the DBA providing 
technical assistance and oversight of awarded contracts, the DDP aimed for at least 200 
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demolitions a week and as many as 10,000 per year (Hackman, 2014). By the middle of 2016, 
the DLBA controlled almost 100,000 vacant properties in Detroit (Guillen, 2016b). 
Initial hopes for demolition funds relied on Orr’s Plan of Adjustment directing $520.3 
million over six year to blight removal. However, the money was only available as a budget 
surplus. In early 2015, Duggan revealed the city would need to identify other funding sources to 
continue the DDP past that summer (Gallagher, 2015a). The DDP had exhausted three rounds of 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program funds totaling $42.7 million (Spangler 2015). From then, 
demolition dollars depended on the US Treasury authorizing MSHDA to set aside part of its 
$761.6 million in HHF for demolitions. After awarding Detroit $107.3 million in 2013 and 2014, 
MSHDA allocated funds for demolition every year between 2015 and 2018 – $240,346,128.40 in 
HHF for 14,878 demolitions. Since a $21 million award in 10/2015, HHF has helped DDP 
demolish an average of 40 structures every week for 229 weeks. Kevin Elsenheimer, the 
Executive Director of MSHDA, believed demolition was protecting homeowners, “We believe 
this is the most efficient way to get these dollars out on the ground (Spangler & Egan, 2015).”  
HHF is set to expire at the end of 2020. Although Duggan attempted to put a $250 
million bond measure on the 3/2020 ballot, the city council rejected the proposal based on 
concerns about accountability and oversight (Ferretti, 2019a)36. Duggan’s blight regime had 
grown too strong, too fast and city council members felt the muscular DDP needed a regulatory 
retrofit before new funding. Brenda Jones, the council president, explained, “We are the checks 
and balances to ensure that everything that should be in place, is in place (Guillen & Stafford, 
2019).” In the meantime, demolitions have slowed as the DDP exhausts a final HHF award. The 
end of federal support also signals the conclusion of DLBA’s role in the DDP, Duggan has 
 
36 I address the regulatory and transparency concerns in the next chapter. 
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moved the DDP into a new Department of Demolition, led by LaJuan Counts (Stafford, 2020). 
Even as bulldozers idle and budgets shrink, Duggan’s blight regime - outlasting Pulte, Orr, and 
Gilbert – has left its trace in policies, institutions, and neighborhoods. The mayor had promised 
to collaborate with the council to place the bond issue on the 11/2020 ballot (Neavling, 2020). 
However, Duggan’s formidable authority over the blight regime and his agenda of a blight-free 
Detroit has become less of a certainty with the community circulation of Covid-19. In early 
spring 2020, as the city took on the morbid mantle of the nation’s highest death rate, Duggan 
suspended the DDP while DLBA began layoffs for 20% of its staff (Ferretti, 2020). 
 Building a Blightocracy in Detroit 
In 2013, Brian Farkas, the then-executive director of Pulte’s DetBa, told a reporter, "If 
you address Detroit's blight problem, you make the rest of the city's problems easier to solve 
(Carey, 2013).” Robust and comprehensive blight removal – funded by public largesse and 
managed by a trustworthy administration – suggested new possibility for remaking Detroit, its 
institutions, and neighborhoods. Despite publicizing that theory of change, Farkas and other 
actors focused on blight had little to say about how blight would affect those problems. For 
some, the state’s insistence on bankruptcy and Orr’s unilateral restructuring of the city’s agencies 
had unsettled the institutional rust that had prevented previous attempts at demolition from 
transforming the city. If, as some said at the time, blight “made Detroit unmanageable” then a 
refreshed capacity to demolish abandoned buildings served as an alibi for the city’s bankruptcy 
(Green & Ghopal, 2013). Indeed, on the day after DBTRF released its report on neighborhood 
blight, John Gallagher, the former urban affairs columnist for the Detroit Free Press, observed: 
Detroit’s bankruptcy feels for many like a fresh start for a city that for decades has 
endured relentless image-bashing as a decaying, crime-ridden, irretrievable and once-
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great urban center. So much of that reputation has been tied to home abandonment and 
eventual wide-scale blight, which not only breeds crime and other social ills but also just 
looks bad. (2014c) 
Whether an entry point for solving other problems or a physical face-lift to redeem Detroit’s 
national reputation, blight removal would make the city livable, governable, and developable. 
Bill Pulte approached residential blight as an existential threat to Detroit and cities like it: the 
bulldozer would make the city great again. In that sense, Pulte and others were no different than 
antecedents social improvers that associated abandonment with the death of the city (Page, 2007; 
Beauregard, 1994). The urgency in the words and work of Orr, Pulte, Gilbert, and Duggan to 
counteract blight is not unfamiliar to policy think tanks, corporate boardrooms, nonprofits, 
neighborhoods, housing and development agencies, and city halls across the United States. 
However, in Detroit, blight removal was not just a policy goal for these interests but an 
expression and achievement of renewed civic, political, investor, and philanthropic capabilities. 
 Administrators of the DDP commanded the apocalyptic language of Pulte, Orr, and 
Gilbert to position blight as a timebomb that would halt Detroit’s chances of revitalization. 
Demolition, for them, was a core principle of a restructured government tasked with enabling 
reinvestment. Leaders treated blight as a formal emergency that could lighten regulation, but 
they also approached blight as an everyday crisis that justified demolition at all costs. In a 
4/26/2016 presentation by Farkas to the Detroit City Council entitled Safe Demolition at Scale, 
he shared the three priorities of the DDP: “1) Protecting Public Health and Safety; 2) Increasing 
Speed/Pace of Demos – Creating a Sense of Urgency; 3) Cost Controls.” The second priority 
illustrates how DDP administrators relied on a narrative of disaster to rationalize blight removal, 
going so far as to “create” the urgency necessary to explain the program’s frenetic pace. Instead 
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of the discrete economic-space Mitchell observes in Egypt, leaders in Detroit crafted a blight-
space with its own logics, disciplines, and interventions. The map of blight was the product of 
blight emergency conditions, but it also provided a coherent image that crystallized a form of 
expertise about blight. One could know blight without understanding its material production.  
In a 6/13/2017 article appearing in Government Technology, Bob Graves interviewed 
Farkas about the DDP’s efforts. The Special Projects Director of the DBA suggested residential 
demolition is a necessity because it confronts the main determinant of Detroit’s decline: blight 
flight (Graves, 2017). In Farkas’ view, blight eventuates urban decline because it discourages 
residents from staying and investing in their homes. In this chain of events, uneasy residents 
depart their weakened neighborhoods and leave behind deteriorating properties that trigger a new 
round of homeowner anxiety and another phase of decline. For Farkas and others administering 
Detroit’s demolition campaign, wrecking existing blight interrupts a sequence of events in which 
blight is simply the product of prior adjacent blight. Despite strong evidence that population 
flight is pushed by the low quality of central city public goods (Bayoh, Irwin, & Haab, 2006), the 
dominant narrative of blight flight has remained unaltered since the early phases of the DDP. 
Officials in Mayor Duggan’s administration and the DLBA have endorsed the view in local and 
national media. In a 2017 episode of “This Old House,” Craig Fahle, the then-spokesperson for 
DLBA, expressed dismay Detroit residents would abandon homes but shared optimism that 
demolition and rehabilitation could counter the lack of resident morale. While stumbling through 
a vacant house, he told host Kevin O’Connor, “Sometimes they will leave behind everything and 
just leave in the middle of the night.” The determinants of that vacancy remained off the table. 
Orr’s blight emergency declaration was a vivid example of blight as a way of disciplining 
institutions, geography, and markets. In Orr’s formulation, blight was not simply a target of 
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government intervention. By declaring blight to be of such emergency proportions that it 
demands exceptional executive action, Orr showed how to govern blight but also govern through 
blight. Pulte’s insistence that challenging Detroit government’s monopoly over blight removal 
was synonymous with upending Detroit government’s reason for existing suggests the politics of 
blight extends beyond debates over “what is blight?” and “what do we do about it?” Moreover, 
Gilbert’s inflexibility about blight removal as a way of triggering investment and maximizing 
profit – gaining Detroit’s reentry into a mesh of regional, national, and global capital – shows 
blight is more than physical nuisance and demolition is more than contractors demonstrating 
technical proficiency. At a public event prior to the release of the DBTRF guide, Gilbert 
declared, “Removing all blight is going to create economic value. You are going to have 
significant interest from profit-making capitalist folks.” In each instance, the eradication of blight 
has helped to preserve and reimagine authority over governing, developing, and inhabiting. 
While Duggan was quick to bar DetBA from the city he retained the Blight Authority's 
central philosophies by keeping Pulte’s chief strategist. Farkas has remained the public face of 
the DDP, namely, defending lapses in DDP’s practices and processes (Stafford, 2019g; Rahal, 
2019). As Farkas stated in a 2013 interview, "So by getting rid of the blight you really help every 
other effort that's going on in these neighborhoods (Click on Detroit, 2013)." More important is 
the stance DetBA, Pulte, and Farkas took towards the demolition process: demolition at scale. 
This scale of demolition – descending on a neighborhood and executing the plan with logistical 
precision – was Pulte’s attempt to overthrow Detroit’s “blightocracy.” However, debates over 
whether red tape or institutional complacency are responsible for blight misses how different 
interests have mobilized blight removal as a means and goal of governing Detroit. Deciphering 
blightocracy means apprehending how the medley of interventionist interests in Detroit and other 
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declining cities frame the goals of stabilization and revitalization, and how those interests 
envision and set about achieving those goals (Rein & Schon, 1996). Widespread insistence on 
demolition and blight removal as solutions to the challenges of urban decline focused public 
resources and attention on a set of financial and physical priorities that did not automatically 
prioritize improvement in the quality life of inhabitants. Blight removal presented the possibility 
to place the city’s challenges in a vacuum of population flight, nuisance, and bureaucracy. 
Demolition was not only a way to clear land, but it became a way to clear structural problems.  
Less a theory than a model, blightocracy marginalizes the structural and institutional 
factors planners, activists, inhabitants, and public officials should hold responsible for the 
decline of cities and neighborhoods. Institutionalizing a blightocratic approach to urban decline 
has material, discursive, and institutional implications. Blightocracy approaches existing or 
potential dereliction as a cause of present and future abandonment rather than a symptom of 
political-economic processes operating at a variety of scales. I adopt Pulte’s word for viewing 
government through the lens and presence of blight, but where he argues public institutions 
frustrate and limit demolition through unnecessary regulation. Rather than regurgitate opprobria 
for government involvement in demolishing, I borrow and adapt Pulte’s conservative neologism 
to treat blight removal as a framework for comprehending how policymakers shape government 
to take on abandoned structures (instead of a towering bureaucratic challenge). By invoking the 
threat of blight, directing funds to remove it, and restructuring institutions to oversee it, blight 
bridges divides between public and private while normalizing policy or investment strategies for 
managing decline without attention to the political, social, or economic factors of decline.  
This resulting repertoire of interventions and programs elevates widespread residential 
demolition into a default and powerful solution to the decline of Detroit-like cities, a decline 
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associated with visceral and ubiquitous neighborhood ruination. Blightocracy does not merely 
demolish abandoned buildings because of their unproductive nature (social and economic costs; 
low exchange value; impairment to development) but because demolition may solve a variety of 
local challenges without explicitly drawing attention to the political and economic relationships 
and processes that produce decline and dispossession. From this perspective, demolition serves 
as a solution to the city’s problems and the vagueness of its targets and objectives allows a 
variety of interests to employ it to realize and reinforce their agendas. The urgency of blight and 
the promise of demolition restructures public and economic authority to focus on mechanisms 
other than regressive political-economy or white supremacy. Like other paradigmatic standouts 
of urban regimes, Duggan drew on blight and demolition to establish and maintain his power and 
capacity to act in the collective interest (Stone, 1989).  
Whether Orr, Pulte, Gilbert, or Duggan, blightocracy narrowed the range of permissible 
policy solutions to problems resulting from generational class and racial domination, whether 
regional or national in scope. In Table 4, I demonstrate how these institutions transformed major 
fields of policy intervention – including infrastructure, education, public health, and technology 
– and reduces fundamental disagreements over inequality into problems solved by blight 
removal. The example of “Safe Routes to School” is a powerful example of how blightocracy 
transforms social problems in places like Detroit. By linking academic performance to students 
passing vacant buildings, leaders have expanded demolition as a solution to segregation and 
unequal educational funding (Einhorn, 2016).  These framings extend “blight flight” to 
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inhabiting, developing, and governing Detroit. These framings produced and preserved 
demolition as a collaboration between public and private sectors to manage the city.  
 Conclusion: Making Detroit Demolishable 
The clearance consensus that emerged in early 2014 in Detroit was not a fix for the city’s 
decline – it was a terrain for negotiating power over that fix. Orr’s emergency, Pulte’s authority, 
Gilbert’s machine, and Duggan’s regime were never just attempting to clean-up Detroit. The 
returns to property values and livability may have been uncertain at the outset of the DDP, but 
the gains for institutional and investment interests became as obvious as a bulldozer. Blight and 
political power inhabited two prongs in a dialectic of institutions in Detroit. Every invocation of 
Table 4: Blightocratic framings of social problems in Detroit; how local concerns become demolishable 
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blight interacted with the limits of power and synthesized new institutional arrangements that 
informed and justified a wave of interventions.  
With each passing intervention these arrangements mobilized new conceptions of blight 
that required new articulations of political power. Blightocracy perspective suggests that rather 
than treat demolition as a tool or a transaction cost in the process of urban change scholars 
should interrogate it as a way of organizing political environments. The blightocracy in Detroit 
provides an institutional analog to the production of demolition that recasst a discrete 
intervention into a regional process of income-generation and valuation. In late 2019, Farkas told 
a Detroit News reporter, “We’re coming to every part of the city (Ramirez, 2019).” This planned 
omnipresence of destruction depends on both the achievement of blightocracy and a process of 
demolishing embedded in the operations of contractors. Though each phase of blight discipline 
since 2013 possessed its own political and economic aims, the cumulative effect has made 
Detroit and its problems demolishable. 
Today, blight in Detroit serves an important role in imagining the future. Investors 
mobilize resources around dereliction and aim to open space for development. Inhabitants lobby 
for the bulldozer to transform their quality of life. But blight is also a potent tool for reframing 
social and economic problems – a way of structuring challenges that disguises the social 
determinants of inequality that produce decline. Institutions may wreck buildings to advance 
investor interests, but they also render a city governable by making demolition both the goal of 
policy and a process of policymaking in Detroit. The “will to remove” of Orr, Pulte, Gilbert, and 
Duggan is an intervention in governing Detroit as much as it is an intervention in its blocks. By 
making blight synonymous with Detroit’s problems, DDP leaders could intervene locally without 
transforming the political-economic determinants of Detroit’s decline and instability.  
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Detroit’s blightocracy relied upon the perceived, conceived, and lived spaces of 
demolition to justify blight removal. The faces of power met the production of space; different 
conceptualizations of Detroit and its problems provided opportunities to govern and intervene. 
But more than control or domination, such a confluence between policy and geography allowed 
the mechanisms behind Detroit’s decline to remain beyond the reach of the city’s interventions. 
Political power and space converged to place the environments, achievements, priorities, and 
resources of demolishing Detroit off the map and off the public agenda. Demolition was 
produced politically and maintained institutionally. In the next chapter, I show how DDP and the 
Duggan blight regime created the favorable conditions for contractors to command the 
institutional dimensions of demolishing Detroit – how the necessity of removal turned from 
governing and developing the city into generating income from its destruction. Demolishing had 
to be produced financially and materially. Even in the city’s emergent blightocracy, demolishing 
was not a conveyor belt of equipment, resources, and labor, but a regional market constructed to 
reward contractors and their ability to control the regulation and valuation of backfill material. 
 
107 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Backfilling the Blightocracy: 
Rentiership, Regulatory Capture, and the Dirt on Detroit 
“Hence, money may be dirt, although dirt is not money.” 
– Marx, K. (2004). Capital: Volume I. Penguin. 
In this chapter, I answer the questions: How did backfilling become a main focus of the 
Detroit Demolition Program’s (DDP) administration? How did contractors create or control 
value from backfilling? I show how demolition contractors exploited the perceived emergency 
around blight to exploit the regulatory and compliance processes around the backfill program. 
Demolishing Detroit expanded to include backfilling Detroit. This expansion opened spaces for 
value extraction. By illustrating the evolution of backfill – from an innocuous concern in 2014 
dealings between contractors and officials to the biggest obstacle facing the program – I argue 
the DDP not only yielded control to contractors but became a willing partner in building 
permissive accountability and enforcement measures. I address the consequences of these
contractors possessing this authority over backfill and the financial, institutional, and political 
stakes of the DDP and its partners regulating the program. The absence of substantive controls 
on backfilling is not a failure of regulation but a form of valuation and regulation that has 
allowed contractors to generate incomes through dirt by wrecking Detroit’s vacant buildings. 
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 Demolition Production and Dirt Costs 
By the fall of 2015, allegations of misconduct in the Detroit Demolition Program (DDP) 
had fueled public anxiety and press enquiry (Burns, 2015). In the latter part of October, the City 
of Detroit Inspector General (OIG) opened Case No. 2015-CC-0179 to probe whether the Detroit 
Building Authority (DBA) had manipulated a Request for Qualifications (RFQ) in 6/2014 to 
award Adamo, MCM, and Homrich – the region’s three major wreckers – millions in Hardest Hit 
Funds (HHF) contracts to complete demolitions in the summer and fall of 2014. Mistrust over 
high costs and unclear compliance prompted OIG to pursue a review of the RFQ (LeDuff, 2015). 
After three years, on 12/18/2018, Ellen Ha, the city’s Inspector General37, released a report 
detailing OIG findings from its investigation into the contract bidding process of the Detroit 
Demolition Program (DDP) (City of Detroit Office of Inspector General, 2018). OIG scrutinized 
the development of that first DBA RFQ, 2014 meetings between these large-unit contractors and 
DDP leadership, and the DBA’s internal process for soliciting bids and awarding the contracts.  
In its 2018 report, the OIG determined DBA and the Detroit Land Bank Authority 
(DLBA) had improperly prevented smaller demolition contractors from participating in those 
DDP contract meetings. Despite the process lacking “fairness, openness, and transparency,” the 
OIG’s investigation did not find evidence of corruption or fraud in the DDP’s 2014 actions. OIG 
concluded the DDP had sought out large-unit contractors because the city needed to spend 70% 
of a $52.3 million HHF allocation by 10/7/201438. MSHDA allocates HHF through the Michigan 
Homeowner Assistance Non-Profit Housing Corporation (MHA) upon completion of an 
 
37 The Office of Inspector General is responsible for investigating “waste, abuse, fraud, and corruption in City 
government.” 
38 The rationale was large-unit contractors had the equipment, experience, and bonding to complete contracts that 
smaller firms lacked capacity to complete. 
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agreement between itself and its blight partners39. The HHF Blight Elimination Program requires 
partners to spend 25% of an allocation in the first six months, 70% within a year, and 100% 
within 18 months. Failing to meet these deadlines risks surrendering unspent funds and future 
ineligibility. MHA, DLBA, and Detroit Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr had reached an HHF 
agreement six months prior in 10/2013. However, by the beginning of 4/2014, the DDP had not 
completed a HHF demolition40. DDP leadership determined that city agencies would not be able 
to spend the requisite 70% of its HHF allocation without tailoring unit-price contracts41 to fit the 
needs of the region’s largest demolition contractors: MCM, Adamo, Homrich, and Bierlein42. 
DDP officials felt these high-volume contractors were favorable to DDP’s production goals43. 
 For Ha and the OIG, the DDP’s explanation for the unit-price RFQ made sense given 
MHA deadlines and the urgency to identify high-capacity demolition firms44. The bid process 
and contracts did not violate any local or state policies. The DDP needed to quickly award 800 
demolitions in additional contracts to hit its spending goal45. In addition to accelerating 
demolitions in the city, DDP officials had imagined the large-unit pricing model could appeal to 
other high-capacity demolition contractors in the Midwest and the United States (City of Detroit 
Office of Inspector General, 2018; Ferretti, 2015) – a dimension of the DDP that never left the 
draft stage. In addition to those friendly pricing models, officials also predicted the stable 
 
39 MHA and MSHDA use the term “blight partners” to refer to local agencies and authorities responsible for 
executing a blight removal plan. In many cases, independent public authorities serve as these partners instead of the 
municipal government. DBA and DLBA are independent public authorities supported by the city’s government. 
40 The DDP had allocated $421,000 to contractors to manage the program. Barry Ellentuck, the president of ADR 
Consultants, was an early manager of the DDP. His relationship with the DDP culminated in litigation over unpaid 
bills and allegations of fraud. 
41 DDP had earlier RFQs for demolition contracts aimed at smaller contractors. 
42 Bierlein – based in Midland, MI - chose not to participate in the program. 
43 Staff with the DBA and DLBA frequently refer to demolition as “production.” The word “production” disembeds 
demolition from the geography and political-economy of Detroit and sets it aside as an industry with its own logic. 
44 75-100 properties per week 
45 $36,610,000; Detroit had already awarded HHF contracts for another 2,200 demolitions. 
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financial resources, the volume of demolitions, and bundled contracts would relax any doubts 
about the pace of work and the strength of the market. The DDP opened the RFQ on 6/14/2014 
and closed it on 6/19/2014. They already knew the winners. In July, DBA awarded Adamo, 
Homrich, and MCM the unit-price contracts and proceeded with a portion of HHF demolitions. 
The DDP established a $.52 per cubic foot price for the HHF demolitions based on 
comparable prices in previously awarded contracts. Managers shaped the pricing structure based 
on meetings with contractors prior to the RFQ. The contracts included accommodations for 
change orders because contractors expressed concern that the size and scope of the DDP could 
exhaust the free backfill46 material sources that contractors rely on for completing demolitions. 
The $.52 unit price per cubic foot did not account for backfill costs. This was an intentional 
choice by DDP administrators despite a warning from Atwell Group47, a Southfield-based 
construction consultant hired to review the DDP’s structure and strategy, that “The market 
conditions and the clean fill compliance have made it virtually impossible to obtain free fill at the 
volumes required for this phase of the HHF project (OIG, 2018, 18).” Unprecedented backfill 
needs for constant demolition meant a dirt market would spring from the sudden demand and the 
exhaustion of free supply. In effect, the DDP transformed dirt into a commodity. To revise Marx, 
dirt may not be money, but for Detroit demolitions dirt became money in disguise.  
In line with Atwell’s prediction, the condensed timeline to tear down 3,000 properties in 
six months placed extraordinary strain on the existing network of builders and material yards 
providing backfill to demolition contractors. Anticipated clean sources proved contaminated and 
the summer construction season depleted truck fleets and overcommitted hauling services. State 
 
46 An RFP from the DDP defines backfill as: “Material with which Open Holes shall be filled to Final Grade Level 
and that has been previously approved for use according to Specifications.” 
47 Atwell Group turned down a formal DDP offer to manage the backfill program. 
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agency testing disqualified presumptive sources of material like the construction of the Little 
Caesars Arena (LCA), the I-96 highway overhaul, and the completion of the QLine streetcar 
(Stafford, 2019h). DDP leaders at the time felt a failure to adjust awarded demolition contracts to 
incorporate those unanticipated backfill costs would endanger the DDP’s demolition production, 
undermine contractor confidence in management, and thwart the success of the program (Helms 
& Guillen, 2015). DDP appeased the firms. The OIG report concluded 96% of demolitions 
completed by Adamo, Homrich, and MCM by 10/2014 included change orders for unexpected 
backfill costs. These change orders resulted in a total price increase of $4,183,736.22 over a 
period in which Adamo, Homrich, and MCM combined to demolish 2,229 properties at a cost of 
$20,065,195. In other words, backfill costs accounted for over 20% of the HHF dollars spent in 
the six-month period during which the Duggan administration introduced and launched the DDP.  
The OIG’s attempt to uncover dirt on the DDP’s contract negotiations had revealed how 
contractors mobilized dirt to maximize the distribution of HHF and grab at all available value. 
DDP leaders attributed the spike in backfill costs to a lack of clean and free fill material. At the 
same time, the DDP increasingly relied on contractors to establish their own supply chains for 
sourcing backfill material. The DBA and DLBA trusted contractors to accurately report their 
hauling and material costs for provisioning clean fill. All of this happened at a time in which 
DDP officials treated residential abandonment as an existential threat to Detroit. For powerful 
private and public interests, the achievement of demolition would coincide with the city’s 
renewed developability. One significant consequence of institutionalized this approach to 
managing decline was an almost unavoidable dependence on contractor control and access to 
material sources, backfill supply chains, and the logistics of demolition. The process of 
demolishing had to expand to include backfill material and its market. Alongside a medley of 
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public institutions responsible for executing the intersecting visions of Kevyn Orr, the Detroit 
Blight Removal Task Force (DBRTF), and Mayor Mike Duggan, the early months of the HHF 
program illustrates the opportunities available to contractors to capture and command the city’s 
emergent blight-removal regulation scheme to serve a set of financial and industrial interests.  
I analyze the development and regulation of this backfill program from 2014 until the end 
of 2018. I argue the DDP’s backfill program illustrates how demolition contractors positioned 
themselves to shape the finance and regulation of demolition – intentionally and unintentionally 
– as well as be primary beneficiaries of the DDP’s urgency to wreck abandoned properties. 
Rather than the muscle to support city-builders attempting to realize grand redevelopment plans, 
contractors extracted value wherever possible from the DDP. Regulators did not turn a blind eye 
to that extraction. Rather, regulators relinquished the steering wheel. I argue these demolition 
contractors took advantage of the “blight is cancer” philosophy that justified a rapid realization 
of a blight-free (and governable, and developable) Detroit (Pierog, 2014; Detroit’s Fight Against 
Blight, 2014). Although the OIG cleared the DDP of misconduct related to early HHF dealings, 
the formal process by which the DDP awarded those contracts in summer 2014 and its financial 
consequences illustrate how regional contractors commanded the incipient demolition program.  
In a 2015 interview, Tony Kashat, an AKT Peerless principal ultimately responsible for 
the DBA backfill program, described how the initial urgency surrounding residential demolition 
marginalized the perceived significance and constrained the organization of backfill program: 
The primary focus was getting houses down and remove the blight, stabilize the 
neighborhoods. There’s a lot more that goes into it. Quickly behind it is this idea that as 
the volume of demolished houses goes up, the strain and stress on the clean fill materials, 
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it became more costly. There wasn’t a clear reference in previous RFP to backfill and 
soil. Just an assumption we’d get clean stuff. (Personal communication, 2015)  
In this chapter, I show how the city was slow to implement protocols for handling backfill 
material but also how this reinforced the interests of contractors. The lack of depth and the length 
of delays in regulation were not failures or mistakes. Over time, backfill evolved from a 
“problem” to a “question” and finally a “program” that developed and institutionalized 
organizations, guidelines, and monitoring processes48. However, the workings of the program 
were unclear even to contractors, who were quick to accuse the city of slowing production with 
fatuous bureaucracy. Contrary to these claims of red-tape, I find the DDP adopted an “innocent 
until proven guilty” approach to monitoring quality, quantity, and financing of backfill. DDP 
managers and officials recognized the risk of pressing contractors into a regulatory scheme that 
could complicate contracts, discourage firms, or jeopardize the pace of demolitions. Demolishing 
Detroit meant backfilling Detroit, a process that required its own standards, scale, and supply. 
The DDP’s regulatory ensemble – made of DBA, DLBA, Mayors Office, and MSDHA – did not 
limit contractors. Rather, DDP management crafted a regulatory system that would achieve its 
goal of a blight-free Detroit while facilitating and enabling contractors to identify and grab value. 
I argue DDP leaders nested the backfill program in the immediacy and necessity of 
ending the blight emergency. DDP needed to ramp up demolition and depended on contractors to 
execute that agenda. Although this incongruency appears to be a gap in implementation, I show 
how the current state of the demolition and backfill programs is largely an artifact of 
unchallenged contractor power allowed through regulation rather than simply unregulated into its 
authority. It was not the absence of standards that allowed demolition to become “a clear and 
 
48 Current controversy (2/2019) over the city’s backfill program suggests that the DDP has come full circle and 
backfill is again a problem. 
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present danger to the community" but the effect of DDP’s prolonged effort to balance demolition 
production and public safety to ensure continued community support (Cwiek, 2017). Contractors 
approached the DDP as a stream of money to be dominated, dammed, and directed. A 9/2019 
report in The Detroit News confirms contractors fabricated and invented prices for dirt and both 
MSHDA and DLBA approved of these practices until 2017 (Ferretti, 2019b). The backfilling 
dimension of Detroit’s administration of home demolition entwines finance, industry, and 
regulation. Demolition contractors delivered on the objective of demolishing Detroit’s blighted 
house while also strengthening their command over the city’s built and regulatory environment.  
DDP established and mobilized the backfill program to align with the logistical and 
industrial priorities of regional contractors. The supply of backfill became a secondary market 
upon which the success of the entire demolition program depended. Backfilling became as 
important as taking down empty buildings. As time passed, demolition backfill emerged as its 
own touchstone in the political debate and conflict over the DDP. Technical considerations and 
engineering concerns about dirt quality entered the public discussion and helped Mayor Mike 
Duggan and DDP leadership pivot so the necessity of backfilling became synonymous with the 
necessity for demolishing. The ubiquity of blight combined with the seemingly bottomless 
reserve of Hardest Hit Funds (HHF) encouraged DDP boosters and managers to frame 
demolishing as the jolt the city and neighborhoods needed to stabilize and revitalize. Regulation 
served a dual function: mollify skeptics and enroll contractors as partners. As Duggan shared in 
2014, “The complexity of the blight problem is amazing. You have HUD regulations, you’ve got 
banking regulations, you’ve got environmental regulations. (Headapohl, 2014)” But rather than 
inhibit action, each sphere served to enable demolition contractors and their networks. The 
apparent emergency of Detroit’s blight created justification for the DDP to regulate backfill into 
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an asset class that automated value-grabbing in post-crisis Detroit (Fields, 2019). Popular and 
policy appetites for a disaster of blight and restructuring public institutions around demolishing 
Detroit also provided for and opened space for rentiership and regulatory capture in backfilling.  
 Finding the Dollars in Destruction: Relevant Literature 
 Three currents of work in political economy and geography relevant to regulatory 
capture, rentiership, and disaster capitalism. Each are fundamental to developing my description 
and analysis of the practices and processes associated with the DDP backfill program. In the 
previous chapter, I addressed how the priority of interventions placed “beyond politics” shaped 
the DDP’s approach to demolition and implementing the program in city neighborhoods. 
Drawing from scholars on law, emergency, and politics, I argued the DDP attempted to position 
demolition as a necessary undertaking outside history, segregation, profit, and authority. 
However, as I concluded, the DDP was not a post-political or anti-political undertaking49. 
Rather, DDP leaders subscribed to a form politics that institutionalized emergency and 
marginalized structural determinants and social relations producing residential abandonment. 
Where once a blight emergency shaped the context of governing Detroit, a blightocracy emerged 
to prioritize demolishing as both an achievement and expedient. The apparent absence of politics 
– the rendering technical – was itself a political project aimed at developing and propagating a 
consensus enabling the blight crisis to reshape policy and administration. In the below, I draw on 
currents of research on rent, regulation, and disaster to extend this administrative logic and 
interpret consequences for the financial and regulatory dimensions of DDP backfilling. 
 
49 In the previous chapter I explain why the terms “post-politics” and “anti-politics” can treat late capitalist or 
entrepreneurial approaches to government as an erasure or expulsion of radical or progressive politics instead of a 
countermovement with conservative, pragmatic, or market-fundamentalist politics. 
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 Disaster Capitalism 
In his recent criticism of capitalism’s appetite for catastrophe, Jorgen Randers – the 
author of Limits to Growth - concluded, “It is profitable to let the world go to hell (2015).” Such 
an observation about the market potential of disaster resonates with Neil Smith’s (2006) 
clarification on the socio-genic characteristics of calamity. Reflecting on Hurricane Katrina, 
Smith wrote, “In every phase and aspect of a disaster – causes, vulnerability, preparedness, 
results and response, and reconstruction – the contours of disaster and the difference between 
who lives and who dies is to a greater or lesser extent a social calculus.” Natural disasters are not 
nature’s wrath against man; the co-constitution of the built and the natural means social inequity 
serves as a multiplier of calamity’s effects (Kaika, 2004). Whether the consequence of 
anthropogenic climate change or socially determined vulnerability, at least a portion of a 
“natural” disaster can be traced back to the institutions, policies, and investments that shaped the 
context of its effects. As such, disasters do not reset the social, economic, or political landscape; 
their effect can be one of intensification rather than simply eradication. Adolph Reed Jr 
described this dynamic acerbically when he wrote of New Orleans, “The people who were swept 
away or simply overlooked…were the same ones who were already swept aside (2008, 148).” 
Crisis, therefore, does not erode context. Instead, crisis is made possible only in social context. 
Within these spaces of intensification, powerful interests possess the ability to preserve 
and reinforce their position by sacrificing destroyed, depleted, and contaminated areas (Lerner, 
2010). Paroxysm exploits the incremental violence (Nixon, 2011). The uneven social order may 
be fundamental to an economically productive afterlife of disaster, but catastrophe prompts a set 
of financial maneuvers that can turn tumult into windfalls (Schumpeter, 1942). The blank slate – 
social, spatial, or institutional - is an attractive business proposition: out with the old, in with the 
117 
 
new. Capitalism and disaster are uniquely twinned in a political economy in which floods, 
earthquakes, and hurricanes can be favorable in the short-term to the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of developed economies (Neil Baily, 2011). That temporary favorability becomes a 
permanent inclination for agitating markets and industry. Those fixes and expansions depend on 
periodic local and global devastation to transcend the low returns from past investments (Arrighi, 
2004). More than moments of creative destruction instating innovation, upheaval has taken on a 
foundational role in management best practice (Nolan & Croson, 1995; Hart & Milstein, 1999).  
But weathering incidences of technological uncertainty is different than inciting or 
prolonging that instability in the pursuit of grabbing value. In Shock Doctrine, Naomi Klein 
(2007) shows how global corporations and state actors depend on destruction to establish and 
expand markets. She writes, “Believers in the shock doctrine are convinced that only a great 
rupture – a flood, a war, a terrorist attack – can generate the kind of vast, clean canvases they 
crave. It is these malleable moments, when we are psychologically unmoored and physically 
uprooted, that these artists of the real plunge in their hands and begin their work of remaking the 
world (25).” Democracy is meant to serve as a shield against these ruptures – a stabilizing 
structure that prioritizes collective good over corporate – but constant crisis has created a 
commodity of insecurity for corporate actors to extract value (Loewenstein, 2015). Vulnerability 
and dereliction are now pillars of income-generation at a time when the declaration of emergency 
no longer mediates and manages disaster but demonstrates the opening of market potential. 
Disaster capitalism instrumentalizes catastrophe to “promote and empower a range of private, 
neoliberal capitalist interests (Schuller & Maldonado, 2016).” A border crisis enables private 
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detention camps (Delgado, 2018). A drug war enables mass incarceration (Alexander, 2010). A 
blight emergency enables a billion-dollar home demolition program (Abbey-Lambertz, 2013).50 
In her ethnography of post-Katrina housing security, Vincanne Adams portrays how New 
Orleans’ recovery provided windfalls for for-profit firms that treated the rebuild as an exploitable 
market opportunity (Adams, 2013). The aftermath of Katrina provided succor for public housing 
opponents that used the devastation as an excuse to finish off remaining complexes, with one 
conservative US congressperson admitting, “We couldn’t do it, but God did (Saulny, 2006).” 
While divine intervention is an improbable culprit, the outcome appears constant. Destruction of 
the variety wrought by Katrina created the opportunities for investment and accumulation that 
thickened the silver lining until it concealed the entire storm cloud. In the wake of catastrophe, 
crisis production emerged as the dominant industry in town (Roitman, 2013). Exploiting, 
reinforcing, and normalizing disaster proved essential to generating income from it. The appeal 
of disaster capitalism as a philosophy – and one consonant with American neoliberal capitalism - 
has been its relationship to creating and adding value to the GDP while also stabilizing class 
dominance (Harvey, 2007). Technological innovation and (eventual) shared growth provided 
relief to the immediate pain of change. However, Komlos (2016) has argued the destructive side 
of creative destruction now dwarfs any claims to creativity. Rather than a gale that galvanizes 
change by anticipating productive activity, creative destruction is now a persistent maelstrom 
extracting rent and redistributing that value to powerful classes (Purifoy & Seamster, 2020).  
 Rentiership 
 In 1974, Anne Krueger outlined a theory of rent-seeking. Her approach spotlighted the 
positive correlation between regulation and rent-seeking, specifically related to competition for 
 
50 A vaccine for a pandemic. 
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government-provisioned licenses. For scholars like Krueger and some Marxist scholars, rent-
seeking can be reduced to a distortion or corruption of economic processes – a wrench in the 
gears of production and competition. However, following Birch (2019) and his engagement with 
technoscience, I argue rentiership should be approached as a form of historically situated value 
extraction and the consequence of spatial-specific configurations of institutions and policies. 
Rent-seeking and rentiership are not flaws within the urban process under capitalism; they are 
expressions of the relationship between state and capital rooted in appropriating value. As 
Ferguson (1999) concludes of African mining operations, what might be considered market 
inefficiencies or policy failures by one party are thriving economic sectors for others. Disaster 
capitalism is one such approach to developing and maintaining political-economic conditions 
compatible with this generation of income. Rather than an unearned income or an error, rents are 
made possible by transforming a possession into a commodity. Whether data (Sadowski, 2019), 
knowledge (Fuller, 2019), or housing (Teresa, 2019), curation and standardization provides the 
foundation of a discrete asset class upon which expertise, regulation, and markets may develop. 
Rentiership is the “circulation of money and profit through non-productive forms of value 
appropriation (Andreucci, Garcia-Lamarca, Wedekin, & Swyngedouw, 2017).” As David Harvey 
has suggested, rent brings “together an understanding of the ongoing production of space and 
geography and the circulation and accumulation of capital. (2010, 183).” Rent and accumulation 
may overlap, but the resources and strategies of the former distinguish its class struggles from 
the latter. Where capital accumulation depends on production and myriad fixes to sustain its 
profit rate, rentiership relies on the monopolization of assets and the distribution of that value 
without appreciation or expansion (Sayer, 2020). If accumulation is the violent, vigorous river, 
rentiership is the still, glassy oxbow lake. Rentiership, Lapavistas (2013) has argued, generates 
120 
 
income without contributing much of anything. Perched beside the exploitative features of late 
capitalism is this rentier capitalism of predation – a political-economic relation that extracts and 
funnels value (Pollin, 2007). The occupation and appropriation of existing value – notably within 
the built environment – thwarts capital flows across space that would usually operate as the 
engine of the capital accumulation process. The rentier class serves as an intermediary that 
assetizes its possessions and deploys them to intensify control over urban space (Moreno, 2014). 
Andreucci and his co-authors are astute in recognizing rent relations rely on flexible 
property rights to enact conversion of use-values into exchange-values. Their term, value 
grabbing, renders “visible and politicize taken-for-granted distributional relations (2017, 29).” 
For them, value grabbing is synonymous with mobilizing the rent-relation to appropriate surplus 
value produced elsewhere – the rentier does not control the means of production. Property 
regimes and entitlements back this transformation into exchange-values. Proprietorship may be 
essential but so too is the role of the state to preserve and reproduce bonds between rentiers and 
the built environment. Regulation enables and formalizes concentration of ownership. Scholars 
have argued the control of resources and the revaluation of nature serves as a useful distinction 
between accumulation and value extraction. (Greco & Apostolopoulou, 2019). As such, to avoid 
the abstraction that comes from world-historical explanation, analysis of rent-relations must 
address concrete arrangements of resource (nature), assets (property), and regulation (state). 
 Rent, therefore, exceeds a price representing differences between superior and inferior 
products or land (Ricardo, 2012), nor is it synonymous with a price paid for a use by another 
person (Smith, 1977). These classical definitions centering supply and demand do not capture 
political conflicts over space and resources. Notwithstanding the importance of price, the 
struggle for power is central to accounting for the workings of rent and the system that stabilizes 
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this social relation between labor and capital (Marx, 1992). Currents of thought drawing on 
critical traditions have grounded the study of rent-relations in specific land, property, and 
resource regimes. Land values under capitalism remain an artifact of potential and capitalized 
rents on property and housing (Smith, 1979). Capital’s circulation in space enacts an iterative 
process of devaluation and revaluation of land within a regional geography of uneven 
development in which the powerful extract the surplus value (Smith, 1987; Harvey, 2005). The 
risk and reward of rentiership– as the distribution of value rather than an additive process – is 
fundamental to probing gentrification and speculation. Hammel (1999) evaluated land price 
change over 130 years to illustrate neighborhood change in Minneapolis, MN. Darling (2005) 
employed a similar approach to shifts in value in rural Adirondack communities and the swift 
transition from individual owners to developers. Haila’s (2015) study of the “rent question” in 
Singapore uncovered value extraction regardless if land is “private, common, public, collective, 
state, municipal and shared (71).” By reframing Krueger’s rent-seeking as political rent-seeking, 
Haila drew attention to the policies that allow and maintain rent-seeking. These institutional 
patterns – in Minneapolis, the Adirondacks, or Singapore – make value-grabbing possible. 
 Regulatory capture 
 Policymakers and officials construct and shape institutions to safeguard income-
generation through extraction. Rather than a separate sphere of relations, these choices signal the 
social dimension of economic life (Polanyi, 2001). Rent requires monopoly control over the 
supply of an asset, but the state safeguards the conditions of that ownership. Concomitant with 
rentiership, regulatory capture – in which special interests use and influence government power 
for their narrow advantage over that of the public (Levine & Forrence, 1990) – is essential to 
making sense of value-grabbing. Despite arguments by Pautz and Rinfret (2013) that regulatory 
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capture is a rare occurrence, the role of policy and institutions in enabling business models based 
on value-grabbing is well-documented (Sadowski, 2020). Capital’s continuity depends on allied 
modes of regulation to attenuate internal contradictions (Boyer, 1990). Jessop and Sum (2006) 
argue the stabilizing force of the state on capital is essential to the scale of modern production. 
Regulationist literature approaches accumulation and regulation as a dynamic socio-economic 
process of capitalist institutions managing crisis tendencies within labor markets (Peck, 2001), 
bond markets (Peck & Whiteside, 2016), urban politics (Goodwin, Duncan, & Halford, 1993), 
and education markets (Cohen, 2017). Therefore, the state and mode of regulation play a major 
role in enabling accumulation and normalizing markets in the provision of collective goods.  
As scholars in the Regulation School tradition, Andreucci et al (2017) describe three 
ways the state regularizes, facilitates, and enables rent-based social relations. First, it controls 
property and associated entitlements. Second, it acts as a regulator of uses and how they apply to 
development and ownership. Finally, the state can take the role of a landlord and control access 
to its holdings and resources. Scholars have argued the state is essential to understanding how the 
rentier class controls private property, innovation, and accumulation processes (Parenti, 2015; 
Jessop, 1990). Importantly, the state and its agencies regulate the boundary between public and 
private to the benefit of industry instead of people or place (Davis & Abraham, 2013). In a 
concrete sense, the revolving door between industry and watchdog – capital and state – illustrates 
how the inside/outside dynamic of regulation blurs to accommodate capture. Makkai and 
Braithwaite (1992) have distinguished three varieties of capture: industry identification; 
sympathy for private firms meeting standards; and absence of toughness. But more than a failure 
of monitoring or enforcement, regulatory capture indicates the ways in which public institutions 
serve the goals rentiership and prioritize income generation over maintaining collective good. 
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 Research Methods 
My analysis in this chapter draws on backfill and demolition records at the city and state 
levels. By focusing on the financial transactions and approval date for backfill transactions, I 
have grounded the backfill program in specific practices to de-fetishize the process and pathways 
used by the DDP and its contractors. I have adopted an approach laid out by Christophers (2011) 
and followed the money and the regulation that enabled the value-grab by contractors – this, of 
course, also requires following the dirt (see Chapter 4). Importantly, following the money means 
moving between different venues of policy and industrial practice; the inside and outside of 
regulation blur together. Profit and income provide more than incentives for firms to act; the 
prospect of extracting value from the DDP also shaped the contexts in which institutions 
monitored action – determining the scope, depth, and spaces of regulation. Records from local 
and state agencies illustrate the lengths to which the DDP went to accommodate the practices 
and processes of powerful and smaller-scale demolition contractors. My research identifies how 
the interaction of blight removal money and backfill material served to ensure contractors could 
bring production demolition to Detroit without the bogeyman of regulatory challenges. 
Beginning in 3/2015, the Detroit Building Authority (DBA) maintained an internal 
spreadsheet record of demolition backfill transactions (n=8,239). I also use data I obtained 
through Detroit’s demolition open data portal that provides addresses, dates, contractors, and 
wrecking costs for HHF and non-HHF beginning 1/2/2014 (n=16,737). In addition to the city’s 
data, I draw on Michigan State Housing Development Authority (MSHDA) data on HHF that 
reports costs for each component of a demolition (n=13063). This MSHDA data includes dirt 
costs for demolitions completed using HHF between 4/2014 and 3/2018. I matched the 
destination addresses of the backfill data to the demolition addresses of the MSHDA cost data 
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and created a database containing every HHF backfill transaction beginning in 2014 and running 
until the middle of 2018. Each demolition in this dataset was linked to a cost, volume, and origin 
of approved backfill material. In response to a FOIA request, the DBA also provided cost records 
for a series of demolitions between 1/31/2017 and 7/11/2018 (n=2,675). I have used these data to 
construct a record and narrative that shows how DDP addressed backfill and created the 
regulatory plasticity that contractors could shape towards their own purposes and priorities. 
 How Backfilling Became the “Biggest Problem” 
On 11/23/2015, WDET, the NPR station based in Detroit, posted an update on the city’s 
residential demolition program. “Detroit’s Blight Problem…and Solutions” reported on efforts 
by the Detroit Land Bank Authority (DLBA) to address residential blight through the Detroit 
Demolition Program (DDP). Although the bulk of the story features an interview with Craig 
Fahle, a former-WDET host and the then-DLBA spokesperson, it does include a quote from 
Mayor Mike Duggan drawn from a public statement he made to a meeting of city council: 
The biggest problem turned out to be filling the holes… When you’re knocking down 25 
a week you can always find some office park somewhere where you can go get the dirt 
and fill in the hole for free somewhere nearby. When we started doing 150 and 200 a 
week, we used up every bit of dirt within 20 miles of Detroit. We had to get trucks. We 
were going out to Rockwood and Port Huron. The cost got so high at some point that we 
were driving up the truck prices for the hockey arena deal because we were hiring the 
trucks away from the hockey arena to go get dirt. We brought 2 million cubic yards of 
dirt into this city in the last 18 months to fill holes. (Batcheller,, 2015) 
Duggan’s observations are instructive because they show the limits of unleashing bulldozers to 
transform a city. Having reached a multi-scale consensus in early 2014 on the potency of 
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demolition to realize the city’s revitalization, DDP moved forward from DBRTF with a halo 
burnished by positive coverage from local, state, and national press (AlHajal, 2014b; Byrnes, 
2014; Rushe, 2014). Before late 2015, Detroit inhabitants, institutions, and investment interests 
appeared to share a comprehension of the city’s blight challenge, but also the costs involved and 
administrative virtuosity necessary to eliminate it. However, the necessity of backfilling and 
scarcity of backfill tested the goal of accelerating residential demolitions across neighborhoods.  
Although spirited advocacy, flattering news coverage, and glossy guides illustrated unanimity for 
and the urgency of Detroit’s demolishability (DBRTF, 2014); the practice of demolition faced 
dwindling reserves of dirt. Demolition officials had neglected to address how demolishing – a 
process aspiring to wreck over 40,000 houses in 5 years – was embedded within both a regional 
industry of wrecking and a logistical space insulated from slogans of ineluctable progress.  
Despite plaudits for the DDP’s blight removal bravado, officials and contractors 
struggled to build a backfilling program. Attention to money and feasibility had marginalized 
material and physical requisites to wrecking. John Gallagher, a columnist with the Detroit Free 
Press, crystalized these challenges in a 12/2014 writeup. After describing the city’s demolition 
ambitions – 200 per week and 10,000 per annum – he alights on the logistical complications 
associated with Detroit’s goals. He writes, “Shortages of trained workers, trucks, bulldozers, and 
even enough clean dirt to fill the basements left behind after a house is demolished challenge the 
city's efforts (2014).” Large projects – Little Caesar’s Arena and the I-96 reconstruction – were 
poised to provide plentiful stocks of material but heavy metal and salt content forced contractors 
to seek out rural sand pits and gravel quarries. Commercial backfill sources equated to higher 
material and hauling costs. Contractors were billing the DDP and MSHDA for material that only 
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eight months earlier they had forecasted to be free and readily available. The rapid launch of the 
program meant a minor cost of business became a full-blown secondary market (Trickey, 2017). 
DDP ambivalence towards backfill costs appears to be a failure to establish and 
streamline its regulatory and institutional approach, but a review of the official demolition 
process suggests another blind spot that established market conditions for backfill. By 
overlooking backfill the DDP was not ignoring an essential ingredient to demolition; rather, the 
program and its administrators had taken an entire industry and turned it into an on-demand 
service. This is less of an oversight than a regulatory choice that sealed off the regional and 
industrial process of demolition from the policy and engineering practice of demolition. 
According to one local contractor, a residential demolition in Detroit takes a 23-step course over 
2-3 as shown in Figure 1251. Prior to arriving at the demolition site, a contractor also proceeds 
through a period of pre-demolition activities required for DBA and DDP compliance.  
 
51 Eric Dovas – the Vice President of Estimating for MCM Management – provided this sequence in an email on 
September 17, 2015. 
Figure 12: Demolition summary provided 
by Eric Dovas of MCM Management 
(Personal correspondence, 2015) 
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The apparent technical recipe culminating in a completed demolition camouflages the 
supply chains that make demolishing possible. Notwithstanding efforts to instrumentalize 
demolishing as a predictable decision tree, blight removal is not tantamount to awarding 
contracts and awaiting the arrival of a crew and machinery; nor is it wrecking a house and 
relocating the remainder to a landfill. Networks of haulers, contractors, suppliers, consultants, 
and administrators shape and steer each stage of the demolition. As evidenced by MCM’s 
understanding from its order of operations, backfill is just step 16 in a choreographed dance of 
engineering between demolition contractor and demolition program. But this serves to obscure a 
sprawling network that makes step 16 (and backfilling) possible, achievable, and lucrative for the 
contractor. Backfill and demolition are not items rolling along on a conveyor belt and 
conveniently delivered to an address in Detroit. Backfilling sits within a region of interests that 
produce and perpetuate configurations of industries, resources, and value. Approached this way, 
backfill is more than a set of properly mixed ingredients – it is a chain of achievements across 
space, sectors, and spreadsheets. These are chains of capital and production that can contradict 
and conflict with demolition-dependent redevelopment. They can also render invisible the 
process by which contractors use backfill to capture and extract value in Detroit. 
More importantly, step 16 in this sequence undermines its significance to the producing 
demolition and DDP operations. The technical practice of demolition is one step while the 
backfilling process is five separate steps. Backfilling a hole is not an intermediate stage of action 
but a logistical and environmental process around which the entire DDP rotates. In 2015, Detroit 
City Council expressed concern that improper backfilling would jeopardize the goal of 
demolition: creating developable vacant land (LPD, 2016). To put this another way, without the 
identification, extraction, and circulation of backfill material, the entire DDP may fail to achieve 
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the objective of rebuilding the city through demolition. As I show later in this chapter, backfill 
was not a contributing factor to the success of the DDP – backfilling determined success for the 
program. However, contrary to those pressures, DPP leader and officials treated filling holes as a 
one point in an on-demand operation. The DDP awards the contract, contractors wreck the 
structure, contractors fill the hole. Contractors, on the other hand, turned the essential process of 
backfilling into a market where dirt became an asset and valuation could surpass regulation. 
 The Levers and Leverages for Ground Control 
Despite fanfare about the Motor City Mapping Project (MCMP), demolition officials 
with DBA and DLBA launched the DDP a month prior to the release of a demolition framework. 
The DDP emerged in the context of the unit-price approach and moved rapidly to spend down 
over $50 million by 10/2014. Residential demolitions drawing on HHF funds commenced on 
4/24/2014 with the teardown of 16763 Woodingham by ABC Demolition. ABC received 
$6,900.00 to remove the structure, backfill the hole, and grade the lot52. In the first full month of 
HHF-demolitions – 5/2014 - the DDP contracted out 183 demolitions totaling $1,747,788.61 to 
eight contractors. HHF-supported residential demolitions continued through the summer of 2014 
with production dwarfing the launch period. From 6/2 to 8/20, the DDP paid contractors 
$12,990,635.63 to complete 1,120 demolitions at an average of 200 demolitions per week.  
The pace of demolitions, however, did not satisfy city leaders and DDP management. On 
8/21/2014, Kevyn Orr released a new emergency manager order aimed at rectifying 
inefficiencies. In three pages, Order No. 33 – Order Suspending Certain City Demolition 
Requirements to Address Blight – reasserts the city’s blight emergency from Order No. 15 and 
continues Orr’s practice of lifting restrictions on the industry and practice of residential 
 
52 MSHDA does not have a Dirt Cost for this demolition. The file shows $750 for “Lot Maintenance.” 
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demolition. While the previous order lightened rules applied to contractor credentials – thus 
increasing the volume of qualified wreckers – the 2014 order addressed the rising costs of 
demolition backfill. Orr ordered:  
Section 12-11-19.10 of City Ordinance 290-H establishes certain requirements with 
respect to demolition of residential properties and filling of excavations. Such 
requirements include specifying the type of fill to be used. The specified fill procedures 
impose severe financial burdens on efforts to address the City’s Blight Emergency, as 
described in Emergency order No. 15 and continuing today, specifically, they require the 
City, its Departments, and the City of Detroit Building Authority (the “DBA”) and the 
Detroit Land Bank Authority (the ‘DLBA”) to spend approximately $6,000 on fill for 
each residential demolition. (2014, 2) 
By framing the burden of rising backfill costs as a contributor to Detroit’s blight emergency, Orr 
deepened the apparent crisis to release the DDP and its contractors from guidelines required by 
Detroit municipal code. Orr goes on to link the blight emergency as a major determinant of the 
city’s financial precarity with deleterious effects on Detroit’s “public health, safety, and 
welfare.” He explained compliance with established backfill rules “imposes unnecessary costs in 
connection with the demolition of blighted structures which needlessly impair the City’s efforts 
to address the Blight Emergency (2014, 2).” The solution was clear. He ordered contractors to 
recycle excavated concrete basements by crushing them into “pieces no larger than 8 inches.” 
Contractors would fill excavated basements with this material and finish with clean topsoil. For 
Orr, the suspension of rules and the adoption of “Alternative Fill Procedures” allowed agencies 
to “more effectively address the Blight Emergency.” There is little evidence to suggest Orr’s 
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change in backfill rules contributed to lower costs.53 From then through 9/8/2014, the DDP 
funded the demolition of another 449 residential structures at a total cost of $5,970,366.20.  
Orr’s declaration was just the beginning of regulating and then re-regulating backfill. On 
9/9/2014, the DLBA and DBA posted a request for proposals (RFP) to contract with outside 
environmental firms to administer a new demolition backfill program. Until this point no formal 
arrangements provided oversight on backfill practices. The RFP sought “Materials Testing 
Consultants” capable of assuming responsibility over five components of the city’s program: 1) 
Track origin and destination of backfill; 2) Interpret backfill testing reports; 3) Approve or reject 
material based on testing; 4) Communicate and record approval process; 5) Perform testing at 
request of the DLBA (DLBA, 2014). The RFP required backfill material to be tested in 
accordance with Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ)54 procedures and 
residential soil standards included in “Cleanup Criteria Requirements for Response Activity” – 
state-level rules for screening and detecting levels of hazardous substances55. The DLBA closed 
the RFP on 9/17 and announced its selection on 9/22. DLBA awarded project management to 
AKT Peerless, an environmental consultant based in Farmington Hills, MI, with additional 
technical assistance provided by the Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Authority (GDRRA). 
GDRRA is an independent local governmental unit established in the late 1980s and, according 
to its website, provides “efficient, environmentally responsible waste disposal service to the 
 
53 There is virtually no way to definitively determine if Orr was describing an actual cost problem. MSHDA data 
from most of 2014 is inconsistent and contractors were not reporting backfill costs in accordance with any standard. 
The DDP did not report backfill costs for non-HHF demolitions. Contractors completed 1,875 demolitions as of 
8/21/2014. Only 251 demolitions have a backfill cost listed with MSHDA, totaling $306,137.89. The average 
backfill cost was $1,224.55. During the year after Orr’s declaration, backfill costs averaged $1,973.25, exceeding 
$2,000 over June and July 2015.. 
54 Rebooted on 4/22/2019 as the Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy 
55 Acenaphthene to Zinc 
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residential, commercial, industrial sectors of Detroit (GDRRA, 2018).” According to USEPA 
staff, GDRRA negotiated contracts with potential corporate suppliers of backfill material56. 
In the weeks following the close of the backfill RFP, representatives of Detroit’s health 
department appeared in local and national press coverage declaring the demolition program’s 
unprecedented commitment to transparency and sustainability policies. David Manardo, 
Duggan’s Group Executive for Operations, explained his departments were prioritizing safety in 
what was becoming the “largest undertaking of residential demolition in the history of the 
country (Detroit raises safety, 2014).” In candid photos accompanying these reports, contractors 
modeled the wet-wet method of dust prevention57 and public health officials touted their 
aggressive approach to maintaining environmental safety relative to lead and asbestos. Regina 
Royan, an epidemiologist with the health department in 2014-2015, underlined the DDP and her 
department were more than capable of meeting the challenge of monitoring the safety and 
sustainability of the demolition program. She remarked, “This effort is the largest municipal 
redevelopment strategy in the country, maybe the world. When you think about these extra 
environmental and public concerns, why not address these up front? (Hulett, 2014)” Despite her 
enthusiasm, the Taskforce on Demolitions and Health scrutinized the DDP dust controls in 2017 
after blood analysis confirmed elevated blood levels in children living near demolitions (2).58 
Journalists and officials praised Duggan and the DDP’s commitment to public health, but 
the DDP was slow out of the gate to establish backfill guidance and monitoring. Although the 
USEPA released a statement in 9/2014 recognizing the DDP for practices balancing “speed, cost, 
 
56 FCA being the largest 
57 Demolition contractors use a “dustbuster” to mist demolition sites with water and reduce lead and asbestos 
particulate. In the early stages of the DDP, contractors frequently used mister equipment but recent site visits (2018-
2019) confirm contractors are now using high pressure water hoses. 
58 The thirty-page report on health does not mention backfill. 
132 
 
and environmental performance (DBA, 2020),” the DDP did not formalize backfill guidance 
until 12/18/2014. The first backfill transaction (date, address, source, volume, contractor) did not 
appear in approval records for another three months59. These records contain six transactions in 
2014 and 52 transactions in 2015 before DDP officials and AKT both claim they made the online 
management system available to contractors (Ferretti, 2019g). Contractors submitted these 
backfill transactions months after the completion of each demolition. The first HHF demolition 
in DDP backfill records is 2931 Halleck – completed by Homrich on 7/28/2014. However, 
Homrich did not report the backfill transaction until 11/19/201560. On average, contractors 
reported backfill transactions for those first 58 demolitions 282 days after completion. DMC 
Consultants submitted a record for 4003 Gilbert almost four years after completing a demolition. 
Although officials and regulators stressed the DDP’s heightened focus on public health, 
the inconsistency and scarcity of backfill records between the launch of the demolition program 
and the first entry in the DDP’s platform suggest the city was not prepared to monitor material 
or, at worst, that managing the backfill program was delegated to contractors themselves. DDP 
managers used the necessity of demolition production to justify initial gaps or missteps in 
program oversight (Snell & Ferretti, 2017). Duggan observed of this time, “We were acting with 
urgency. In retrospect, we were trying to do too much too fast.” During this period, the city 
approved $43,650,962.83 in HHF funds with 11 contractors to tear down 3,285 buildings. 
Although backfill costs are not available for 1,611 demolitions conducted in 2014 and 2015, 
HHF records include payments for backfill material at the remaining 1,674 demolitions in the 
 
59 Homrich reported the first backfill transaction in the city’s record on 3/12/2015. The contractor sourced 3,440 
cubic yards of material from The Corners of Cherry Village – a suburban development in Canton, MI – for the 
demolition of 8539 Grand River. However, this was not supported by HHF and the city’s own demolition records 
report that another demolition contractor – 1 Way Service - wrecked the building on 2/18/2015 for $22,025.00.  
60 Homrich did not distinguish the backfill cost from the demolition cost. 
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sum of $3,893,875.03. State records confirm money changed hands, but not how the material 
changed places. Demolition backfill costs during this period averaged $2,326.09 per house.  
The irregularities of these figures show the DDP was unable to match action to the 
rhetoric of protecting public health. Tony Kashat of AKT Peerless admitted the backfill 
compliance process was anything but turnkey, sharing “Smaller [contractors] need a lot of 
handholding and training.” Contractors had grown accustomed to ignoring prior monitoring 
process, but new regulatory schemes attempted to expel those behaviors from their routines. 
Even with Detroit officials and DDP administrators describing the novelty and impact of new 
measures, records show little oversight until mid-2015. As a result of these delays and gaps in 
monitoring, it is difficult to verify the quality of the material used to fill and grade demolished 
properties over those 11 months (4/2014 - 3/2015). Leaders of the DDP claim to possess paper 
records for transactions during this period and into the first half of 2015, but a 3/2019 report by 
The Detroit News illustrated DDP’s current recordkeeping and retrieval measures were lackluster 
compared to the challenge of the task (Ferretti, 2019g). Farkas explained then, “We see the fact 
that some records may not be immediately retrievable as a reflection in the record keeping 
process, not as a reflection of our work in the field to ensure the use of clean dirt.” Farkas was 
confident paper records for these transactions would eventually be located and shared publicly61. 
Even as the DDP’s backfill monitoring process ramped up, the quality of transaction 
information provided by contractors remained inconsistent and unreliable. The monitoring 
platform shows contractors were free to submit inaccurate information without consequence. 
Two transactions by SA Torello on 4/25/2015 report “Detroit” as the destination for 80 yd3 of 
material from 3500 Dove Road in Port Huron, MI. Incorrect destination addresses is just one of 
 
61 Farkas was able to produce a limited number of requested paper records to The Detroit News but eventually 
ceased updating reporters with information on the missing transactions. 
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the routine errors in backfill records.62 Those early transactions show SA Torello as a demolition 
contractor even though Homrich was responsible for those teardowns. A simple review of public 
data confirms SA Torello has never completed a demolition under the DDP and an online search 
indicates the company specializes in fill and excavation services. This is only a minor example of 
the frequent mistakes and inaccuracies in the DDP’s data. In my analysis of the DDP backfill 
records, I identified a consistent pattern of errors. Contractors submitted wrong or flawed 
backfill data on at least 151 transactions totaling over 80,000 yd3 of material. These ranged from 
seven instances of contractors misspelling “Detroit” to 115 in which contractors misspelled the 
street name: Lahser became Lasher; St. Aubin became St. Auburn. In Table 5, I compile these 
errors along with the contractor responsible for submitting the flawed transaction information. 
Contractor Reporting Errors 
313 Construction 1 
Able Demolition, Inc. 8 
Adamo Group, Inc. 33 
AKT Peerless 1 
Berkshire Development 1 
Blue Star 3 
Direct Construction Services 6 
DMC Consultants, Inc. 21 
GLO Wrecking 1 
Homrich 21 
Rickman Enterprise Group 47 
S.A. Torello Inc. 2 
Salenbien Trucking & Excavating 
Inc 5 
Smalley Construction Inc 1 
Grand Total 151 
 
Table 5: Backfill record errors in DBA dataset by demolition contractor (2014-2018) 
 
62 In Chapter 1, I described the process of obtaining and cleaning the city’s backfill data. I corrected the errors listed 
in this section but I thought it crucial to identify the ubiquitous mistakes in the records as evidence that contractors 
had wide berth to manage the city’s demolition program.  
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While the DDP backfill data indicates the careless reporting by demolition contractors, 
these mistakes also demonstrate another way in which AKT’s approach to the approval process 
failed a stress test. Contractors submitted transaction information, AKT approved that transaction 
information, and DDP maintained that transaction information as an accurate record of the 
backfill program. Regardless of the quality of the material distributed to these addresses, the 
errors complicate the shared narrative on public health and material quality. DDP managers and 
administrators stated their confidence in the safety of the program, but their records suggest at 
least 151 instances when contractors misrepresented basic source information. Safe harbors for 
inaccurate information are inconsistent with Kashat’s focus on changing backfill practices, 
“[Contractors are] looking for dirt from everywhere. Left unchecked they’ll bring in anything,” 
But even when checked, DDP permitted contractors to turn source nowheres into somewheres. 
When pressed by city council, Duggan provided one logistical explanation for escalating 
costs and regulatory leniency, but another suggests new and old contractors leaned into a stable 
market for demolition bankrolled by public money. The emergence of 313 Construction and 
Gayanga both demonstrate how demolition became a growth industry in Detroit that encouraged 
startup firms to enter the market. Between 2015 and 2016, 313 Construction completed 41 
demolitions worth $518,688.58 in DDP contracts. Sonja Poncy incorporated 313 two weeks 
before the DBRTF released its demolition guide. Notwithstanding Pouncy’s observation, “We’re 
truly in the thick of a renaissance in Detroit (Thibodeau, 2016),” the DDP has not awarded 313 a 
contract since 2016. In 2017, Gayanga Co. LLC completed 35 demolitions in the HHF program 
totaling $445,222.35 in contracts. Gayanga also completed another 449 demolitions outside the 
HHF program to the sum of $9,934,610.15. In 2016, Brian McKinney incorporated Gayanga – a 
“construction engineering startup” - after returning to his hometown of Detroit from Houston, 
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TX. In a 2019 profile appearing in Crain’s Detroit, McKinney described how he used data-
mining to obtain DDP contracts and “figure out where the market should fall (Livengood, 
2019b).” Despite Gayanga’s precision, DDP officials briefly suspended them in 2019 over 
concerns the firm failed to properly excavate basements during demolition (Ferretti, 2019f).  
The greenness of 313 Construction and Gayanga is not an anomaly in the DDP. Five 
demolition contractors – BBEK, Blackstar Global, RDC Construction, J Keith Construction, and 
Detroit Next – incorporated within two years of the DDP. These five have demolished 116 
properties since 2014 totaling $1,645,455. FutureNet Group, a contractor completing demolitions 
in 2014, tore down 88 properties to the tune of $1,088,477 before the Department of Justice 
brought charges against its CEO for bribing a former director of Detroit’s technology department 
in a scheme unrelated to DDP (Snell, 2018). Inner City Contracting – an engineering firm dating 
back to 2009 – did not conduct residential demolitions until 2019 but has torn down over 100 
properties since joining the DDP in 9/2019. Beginning in 2014, the Detroit Training Center 
(DTC) – a for-profit vocational training center - launched its Blight Removal Program available 
to students for $3,500. DTC marketing materials state, “Let’s bring out Detroit’s full potential. In 
order to improve our city, we need trained and certified professionals in urban blight removal 
(DTC 2020).” The six-week program includes eight certifications so trainees can join a 
“dramatically growing industry” in Detroit and Flint (DTC, 2020) despite contractors sharing 
that curriculum is unwarranted for entry-level work at a demolition site63. Whether for services 
or training, DDP deepened the demolition market and turned destruction into a lucrative venture  
 
63 Contractors expressed doubt the DTC-trainees would enter a position requiring any of these advanced 
certifications. Most contractors train laborers on their own practices. In one encounter at a DMC site, an entry-level 
laborer admitted her job was holding the hose to control dust as an excavator operator tore down the house. 
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The powerful, experienced firms have also benefited from a robust demolition economy. 
In 3/2015, John Adamo, the CEO of Adamo, told a reporter with Construction & Demolition 
Recycling Magazine, “We would welcome a steady workflow over an extended period of time so 
it would be good for everyone if this work would continue at this pace (Smith, 2015).” Prior to 
the DDP, Adamo had not considered itself a residential demolition contractor, but the advent of 
the new program and the insistence on production meant Adamo was now busier than any 
previous time in its five decades of operations. In the same writeup on Detroit demolitions, 
Anthony Abela, a manager at Homrich, echoed this sentiment and described how his firm had 
invested in “a new fleet of six Komatsu 240 excavators with buckets and thumbs specifically for 
the residential demolition program64.” Regional contractors once specializing in industrial and 
commercial projects had retooled to concentrate on Detroit’s thousands of house demolitions. 
Notwithstanding both companies’ newfound appreciation for residential blight removal, neither 
Homrich nor Adamo websites mention the DDP or any home demolition in their past projects65. 
Homrich and Adamo remain special cases within the DDP. For most contractors, 
producing and using the crushed concrete fill made legal by Orr in 2014 is cost prohibitive for 
most smaller, regional demolition contractors. According to the EPA, both experienced firms had 
developed an industrial approach and possessed the capacity to crush basement concrete on site. 
The remainder of contractors had to purchase new equipment or identify their own crushed 
materials sources to take advantage of Orr’s re-regulation of backfill. Initially favoring larger 
contractors, the shift in policy would open new terrain for value-extraction. Though it would take 
ten months for the source to first appear in DDP records, Mid-Michigan Crushing & Recycling 
 
64 Machinery dealers are protective of pricing for new models, but Machinerytrader.com lists this model used for 
$87,000. Models with fewer hours – including one 240 manufactured in 2018 – list for $250,000.  
65 Both firms emphasize services for industrial and commercial companies, institutional, or utilities. 
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(MMCR) – based in Fenton, MI – entered the city’s growing backfill market when it shifted its 
production site in Highland Park, MI. MMCR is located on the footprint of the defunct Model T 
factory adjacent to shopping centers studdding Woodward Avenue66. Despite owning concrete 
crushing equipment, Homrich was the first contractor to purchase backfill from MMCR to 
complete the demolition of 16503 Strathmoor. Homrich reported a dirt cost of $3,750.00 on 
6/9/2015. The DDP backfill records do not disaggregate by specific residential addresses but 
shows the contractor sourced 840 cubic yards of “crushed aggregate” for 13 HHF demolitions. 
Orr’s decision to lift rules on backfill had created a new regulatory environment in which 
transforming rubble into rents was not a by-product of compliance but a primary achievement.  
On 6/12/2015, Next City – an urbanism blog with a national audience – featured both 
Royan and Farkas praising the standards and compliance practices of the DDP (Owens, 2015). 
Each official implicitly describes the lack of formal accountability in prior demolitions programs 
that enabled contractors to skirt public health regulation. Invoking outlaw imagery, Royan 
described Detroit demolition practices prior to 2014 as loose and ad hoc. Royan was not alone in 
characterizing this unruly period as an artifact of the sloppiness of Duggan’s predecessors – 
administrations that had sidelined resident welfare67. An EPA staff member called this the 
“Don’t ask, don’t tell” period of Detroit demolition. Farkas was unequivocal that DBA and the 
DDP had overhauled its formal regulatory approach to monitoring and sanctioning demolition 
backfill. Farkas remarked to the reporter, “We realized that there was really no [fill dirt] testing 
that went on beforehand. Think about that. We were about to undertake the largest demolition 
 
66 I examine this property in depth in a latter section. 
67 Although Farkas does not accuse Mayor Dave Bing’s administration of irresponsible management, Mayor Mike 
Duggan had previously criticized Bing and Kwame Kilpatrick before him for giving contractors free rein over the 
quality of demolition work and backfill.  
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operation probably in the country, if not the world, and there was kind of an honor system on the 
type of dirt we were putting in the holes. Immediately we were like, ‘That’s not going to fly.’”  
 Dirt Becoming Money in Disguise 
Farkas’ confidence in reform may have been immaterial. The DDP’s honor system 
remained resilient even as he boasted about a new era of compliance. DDP records show the city 
paid out $309,508.00 to three contractors – Adamo, Homrich, and Able - to tear down 24 houses 
on the day his interview appeared. Nineteen demolitions drawing on $261,416.00 in HHF. Only 
eight of these HHF demolitions are linked to both backfill source and backfill cost records (all 
Homrich).68 MSHDA reports $30,000 in backfill costs for those demolitions. However, MSHDA 
also reports $11,455.73 in HHF for ten Adamo demolitions and $3,750.00 for one additional 
Homrich demolition69. This means $15,205.73 in HHF paid for backfill material that is not 
linked to any specific source or approval record. While Farkas is commending DDP efforts to 
implement and monitor robust protocols, major demolition contractors are flaunting backfill 
guidance and distributing untracked material to fill basements. More importantly, by the time 
Farkas and Royan’s positive spin reached NextCity’s national audience, AKT Peerless and 
GDRRA had served as the DDP’s official backfill program managers for nearly seven months. 
Soil testing was never tantamount to ending the honor system of demolition backfill. Rather, 
DDP officials used testing to suggest high quality material required patience with high costs. 
The empty suit of regulation in 6/2015 is not unusual for the DDP, but the sum of 
unapproved backfill costs during 2014-2015 is subject to a variety of important disclaimers. As I 
stated earlier, inconsistent contractor reporting and inferior data management are partly 
 
68 The backfill volume is not disaggregated for these 8 demolitions.  
69 12873 Stout; 12822 Stout; 13529 Kentfield; 12153 Archdale; 12069 Archdale; 12047 Archdale; 12900 Vaughan; 
19740 Ashton; 7248 Ashton; 6354 Ashton; 14317 Westwood (Homrich) 
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responsible for the estimate. First, the DDP and its administrators claim the online platform 
through which contractors submitted backfill transactions was not accessible until 3/2015 and 
therefore could not have been used to track backfill70. However, the backfill data contains 58 
backfill transactions for demolitions between 7/24/2014 and 3/2/2015 in the sum of 
$131,505.8771. ABC Demolition submitted 48 transactions totaling $120,050.00 in backfill costs. 
Homrich submitted six transactions totaling $11,455.87. Contractors were able to submit sources 
and transactions for review by AKT Peerless during a period in which DDP management also 
claims only paper records could demonstrate formal approval of material. Under different 
circumstances, these transactions could be forgiven as mistakes due to slow adoption by 
contractors or an incremental intensification of the DDP’s method of compliance. However, 
transactions into 2016 show a pattern of regulation captured and controlled by contractors. 
Submitting sources to a platform prior to the platform’s existence raises a red flag, but 
1,171 demolitions are also not attached to a state record of dirt cost. This period begins with 25 
demolitions on 7/24/2014 with a total of 1,113 through 2014. Another 55 demolitions lack cost 
records in 2015 (while 2016 and 2018 each have only one demolition with a reported $0.00 for 
backfill). Mary Townley, a MSHDA director leading blight removal, offered the explanation that 
individual demolition contractors approached reporting backfill costs differently at the launch of 
the program than later periods. Some contractors included the cost within the total demolition 
while others reported it separately. There is no way to know for sure how much contractors were 
spending on backfill material at the beginning of the DDP. Even accounting for the change 
orders in 2014 on 96% of those demolitions – a total of $4,183,736.22 for backfill alone – does 
 
70 DDP officials claim they were maintaining paper records for every demolition prior to March 2015. 
71 ABC Demolition batched many of these demolitions, so it is impossible to identify the specific backfill volumes 
for each demolition over this period.  
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not clarify unapproved contractor expenditures. Contractors requested additional HHF funds but 
MSHDA did not have the data to report those costs independent of general demolition costs. 
Recognizing the implausibility of free backfill – especially at during a period when contractors 
working in Detroit were expressing alarm about access to fill material – it stands to reason that 
the sum of total unapproved backfill costs beginning in the summer of 2014 is deceptively low.  
We can attempt to fill gaps. The average backfill cost during 2014 was $1,580.56. The 
average backfill cost in 2015 was $2,035.44. The same figure for 2016 was $1,608.08. The 
average for 2018 was $1,721.42. By inferring from these averages, I estimate an additional 
$1,850,835.76 in backfill costs for 2014, $111,949.20 for 2015, and $3,329.5 combined for 2016 
and 2018. This represents an extra $1,966,114.46 in potentially unapproved backfill costs. 
Because I calculated these figures from estimates based on averages, I do not include this in the 
above tally of unapproved backfill costs. It is possible demolition contractors were able to 
identify free or discounted stocks of backfill material. However, this figure suggests another way 
in which contractors disguised backfill costs, by hiding it within the total cost of each home 
demolition72. In an interview, Eric Dovas summarized this approach when he explained, “Demo 
contractors assume to pay for backfill and reap the benefit when it comes for free, a gamble of 
sorts.” Free or not, demolition contractors reported a backfill price to the DDP and expected 
MSHDA and its HHF allotment to cover the cost regardless if it reflected their own expenses. 
In 9/2015, Dovas shared an HHF1 cost breakdown his company used to tabulate margins. 
Figure 15 illustrates the typical budget and billing for a residential demolition. HHF1 
demolitions occurred between 10/2013 and 4/2015. The chart states that “Soil material” costs 
 
72 The additional backfill costs would need to be added to both the unapproved cost and the total cost. This would 
increase unapproved costs to $7,438,260.89 and the total backfill cost to $17,165,449.40. By including the estimate 
costs, the percent of costs of unapproved backfill rises to 43%. 
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$745.67, roughly 6%, and “Backfill labor” costs $895.34, a total backfill-related cost of 
$1,641.01, or 12.5% of the demolition figure. This percentage is not consistent in the MSHDA 
data. During the HHF1 period, contractors billed $3,002,216.48 in backfill costs ($152,085.60 
approved; $2,850,130.88 unapproved). Not all 2,813 demolitions over that time included a 
backfill cost. Given the improbability of having no backfill cost (logically and logistically), I 
removed each blank value and $0.00 figure, leaving 1,691 demolitions. Congruent with the 
breakdown, backfill costs during this period represented an average of 13% of the total 
demolition cost. However, the percentage ranged from 1% to 60%. Of the remaining 
demolitions, 667 during HHF1 included backfill costs over 14% of the total demolition – 
Figure 13: Hardest Hit Fund (first allocation to DDP) costs per demolition according to MCM (Personal correspondence, 2015) 
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representing approximately 40% of every HHF demolition conducted in 2014 and 2015. These 
findings suggest contractors invented costs and did so without repercussion.  
By the middle of 2018, the number of unapproved backfill transactions thwarts claims 
about the thoroughness of regulation. Out of the 6,782 unique addresses included in the DDP soil 
management system, 5,324 demolitions received HHF dollars. MSHDA awarded $78,954,995.30 
in HHF to those 5,324 demolitions between 7/28/2014 and 6/20/2018. The last address with a 
backfill transaction in the records provided by DBA is 5611 Wayburn on 6/20/2018 (total: 
$12,064.3; backfill: $1,200)73. Contractors completed 9,875 HHF-funded demolitions during the 
same period at a total cost of $145,730,387.10. However, only those 5,324 demolitions are linked 
to both DBA backfill approval and MSHDA backfill cost records (even if the MSHDA cost cell 
is blank). The total backfill cost for these is $9,736,733.15. The remaining 4,551 do not appear in 
the digital backfill records. This represents $5,472,146.23 in backfill costs without reported 
sources. Figure 16 illustrates these discrepancies for each demolition contractor working until 
summer 2018. Figure 17 maps the distribution of demolitions with approved and unapproved 
backfill sources. Contractors involved during this period failed to provide DBA with a source or 
volume for 47.2% of HHF demolitions and 36% of HHF backfill costs. Four contractors did not 
report backfill sources for any of the demolitions they completed while working with HHF74. 
 
 
 
73 I was not able to obtain DBA backfill transactions records for the period following 6/20/2018. 
74 Leadhead Construction; MCM; Timesavers Contracting; Jenkins Construction 
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Figure 16: Unapproved and approved backfill costs by demolition contractor (2014-2018) 
C
o
n
tracto
r
U
n
ap
p
ro
ved
 B
ackfill C
o
sts
A
p
p
ro
ved
  B
ackfill C
o
sts
To
tal B
ackfill C
o
sts
%
 U
n
ap
p
ro
ved
313 C
o
n
stru
ctio
n
$0.00
$46,733.35
$46,733.35
0%
A
B
C
 D
em
o
litio
n
$134,600.00
$235,850.00
$370,450.00
36%
A
b
le D
em
o
litio
n
$176,200.00
$733,480.00
$909,680.00
19%
A
d
am
o
 G
ro
u
p
, In
c.
$1,868,789.01
$1,087,896.70
$2,956,685.71
63%
B
erksh
ire D
eve
lo
p
m
en
t, In
c.
$1,050.00
$3,500.00
$4,550.00
23%
B
lu
e Star
$241,179.00
$64,541.00
$305,720.00
79%
D
en
-M
an
 C
o
n
tracto
rs
$204,240.06
$8,104.49
$212,344.55
96%
D
irect C
o
n
stru
ctio
n
 Services
$31,795.89
$28,569.75
$60,365.64
53%
D
M
C
 C
o
n
su
ltan
ts
$326,824.67
$1,554,229.77
$1,881,054.44
17%
Esso
 W
reckin
g C
o
.
$68,000.00
$558,000.00
$626,000.00
11%
Farro
w
 G
ro
u
p
$193,500.00
$69,000.00
$262,500.00
74%
G
ayan
ga C
o
$9,525.65
$111,935.72
$121,461.37
8%
H
o
m
rich
$1,576,834.80
$2,788,610.87
$4,365,445.67
36%
Jen
kin
s C
o
n
stru
ctio
n
$28,500.00
$0.00
$28,500.00
100%
Lead
h
ead
 C
o
n
stru
ctio
n
$35,700.00
$0.00
$35,700.00
100%
M
C
M
$140,224.54
$0.00
$140,224.54
100%
R
ickm
an
 En
terp
rise G
ro
u
p
$333,290.61
$1,291,528.00
$1,624,818.61
21%
Salen
b
ien
 Tru
ckin
g &
 Excavatin
g In
c.
$74,721.00
$1,151,608.50
$1,226,329.50
6%
Sm
alley
$445.00
$3,145.00
$3,590.00
12%
Tim
esavers C
o
n
tractin
g
$26,726.00
$0.00
$26,726.00
100%
G
ran
d
 To
tal
$5,472,146.23
$9,736,733.15
$15,208,879.38
36%
145 
 
  Alongside inconsistent practices and unreported dirt costs, the MSHDA records for 
HHF demolitions also include a column for what the agency called “Dirt Refunds.” Mary 
Townley justified this column and the refunds by explaining, "Through some file review we 
determined that dirt costs were overpaid and we needed to create a field for all possible refunds. 
Any refunded money from Detroit was accounted for in each category it was originally reported 
(Personal correspondence, 2018)." During the launch of the DDP over the summer of 2014, 
Adamo Group, Homrich, and MCM completed 1,367 HHF demolitions linked to $3,478,399.78 
in dirt refunds. The OIG report from December 2018 illustrates how these contractors engaged in 
a unit-price contract arrangement that – despite warnings by Atwell Group - did not include 
backfill costs. Because contractors frequently reported bundled demolition costs to MSHDA, it is 
Figure 17: Map of Detroit and status of the Backfill Approval at each Demolition (2014-2018) 
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difficult to identify the original sum of overpayment. State data suggest that over the period 2014 
to 2018 MSHDA management did not hold the DDP to any uniform standard for reporting costs. 
Orr’s move to release contractors from the burdens of backfill standards had succeeded, but not 
because it reduced costs. Re-regulation of backfill became a necessity in a policy environment in 
which 2020 was the deadline for eradicating the city’s blight (Ferretti, 2015). Orr and the DDP 
hoped a different stance on backfill would give the go-ahead to accelerate demolition production, 
but contractors took it as an opportunity to misrepresent material sources and manipulate costs.  
 From Compliance to Capture 
The gap between DBA backfill approval and MSHDA backfill costs is not the sole 
discrepancy contained within the city’s backfill program. The 12/2014 backfill guidance 
document lists compliance requirements for each category of backfill material. If demolition 
contractors source material from locations falling into Category 1 (Residential Construction 
Sites; Residential Landscape Yard Sites) and Category 2 (Virgin (Native) Commercial Borrow 
and Sand/Gravel Pit Sites) they are required to submit “written certifications” to the DLBA. For 
Category 1 sites, these certifications are submitted by the contractor to the DLBA. For Category 
2, the owner or operator of the gravel pit must submit certifications to the DLBA. In both 
instances, the backfill guidance outlines four components of certifications: 1) origin of material; 
2) evidence of clean material; 3) evidence of a native soil source and homogeneous composition; 
4) material is free of debris, large rocks, concrete75. Despite the requirement to provide these 
certifying statements, a former administrator with Able Demolition, a contractor operating out of 
Shelby Charter Township, MI, was not aware of this required practice. There is no record of 
 
75 The DBA backfill monitoring data does not identify the category of material. However, my review of the DBA 
Soil Management Platform – dba.aktpeerless.com – confirms contractors are required to submit this information. 
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these certifications. By mid-2017, her employer had completed 557 HHF demolitions totaling 
$17,647,668.3376. She explained, “We as contractors do have to input the address of the backfill, 
which source it came from and the yardage (Personal correspondence, 2017).” 
In the 4.5 years since that initial backfill guidance, the DDP has not released updated 
protocols. The 2014 guidance remains available for review on the DBA soil management 
platform. In 5/2018, MSHDA circulated a document as part of its authority over HHF. The sixty-
three page “Blight Elimination Program Operations Manual” includes three instances of 
“backfill” and nine for “dirt.” On page 24, MSHDA requires contractors to submit a written 
statement reporting “the source material is free of environmental contamination, is from a native 
source, and free of debris, concrete and other unsuitable substance. This written statement must 
be uploaded in each file [emphasis added].” In a response to a fall 2018 FOIA request for 
examples of these statements77, attorneys with The Allen Law Group (DBA’s FOIA lawyer) 
explained, “Your request has been denied because, after a diligent search for the requested 
records, we have determined and certify that the records do not exist.” AKT Peerless did not 
respond to repeated requests for information pertaining to the requisite backfill certifications. For 
its part, AKT holds no public presence in the DDP. However, AKT’s silence on the program 
serves as an ironic twist on Kashat’s interpretation of his firm’s urgent regulatory role for the 
DDP, “What you find is people ignore the backfill. They just don’t ask the questions. Bring in 
clean fill is all the RFP says. We have one opportunity to do it right. (Interview, 2015)”  
These lapses were not unique to Detroit or Michigan. On 4/21/2015, Christy Romero, the 
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), released an audit 
 
76 Able completed these demolitions between 5/1/2014 and 10/17/2016. 
77 I submitted the request on 9/5/2018, the city confirmed receipt on 9/12/2018, and issued a response on 9/26/2018. 
The request was: Please provide copies of written certifications mentioned in the DBA’s Backfill Guidance 
document for 2014 to the present. 
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of the Hardest Hit Fund Blight Elimination Program. Writing to the Treasury secretary, Romero 
stated, “SIGTARP found that Treasury takes a hands-off approach to the HHF Blight 
Elimination Program and has very limited involvement in the planning or execution of the 
program (4).” Romero accused Treasury of ignoring risks that could culminate in fraud and 
abuse. Moreover, Treasury failed to establish controls and goals for HHF spending and allowed 
state and local governments to treat demolition as an end itself. She wrote, “It is the outcome of 
that demolition, not the demolition itself (6).” SIGTARP expressed concern about a Michigan 
official disclosing MSHDA was not interested in actively monitoring program performance (51). 
Romero criticism was vindicated at the end of 2015 when officials in Evansville, Indiana used 
HHF to fund the seizure and demolition of occupied homes to clear land for a car dealership 
(SIGTARP, 2016, 3). A similar leniency allowed DDP and MSHDA to move the regulatory 
goalposts to fit the priorities and interest of demolition contractors operating in Detroit. 
In addition to internal regulatory concern over backfill, the public’s attention turned to 
backfill in 10/2015 after Charlie LeDuff, a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter formerly with The 
New York Times and The Detroit News, conducted an investigation into escalating demolition 
costs on his WJBK-TV program (LeDuff, 2015a). His reporting showed the price of demolition 
had risen sharply throughout 2014 and 2015 and had exceeded costs under prior mayors. LeDuff 
implied the mayor had established contracting processes skewed to benefit four major demolition 
contractors. To quell these reports and rumors of collusion and malfeasance, Duggan appeared at 
a city council meeting on 10/13/2015 (Helms & Guillen, 2015). He linked inflated demolition 
prices to changes in the regulatory approach to sourcing clean backfill material and controlling 
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the spread of dust at sites. Duggan also attributed part of the cost increase to the DDP’s more 
rigorous asbestos disposal program in contract to leniency in the prior administration78.  
Standing behind a lectern in the Young Municipal Center, Duggan refuted LeDuff’s 
allegations, "To suggest these costs went up because we're doing something wrong, I don't 
believe is true." In his view, backfill costs had risen because the volume of demolitions had 
strained available reserves of clean dirt and forced contractors to venture further and further for 
approved material. The act of approving material became synonymous with regulating the 
material. His explanation echoed the column penned by Gallagher (2014a) reporting how 
excavated material from several major development projects was disqualified as a backfill source 
because of heavy metal and salt contamination. For Duggan, rising backfill costs were a 
distressing but necessary aspect of keeping the pace of residential demolition. Danielle Lewinski, 
a director with the Center for Community Progress and consultant to the DDP, dismissed any 
evidence of misconduct, “It’s not like going to the market and buying an apple that’s going to be 
the same regardless of which market you buy it at (Ferretti, 2015).” Differences in produce 
quality aside, the regional demolition market is more like buying the teeth to chew the apple. 
LeDuff continued to probe and speculate on demolition costs in a series of televised 
reports and confrontations with DDP officials. In a contentious broadcasted debate in 10/2015, 
LeDuff appeared alongside Duggan at the FOX affiliate studio to discuss the DDP backfill 
program and the ballooning costs (WJBK. 2015). Both men volleyed accusations of inaccuracy 
and impropriety. The back-and-forth provided little clarity to Duggan’s or LeDuff’s claims. The 
former rationalized demolition costs as a necessary evil to realize a blight-free city. The latter 
 
78 In a Detroit Free Press report two weeks later (Helms & Guillen 2015b), former Mayor Dave Bing took issue 
with Duggan’s characterization of his administration’s asbestos abatement approach. Duggan also claimed Bing’s 
program never exceeded 25 demolition a week. Bing bristled at the figure and asserted his program tore down 60 a 
week. 
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accused the mayor of rewarding his construction buddies with sweetheart demolition deals. 
However, LeDuff’s reporting had already exacted sufficient damage to the stability of Duggan’s 
signature program. The mayor’s vigorous defense of DDP did not blunt skepticism about 
demolition policy and what interests the DDP was serving. In spring 2016, SIGTARP broke 
precedent79 and subpoenaed Detroit’s Auditor General for demolition cost records, marking the 
beginning of a formal federal investigation into program operations. Mark Lockridge, the 
Auditor General for Detroit, explained SIGTARP investigators were focused on invoicing and an 
alleged conflict of interest involving a member of Duggan’s inner circle and contractors (Guillen, 
2016d). Lockridge viewed SIGTARP’s interest as more than a standard review, “They’re not just 
doing an audit of course.” Erica Ward Gerson, the chair of the DLBA80, chafed at the perceived 
gravity of the SIGTARP subpoenas, “This is the biggest program of this type that anybody has 
ever done in the country. It was needed. We are very proud of what we’ve done. It’s working. 
But we had to invent it. So, you try different things along the way (Ferretti, 2016).” 
Gerson’s explanation of inventiveness only captures part of the regulatory process. 
Where invention stalled, policy accommodation had room for expansion. In a follow-up to his 
initial reports on rising costs, LeDuff challenged Duggan’s cost explanation in a series of 
sensationalized reports on the backfill program. In “Detroit’s Dirty Dirt Drama,” LeDuff 
chronicled how DDP officials revised city ordinances to quicken backfilling processes and allow 
the “alternative fill measures” allowing different quantities of topsoil and crushed fill (LeDuff, 
2016). On the advice of the city’s principal corporation counsel, Detroit City Council integrated 
Orr’s 2014 emergency order into municipal code. From 7/2016 onward, DDP allowed 
 
79 Policy observers and pundits speculated on SIGTARP’s reasoning for subpoenas instead of a formal request. 
80 Duggan appointed Gerson in 2014. The two had previously worked together at the Detroit Medical Center. In a 
profile for The Jewish News, Gerson recalled Duggan saying, ““I can’t do it unless I come up with a policy I believe 
in to cure blight in the city; because if I can’t cure the blight, nothing else I do will matter. (Headapohl 2014)” 
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contractors to use six inches of topsoil in place of the prior three-foot standard. Moreover, as 
LeDuff reports, city attorneys made the rule change retroactive to include backfill processes that 
preceded the ordinance change – this revision released contractors from potential future liability. 
The rule change was not an imperious revision forced on the city by Duggan and his DDP 
lieutenants. The shift originated in a 2015 supplemental report in which the council’s Legislative 
Policy Division (LPD) responded to the body’s inquiries about the technical management of the 
demolition program. David Whitaker, then the Director of the LPD, shared concern demolition 
contractors may not be complying with Emergency Order #33 and its newly imposed backfill 
standards (LPD, 2015b). Whitaker indicated the DBA’s official backfill guidance from 12/2014 
conflicted with the order and that such a contradiction could pose significant problems for 
managing contractor compliance and demolition practices. He wrote, “Therefore, a question 
arising out of these mixed legal and technical documents would be whether demolition standards 
for the City’s ongoing blight eradication efforts are governed by: 1) the terms of the Scope of 
Service Exhibit A proffered as an attachment to the subject demolition contractor management 
agreement with the DBA; or 2) alternatively are they governed by EM Order No. 33 (2)?”  
But rather than lift or rescind the city’s blight emergency, the city council’s solution was 
to incorporate the “substantive provisions” of Orr’s emergency order into municipal code in 
concert with a more elaborate explanation of fill materials and procedures (Gross, 2016). The 
exception became the rule, the suspension became the norm. In passing the change, city council 
formalized four backfill types: clean soil; combination fill; hard fill; and inert material. The new 
ordinance did away with contradictions in requirements and formalized three backfill depths: 
- The portion of the hole or excavated area more than 3 feet below grade shall be filled 
with clean soil, hard fill, or combination fill, at the option of the permit holder. 
152 
 
- The portion of the hole of excavated area from 3 feet below grade to 6 inches below 
grade shall be filled with either clean soil or combination fill, at the option of the 
permit holder. 
- The portion of the hole or excavated area from 6 inches below grade to grade level 
shall be filled with clean soil. 
The rule changes eased stress on contractors and regulators but also meant there was no longer 
an outside to the blight emergency and a possible return to normal. In effect, city leaders and 
DDP officials turned the extraordinary situation described by Orr in 2014 into the ordinary 
context for demolishing and backfilling Detroit. The blight emergency was no longer a 
prolonged exception to the rule of law, the city council incorporated the precepts of the blight 
emergency into the rule of law. The DDP was not just a dramatic response to the cancer of blight, 
it could now be a policy laboratory for the city going into the future. Detroit may have exited 
financial emergency through bankruptcy, but its blight emergency was now permanent. 
Pacifying contractors by collating internal regulation did not relieve pressure from 
external observers. Press scrutiny of backfill costs took on extra significance when DDP 
announced in 10/2016 the Department of the Treasury had suspended demolition activities and 
MSHDA would place observers in the DLBA offices (Wisely, 2016). An ongoing audit had 
uncovered inconsistent bid procedures and inadequate recordkeeping (Guillen, 2016a). The DDP 
had halted demolitions for two months by the time reports surfaced about the audit. Duggan 
admitted then to reporters, “The speed at which we went outstripped the controls that we had in 
place.” MSHDA lifted the suspension in early fall, contingent on DDP imposing new contracting 
practices that limited the size of bid packages and monitored subcontractors (Ferretti, 2016).  
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Notwithstanding Duggan’s admission of responsibility, state and federal agencies 
continued probing and uncovering misconduct. Over 2017 and 2018, local press turned 
scrutinizing the DDP into a genre. In 2017, the US Attorney empaneled a grand jury to broaden 
the investigation into the DDP (Snell & Ferretti, 2017). A different 2016 audit completed by the 
Michigan Homeowner Assistance Nonprofit Housing Corporation (MHA) – coinciding with the 
internal audit - detailed more evidence of no-bid contracts, pricing manipulation, and collusion 
between officials and contractors (Dietz & Hutchinson, 2018). DDP officials immediately 
disputed the audit’s significance and whether its findings rose to the level of criminal activity 
(Guillen, 2018). Despite those objections, the MHA turned the results over to the FBI. 
In early 2019, SIGTARP subpoenaed demolition contractors operating in Detroit for 
backfill records between 2016 and 2018 (Ferretti, 2019i). As one contractor shared with me 
following the announcement of subpoenas, “It’s a tumultuous environment at the moment.” 
SIGTARP’s abrupt focus on backfill brought refreshed scrutiny on DDP’s approach to 
monitoring contractor practices. Investigations by the Detroit Free Press and The Detroit News 
proceeded through the spring of 2019 unearthing and scrutinizing a pattern of violations by 
contractors, including allegations of unverified backfill and unfilled holes. By the end of 3/2019, 
the DDP incorporated ground radar systems to inspect the quality of backfill (Ferretti, 2019e). 
Press reports continued to address whether contractors manipulated the results of soil testing that 
disqualified I-96 and LCA excavations from being used. These reports implied demolition 
contractors deliberately axed the 800,000 yd3 of material from the supply to create the backfill 
market through artificial scarcity. Kat Stafford, a Detroit Free Press reporter, wrote (2019h): 
The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program is also probing 
whether some companies used free dirt obtained from a variety of unverified sources—  
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including the I-96 freeway construction project — and then passed it off as an approved 
residential dirt source before billing the federally-funded Detroit Land Bank Authority 
demolition program for materials they never actually paid for, sources said. 
Stafford’s reporting echoed an 8/2018 post on Deadline Detroit by LeDuff. In that post, he 
shared evidence that the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) had approved I-96 
soils for use in construction projects in communities neighboring Detroit (LeDuff, 2018). The 
free material may not have been contaminated. Diane Cross of MDOT stated, "It was tested for 
heavy metals and Northville required chloride81 testing. It came back at standard levels."  
Concerns over backfill quality intensified in 2/2019. Spurred by questions about the 
quality of material, Mary Sheffield, the Detroit City Council President Pro-Tem, requested US 
congressional hearings on the backfill program (Neavling, 2019). In early 4/2019, Rashida Tlaib 
and Brenda Lawrence, Detroit’s US Representatives, echoed Sheffield and expressed formal 
concerns to the MDEQ and MSHDA and encouraged the agencies renew their scrutiny of the 
DDP. In the joint letter, the congresspersons wrote, "The potential use of contaminated and 
unverified sources of dirt being used to fill these demolition sites presents an alarming lack of 
oversight that could have public health ramifications for thousands of Michiganders (Cottom, 
2019)." Three days later, federal prosecutors charged Aradondo Haskins and Anthony 
DaGuanno, two former employees of Adamo Group, with bribery and corruption (Mondry, 
2019). Before the week’s end, the federal government released a statement that SIGTARP and 
FBI investigations into demolitions and bid-rigging would not produce additional charges (Snell 
& Ferretti, 2019). This statement did not mention the status of the backfill investigation. 
 
81 Road salt. 
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The criminal inquiry into the DDP closed but reporters continued probing. In 9/2019, The 
Detroit News reported findings from an investigation into MSHDA and DLBA’s approach to 
backfill costs (Ferretti, 2019b). Emails obtained through FOIA illustrated a joint failure to 
monitor and scrutinize contractor practices. Early in the DDP, regulators encouraged contractors 
to “simply place a cost in the dirt column.” In 1/2017, MSHDA and DLBA adopted a “cost 
reasonableness” structure that narrowed backfill costs to a range of $2,000 - $2,500 for what one 
staffer called “dinky houses,” with as much as $3,000 for large houses. Prior to the 
reasonableness policy, backfill costs with an approval averaged $3,306, with a range between 
$200 and $7200. After MSHDA changed the cost standard, the average for approved material 
fell to $1,654.03 but maintained a range of $366.03 to $6,912.00. For unapproved transactions, 
the average was $1,630 before the rule change and $1,533.10 after the introduction of the “cost 
reasonableness” standard. MSHDA and DLBA were not able to produce an explanation for the 
sudden decrease in backfill costs. One interpretation would be contractors encountered cheap 
reserves of backfill at the end of 2016. The alternative interpretation is contractors continued 
their practice of concealing inflated backfilling costs in other categories of their expenses82.  
On 8/24/2017, Rebecca Camargo, then DLBA Demolition Director, resigned her position 
(Guillen, 2017a). A spokesperson with DLBA declined to explain. Camargo’s departure 
followed the resignation of the previous demolition director in 1/2017 (Guillen, 2017a). Unlike 
her predecessor, Camargo did not leave town or enter a phase of professional anonymity. The 
former legal counsel and demolition director at DLBA positioned herself as a specialist 
representing contractors working in the DDP. In 2018, Camargo joined Beier Howlett, a law firm 
 
82 In 2016, the DDP hid costs by redistributing money across several demolition contracts to avoid exceeding the 
$25,000 cap on HHF (Ferretti 2016). Example: If the DDP had two demolitions priced at $28,000 and $17,000, the 
DDP would report the latter as $20,000 and the former at $25,000. 
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based in Troy, MI, where she now advises demolition, construction, and real estate clients. Since 
joining Beier Howlett, Camargo has represented BBEK Environmental, Salenbien, Gayanga, and 
Smalley Construction (Kiertzner, 2019; Stafford, 2019d; Ferretti, 2019i). Now through the 
revolving door, Camargo has remained busy in her industry role. DDP accused BBEK of non-
compliance. SIGTARP subpoenaed Salenbien, Gayanga, and Smalley for backfill records.  
Contractors retain the former demolition director as counsel because of her prior insider-
status and ability to navigate the DDP bureaucracy. She is a former regulator now representing 
the regulated. But of comparable significance is the stance Camargo previously took as the 
demolition czar and how that shows through in her present approach. On multiple occasions she 
encouraged contractors to “simply place a cost in the dirt column,” and explained to one the 
figure they reported “is not necessarily reflective of the actual cost” (Ferretti, 2019b). Regulation 
was not a process of monitoring demolition production; it was a process of enabling and 
accelerating demolition production. This is no clearer than in her capacity as a representative of 
BBEK in its suspension for asbestos violations, Camargo was adamant that investigating the 
contractor would jeopardize DDP’s effectiveness. She told one reporter, “They’re the company 
that has the capacity to do it. It’s going to slow down the whole timeline (Stafford, 2019d).” 
The revolving door of DDP officials illustrates how regulatory capture is especially 
crucial to understanding the demolition and backfill programs in Detroit. A former journalist 
once responsible for scrutinizing the DDP joined and then resigned from the DLBA public 
relations team (Dudar, 2018). The perceived urgency of the DDP punched through the already 
porous barrier separating the regulated from the regulator. Recently, the state of Michigan has 
been embarrassed by the consequences of regulatory capture. Gravel and aggregate producers – a 
significant supplier of material for demolition contractors – have come under increasing scrutiny 
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for mischaracterizing the gravel supply in Michigan (Egan, 2019a). This systematic attempt at 
deception was meant to undermine efforts to limit local zoning approvals of new gravel yards. 
According to email records, Michigan Aggregates Association (MAA) encouraged the Michigan 
Department of Transportation (MDOT) to report the state faced a gravel shortage that could 
doom infrastructure and construction projects (Egan, 2019b). MAA leadership then used the 
“objective” MDOT report to lobby state lawmakers to pass legislation83 limiting community 
resistance to new gravel pits and mineral yards. Although the attention has remained on the 
relationship between gravel and road construction, the implications for backfill are significant. 
At least 236,036 yd3 of material for demolitions has originated in pits with MAA membership. 
The Board of Directors of MAA includes two executives from Edward C Levy, a multi-national 
material management firm, that has sold 12,396 yd3 of backfill material to Adamo and Farrow. 
Despite claims to the contrary, the DDP has continued to market the program to national 
demolition contractors (OIG, 2018). McDonagh, a contractor based in suburban Chicago, entered 
the fray by completing 90 HHF demolitions between 12/2018 and 3/2019. By the end of 
February, McDonagh had submitted invoices totaling $1,489,936.70 to the DDP and MSHDA. 
In March, accusations that McDonagh used demolition debris as backfill culminated in DDP 
permanently banning the contractor from receiving future contracts and revoking its city 
wrecking license (Stafford, 2019f)84. The ouster cancelled an additional $15 million in awarded 
contracts (Ferretti & Noble, 2019). DDP officials insisted the expulsion signaled their 
commitment to regulating contractors, but later reports revealed DDP had not uncovered the 
misconduct. A former McDonagh employee reported the violation to DDP officials (Ferretti, 
 
83 Senate Bill 431 – introduced by Adam Hollier (Detroit - 2) – would (in accordance with existing zoning) prohibit 
a local unit of government from deny a permit for mining or extraction if the resource is a) valuable and b) deemed 
safe. The bill remains in committee. 
84 A later cleanup settlement between McDonagh and DDP qualified the contractor for future work. 
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2019h). Farkas admitted the DDP only employed seven liaisons responsible for monitoring 
demolition sites (an improvement over two during 2014 and 2015). In 1/2020, the DDP 
completed 218 demolitions, with as many as eighteen in a day (1/13). According to a recent job 
posting, Field Liaisons for the DBA are “responsible for daily monitoring and interaction with 
various contractors performing all aspects of demolition activities.” Liaisons prepare daily 
reports on demolitions in addition to monitoring pre and post demolition work. When pressed 
about prior stop-work orders related to backfill practices, Farkas could not confirm that Field 
Liaisons had been those responsible for discovering contractor misconduct (Stafford, 2019g).  
 Conclusion: Valuation as Regulation 
In Detroit, consensus around disaster and crisis prompted the formation of the Detroit 
Blight Removal Task Force (DBRTF) and helped justify the Detroit Demolition Program (DDP). 
But rather than the world-shattering emergency of Hurricane Katrina or an earthquake, Orr, 
Duggan, and DDP officials narrowed disaster capitalism to an area code and the institutions 
imagining its political, economic, and social restructuring. Demolishing held promise as a 
response to a perceived crisis, but also in unlocking the potential for neighborhood stabilization 
and revitalization. However, the possibility for rentiership on the DDP – as policymakers and 
officials steered the agenda to fit the monopoly on destruction held by regional contractors – also 
enabled regulatory capture that rationalized, accommodated, and legislated non-compliance. Like 
landlords extracting income from inventory, contractors became a rentier class that relied on a 
preprogrammed process of regulation that affirmed and protected the value of dirt (Fields 2019). 
The structuring of Detroit government around demolishing first entertained in 2013 and 
then institutionalized in 2014 established a new backfilling process that depended on demolition 
contractors to report costs, sources, destinations, and quality. But dirt did not begin as backfill 
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nor as an asset. As Birch explains of assetization, “A process in which value is constituted by the 
management of value and valuation, especially as they relate to organizational entities and their 
capacities (2017, 470).” In other words, valuation and regulation do not always overlap. 
Contractors captured the space of valuation that extended beyond regulation’s reach. Despite the 
state’s demand for refunds during the initial rollout of widespread demolitions, the sudden 
scarcity of free and clean material meant contractors controlled where dirt came from and how it 
was used. Contractors did not avoid and evade regulation, the regulators responsible for 
monitoring their activity crafted standards that prioritized production. Whether gaps in source 
certifications, online reporting, or paper records, each mistake prompted a fix that accelerated the 
DDP and strengthened valuation. Contractors did not produce backfill material, they relied on 
DDP regulation to assetize and then capitalize on dirt. Production was not encouraged or 
frustrated by regulation. Regulation made demolishing feasible; valuation made it practicable.  
The maneuvers by demolition contractors to capture the DDP’s regulatory apparatus 
recalls strategies by corporate actors at a national and multinational level to exploit catastrophe 
for profit. Although property abandonment and blight may not rise to the level of “terrorist 
attack,” Detroit policymakers and the investor class mobilized the language of cancer, crisis, and 
catastrophe to explain blight as an emergency and justify demolition-dependent redevelopment. 
Disaster made demolishing necessary and demolishing made backfilling inevitable. Alongside 
these discourses of cataclysm to rationalize land clearance is a coincident push to view regulation 
as a mutable interference when addressing the emergency. As mentioned in the preceding 
chapter, Pulte, Orr, Duggan, and Gilbert each invoked the urgency of blight removal as reason to 
reshape and transform the institutions responsible for oversight. Klein’s insight suggests how the 
income generation dimension of the blight shock meant demolition contractors possessed 
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authority to steer and command these policies and interventions to directly benefit their own 
financial interests. Contractors saw in the disaster the potential rents through invigorated 
demolition and DDP leaders saw the promise of a blight-free Detroit ready for development. 
 These interests transformed backfill from an unanticipated cost in a fast-moving program 
into a secondary market and value chain upon which the DDP would ultimately depend. 
Regardless of Duggan and the DDP’s explanations for soaring demolition costs, the scarcity of 
clean fill material enabled the sudden emergence of a backfill market. Overnight, the strain 
placed on material by demolition caused a spike in costs as contractors converted dirt from 
recycled waste into a scarce commodity. Questions about supply, demand, and quality remain 
open and continue to jeopardize local trust in the DDP. Although LeDuff and others have 
claimed contractors intentionally excluded LCA and I-96 dirt to justify expenditures, the effect 
of banning that material created a regional environment in which dirt became money in disguise.  
Demolition is a vital public service for managing the built environment and does not 
contain a political essence: progressive, regressive, revolutionary, or authoritarian. Demolishing 
buildings and backfilling holes are and will be fundamental components of Detroit’s ongoing 
neighborhood stabilization. But considerations of value and who has an interest in that valuation 
process matters. Backfilling presented an opportunity for contractors to impose a mode of 
valuation that stretched beyond the regulatory controls of the DDP. The ubiquitous gaps in 
backfill reporting, incomplete or deflecting explanations, the unreliability of the DDP's source 
and destination data, and the delay in establishing protocols to verify material illustrate choices 
of political-economic expediency – the relationship between rents, regulation, and the possibility 
of realizing value - and not the consequences of policy failure. Rentiership was not a flaw in the 
DDP’s method of implementation, it was a feature of implementation – a necessary cost within 
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conducting the business of demolishing. Contractors used these structural conditions to transform 
profit-seeking into value-grabbing. The DDP may have periodically resisted regulatory capture 
with sanctions and suspensions but did little to discourage a different form of capture: valuation. 
As a place-based measure to address the city’s decline, demolishing was less a matter of 
investing to restore neighborhoods than a scheme by contractors to capture value from the DDP. 
In this chapter, I continued the history of the DDP and the emergence of demolition as a 
dimension of local government and regional industry. The priority of demolishing established a 
political-economic environment with conditions favorable to regulatory capture and rentiership. 
The enormity of the blight disaster – an official emergency for those leading the city – forced 
DDP officials and policymakers to prioritize demolition production. But that emphasis on 
enabled demolition contractors to influence and shape DDP and its enforcement processes. 
Backfilling provided a way for contractors to control the demolition market by turning dirt into 
an asset, one the DDP was willing to pay for. I drew on gaps between approved and unapproved 
backfill transactions to show contractors exploited opportunities to use valuation as a form of 
regulation, a strategy accommodated by DDP officials facing production goals. Contractors did 
not corrupt the DDP, nor were they charging premiums for superior products. Rent-seeking was 
a feature, not a flaw. Contractors proceeded within this regulatory environment confident DDP 
officials would adopt their approaches to the material, market, and method of backfilling. These 
findings contrast with existing research on demolition that narrowed the practice to focus on 
outcomes for adjacent properties rather than the contractors and networks involved in 
demolishing. The DDP was not a local response effectively or ineffectively delivered. Instead, 
the DDP was part of a value-grabbing operation that generated income for contractors. 
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In the next chapter, I analyze and discuss the geography of backfilling and its relationship 
to the regional real estate market in Detroit. In late 2014, the DDP issued guidance to contractors 
for backfilling. These standards provided an approval process but also required contractors to 
record their sources. However, if backfilling’s value does not precede valuation and regulation, 
then dirt does not precede its excavation and circulation. As I argue in Chapter 4, the sources 
described backfill as a topographic or geologic feature delivered to a demolition site. In place of 
this approach, I categorize each of the backfill sources based on the real estate and property 
practices that produced the backfill material. The material that becomes backfill is embedded in a 
regional geography of growth, decline, and extraction presided over by an unsustainable 
expansionist logic. The value grabbed by contractors was part of a broader process of 
demolishing and backfilling. As contractors demolish Detroit, their supply chains grow to 
include the regional operations of speculation and capital accumulation. Contractors, haulers, 
excavators, and developers use continued expansion to preserve a landscape in which risky 
housing development is crucial to the regional economy. By bringing attention to these pathways 
for backfilling, I illustrate how demolishing can reproduce spatial differentiation at the regional 
scale. I reconsider sources as an expression of socio-environmental transformation rather than 
regional topography. I move from the value-grab of regulation to the dirt-grab of geography. I 
situate demolishing and backfilling Detroit within a system of development and circulation.  
163 
 
CHAPTER 4 
Soil Horizons and Waste Frontiers: 
A Regional Geography of Backfilling Detroit, MI 
In this chapter, I extend my analysis of backfill management in the Detroit Demolition 
Program (DDP) to include the regional geography of sources. Contractors captured the valuation 
and regulatory processes by manipulating and misreporting demolition costs within a political 
environment that demanded accelerated blight removal. However, controlling the financial 
dimensions of backfill represents only a portion of the authority contractors and their networks 
wielded over the DDP. Although program leaders established source categories for backfill 
material that would confer rapid approval, the regulatory framework treated backfill material as a 
topographic feature rather than a product of regional processes of growth, speculation, and 
expansion. This chapter investigates the origins of backfill and in doing so draws conclusions on 
the material contradictions of demolishing to change neighborhood fortunes and reshape cities.   
River Street in Ypsilanti, MI is rarely more than a means for locals to access the growing 
Depot Town business district at the northwest edge of the small college town’s downtown. At its 
northern terminus, River Street is capped by a pair of sprawling cemeteries before fading into 
LeForge, an undulating county road cutting through fields and golf courses. At its southern 
terminus, River Street meets its end between a KFC and Dairy Queen and fades into a gravel trail 
after merging with Michigan Ave – a busy thoroughfare that slices east-west and links Ypsilanti 
to a chain of industrial suburbs before spilling into the southwestern boundary of Detroit, MI.  
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On 11/20/2015, the link between Detroit and River Street exceeded the ordinary traffic 
feeding into Michigan Ave. That day, Direct Construction Services – an all-purpose contractor 
with offices in Detroit - demolished 14410 Alma and 14418 Alma. DDP records show Direct 
completed the 14410 for $22,500.00 and 14418 for $12,478.96. MSHDA records report the use 
of Hardest Hit Funds (HHF) and list backfill costs for the pair of demolitions on the eastside of 
Detroit. In both cases, Direct billed MSHDA $1,000 in backfill costs. Direct Construction 
sourced the 160 yd3 of material from a site 41.6 miles away: 8 North River Street, Ypsilanti, MI.  
The question, then, is how did this 160yd3 of backfill come to be and what processes 
enabled its production and presence in the supply chain of the DDP? On 5/11/2015, the Building 
Department of Ypsilanti issued a permit to Philip and Roselyn Meyers, the owners of 8 North 
River since 1983, to “REMOVE & REPLACE CONCRETE STEPS DUE TO VEHICLE 
DAMAGE.” They retained Robert Hopps, founder and owner of The Equity Build Company, to 
complete the residential construction project. Hopps crushed the concrete steps and sold the 
material to Direct Construction. On 4/24/2019, the Meyers placed the rehabbed 118-year old 
building on the market for $234,900.00. The Meyers purchased 8 N River for $80,000 thirty-five 
years earlier. On 5/2/2019 they received a contingency offer for the 2-story colonial house. On 
5/31/2019, the Meyers sold the five-bedroom house to Desmond Kolean-Burley, the owner-
operator of CameraMall in Downtown Ann Arbor. Kolean-Burley purchased the property for 
$226,000. Through 8 North River, the chain of backfill relationships enabling destruction in 
Detroit grew to entrain the Meyers, Robert Hopps, and Kolean-Burley in ways that defy 
demolishing as an isolated action in space judged on its relationship to future redevelopment. 
 Backfilling and demolishing are powerful financial processes shaped by regulatory and 
valuation capture .The backfill transaction joining renovation to destruction, Ypsilanti to Detroit, 
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and the Meyers to Direct Construction exemplifies the circulation of soil and aggregate material 
expanding the space of demolition beyond a wrecked address. However, the logsitics, flows, and 
environments of backfilling Detroit go undetected when leaders and observers simplify the DDP 
as an urban megaproject obedient to 8 Mile Road (Cwiek, 2019; Ikonomova, 2018; Trickey, 
2017; Messner, 2016; McKinney, 2015; Griggs, 2014). The Detroit Demolition Tracker – 
released in 2016 to signal DDP transparency – plots the site of daily demolition but omits the 
continuous process behind demolishing that is linked to forms of production and accumulation 
beyond a demolished building (Helms, 2016). The wrecking industry depends on regional 
relations and a supply chain linking River St to Alma Ave and contractors and DDP officials to 
an ever-expanding resource hinterland of decline. The marketplace of demolishing Detroit now 
depends on a secondary marketplace of dirt, gravel, and sand reaped from regional change. DDP 
and boosters vow to identify the billions of dollars necessary for demolishing over 40,000 
buildings (Aguilar, 2015), but backfilling depends on finding at least 10 million yd3 of material. 
In 2015, AKT Peerless estimated the average backfill amount at 250 yd3 per 
demolition85. The DDP’s own backfill transaction records average 189 yd3 per demolition. 
However, the latter figure contains multiple transactions per destination address as well as 
multiple transactions per source address86. In place of that misleading figure, I have chosen to 
use the mode volume of the DBA’s backfill records: 200 yd3. If the DDP can demolish the 
40,000 structures anticipated in the Detroit Blight Removal Task Force (DBRTF) report, 
contractors will need a volume of material comparable to the dirt displaced by construction of 
the 150-mile English Channel in the late 1980s. The construction of the Three Gorges Dam on 
 
85 Interview, 2015 
86 As I mentioned in the above, contractors did not follow any uniform standard for reporting backfill transactions. It 
is difficult to disaggregate the backfill volume without relying on estimates of basement size. 
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the Yangtze River in China moved 13,400,000 yd3 of dirt. The Central Artery/Tunnel Project in 
Boston, MA removed 17,000,000 yd3 of material87. In a 2015 interview, a Detroit Land Bank 
Authority (DLBA) staff member observed, “Detroit needed all of northern Michigan’s timber to 
be built. It will need all of northern Michigan’s dirt to be unbuilt.” The identification, excavation, 
extraction, and distribution of backfilling Detroit will transform houses, the city, and the region.  
In the previous chapter, I showed how demolition contractors working in Detroit, MI 
took command of the DDP by shaping, steering, and controlling the finance and regulation of the 
backfill program. I argued contractors captured the medley of agencies and institutions 
responsible for managing the thousands of residential demolitions. Although policymakers and 
officials claimed Detroit was undertaking the most transparent and public health-conscious blight 
removal project in the US, the slow and sometimes contradictory process to draft backfill 
guidance complicated that characterization. Contractors frequently omitted and misreported 
backfill transactions despite the Michigan State Housing Development Authority (MSHDA) 
reporting dirt costs for each residential demolition. I presented the political and economic 
tensions of the demolition backfill program from its inception to the more recent series of 
controversies that continue to cast a pall over its operation. The scarcity of free fill material 
jeopardized the DDP philosophy of maximizing demolition production. In turn, a commodity 
market for backfill material emerged that DDP officials and administrators struggled to support 
and manage. I showed how demolition contractors have failed to submit backfill transaction 
details for thousands of demolitions and I argued this represents a shift in contractors from 
technicians behind real estate intervention in Detroit to transformative actors themselves.  
 
87 I include these latter two projects because they show the company Detroit’s backfill program could keep should it 
surpass my conservative estimate. 
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I turn my attention from the money and regulatory side of contractor value-grabbing to 
the regional geography and real estate relations of the demolition backfill program. I spotlight 
the material supply haunting the political, logistical, and environmental achievement of 
demolishing Detroit. I focus on the backfill program and its embeddedness in property and land 
use change in Detroit and metropolitan area. As I argued earlier, planning, urban studies, and 
geography scholars often approach demolition as a technical practice with future policy effects 
(Prener, Braswell, & Monti, 2020; Garboden & Jang-Trettien, 2020; Weaver & Knight, 2018; 
Yin & Silverman, 2015). This Cartesian conceptualization isolates and flattens demolition as a 
point in space without probing spatial and material contradictions shaping the process of 
demolishing. Instead, I address the scope and geography of the DDP’s backfill needs and argue 
backfill is not a topographic or geologic feature of the regional environment. Contractors did not 
stumble upon backfill while roaming the metro. Rather, backfill is produced in contexts that can 
contradict demolition-dependent redevelopment. Backfilling relies on material linkages between 
the property relations of a declining city and property relations of regional prosperity and profit. 
This chapter travels in the current of classic and recent scholarship complicating the 
history and origins of urban decline (Hackworth, 2019; Thomas, 2013; Gordon, 2008; Sugrue, 
1996; Beauregard, 1994; Darden, Hill, Thomas, & Thomas, 1990). Rightfully esteemed for their 
authoritative accounts of the racist and classist footings of distress, the emphasis of those works 
on public policy and capital mobility curbed analysis of the diverse industries and strategies 
generating income through decline. By concentrating on the material/materialist production of 
vacant land, I add to critical approaches revealing pipelines feeding property into the portfolios 
of slum lords and land banks (Seymour, 2020; Seymour & Akers, 2019; Akers, 2015; Dewar, 
Seymour, & Druta, 2014). That dirt is a financial and physical artifact carrying legacies beyond 
168 
 
the departure of inhabitants, owners, and excavators complements work examining the pieplines 
behind the production of decline. Developable land does not come from nothing. The points of 
backfill source and destination both depend on the firmness of chains formed by developers, 
builders, excavators, crushers, and contractors. Like the property that lives on after tax 
foreclosure as a speculative vehicle or the contract-for-deed that plunders occupants until the 
building crumbles, backfilling is rooted in conflicts over land and property. These are conflicts 
linked to regional asymmetries that reproduce differentiated urban space. These are pipelines of 
dirt, gravel, and sand – constituents of land - but also pathways for value, policy, and power. 
 Extraction and Environments: Relevant Literature 
Demolition backfill has not attracted the attention of scholars in urban planning and 
geography. Considering this, the robust work on extraction, urban political ecology, and urban-
environmental history can provide some insight into the limits and possibilities of studying 
decline through the geography of backfill. The scholarly literature on extraction88 focuses on the 
ordinary and spectacular forms of destruction associated with the environments of rural mining 
or drilling operations and the “minescape” of capital (Ey & Sherval, 2015). Whether indicative 
of the Anthropocene or the Capitalocene, scholars have pushed concerns over the environmental 
despoliation wrought by socio-political processes of coalmining and hydraulic fracturing to 
center stage (Lave & Lutz, 2014; Mitchell, 2011). For these authors, nature and society are 
always co-productive. Recent work has attempted to expand the concept of extractivism to 
integrate analyses of the hegemony of logistics and the potential for friction, resistance, and 
struggle (Luque-Ayala & Marvin, 2015; Cowen, 2014). Tsing (2009) went so far as to name 
 
88 Scholars have used the term “extractivism” to capture the constellation of political and material that gives 
extraction weight within present and historic structures of investment and policy (Pahnke 2018). 
169 
 
these linkages of profit, flow, and power as Supply Chain Capitalism, arguing extraction is more 
representative of plantation logics at a global scale (Tsing, 2017). New approaches have 
connected extraction to webs of capital accumulation as corporations and governments deplete 
and destroy environments, landscapes, and resources (Arboleda, 2020; Mezzadra & Neilson, 
2017). This scholarship has revealed extraction as an operation of modern capitalism producing 
waste while serving corporate and authoritarian agendas (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2019)89.  
The matter and materialism of soil has also not gone without attention from critical 
physical geographers and political economists interested in the connections enrolling extraction, 
accumulation, and environmental transformation. Blaikie’s (1985) analysis of soil degradation 
remains a landmark text elaborating the capitalist exploitation – rather than irresponsible farmers 
- at the heart of environmental destruction. Bebbington (2012) points to how extraction is 
constitutive of and constituted by political, economic, and institutional arrangements. Calling for 
an “underground political ecology,” Bebbington argues extraction illuminates state-society 
relationships and how they are intertwined with the operations of capital and the economy. In his 
view, extraction and mining are essential to the functioning of capitalism and the invisibility of 
extractive processes to critical analysis has significant political, methodological, and conceptual 
consequences. This is echoed in Lave’s recent work (2014) and her call to create critical social 
theory drawn from a deep materialist knowledge of the environment and its determinants.  
Soil in the above work, however, is an agricultural input subject to social power and not a 
manufactured supply or resource in the production of the built environment. Recent work on the 
manufacture of construction materials and aggregate has illuminated supply chains stabilizing 
the metropolitan condition. By “following the thing” of cement and its place within city-making, 
 
89 The concept of “operation” is an important one for distinguishing the financial dimension of rentiership and 
valuation from the material conditions of supply and resources. I return to this term later in the chapter. 
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Choplin (2019) argued the building material’s prominence in West Africa illustrates the potency 
of the continent’s construction sector to transform cities. Researchers have mobilized these 
construction materials as lenses for clarifying urbanization processes and possibilities for new 
economies and architecture (Minuchin, 2016; Myers, 1999). This work has concentrated on the 
enormous resource appetite of expansion. However, these approaches have prioritized the 
cultures and political economies tied to the assembling of the city and have not addressed how 
these supply chains or construction materials figure physically in non-growth circumstances. 
 My approach to backfill recognizes that extraction and construction material does not 
always illustrate material relationality of places, values, or interests. That a commodity has 
originated elsewhere and has been acted upon does not by itself analyze the entanglements of 
land, labor, and capital making its appearance possible. Gestures to relationality can conceal the 
mechanisms and exchanges underlying the relations90. The question, then, is how these supply 
chains and relationships serve as determinants of urbanization, instead of the urban acting as a 
container for those relationships. Research from within the urban-environmental history 
literature has centered the dynamic linkages between center and periphery, between urban and 
rural, and between use and exchange. In Nature’s Metropolis (1991), Cronon introduces an 
inchoate Chicago, IL a disorienting place where entrepreneurs, traders, and builders attempt to 
will the city’s greatness into inevitability. By linking the explosive growth of a fur-traders’ 
outpost along Lake Michigan to the transformation of regional commodities and their markets, 
Cronon interweaves hinterland to metropolis in ways that complicate pure luck or destiny.  
In a similar vein, Klingle (2009) documents how Seattle, WA underwent a series of 
“regrading” projects in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in order to produce land. In parts of 
 
90 “It’s relational” risks becoming the new “It’s political.” 
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the city, engineers blasted away hills with hydraulic cannons to unlock space for development. 
Urban environmental histories are always also urban social histories. Nature was transformed 
into property and the physical elements of the latter intersect with the social value attached to it 
(Klingle, 2006). Cities, then, are not the mythical or fated outcrops of good luck or godly 
providence, but artifacts of intervention entangling supply chains, markets, and environments 
under the banner of growth and profit-maximization. Gandy (2002) has captured how the 
urbanization of nature in New York City both heralded an age of technical prowess but also 
served to depoliticize ideologies of capital and empire as natural traits of urban growth and 
expansion. This strand of work offers immense possibility for considering the hinterlands, 
commodities, and socio-natural processes that make city-unbuilding as practical as city-building. 
 Urban political ecology (UPE) has emerged as a theoretical subfield of critical geography 
that expands upon urban-environmental history to illuminate the ways ecological processes are 
intrinsic to social, political, and economic processes (Heynen, 2016, Rademacher, 2015; Heynen, 
2014; Keil, 2003). This perspective challenges prior scholarly accounts of nature that UPE 
thinkers believe fetishized environmental change and disguised the salience of capital 
(Christophers, 2018). UPE offers a historical-geographical and relational approach for making 
sense of interconnected processes that produce highly uneven and inequitable landscapes 
(Swyngedouw & Heynen, 2003). Moore (2015) has argued for an epochal shift that recognizes 
how Wall Street organizes nature. Importantly, that approach omits other largescale modes of 
regulation and regimes of accumulation that have played a major role in creating and exploiting 
these natures (Haraway, 2015). Notwithstanding those flaws, by integrating the environmental 
and the social (or tracing attachments), UPE scholars contend the fight for a more sustainable 
future is a struggle against the global hegemony of capital. The potent dialectic of nature-society 
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means capital produces its own environments and terrains of class conflict (Heynen, Kaika, & 
Swyngedouw, 2006). At the same time, the city is a product of multiscale metabolic processes 
and cannot be studied as an object outside a web of domination (Angelo & Wachsmuth, 2015).  
Notwithstanding the attention to the urban, the political, and the ecological, much of the 
research coming out of the UPE current fails or struggles to mobilize workable definitions of 
each tip of the tripartite. The work has prioritized manifestations of ecology – forests, 
watersheds, waste – but has omitted a more forensic account of urban land and space. Persistent 
social inequality and uneven development has accommodated approaches that can mystify the 
institutional or income-generation processes. The outcomes of urban-political-ecological 
relationships are evident, but the operations remain generic. By analyzing timber, Prudham 
(2005, 55) offers one approach by viewing ecological and social production within the frame of 
ecoregulation – the tree is not incidental. Extraction, supply chains, and resources depend on a 
balance of the political and ecological where valuation and assetization often resist scripts.  
 Research Methods 
 For this chapter, I analyzed the DDP’s demolition backfill data to create a database of 
approved backfill sources between 2015 and 2018 (n=444). The DDP data – drawn from DBA 
and DLBA work - includes submission date, backfill volume, destination address, source name, 
source address, the demolition contractor, and the contractor staff member responsible for the 
backfill transaction. By isolating and geocoding each source site, I have illustrated the broad 
regional footprint of the backfill program. In addition to mapping each source site, I accessed 
property records to determine the use and condition of the source property. By drawing on 
publicly available data in municipal assessor offices in southeast and eastern Michigan I was able 
to identify a history of real estate transactions for each source property. I also linked LLC actors 
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to the backfill expenditures associated with sources and the destinations, creating a mesh of land 
use and property exchange that can be applied to existing transactions. I then coded the sources 
using my own categories (8) and identified specific real estate transactions or sales that preceded 
or followed the acquisition of backfill. My fieldwork included visiting at least 90 of these sites to 
confirm their categorization. I focused on these transactions because they illustrate how 
demolishing Dettroit is entangled in a variety of other forms of land and property transformation.   
I begin this chapter by illustrating the sprawling “dirt-shed” that feeds the DDP’s 
demolition backfill appetite. From there I proceed to challenge and reconstruct the categories 
used to distinguish backfill sources and material. In this section, I address how the geography of 
backfill is linked to a set of real estate tensions and spatial contradictions shaping the demolition-
dependent redevelopment of Detroit. If it is true that Detroit is undertaking the “biggest urban 
policy project America has seen in a long time91,” then it is vital to understand how demolition is 
a practice embedded in regional geographies of urban-environmental transformation. Demolition 
is not only a policy project or an urban-environmental project but the constant interaction of 
those projects as they rely on processes of extraction and circulation that preserve regional 
property dynamics and the uneven development of shifting capital. Rather than treat demolition 
backfill as a found object – a resource that is “out there” for contractors to capture and use – I 
show how each source is freighted with histories of accumulation, expansion, and destruction. 
 Recategorizing Backfill Material 
The DDP’s backfill guidance codifies and identifies six categories of backfill sources. 
AKT Peerless and DBA jointly drafted the guidance and determined backfill categories. Wendy 
 
91 Email Correspondence: Brooke Furio (EPA) to Dave Manardo (City of Detroit), 10/20/2016; obtained through 
FOIA request to City of Detroit. 
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Sitek, formerly of Able Demolition, said of AKT, “They pretty much are the dirt police.” Tony 
Kashat, founder and principal of AKT Peerless, was a realist about the resistance from 
demolition contractors, “The first thing we did was develop this guidance policy. It included 
types of materials and types of locations. We developed protocol for testing. No one has tackled 
this before. No one can really approve it. Everyone gave it a head nod and a thumbs up, but early 
complaints were this cost so much.” Regardless of the onerous compliance process, DDP 
officials expected contractors to abide by the rules linked to each of the source categories. Kashat 
remarked of the region’s demolition contractors, “They’re looking for dirt from everywhere. Left 
unchecked they’ll bring in anything.” Despite Kashat’s assertion, the regulatory approach 
favored by Pulte and Farkas of the Detroit Blight Authority – and fully integrated into the DDP 
by 2014 – privileged demolition production (volume) and accommodated valuation capture. 
The six official DDP source categories are: 1) Residential Construction and Residential 
Landscape Yard Sites; 2) Virgin (Native) Commercial Borrow and Sand/Gravel Pit Sites; 3) 
Commercial, Utility, and Road Construction Sites; Commercial Landscape Yards, and 
Agricultural Sites; 4) Industrial Construction Sites; 5) River and Lake Dredge Sites; 6) Other. In 
the 12/2014 guidance document, the DBA states of the latter three categories, “Backfill soil 
materials from these types Sites are prohibited for use as backfill materials for residential 
demolition projects. However, these and other Categories are under review and may be included 
in any future guidance document (DBA, 1, 2014).” No contractors have sought approval for 
backfill sourced from any of those three categories. Although MSHDA had released frequent 
guidance updates for backfill reporting and monitoring, these state directives have not elaborated 
on the DDP’s requirements. That guidance often takes a descriptive approach to compliance that 
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adopts existing contractor approaches as the best practices for regulating backfill in the DDP. 
Figure 14 illustrates the location and distribution of these backfill sources across the region. 
Figure 14: Location of approved demolition backfill sources in the Detroit region, 2014-2018 
Even with DDP’s efforts to narrow backfill categories for contractors, many of the backfill 
transactions do not fit tidily into these definitions. In a review of backfill sources, contractors 
have used Category 1 to describe material drawn from residential addresses in suburban 
neighborhoods as well as material stockpiled on an industrial or commercial site92. The 
categories generated and employed by AKT and the DDP reflect an understanding of regional 
space as static and self-evident: the source is a feature or gift of the geomorphology of land and 
its resources. A source contains backfill and contractors move it to a demolition site. The 
 
92 In 2015, AKT Peerless prioritized stockpiling backfill in city lots to reduce demolition costs. DDP and AKT asked 
MSHDA for several hundred thousand dollars to pilot the program. MSHDA did not fund the project. However, the 
DDP did encourage contractors to dump fill as a cost-cutting measure. I discuss this in Chapter 5. 
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categories flatten backfilling into an uncomplicated supply chain with a beginning and end. In 
place of that instrumental approach taken by DDP officials and consultants, I have distinguished 
backfill material along different dimensions and established a typology of sources as material 
products of social and economic relations within a changing urban and regional environment. I 
have generated these categories based on property histories, mapping, and data drawn from 
municipal records of sales and other transactions. My categories are: 1) Illusive; 2) Speculative; 
3) Extractive; 4) Destructive; 5) Expansive; 6) Infrastructure; 7) New construction; 8) N/A.  
Illusive sources are those submitted by contractors that meet at least one of three criteria. 
First, the address does not exist. Second, the address was the location of a stockpile and not an 
original or native source. Third, the residential address disguises an adjacent infrastructural or 
non-residential source93. Speculative sources are those that match with residential development 
projects in which there is no record of an owner-occupant prior to a sale. Extractive sources are 
those that match a sand pit or gravel quarry operating as a commercial enterprise94. Destructive 
sources are commercial enterprises that specialize in producing backfill material. Expansive 
sources describe commercial or industrial developments. Finally, Infrastructure sources match 
onto sites with evidence of public street, sewer, park, and sidewalk projects. I have included one 
additional sub-category for sources with evidence of New Construction but insufficient evidence 
to conclude they are associated with a speculative development. This category also includes new 
construction by owner-occupants or affordable housing developments. Through analysis of DDP 
data obtained through FOIA, I have identified 444 unique backfill sources used by contractors 
 
93 I believe the use of Illusive sources amounts to defrauding the DDP and its funders, as well as jeopardizing the 
health and well-being of Detroit residents living near or using the newly vacant land. 
94 I recognize that all backfill material could be considered “extractive.” Dirt, as it happens, is the “ground,” but 
naming it extractive does not account for the other political or economic interests at play. I chose to distinguish 
mining aggregate material from simply excavating for a sports complex or a residential basement. 
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between 7/2014 and 6/2018. Table 6 represents percentages for each category. Figure 15 maps 
how re-categorizing converts backfilling into an embedded regional process. Contractors sourced 
34% of material from Destructive sources. Five categories supplied between 9% and 15% of 
material for DDP demolitions. I could not identify a category for 1% of sources95.. 
Sources of all types are distributed across southeastern Michigan. Each have histories that 
explain how backfilling become possible for the DDP. The source located furthest from a DDP 
demolition was 2400 E. Ganson, Jackson, MI. I categorize this property as a Destructive source. 
Smalley Construction used 946 yd3 of material from the site to demolish 17 properties. 
Demolition were located an average of 72.5 miles from the 2400 E. Ganson source. On 
8/29/2017, Smalley transported material 78.7 miles to 10403 Harper to complete a demolition 
 
95 There are several reasons why a source may not fit a category: 1) The address could be a mistake and I was not 
able to identify an adjacent address or project that fit the reported source profile; 2) Aerial and street photography 
may not show visible activity and property records with the county and municipality do not suggest a construction 
project; 3) Aerial and street photography may not show visible activity but a latter 
infrastructure/expansion/construction project could have occurred at the site.  
Table 6: Percentage of backfill material by category, 2014-2018 
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priced at $26,920.00. The DDP did not allocate HHF to support the Harper demolition or the 
other 16 demolitions. Despite the DDP maintaining data for both HHF and Non-HHF 
demolitions for most of 2017 and 2018, costs associated with purchasing and moving backfill for 
10403 Harper do not appear in available DDP records. However, property records for 2400 E 
Ganson suggest the relational dynamics of sourcing backfill from the site. Until 10/2013, 2400 E. 
Ganson was owned by Bill Springer, a real estate developer and owner of Daylight Donuts based 
in Auburn, Alabama. Springer purchased the sprawling facility and two other properties in 2010 
for $3,500 from Sparton Corporation96 (Gautz, 2011). On the evening of 3/26/2011, a group of 
arsonists set fire to the factory (Aupperlee, 2011). Jackson firefighter efforts could not prevent 
 
96 Sparton (SPA) is a manufacturing company specializing in defense and health care products. The company closed 
its Jackson, MI headquarters and factory in March 2009. Sparton laid off 200 employees. They are currently based 
in Schaumburg, IL. A 2008 interview with Cary Wood, the new CEO of Sparton, framed him as a turnaround 
specialist. Wood said of himself, “I do well in operating turnarounds and distressed situations." 
Figure 15: Distribution of all backfill sources by category of material in the Detroit region, 2014-2018 
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the inferno from raging into the morning and destroying the factory. Prosecutors charged four 
teenagers, sentenced two, and incarcerated one perpetrator (Salisbury, 2011). Although the 
facility was uninsured, Springer promised Jackson County he would clean up the site.  
Springer’s planned clean-up never materialized. The fire intensified Springer’s neglect of 
the property (Jackson, 2013). Consequently, on 10/25/2013, Jackson County foreclosed on the 
properties for unpaid property taxes. In 2014, Smalley Construction purchased the rubble-strewn 
property for $150 through the county auction (Flory, 2014). In an 8/15/ 2014 local news profile 
about site improvements at 2400 E. Ganson, Joseph Smalley, the owner and operator of Smalley 
Construction, laid out a vision of short-term and long-term reuse. He explained, "We're going to 
clean it up and park our equipment there (Flory, 2014)." Smalley proceeded to describe how his 
company would manage the debris left behind by the arson and the prior owner. His expertise in 
recycling demolition waste would come in handy. He would send the wood to a nearby landfill 
and recycle the remaining concrete and brick as road base. He anticipated converting the derelict 
and damaged industrial site into a concrete recycling center. In Figures 16-18 I show how the 
property at 2400 E. Ganson evolved from a derelict factory into a concrete crushing facility.  
 
Figure 16: 2400 E Ganson, 2011 (Google, n.d.) 
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Figure 17: 2400 E Ganson, 2016 (Google, n.d.) 
 
Figure 18: 2400 E Ganson, 2018 (Google, n.d.) 
Smalley found markets for the “burnt rubble” of the Sparton plant. His plan for road base 
operations shifted to demolition backfill origins within three years. Smalley first used recycled 
and crushed foundation from its Ganson property on 8/8/2017 for a demolition at 11359 
Littlefield. Smalley demolished 11 properties in 8/2017 totaling $156,215.00 in city contracts. 
Seven of these were commercial properties97. On 10/6/ 2017, Smalley used 160 yd3 of backfill 
material from the Ganson source to complete the demolition of the fire-damaged and 
decommissioned O’Shea Recreation Center at 15810 Capitol St in Detroit, MI. DDP paid out 
 
97 Detroit does not track backfill material for commercial properties. Despite my broader focus on HHF and 
residential demolitions, I felt it was important to show how money, property, and backfill material produce 
landscapes within and outside Detroit – especially one that included such considerable distance. 
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$55,000 in “Quality of Life” demolition funds to Smalley to remove the complex and create 10-
acres of vacant land (Guillen, 2016e). Today, the land at 15810 Capitol St is a DTE solar array98. 
 
Figure 19: O'Shea Recreation Center, pre-demolition (DetroitUrbex.com, 2018) 
The source site at 2400 E. Ganson is only one of 444 sites that makes backfilling 
possible. While its volume may not suggest its significance to the broader DDP agenda, the 
history and transactions behind that 946 yd3 of material illustrates one way that backfilling is a 
process embedded within a regional constellation of land use and development. Demolishing 
Detroit helped transform Ganson from expendable into essential. The flattened map of residential 
demolitions and backfill sources conceals the combined actions of Sparton, Springer, Smalley, 
DTE, and the DDP. Their interests, values, conflicts, and priorities fall to the wayside of 
demolishing. For DDP officials and boosters, demolition is the production of vacant land – the 
city’s comparative advantage (Williams, 2019) - but the technical practices of dumping material 
and grading lots camouflages how regional processes of backfilling can tilt the scale of Detroit’s 
redevelopment in favor of suburban homebuilders, excavators, haulers, and aggregate producers,.  
 
98 DTE – a local utility company – negotiated a 20-year lease of the site from Detroit. The solar array is the second 
largest urban solar array in the US. Detroit will use the remaining land for a park integrating sustainable 
technologies. DTE made a one-time payment of $25,000 in 2017. DTE’s use of the site is expected to generate $1.4 
million in property tax revenue over the 20 years.  
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While Smalley initially specialized in demolitions of institutional and commercial 
properties, the contractor’s backfill practices reveal the makings of a resource hinterland of urban 
decline that I will probe and analyze in this chapter. By linking backfill source sites to residential 
demolitions in Detroit, the geography of the DDP shows how demolishing can reinforce regional 
difference and uneven development instead of revitalizing Detroit neighborhoods. The supply 
chain of backfilling provides a lens for identifying and interpreting a regional geography and 
political economy of demolition with priorities that are not compatible with strategies to rebuild 
the city through destruction of abandoned properties. The volume and sites in Table 7 
defamiliarizes the practice of demolition – encouraging explanations that address 
demolishability, governability, and profitability. In the case of 2400 E Ganson, demolished 
houses in Detroit are embedded in histories and relationships that transcend industries and parcel 
lines, while complicating evaluations that depend on post-demolishing trajectories for properties. 
Category Backfill Volume (yd3) Source Sites 
Destructive 573,219 5 
Extractive 182,126 12 
Expansive 210,031 25 
Illusive 170,862 52 
New Construction 140,247 125 
Speculative 145,640 124 
Infrastructural 108,116 35 
Not Available 28,986 66 
GRAND TOTAL 1,559,227 444 
Table 7: Backfill source categories by volume and number of source sites, 2014-2018 
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 Illusive Sources 
 I have identified 52 Illusive sources used by demolition contractors between 2014 and 
2018. Illusive sources illustrate the lengths to which demolition contractors are willing to go to  
Figure 20: Map of approved Illusive backfill sources in the Detroit region, 2014-2018 
manipulate DDP regulation to obtain and use backfill material. Contractors marshal the regional  
geography of property and development to camouflage the origins of backfill99. These 49 sources 
in Figure 20 provided 170,862 yd3 of material to at least 359 residential demolitions in Detroit 
by summer 2018. Illusive sources are those used by contractors that exhibit one or more of the 
following traits: 1) Contractors reported the site was residential despite contrary evidence; 2) The 
site was a stockpile or dumpsite for backfill material and not an original or native source; 3) The 
reported site address does not exist; and, 4) The site could have not have produced the volume of 
material reported by a demolition contractor. Within this section I will focus on two approved 
sources located within the boundaries of Detroit: 1406 W Elizabeth and 1355 W Elizabeth.  
 
99 It is important to point out the category of “Illusive” is not tantamount to using contaminated material. 
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 On 5/7/2017, Monahan Construction began construction of the $150 million Elton Park 
project in Detroit’s Corktown neighborhood (Runyan, 2017). Named for a historic park removed 
by 1950s highway construction, the mixed-use development was set to include 420 apartments 
and 30,000 square feet of retail space. With nearly $7 million in public financing, the Elton Park 
development would consolidate 18 parcels owned by “billionaire” Anthony Soave and his Soave 
Enterprises, LLC into one cohesive development (Williams, 2019). Soave had spent the prior 
four years assembling these properties under the name Trident-Checker, LLC100, a reference to 
the Checker Cab company he purchased in 2002 that maintained its headquarters in a nearby 
warehouse at 2128 Trumbull. Soave, a favorite personality among city and county leaders101, 
accumulated his wealth with City Management, Inc, a multi-state garbage hauling company, and 
then selling the firm to the Waste Management corporate colossus in 1968 (Pinho, 2016). 
 The Elton Park development was not Soave’s first residential project. Soave’s portfolio 
also includes luxury developments in Northern Virginia and Naples, FL (Soave Enterprises, 
2019). It is, however, Soave’s first attempt at a dense urban environment. The promotional 
website for Elton Park calls it “an eclectic mix of residences, retail and inviting public spaces at 
the heart of Detroit’s most historic neighborhood.” In addition to rehabbing the Checker Cab 
headquarters as two properties, the project included five new structures: 2100 Trumbull, 2120 
Trumbull, 8th Street Row, The Robertson, and The Crawford. Monahan built The Robertson and 
The Crawford on parking lots used by adjacent bars. The latter building, the largest of the 
structures at five stories and the property with the most “refined aesthetic and sense of airiness 
 
100 Ten days after breaking ground, Trident-Checker, LLC “sold” these seven properties to Trident Corktown, LLC 
for $70.00. According to state records, the latter took on the assumed name of Elton Park in 4/2019. 
101 Soave’s involvement in the city’s public affairs and the social lives of the city’s leaders is well known. For an 
instructive example of Soave’s status and his irreverence, see the transcript of his testimony during the Kwame 
Kilpatrick trial: https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/kwame-kilpatrick-trial-soave-i-dont-brag. In reference to a 
prosecutor’s question about his wealth, Soave stated, “It's a lot of muchachos, yeah.” 
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(Elton Park, 2019),” featured fifty-two 1-bedroom and 2-bedroom units. Across from The 
Crawford, The Robertson would offer 1-bedroom and 2-bedroom units but also connect directly 
to the Checker Building by way of a bridge on the second, third, and fourth floors (Elton Park, 
2019). At the 9/2019 ceremony marking the completion of Elton Park’s first stage of 
construction, Duggan predicted, “Elton Park is going to be a huge part of this city’s future (Durr, 
2019).” The developer and his lieutenants declared apartments in The Robertson and The 
Crawford were at 70% occupancy and promised they would soon announce retail occupants. 
 The story of Elton Park does not begin with breaking ground for footings or the first 
tenant inhabiting The Crawford. These fallow Corktown addresses were part of a scheme several 
weeks before Monahan arrived at the empty lots. On 4/19/2017, Rickman Enterprises 
demolished three houses in Detroit’s Springwells Village neighborhood: 2565 Carson, 2418 
Casper, and 9171 Rathbone. The contractor billed the DDP and MSHDA $38,450 to complete 
the demolitions. In 10/2017, Rickman reported to AKT Peerless and DDP using 620 yd3 of 
backfill sourced from 1355 W Elizabeth. Rickman recorded backfill costs of $6,920 or over 
$11/yd3. This reported source address is a parking lot for Nemo’s, a nearby tavern, but also 
within the footprint of The Crawford in the Elton Park development. Ordinary backfill sourcing 
practices suggest Rickman was recycling basement digs from the Elton Park construction; 
moreover, due to the nature of the construction, this material would have fit into the Residential 
category as established by DDP in its 2014 guidance102. Under more routine circumstances, this 
arrangement exemplifies the “symbiotic” relationship between builders and wreckers within the 
regional built environment. Builders possess material and wreckers need that material. However, 
the valuation capture and rentiership described in the prior chapter established the institutional 
 
102 Residential categorization exempts the soil from testing. 
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conditions in which that fortuitous symbiosis around recycling would not ensure the income-
generation and margins desired by contractors. Reporting a zero for backfill costs was a missed 
opportunity to value-grab on the DDP and its reliance on contractors managing the supply. 
Rickman did not source the material from Elton Park. No evidence exists placing the 620 
yd3 of material at 1355 W Elizabeth. Neither is there activity on site to conclude 4,820 yd3 of 
material for 21 HHF demolitions in 4/2017 - 5/2017 originated from the address. Aerial imagery 
from this time period show the site at 1355 undisturbed by Monahan Construction crews until 
7/2017. Even accounting for the three-week gap between Rickman tearing down these structures 
and Monahan breaking ground in Corktown, demolition regulation in Detroit only allows a 
maximum of 30 days for open holes. The latest Rickman could have sourced material without 
sanction is 5/17/2017. Despite claims to the contrary, Rickman could have served as a contractor 
for site work prior to Monahan. However, no building permits are on file with the city showing 
Rickman was retained to perform any excavation or preparation. Joe Monahan, the Project 
Manager responsible for the Elton Park project, disputed the accuracy of DDP data and rejected 
the notion clean fill material could have originated from the address. Monahan stressed Rickman 
had no prior relationship to the Elton Park project, stating, “We have no record of this material. It 
was not their property. These were flat sites with no material open. (Interview, 2018)” 
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In March, April, and May 2018, Rickman completed three more HHF demolitions: 6345 
Grandville, 6206 Auburn, and 7517 Archdale. The contracts totaled $61,574. Rickman billed 
MSHDA $7,916.00 for 700 yd3 of backfill material, an average cost of $11.3/yd3. The 
contractor reported 1355 W Elizabeth as the source address. However, the official submission 
timestamp in the DBA backfill data shows 10/24/2017. Rickman, DBA, and AKT Peerless have 
not been able to provide an explanation for the former recording and the latter approving 1355 W 
Elizabeth as a backfill source for demolitions that would not be completed for another 4 to 6 
months. In total, Rickman reported using 6,140 yd3 of backfill from the Elton Park development 
and billed MSHDA $66,856.00. Joe Monahan, a 25-year veteran of construction in Detroit, 
believed Rickman had fabricated the address and used Elton Park in a “dirt-laundering” 
Figure 21: Map of approved Illusive sources and demolitions where contractors reported using 
the material, 2014-2018 
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scheme103. Even if 1355 W Elizabeth had produced the material, Monahan denied it could be 
used, “This is contaminated dirt – fuel, oil, brick, debris. You can’t bury that shit throughout the 
city. You can’t put that stuff back in a hole. I can’t see how they’d use that material.”  
Monahan also shared his professional concerns about 840 yd3 of backfill sourced from 
The Robertson address at 1406 W Elizabeth. Monahan confirmed he worked with M.J. 
VanOverbeke Contracting to haul excavated material but again stressed that it should not be used 
as backfill. Mike VanOverbeke Jr was not able to provide any additional details about the 
backfill transaction and concluded, “I didn’t get paid to dump the dirt. I had to get rid of it. I just 
did it.” Den-Man Contractors tore down the three properties104 using this material and its 
president responded by email, “At that time a former employee was handling the backfill.” 
Regarding the possibility excavated Elton Park materials are part of the city’s growing inventory 
of vacant and developable land, Joe Monahan offered, “You can’t develop anything on it – you 
have to dig it out and redo it. You can’t put a fitting on it. Your building would sink.” 
 
Figure 22: 1355 W Elizabeth, 4/2016 (Google, n.d.) 
 
103 Before discussing Elton Park with Joe Monahan, I had used the term “dirt-washing” to describe the process by 
which a contractor uses a false address to accelerate the backfill approval process. It was a happy accident that 
Monahan invoked “dirt-laundering” in the course of our conversation. 
104 3086 24th Street; 9941 Roseberry; 9940 Roseberry 
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Figure 23: 1355 W. Elizabeth, 7/2018 (Google, n.d.) 
Elton Park is an exemplar of the Illusive source phenomenon but the process of 
manipulating the backfill program through “dirt-laundering” often takes place in more mundane 
ways. Figures 22-23 show the implausibility of its source status. The “dirt-laundering” occurs in 
tandem with multi-unit projects in addition to single family homes. In 2017, Blue Star sourced 
2950 yd3 of backfill from six residential address on two streets in Troy, MI: Aleppo Drive and 
Luchu Drive. Blue Star wrecked 11 residential properties with one funded by HHF – 8295 
Auburn. However, no such streets exist in Troy, MI. The only mention of either Aleppo or Luchu 
is in an early planning document prepared by Mondrian Properties, the developer, in a public 
presentation to a zoning commission in Troy, MI. No search of aerial imagery or active 
construction projects would have confirmed the location or category of the source. AKT 
approved these sources despite lacking evidence to verify it was Residential. Today, what was 
temporarily Luchu and Aleppo are now Stonington Drive and Rockingham Drive in the Pinery 
Grove subdivision, where Mondrian has constructed “25 home sites with a park like setting 
(Mondrian, 2019).” Blue Star certainly used material from this part of southeast Michigan, but 
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the regulator had no way of matching the source to an address: aerial imagery would have 
illustrated little about the source or its history. On many occasions, DDP contractors have 
assigned a residential address to adjacent infrastructural or institutional projects. 
In other instances, AKT approved material from “residential” sites that upon scrutiny 
were vacant lots where contractors had dumped material from elsewhere105. On 7/12/2016, 
Adamo Group tore down 4054 Carter and used 40 yd3 of backfill from a site at 2989 W 
Philadelphia. A week later, Adamo demolished 2989 W Philadelphia. Adamo sourced 224 yd3 
from 3770 Manistique in Detroit and another 312 yd3 from an aggregate yard in Highland Park, 
MI. Adamo billed $1,023.73 in backfill costs to MSHDA. In 6/2018, Able Demolition innovated 
a variation of this sourcing approach when it tore down 2687 Whitney and used 160 yd3 of 
material from 14700 Coyle – an address that does not exist in Detroit Assessor records. The 
DLBA is the landowner for at least 10 approved backfill sources inside Detroit, four of which 
were addresses for demolitions only after contractors reported sourcing material. Categorizing 
any of these sources in the manner created and monitored by the DDP does not capture how 
contractors mobilize uncertainty within Detroit’s built environment to perform compliance106. 
 In a 2015 interview, Tony Kashat remarked, “We don’t need a rigorous testing process. 
They’re required to log the source. We spot check that with aerials.” AKT Peerless verifies 
sources in the residential category by reviewing an image of the area. But by attempting to draw 
insights from aerials the consultant and the regulators are merely confirming that a residential 
area exists, not the sequence of practices and events that produced the material or placed that 
material on-site. The Illusive source category illustrates the lengths to which contractors will go 
 
105 Many of the volumes originating from these sites were so small – under 200 yd3 – that it is improbable 
contractors used these sites for stockpiling or staging demolitions. 
106 In the following chapter, I present in detail Stout Street. Contractors have repeatedly recorded the addresses of 
demolished and planned demolitions as source sites. 
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to mark the boxes of compliance – 1, 2, and 3 – while relying on the scale of the DDP to push 
sources through that under ordinary conditions may engender sanction. That dirt was present at 
the site for any amount of time corroborates its Residential status. For Illusive sources, the 
official categories serve only to demonstrate that an approval process is in place and not 
ascertain the origins behind the material. By tracking back through the priorities, interests, 
transactions, and objectives associated with these sources it becomes clear that a “spot-check” is 
a poor substitute for apprehending the quality of material and the reasonableness of backfill cost. 
 Extractive Sources 
Demolition contractors have sourced material from 12 regional sites that I categorize as 
Extractive. Property records, satellite imagery, and site visits confirm these are addresses with 
active extraction operations. Firms specializing in aggregate materials mine exurban and rural 
sites for sand, topsoil, and gravel and market the materials for infrastructure and demolitions. 
Since 2014, contractors have sourced 182,126 yd3 of material to complete 2,240 demolitions. 
These sites range from an unnamed pit where McCabe Road and La Pointe Drive meet in 
Brighton, MI to a sprawling commercial mining site located in the “gravel capital of the world.” 
But stripping the ground of resources is just phase one. Oxford, MI, a town of 3,400 residents 
northeast of Detroit, is home to Koenig Sand & Gravel (Pendle 2016). Koenig’s facility is 
located on a 1200-acre site 1955 E. Lakeville, which is the largest continuous property in 
Oakland County107. On 2/15/2015, AKT approved Koenig as a Category 1 source for DDP 
demolitions. In official AKT and DBA parlance, Category 1 describes sources that are residential 
in nature or companies supplying residential landscaping material. Koenig’s ordinary customer 
 
107 The realtor states, “CAN BE REZONED TO RESIDENTIAL, MULTIPLE, COMMERCIAL OR 
INDUSTRIAL, MASTER PLANNED 1 UNIT PER ACRE, MUST SEE!!!” 
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base is almost entirely commercial and industrial scale. Between 3/2015 and 8/2017, seven 
demolition contractors sourced 9,804 yd3 of material from Koenig in 52 transactions (49 total 
demolitions). In 2016, Koenig listed 1955 E Lakeville with Wilhelm & Realtor, Inc for $16 
million. The listing emphasized the ease with which a new owner could rezone the rural property 
from Mining to Residential and construct a new master-planned subdivision taking advantage of 
the property’s “rolling hills, wooded, 2 deep spring fed extremely clean lakes (Zillow, 2019).”  
As of early 2020, 1955 E. Lakeville remains an active listing. The property’s next 
incarnation appears inevitable. The promise of converting mineral planets and quarries into 
residential properties is on full display just a few hundred feet south. Lake Edge Development 
began building Oxford Lakes in 1986 and completed the first phase of the 455-home project in 
2004 (Hogue, 1999). The subdivision encompasses the eponymous artificial body of water and a 
series of private parks. The tangle of cul-de-sacs is on property once inhabited by a quarry 
operation that dug the pit, cleared the trees, and flattened the ground. As one public official said 
of the development, “It's basic. You get growth where there is vacant land (Hogue 1999).” The 
scenery is a product of both speculation and extraction, of destruction and construction. The 
quarry and mineral operations served as the enabling work of residential sprawl as the 
commodity of aggregate came to be the waste of redevelopment. Concerning Oxford’s extractive 
history, one former quarry laborer observed, “Many people aren’t aware they’re living on top of 
a former gravel pit (Carnacchio, 2010).” In this way, the material drawn from the still-active 
Koenig operation just to the north of Oxford Lakes is not simply one link within the supply chain 
of demolition-dependent development in Detroit, but a signal of Oxford’s own redevelopment. 
One source site 30 miles from the Detroit border exemplifies the way these extractive 
backfilling processes link into other forms of regional change and development, as well as the 
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conflicts over urban transformation that a narrow focus on removal can conceal. Burrell 
Investments owns 27120 Haas Road, Wixom, MI. According to Oakland County property 
records, Holloway Sand & Gravel conveyed the deed to Burrell Investments in 2016 after 
entering into a land contract in 2013. That site has been the source site for 522 backfill 
transactions totaling 53,742 yd3. According to DBA backfill records, Adamo completed all these 
demolitions between 6/2016 and 4/2018. Rodney Burrell incorporated the eponymous Burrell 
Investments incorporated in 2013. The 522 transactions involving Adamo and 27120 Haas – and 
therefore Burrell Investments - represent 341 unique residential demolitions within Detroit. Of 
those, 257 were HHF-funded demolitions which culminated in $315,768.99 in billing for backfill 
material. These demolitions began on 6/20/2016 with 18508 Braile. Adamo wrecked the building 
for $10,596.00 and billed $864.60 to MSHDA for backfill. Available records involving 27120 
Haas conclude with the demolition of 13011 Flanders on 6/5/2018. The DDP awarded Adamo 
$14,707.20 for the demolition and the contractor $982.00 billed to MSHDA for backfill.  
The DBA Soil Management platform includes three records for material from 27120 
Haas Road. One contractor reported using backfill material from this source in 2016, 2017, and 
2018. The 2018 record shows AKT approved 49,000 yd3 of material as Category 2 backfill: 
Virgin (Native) Commercial Borrow and Sand/Gravel Pit Sites. Records for this source from 
2016 and 2017 maintain a “Pending” status. The contractor submitted the 2016 record on July 5, 
2016 and reported 100,000 yd3 of available material. Despite the “Pending” status, the contractor 
also reported using 9,400 yd3 of the material. Similarly, the contractor submitted a 2017 record 
for 91,000 yd3 from this source on 9/5/ 2017. As in the case of 2016, the source shows a 
“Pending” status despite drawing down 41,742 yd3. In total, the contractor used 51,142 yd3 of 
Category 2 backfill material from a source site without formal AKT approval. Based on DDP 
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and AKT guidelines, no “Pending” source should be simultaneously drawn down by demolition 
contractors. One possible interpretation is AKT simply forgot to fully approve the site in 2016 
and 2017, a less generous interpretation is a Pending status is compliance without the content. 
Burrell is no stranger to the dangers of noncompliance in Detroit’s aggregate and 
demolition industries. On 11/29/2010, Rodney Burrell entered a guilty plea to "fraud, money 
laundering, and obstruction of justice" related to HOPE VI demolition and related earthwork as 
part of HUD contracts (Click on Detroit, 2010). Eastern District of Michigan records show 
Bobby Ferguson instructed Burrell to submit rigged bids as part of the Gardenview Estates 
housing redevelopment project108. Ferguson, a confidant and advisor to former Mayor Kwame 
Kilpatrick, received a 21-year prison sentence in 2013 for racketeering, extortion, and fraud in 
relation to public works contracts awarded by Kilpatrick (Schaefer & Baldas, 2013). In a 
conspiracy purportedly crafted by Ferguson, Burrell submitted false and inflated bids under the 
name of his company – R&R Heavy Haulers - and received lucrative subcontracts in return for 
fabricating bids (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010). The charges against Burrell could have 
culminated in three-years in prison and a $250,000 fine. Despite claims by Ferguson’s defense 
that Burrell was a protagonist in the conspiracy, Judge David Lawson looked to sentence Burrell 
to six-months in prison and fine him up to $5,000 for his role in the scheme109. Alongside 37 
other convictions, the district court ultimately sentenced Burrell to 24 months of probation. 
 
108 According to the Detroit Housing Commission, Gardenview Estates encompasses 607 single family and rental 
homes. The 66 townhomes for sale were available to buyers with incomes at or below 80% of AMI. Gardenview 
Estates is on the former site of Herman Gardens. The development’s official website includes testimonials and 
ratings. One testimonial states, “Sooo much better than what was here before 2010.. It was a Dumping put if Sludge, 
Tired, Drugs and Prostitutes.. Its still a very dangerous area. But its like years better.” 
109 The 2012 court proceedings illustrate the uncertainty around Burrell. Bobby Ferguson’s lawyer claimed Burrell 
was the architect of the conspiracy and the district court was out to get Ferguson regardless of the facts. His lawyer 
claimed Burrell routinely lied to the grand jury in his testimony. Court records show Burrell and an accomplice 
failed to detail their own financial records. Court records also show Burrell and a colleague used racist language to 
describe Ferguson. 
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Burrell’s return to the aggregate industry is not itself instructive of the tensions at play in 
the DDP. Although the optics of his association may undermine the credibility of the DDP 
(Ferretti 2019c), Burrell has faced his punishment. However, his objectives in returning to the 
industry illustrate the limits of treating him as one part of a supply chain or reducing Haas to a 
Category 2 site. On 8/16/2016, Tyler Salamasick of the Michigan Department of Environmental 
Quality (MDEQ) conducted an inspection and compliance evaluation of 27120 Haas Road. The 
purpose of the inspection was to verify the present property use was within the parameters of the 
state permit. An activity report on the MDEQ website contains a narrative of Salamasick’s visit 
to the site and his interactions with Rodney Burrell. The inspector states that Burrell disclosed he 
purchased the property “with the intent of crushing and removing the existing concrete.” Burrell 
also shared he was extracting and selling topsoil from the site. State records indicate the site 
produced 35,000 tons of material in 2015 and 45,000 tons in 2016. However, the site’s purpose 
extends beyond a location for a crushing or extractive operation. During the tour of the Wixom 
material yard, Burrell revealed to DEQ’s Salamasick that he intended to remove debris in order 
to develop 27120 Haas into a speculative residential subdivision110. As of 9/2019, Burrell’s 
extraction efforts have deepened the nearby basin and graded the land around 27120 Haas. The 
images in Figure 24-25 show how much progress Burrell has made in his speculative plans. 
 
110 Aerial photos of the site suggest Burrell has expanded the crushing operation at 27120 Haas. No records with 
Oakland County or the surrounding municipalities confirm property development plans. A site visit confirmed 
Burrell Investments has continued extraction and crushing operations. However, the site is adjacent to recreational 
lakes, four golf courses, and several existing residential subdivisions. 
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Figure 24: 2710 Haas Road, 2015 (Google, n.d.) 
 
Figure 25: 27120 Haas Road, 2018 (Google, n.d.) 
 As exemplified by the conversion of the Oxford Lakes area and the seemingly ineluctable 
conversion awaiting 1955 E Lakeville, the operation at 27120 Haas is positioned to give way to 
the more lucrative industry of residential development. The 9,804 yd3 of material from Koenig 
and the 53,742 yd3 of material from Haas have served an essential purpose in filling in holes left 
behind from demolishing parts of Detroit neighborhoods. That contractors should grade those 
voids and DDP should open the purse strings for the material is irrefutable in its merits. 
However, another relationship between prosperity and security slides into view by concentrating 
on the histories and potential futures of these sources. Their status as extractive industries in the 
Detroit region is a temporary stage that prepares the land for speculative redevelopment.  
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By marshalling the DDP, Koenig and Burrell have transformed Detroit into a frontier 
where the demolition industry commodifies and disposes of the waste of suburbanization. The 
newly vacant land at 11810 Wilfred in Detroit should be seen as a signal of 1955 E Lakeville’s 
development potential and not solely a measure of Rickman Enterprises’ demolition prowess. 
The same applies to the empty lot now at 13003 Kilbourne and its relationship to the value 
imagined and produced within 27120 Haas Road as Burrell Enterprises extracted and sold 160 
yd3 of backfill to Adamo. It is not simply whether these sources fit an AKT Peerless or DBA 
backfill category profile but how HHF, MSHDA, and DDP have subsidized and accommodated 
extractive industries that perpetuate residential environments that draw populations away from 
Detroit. In the context of the DDP, the operations at these two sources – and other extractive 
sites – should be reframed from extraction and mining to the production of new environments. 
 Destructive Sources 
 Contractors source most material from the Destructive category. These are sources within 
the Detroit region where private companies produce aggregate material for use in road 
construction or demolitions. I describe these sources as destructive because the companies use an 
array of crushing equipment to recycle concrete – infrastructure and foundations – or screening 
equipment to process organic matter – soil and compost. The largest destructive source is Mid-
Michigan Crushing & Recycling (MMCR) in Highland Park, MI111. Destructive sources account 
for 3,698 of the backfill transactions between 2015 and 2018. This amounted to 573,219yd3 of 
material. The second largest Destructive source is at the above-mentioned Jackson, MI site.  
Destructive sources are notable because they serve as spatializations of Kevyn Orr’s 
8/21/2014 order changing Detroit city ordinances regulating backfill material. In Order #33 – 
 
111 I address this source, its history, and implications for Detroit’s decline in the next chapter. 
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Order Suspending Certain City Demolition Requirements to Address Blight - the Emergency 
Manager triggered a shift in industrial practices within and outside the city. Citing rising and 
“unnecessary” demolition costs, Orr mandated “Alternative Fill Procedures” that permitted 
contractors to crush excavated basements for use as backfill (Orr, 2014). At the time of his order, 
Adamo Group and Homrich were the only contractors that possessed the equipment and know-
how to produce this fill material on a demolition site. However, the order established conditions 
consistent with launching a backfill production site within striking distance of demolition sites. 
Jon Grosshans, USEPA staffer, disclosed that Orr’s order “wasn’t effective” until MMCR moved 
operations from Fenton, MI and had the capacity to accommodate multiple hauling runs in a day. 
Although MMCR is without a doubt the destructive behemoth in the region, other material sites 
emerged to supply demolition contractors with backfill based on Orr’s new fill directive. 
 One of the largest destructive sources is 32 miles southwest of Detroit. Monroe County 
lists Regulated Resource Recovery (R3) as the owner of 200 Matlin Road in Carleton, MI. Tim 
Homrich, the President of Homrich, serves as President of R3. R3 began conducting business in 
1985 and commenced operations at the Matlin site at the end of 1993. The demolition contractor 
uses the company and site to produce compost and dispose of hazardous materials culled through 
their demolition projects. The Matlin site has been involved in 288 demolitions and 357 backfill 
transactions totaling 46,350yd3 beginning with two HHF demolitions on 8/14/2014: 6551 
Minock and 6543 Minock. No disaggregated backfill costs exist for those demolitions. Homrich 
did not use the source again for an HHF demolition until 5/13/2015. On that day, the contractor 
demolished four buildings: 16260 Kentucky, 16245 Kentucky, 16500 Ohio, and 16246 Indiana. 
Homrich used its R3 site for 209 HHF demolitions in 2014-2016 and billed MSHDA 
$771,250.00 for material the Homrich family of companies already possessed. Other than the 
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initial two demolitions, the only property with backfill costs under $3,750 is 16117 Coram. On 
7/16/2015, Homrich wrecked the house for $6,857.61 and billed only $750 for backfill. 
Although the Matlin site became active in March 1992, MDEQ does not have digitized 
records for any hazardous waste disposal before April 2011. At that time, according to state 
records, R3 began contracting with Safety-Kleen to ship Tetrachloroethylene – a dry-cleaning 
solvent and known carcinogen with a liver pathway – to a disposal facility in Dolton, IL that 
specializes in “solvent recovery.” The Dolton Technical Service facility is part of Clean Harbors, 
the largest hazardous waste disposal company in North America. On 2/12/2013, R3 shipped 
750lbs of waste off-site to a Safety-Kleen facility in Toledo, OH. MDEQ was unable to assign a 
waste code to the material. The EPA National List of Asbestos Landfills from March 1992 lists 
the address on Matlin as an approved asbestos disposal site (Office of Enforcement 1992). 
Today, no records suggest Matlin is an active disposal site. However, the official backfill source 
categories view sites like Matlin as topographic features outside of time – they are waiting for 
the train of trucks to take material away. By identifying Matlin as a Destructive source where 
hazards temporarily circulate and compost goes to decay, the issue of what was destroyed and 
why can complicate the image of a streamlined supply chain between origin and demolition.  
In the case of the Ganson site in Jackson and the MMCR site in Highland Park, Orr’s 
shift to alternative fill measures cracked open a new market for their crushed product. Like 
Yiftachel’s (2009) approach to the gray space of citizenship between the light of legality and the 
dark of criminality, Orr’s declaration created gray spaces of demolishing in which expediency 
eclipsed site history or any potential toxic legacies. Importantly, legality here did not “lighten” 
regulation but expanded the inscrutability of demolishing to prioritize contractor valuations. 
Smalley Construction could redevelop the derelict Sparton footprint by shipping obliterated 
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foundation material to addresses in Detroit. Backfilling holes at 8361 Strathmoor and 9900 
Cheyenne is now part of a cleanup campaign to restore property, one located 68 miles west of 
Detroit on a parcel of land where the owner has eyes on future MDOT dollars. As with the 
extractive sources in the above, Smalley was able to satisfy its own land-management goals in 
the process of dealing out 946 yd3 of material for demolitions (five of which received HHF).  
In the next chapter I will expand upon the development of MMCR but for the purposes of 
this section its vital to address how the crushing operation takes advantage of the DDP and HHF. 
Foremost, it is arguable if MMCR’s official categorization as a Residential source is accurate 
given it operates solely at an industrial-scale to serve resource needs of professional contractors. 
Contractors unable to crush excavated basements on a demolition site haul the material to 
MMCR. In this scenario, DDP and HHF have paid to possess the basement – the cost of its 
removal is a form of acquisition – and are its relocation to MMCR. MMCR crushes the 
basements and mixes the material with other processed basement material. At the same time a 
contractor is leaving the foundation with MMCR it is also purchasing fill material for the next or 
ongoing demolition. DDP and HHF have paid twice for the same material – once to the 
contractor for excavation and again to MMCR for the fill. The 230 yd3 of fill resting beneath the 
grass at 4374 Chatsworth is material excavated from another house, hauled to Highland Park, 
crushed by MMCR, purchased by Able Demolition, and dumped to produce a vacant lot. That 
the material comes from a different teardown is less important than how the material becomes 
backfill and the environments of policy, contracting, aggregate, and hauling it moves through.  
For the site managed by R3 and Homrich, its status as a Destructive category raises a 
different set of questions about hazards both historical and financial. While the site has prior 
associations with carcinogens, no strong evidence suggests that Homrich is maintaining a 
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wasteland of toxins or contaminating its backfill with asbestos or dry-cleaning solvents. More 
important than the quality of the fill material is the corporate relationship between the contractor 
and its supplier. The official DBA backfill records identify 200 Matlin as the source of backfill 
supplied by Regulated Resource Recovery. It is only by deciphering LLC documents that R3 the 
supplier is seen occupying the same footprint as the customer. Under ordinary circumstances 
these backfill costs would represent the process of acquiring a needed product from another firm, 
but the relationship between R3 and Homrich illustrates how contractors are commanding the 
backfill market. Demolition in this case is less about restoring developability in Detroit’s land 
market and more Homrich funneling backfill dollars through a sibling firm to strengthen 
corporate interests. The crushed concrete is not the only gray part of demolishing in the DDP. 
 Expansive Sources 
 Expansive sources are those associated with sites where commercial, industrial, or other 
private interests are expanding their operations or footprints. I contrast this with Infrastructural 
sources in a latter section, which are sources of public expansion or improvement. Contractors 
have used material from Expansive sites to complete 1,204 demolitions. These 25 source sites 
have yielded 210,031 yd3 of material. These sources are scattered across the region and involve 
a variety of uses. They range from a new athletic field at Lawrence Technological University – 
9,786 yd3 - to a food hall built of shipping containers in Midtown Detroit – 192 yd3.  
HHF demolitions with material from Expansive sites began on 1/29/2015 with the 
removal of 15367 Baylis. ABC Demolition demolished the property for $8,825.00 and billed 
MSHDA $2,450.00 for backfill. ABC sourced the backfill from 9400 W. Fort, Detroit, MI. That 
address is also the official address belonging to Woodmere Cemetery. Aerial photos show the 
material originated from one of two locations in and near the 250 acres of the 9400 W Fort 
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address. Woodmere produced this material through two processes: 1) the excavation of burial 
sites; 2) updating the landscaping of the cemetery grounds. ABC Demolition used 44,800yd3 of 
material from Woodmere in 166 demolitions in 2015 and 2016. Two other cemeteries – Mt 
Elliott and Grand Lawn – have served as sources. In total, these three sites have contributed 
59,680 yd3 of material for 181 demolitions. That gravedigging is a major supplier to the DDP 
would no doubt exercise the eyebrows of observers who view the program as the city’s last rites. 
The largest expansive source site is listed as 1322 Lycaste Street, Detroit, MI. The DBA 
platform reports this source as FCA Jefferson North Assembly Plant Storm Water Project. FCA 
is one of the world’s largest automobile manufacturers with corporate headquarters in Auburn 
Hills, MI. FCA excavated a southwest section of property to divert runoff from the sewer system. 
Five demolition contractors112 sourced 49,412 yd3 of material from the site to complete 196 
demolitions, 104 supported by HHF. Despite its frequency, 1322 Lycaste was never the accurate 
source address. The retention pond is at 11601 Jefferson, which is owned by FCA. The 
Department of Homeland Security owns 1322 and stationed a Border Patrol headquarters at the 
site. Regardless of the side of the street, both addresses are formally zoned Intensive Industrial.  
In a 2015 interview, Jon Grosshans implied demolition contractors jumped at the chance 
to use the excavated material from the FCA project because it meant they were “not beholden to 
a quarry.” He suggested its availability reduced costs for contractors because John Prymack of 
the Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Authority (GDRRA) had helped broker a deal between 
FCA and the DDP. The state's demolition data lead to a different conclusion. Based on a pricing 
model provided by MCM - one of the region's big three of demolition - the backfill costs for 
these 104 HHF demolitions should have been dramatically lower. Instead, contractors priced out 
 
112 Homrich, Adamo, Farrow Group, Able Demolition, Rickman Enterprise 
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demolitions and billed MSHDA as if they had purchased material from a distant mineral plant or 
aggregate yard. Table 8 shows how contractors generated income by using material removed 
from the site. Homrich completed the first HHF demolition using the FCA source on 6/8/2015 
and charged $3,750 for backfill. In 7/2015, Farrow Group tore down 5130 Casper and billed 
MSHDA $1,500 for 120 yd3. On 8/5/2015, Adamo knocked down 4232 Chene and billed 
MSHDA $23,198 with $2,408.78 going towards 192 yd3 of backfill. A month later, the same 
contractor wrecked 2403 Hudson and billed MSHDA $41,038.00 with almost $4,200 for 96 yd3 
of backfill. Between 6/2015 and 1/2016, four contractors billed MSHDA $203,272.04 for 
backfill material at an average of $1,973.51 per demolition. Homrich reported backill costs of 
$3,750 for each of its 21 demolitions regardless of season, distance hauled, or size of structure. 
Contractor Dirt Cost ($) 
Adamo Group, Inc. 15,022.04 
Farrow Group 43,500 
Homrich 78,750 
Rickman Enterprise Group 66,000 
Grand Total 203,272.04 
Table 8: Contractor billings for FCA backfill material from upgrade of parking lot at Detroit facility, 2016 
This fits with internal discussion at MSHDA at the time that encouraged contractors to 
submit their "self-determined estimate" as the official dirt cost for HHF. The Expansive sources 
show that not only did contractors already possess accessible backfill material, but they also 
could set the prices for that material. If backfill from FCA was free or discounted, then backfill 
costs should mostly reflect hauling and delivery costs (approximately $5/yd3 for transportation 
and $3/yd3 for placement). As an example, Homrich demolished 11664 St Louis on 12/16/2015 
for $12,800.00 with $3,750 towards backfill. Using the prior cost breakdown, the transportation 
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costs (to travel seven miles) should have been $1,250 and placement $750. This estimate would 
suggest Homrich paid at most $1,750 for 250 yd3 of backfill from a supposed brokered discount. 
More likely, Homrich reported a cost to MSHDA that fit with the contractor’s favored margins. 
Homrich was not alone in this approach. Many contractors billed MSHDA as if they had entered 
the secondary market for the material, a cloudy regional market in which they were forced to 
negotiate and haggle. As one contractor disclosed, “Demo contractors assume to pay for backfill 
and reap the benefit when it comes for free, a gamble of sorts.” However, the FCA source 
illustrates how in a best-case scenario contractors served as manufacturer, merchant, and market. 
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Figures 26-27 show the scale and reach of these sources across the Detroit region. 
Homrich has been a consistent player in the Expansive source approach. For almost two years, it 
used backfill material for 255 (228 HHF) demolitions from a site at 20448 Sibley Road, 
Figure 27: Map of DDP demolitions using Expansive sources, 2014-2018 
Figure 26: Map of approved Expansive backfill sources in Detroit region, 2014-2018 
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Brownstown, MI. Homrich sourced this material between 7/28/2014 and 2/17/2016, spending 
$856,263.60 in HHF according to MSHDA records. 20448 Sibley does not have a property 
record reported with Brownstown Township but is encompassed by the nearby property at 20450 
Sibley. Brownstown lists Christie Land, LLC as the current owner of the property 22 miles south 
of Detroit. Scott Christie is the owner of Christie Land, LLC and serves as the President/Partner 
of CMAC Transportation, a company that also owns adjacent property. CMAC Transportation is 
part of a larger family of companies that includes Motown Fleet Repair, Superior Global 
Logistics, MSH Logistics, and MSH Holdings. All of these reflect CMAC’s specialty in freight. 
The backfill material used by Homrich for these demolitions was waste from part of 
CMAC’s construction of a new 300,000 square-foot warehouse. Aerial imagery in Figures 28-30 
indicate the dramatic shift at the site. CMAC moved into the facility in 7/2018. The logistics 
center reinforces CMAC’s corporate claim they are “24/7 logistics powerhouse” by housing 250 
trucks and 450 trailers that ship 5 million tons of freight per day. The Sibley site was the home of 
Par-Fection Golf Center from 1994 up until 2010 when Comerica Bank foreclosed on the 
owners. Two years later Comerica sold the property to MSH Holdings for $525,000. Christie 
Land, LLC then purchased 20450 from MSH Holdings, LLC on 10/10/2014 for $1.00 in a Quit 
Claim action as part of a Distressed Sale. Prior to completion of CMAC’s new warehouse, 
Brownstown Township assessed 20450 at $1,266,295. Today, 20450 is assessed at $5,768,700. 
In three years, Christie Land, LLC has experienced a $4,513,700 gain in the value of its property. 
While 20450 has seen staggering appreciation, 15293 Coram – where Homrich removed charred 
debris on 9/15/2015 and billed MSHDA $3,750 for backfill and $14,100 for demolition – 
remains in DLBA’s inventory after an aborted sidelot sale in 7/2017.   
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Figure 28: 20448 Sibley, 4/2015 (Google, n.d.) 
Figure 29: 20448 Sibley, 4/2016 (Google, n.d.) 
Expansive sources are not only signals contractors bilked MSHDA and DDP into paying 
exorbitant backfill costs, although they certainly have set prices in ways that manipulate the 
backfill guidance. Instead, the dynamics of these Expansive sources suggest how the DDP and 
the achievement of demolishing Detroit relied on urban-environmental transformation inside and 
outside the city that in no way privileged the objective of stabilizing or regenerating Detroit’s 
neighborhoods. The list of Expansive sources is a showcase of affluence underlying the region’s 
uneven development. Sources include the Grosse Pointe Yacht Club, a sports dome, a new 
Figure 30: 20448 Sibley, 2018 (Google, n.d.) 
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parking lot for a car dealership in Redford, MI, and the Detroit Zoo – which sent 400 yd3 to 
three demolitions in 2016. A 2015 parking lot upgrade at the Cabela’s superstore in Dundee, MI 
contributed another 19,972 yd3. The backfill supply chain involving all these addresses are not 
characterized by any principles of unlocking value or development potential within Detroit, but 
rather growing and preserving the private sector’s relationship to value. For FCA, it was an act of 
environmental control. For CMAC at Sibley, it was an act of financial control. For others, the 
DDP was the supply chain moving unwanted matter out of the way. In the majority of instance, 
DDP and the backfill program reinforced where and how development happened in the region. 
 Speculative Sources 
I identified 124 Speculative sources of backfill material used between 7/2014 and 6/2018. 
The status of these sources is significant because their approval illustrates the competing and 
conflicting priorities at the center of DDP and the allocation of HHF dollars. DBA records show 
that contractors sourced 145,640 yd3 of material from these sources to complete 782 demolitions 
over that period. Demolition contractors acquired material removed for residential basements as 
part of what Grosshans of the USEPA described as “the relationship approach” to sourcing 
material. Of that total, the city allocated HHF to 633 demolitions. The total cost of DDP 
demolitions with speculative sources of backfill was $10,111,059.89, at an average of 
$15,973.24. Cost records for demolitions without HHF support are inconsistent but MSHDA 
reports dirt pricing for all but two of those HHF-demolitions. The sum dirt cost is $1,055,630.25 
and the average dirt cost is $1,672.95. However, the backfill costs are only part of the story 
involving demolition and speculative sources. After connecting the material excavation at each 
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source to a future property transaction, I calculated at least $66,413,937.00 in real estate sales (as 
of 3/2019) that directly benefit municipalities and property markets outside of Detroit113. 
Figure 31 shows the reach of these sources and suggests a difference in interests served 
by demolishing. Importantly, the presence of a speculative source does not automatically mean 
demolition contractors, excavators, or haulers made a direct payment to a builder or developer 
for basement digs (or that the payment was HHF backed). However, as part of MSHDA policy 
on HHF, the DDP and its network of contractors do not follow uniform standards for costing out 
material or its trucking. As mentioned in prior chapters, state and local officials accommodated 
imprecision and inaccuracy in costs to accelerate demolition. Neither of those parties nor the 
 
113 This is a conservative figure because many of the speculative sources are within larger tract-housing or 
subdivision developments. I based this estimate on the specific residential address provided by demolition 
contractors. However, given the likelihood of stockpiling or dirt-washing, it is plausible that backfill transactions are 
linked to more real estate sales not captured by the city’s backfill records. It also stands to reason that several of 
these properties will come online after 2018. 
Figure 31: Map of approved Speculative backfill sources and demolitions in Detroit completed 
with material, 2014-2018 
210 
 
DDP’s leaders and officials possess records that distinguish between trucking and material costs. 
Multiple interviewees confirmed MSHDA and DDP accommodated contractors setting costs 
based on “reasonable” estimates. Federal, state, and local officials have avowed trucking costs 
constitute the bulk of backfill costs, however, the individual transactions suggest feeble standards 
for these costs. A 9/2018 FOIA request114 submitted to the DBA asked for “Documents 
separating costs between purchasing demolition backfill material and hauling the demolition 
backfill material.” The Allen Law Group replied, “Your request has been denied because, after a 
diligent search for the requested records, we have determined and certify that the records do not 
exist.” DBA attorney issued that response 4 months after MSHDA circulated its manual 
requiring, “Blight partner must provide a copy of the actual dirt invoice and transportation 
invoices for moving of the dirt (MSHDA, 2018).” When granted the opportunity to share 
documentation, the DDP and DBA were not able to produce cost breakdowns justifying billings. 
Despite a lack of DDP or state records differing material from hauling, there is evidence 
demolition contractors purchase material from these speculative developments. By entering a 
competitive backfill marketplace, basement digs from speculative developments go from the 
waste of sprawl to a resource for destruction. The question of whether contractors are paying a 
significant amount directly to homebuilders becomes irrelevant because hauling the material 
from a development site serves as an in-kind subsidy as it allows for disposal. In these supply 
chains, the act of loading, hauling, and dumping becomes as financially significant as 
purchasing. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) allows contractors to 
dump dirt on private property contingent on the property owner’s permission, otherwise dumping 
 
114 This is the same bundle of FOIA requests I made that included statements certifying backfill sources, the job 
duties of AKT Peerless, and my own name (Michael Koscielniak; RJ Koscielniak). I have included a copy of DBA’s 
responses to my requests in the appendix.  
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fees apply that can paralyze large construction project. One demolition contractor operating out 
of Warren, MI described how his company also provides excavation services for new home 
construction. Although a suburban developer contracts with his company to remove and 
transport material, he disclosed that upon possessing that material as backfill he fabricates a dirt 
cost to report to DDP and MSHDA. As he explained, “Dirt is a commodity with a price.” 
The first demolition to receive material from a speculative source was 1890 Electric. 
MSHDA shows a $1,500 dirt cost for a demolition completed by Rickman Enterprises on 
6/3/2015. Rickman reported sourcing 200 cubic yards of material from 15 residential addresses 
in the Auburn Grove condominium development in Auburn Hills, MI located 32 miles northwest 
of Detroit115. Over the summer of 2015, Rickman drew on the Grove Lane project to source an 
additional 13,780 yd3 of material for 60 HHF demolitions with a total dirt cost of $88,500. 
Ferlito Group, a developer based in downtown Detroit, completed and sold out the Auburn 
Grove project in 2016 (Ferlito Group, 2019)116. Figure 32 shows the style of property built at the 
development. Figure 33-34 show the change in the landscape. The speculative development 
 
115 3432-3500 Grove Lane 
116 Ferlito Group took over as the developer at the Auburn Grove site. A quote from Steven Cohen, the Director of 
Community Development in Auburn Hills, on the developer’s website characterizes Ferlito as the successor to a 
prior homebuilder. 
Figure 32: A standard condo unit on Grove Lane in 
Auburn Hills, MI (Ferlito Group, 2018) 
212 
 
included 130 condos between $225,000 and $300,000. Ferlito also recently completed The 
Reserves of Auburn Hills, a nearby development of 1.5 story condominiums for senior residents.  
Figure 33: Auburn Grove Subdivision, 2015 (Google, n.d.) 
 
Figure 34: Auburn Grove Subdivision, 2017 (Google, n.d.) 
 
 The EPA is aware of the contradiction materialized in relying on speculative suburban 
development to create reserves of backfill material for Detroit demolitions. In a 2016 interview, 
Brooks Furio, a staffer at the EPA specializing in demolition backfill in the Midwest, admitted to 
this tension in Detroit’s program. Although he characterized new suburban construction as one of 
the “local, municipal, and state land policies that are killing us,” he justified the backfill source 
contradiction as one of many straining Detroit. In his view, Detroit “blew up Michigan’s supply 
chain for construction materials” and stressed that no American city in history had made a 
similar attempt to eliminate blight at this scale. While the Cuyahoga County Land Bank 
Authority operates its own backfill production that manufactures an approved fill material 
(Stansberry, 2015), the DDP trusts contractors in Detroit to develop more personal or customized 
logistical operations for sourcing material. Furio explained of DDP contractors, “They work out 
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a deal to move the dirt. They have friends with backhoes and pickup trucks. If they’re a big 
enough company, they are paid to excavate and move that material to another project.”  
 Speculative sources take a variety of forms. Developers and haulers work out deals with 
demolition contractors in which the waste of this residential construction is not simply reused or 
salvaged but commodified within a regional market and supply chain of wrecking. Builders hire 
a basement excavator that either leaves the material behind for the builder to sell or attempts to 
enter the backfill market themselves. In late summer and early fall 2017, Blue Star sourced 1,850 
yd3 of backfill for seven non-HHF demolitions from the construction of the Estates of 
Willowbrook. Mondrian Properties, the housing developer based in Troy, MI, describes the 
Estates of Willowbrook as the “new standard in premium-quality new construction, services and 
amenities – all set in the heart of Troy, where you can share in the comfort and peace-of-mind 
associated with living in the Troy School District including Barnard Elementary, Baker Middle 
and Athens High School (Mondrian, 2019).” The development is located on a footprint that up 
until 4/2016 had five single-family homes. Each of the 59 homes located within the Estates of 
Willowbrook will feature GE appliances, Kohler faucets, and Jeldwin windows. Three-car 
garages will flank open concept colonial plans with guest suites and prep kitchens. DDP could 
only produce cost records for four of seven demolitions. Blue Star sourced the 750 yd3 for these 
demolitions from Willowbrook and billed MSHDA $5,500. The material originated from 2018 
Osprey as part of the basement excavation for Mondrian’s model home marketing the project. 
Tracing backfill also illuminates how builders and developers create fixes for value 
outside Detroit. In tony Detroit suburbs of Birmingham and Royal Oak, homebuilders were 
buying older and modest homes and replacing these structures with custom houses. Contractors 
sourced 35,251 yd3 of material from 26 speculative builds in Birmingham. Great Lake Custom 
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Builder constructed 118 Waterfall in 2015. The builder purchased the vacant lot at 118 for 
$710,000 in 2013. The 5,214 square foot home is on the market for $4,995,000. In 3/2019, The 
Detroit News featured the home in its MI Dream Home coverage. The realtor declared, “Rarely 
in my career have I been in a home that captures so much of an aesthetic and quality (Ramirez 
2019)." With its view of a cataract and 8 bathrooms, 118 Waterfall was part of a bundle of five 
speculative builds that Rickman Enterprises used to complete 35 demolitions during 2015.  
In Royal Oak, MI, seventeen speculative properties have supplied contractors with 
enough material to fill and grade 106 demolitions. In 2016, KRH Inc, a builder based in Royal 
Oak, purchased a modest bungalow at 727 Hawthorn for $121,000. Within five months of 
purchase Royal Oak approved a demolition for KRH at the address. By the beginning of June, 
KRH began construction on the 3,100 square foot dwelling. Over the summer of 2016, Adamo 
and DMC Consultants combined to complete 11 demolitions with 1,186 yd3 of material 
excavated for the new basement at 727. KRH struggled to sell the home for two years until 
5/2019, when a buyer satisfied the builder’s speculative ambitions for $599,000. In total, the 
contractors billed MSHDA $20,069.14 for backfill. The imbalance between production and 
destruction – a process in which HHF has become a subsidy in recycling suburban land – is 
never sharper than in comparing backfill origins to their destinations. For the demolition of 2333 
Ford on 6/9/2015, DMC billed $3,000 for 300 yd3 of fill and $14,262.50 for the demolition. 
Today, 2333 Ford remains in DLBA inventory and a $6,522 HHF lien weighs on the property117. 
For the DDP and MSHDA, demolishing vacant or abandoned properties in Detroit are 
part of an effort to stabilize neighborhoods and prepare the city’s property market for new 
investment. In a 2016 presentation to MDEQ, Farkas included a slide declaring, “The reason 
 
117 I address the purpose and consequences of these HHF liens in Chapter 5. 
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we’re tearing down is to rebuild (Farkas. 2016).” The presence of hundreds of speculative 
sources troubles the strength of causal chain that could link wreckage to regeneration. As Weber 
et al (2006, 21) observed, “Demolition is one kind of ‘spatial fix’ that prepares land for 
conversion to higher and better uses.” The link between clearance and investment is intuitive if 
the derelict structure is viewed as the main impairment to unlocking a property’s development 
potential. The abandoned structure physically and financially stands in the way. Land is cheap 
and plentiful by virtue of capital’s flight from Detroit neighborhoods to the suburbs. Over time, 
development costs in the latter rise and an aging built environment encourages investors to seek 
bargains elsewhere. Seeing potential returns on cheap land, builders, and speculators support 
demolition (Smith, 1996). The city is a frontier of investment when the periphery is exhausted.  
However, by drawing lessons from the backfill program, the demolitions tasked with 
enabling Detroit’s redevelopment worked towards contradictory purposes. Speculative 
conversions of modest homes and vacant lots are examples of the remaining frontiers contained 
within affluent suburban environments. As my research suggests, the backfill supply chain - and 
therefore the DDP itself - is embedded within a suburban land market in which builders and 
developers have unlocked nearly $70 million in home sales since 2014. Detroit’s decline depends 
on a suburban hinterland of backfill, but the continued recycling of properties in the same 
suburbs relies on Detroit as a hinterland of sinks and disposal, with HHF as a source of subsidy. 
In most American cities, demolitions are the initial engineering interventions that reopen land or 
a property market to reinvestment. Capital flows back to the undervalued core. However, these 
hundreds of sources illustrate how demolishing Detroit can mean disposing speculation’s waste. 
The speculative component of the backfilling Detroit entangles developers, builders, and 
destroyers of the regional built environment. Categorizing this material as Residential fails to 
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capture the conflicts and tensions shaping the backfill supply. Instead of DDP and HHF paying 
Able Demolition to stabilize and unlock development at 15762 Freeland - $11,817.00 for demo 
and $1,600 for 120 yd3 of fill in 10/2017 – the rewards are more apparent at the backfill source: 
3973 Lisa Marie Dr, Sterling Heights, MI. Lisa Marie Gardens is a speculative project developed 
by Ryan 19 Properties. The development company is owned by Fazal Khan – a civil engineer 
based in Troy, MI – and represented by Douglas Wozniak, a Sterling Heights-based real estate 
attorney and broker. New-builds in Lisa Marie Gardens contributed 2,190 yd3 of material for 18 
demolitions in Detroit. 3937 Lisa Marie Drive, a 2,800 square foot home, is currently listed for 
$468,000. On 7/12/2019, U.S. District Court Judge Robert H. Cleland found Khan guilty of four 
counts of bribery related to engineering projects in Macomb County. He will be sentenced in 
November. In 1/2019, Wozniak began his first term as the State Representative for Shelby 
Township. A hardline conservative and Republican, Wozniak garnered attention when he 
challenged Governor Whitmer’s plan to increase taxes to fund roads. Without a dose of irony for 
the projects straining state infrastructure, Wozniak rebuked the assumption suburban constituents 
were responsible for infrastructure improvements, “Macomb County taxpayers’ wallets are not 
bottomless pits the government can keep reaching in to (Michigan House Republicans, 2019).” 
 Infrastructural Sources 
In addition to private Expansive sources, contractors also source backfill material from 
infrastructure projects across southeast Michigan. The presence of Infrastructural sources raises 
critical questions about the material quality and monitoring processes that initially established 
the regional conditions for increased backfill costs. In the early phases of the DDP, regional 
demolition contractors planned to source backfill from two largescale construction projects 
located within and adjacent to Detroit – the I-96 surface rebuild and the Little Caesar’s Arena 
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(LCA) development – but elevated chloride and lead content disqualified the millions of cubic 
yards (Gallagher, 2014a). Kat Stafford, the government watchdog reporter at the Detroit Free 
Press, summarized the incident, “City officials said due to testing performed by environmental 
consultants, dirt from the I-96 road construction project and the Little Caesars Arena site has 
been deemed ‘not suitable for residential use’ and has been prohibited from being used (2019).”  
The scarcity of free and clean material transformed backfill material into a commodity 
and established the conditions for a new secondary market within the regional demolition 
economy. As a result, contractors turned to their own regional networks of builders, excavators, 
and suppliers to meet the massive backfill need. By relying on a more sprawling set of backfill 
supply chain relationships, material and hauling costs surged during the initial rollout of the 
demolition program in spring 2014 (Helms & Guillen, 2015). The disqualification of material 
produced by these largescale infrastructure projects set up the regional and political-economic 
climate in which the scales of authority over the program tilted towards contractors. Figure 35 
shows the infrastructure source contractors did use for backfill. The speed and scale of the DDP 
Figure 35: Map of approved Infrastructural backfill sources in the Detroit region, 2014-2018 
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depended on the circulation of backfill and contractors filled the gap by identifying and taking 
advantage of sources already within or available to their routine supply chains. When testing 
disqualified the anticipated I-96 and LCA stockpiles, contractors suddenly had reason to assetize 
dirt as a precious resource and bill the DDP and MSHDA accordingly118. In effect, the 
contaminated spoils of those early infrastructural improvements in Detroit became the 
precondition to accessing the rentiership riches of HHF funding. The potential toxic dangers of 
these infrastructural sources justified an accommodating DDP approach to backfill costs.  
Even with the ineligibility of LCA and I-96 spoils, Infrastructural sources are not by rule 
inconsistent with DDP’s approach to regulating material in the interest of public health. Despite 
official concern about chloride and lead contamination present in backfill material, the DDP has 
approved numerous sources sharing a profile with LCA and I-96. Since 2014, the DDP reports 
329 HHF-supported demolitions119 included material from street, sewer, park, library, sidewalk, 
and bridge construction. As it happens, orange-barrel season is also the season of opportunity for 
regional wreckers. Contractors billed MSHDA $669,699.33 for 108,116 yd3 of material from 34 
infrastructure sites scattered throughout the region. The largest single source within this category 
was a sewer upgrading project on Ternes Street in Dearborn, MI. DMC Consultants used 63,500 
yd3 of material from a residential water main replacement completed in 8/2017. Aerial imagery 
shows the project included removing road surface and sidewalk material in summer 2017. An 
article appearing on the Patch page for Dearborn suggests the Ternes project started in 2/2017 
and concluded in August (Thomas, 2017). However, DMC first listed Ternes as a backfill source 
 
118 Although MSHDA sanctioned many of these backfill transactions by requiring refunds, the overall success of the 
DDP remains subject to contractors identifying and sourcing material with inconsistent supplies. MSHDA has not 
imposed refunds on any HHF demolitions since 2014 even as subsequent backfill costs remained comparable to the 
early refund period. 
119 Total demolitions drawing on infrastructure source is 521. 
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for a 5/2016 demolition: 4240 Neff. In total, DMC reported to the DDP using this backfill 
material for 161 demolitions prior to the City of Dearborn officially beginning the sewer project. 
On 6/9/2017, the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) closed a section of 
the John C. Lodge Freeway that slithers northwest from downtown Detroit (Ramirez, 2017). 
MDOT scheduled this closure to demolish the Martin Luther King, Jr Boulevard Bridge near the 
MotorCity Casino and Corktown neighborhood. The $15 million bridge replacement promised to 
accommodate increased traffic along the nearby southbound M-10 exit in anticipation of the 
opening of LCA (Michigan.gov, 2019). Walled Lake-based CA Hull was responsible for bridge 
construction and partnered with four contractors to complete the bridge. Hull’s online newsletter 
(CA Hull, 2017) states, “Building a project of this size within the footprint of Motor City Casino, 
Little Caesars Arena, and several Detroit Public Schools was not easy.” Able Demolition first 
reported using 540 yd3 of material from the bridge project on 9/28/2017 for four demolitions on 
Glenfield, Wykes, and Parkway. DDP could not produce the backfill cost records. Able 
Demolition used an additional 1,460 yd3 of material for eleven demolitions in the Hubbell-
Lyndon neighborhood to close out 2017. The contractor billed MSHDA $16,800 for backfill.  
The M-10 source is one of the few categorized as an Industrial (3) source. The DDP 
backfill guidance does provide instructions for contractors drawing on this infrequent source 
category. Contractors are required to submit three soil samples for laboratory analysis (DBA 
2014). The DDP expects a contractor to retain its own “environmental professional” to conduct 
these tests and submit nine other deliverables120. The DDP also accommodates alternatives to 
monitoring but workplans must receive AKT approval. DDP expects contractors to follow EPA 
methods and test for volatile organic compounds, semi-volatile organic compounds, 
 
120 These range from Google Earth imagery to descriptions of the firm’s soil sampling methodology. 
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polychlorinated biphenyls, Michigan metals121, chloride, and herbicides and pesticides. The final 
provisions are contingent on the location of the source. The latter is conditional on agricultural or 
commercial landscape property. The former is required if the source is “located beneath parking 
lots only” (emphasis added). This means the parameters of the soil testing of MLK material were 
not extended to include analysis of chloride, the active ingredient in snow and ice control for 
roads. In MDOT’s “Current deicing practices and alternative deicing materials,” the agency 
warned, “In humans, chloride causes skin bums, severe tearing, and respiratory irritation; 
handlers should wear respirators, rubber gloves, and protective clothing (1993, 17).” That DDP 
and AKT were not requiring chloride tests under most circumstances raises questions about the 
process that disqualified major infrastructural sources in 2014. Figure 36 shows demolitions 
where contractors used material from these sources. Kashat had been unequivocal on how proof 
 
121 Arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, copper, lead, mercury, selenium, silver, and zinc. 
Figure 36: DDP demolitions in Detroit using Infrastructural backfill sources, 2014-2018 
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of chloride at those sites reshaped the backfilling economy, “Lots of road salt and heavy metals. 
It’d be great if we could use it. It’s been a tough one. We’ve seen the same data submitted to us 
three or four times. It’s got to be current. We’re not trying to stand in the way.”  
Regardless of the potential for chloride to be present in the dirt from MLK, AKT Peerless 
would need to provide a Certificate of Approval to the Contractor in order to use material from 
CA Hull’s bridge rebuild. The DDP’s backfill guidance instructs, “These certificates must 
accompany all trucks transporting the approved material (4, 2014).” In correspondence with 
Wendy Sitek of Able Demolition, I requested information about the backfill certifications 
provided and required by AKT. Sitek replied, “I'm sorry to say I have never received a backfill 
certification. As long as we use one of AKT's certified approved sources they don't issue one.” 
Outside of Sitek misinterpreting the request, the lack of a certification could suggest AKT and 
Able were not thorough in regulating the 2,000 yd3 of Industrial material that the contractor used 
as backfill. Based on the irregularities in the dates included in DMC’s parallel use of material 
from the Ternes sewer project, the circulation of backfill from Infrastructural sources shows the 
limits and challenges of regulating the backfilling process through chemical histories.  
The regulatory protocols applied to the Infrastructural sources are as much a part of 
backfill’s constitution as the organic matter filling up haulers. In The Social Production of Soil, 
Swidler (2009) argues for “a history of the geological body that proposes that social dynamics 
and struggles over power are important determinants and producers of particular soils. For social 
history, soil is invisible and therefore unmentioned (3).” Although Swidler is correct that soil is 
an artifact of conflict and inequality, that approach threatens to sideline how soil and its health 
are mystified or black-boxed as technical artifacts to serve social or political ends. Like the 
bottlenecks, inefficiencies, and scarcity that served the interests of demolition contractors and 
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their associates, the seeming apolitical nature of soil is not remedied by invoking its politics. 
Rather, it is by tracking the ways soil – or backfill – took on the appearance of a neutral input for 
demolition. How is soil transformed into an object of engineering? Infrastructural sources in the 
DDP signal not merely a social history but the work to erase it. One approach is to avoid any 
evaluation indicating a common contaminant. Another is to categorize soil in ways that makes its 
hazard and history invisible – the waste of a more important intervention. Still another is to 
construct a history in which the material appeared from nothing; a resource found in the wild. 
 New Construction Sources 
In addition to backfill sources associated with speculative residential developments; 
contractors sourced material for 459 HHF-supported demolitions from New Construction (NC) 
sources across the Detroit area. These 125 sources fitting within this category contributed 
140,247 yd3 of approved material to DDP demolitions. Figure 37 shows these New Construction 
Figure 37: Map of approved New Construction backfill sources in the Detroit region, 2014-2018 
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sources. I chose to categorize these sources as NC because available property records and real 
estate transactions show these sites were: 1) a new-build or rehab completed by or on behalf of 
an owner-occupant; or, 2) clouded by inconsistent or unreliable records about who owned the 
property and whether it was sold after the backfill transaction. For the most part, sources within 
the NC category are those that do not fit tidily within the Speculative source profile. 
Contractors billed MSHDA $779,882.43 for material from these sources. Figure 38 
shows where this material ended up in Detroit. The implications of these sources mirror those of 
speculative and expansive sources. In most instances, these sources represent the triumph of 
suburban and regional value over that of Detroit and the efforts by DDP to unlock development 
potential within the city and its neighborhoods. That they are not Speculative only confirms that 
HHF was not subsidizing the forms of residential sprawl that undermine the welfare of urban 
cores. However, HHF did provide a kind of subsidy as part of an arrangement with 24 unique 
Figure 38: DDP demolitions in Detroit with New Construction backfill sources, 2014-2018 
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sources within the Mack-Ashland II development in Detroit’s Morningside neighborhood. Mack-
Ashland II is a 28-unit affordable housing project developed by Southwest Housing Solutions 
and supported by $700,000 in Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC). Rickman Enterprises, 
Adamo, and Homrich combined to source 41,347 yd3 from the project for 232 demolition 
backfill transactions by the end of 2017. HHF demolitions completed with material from the 
Mack-Ashland II development illustrate a geologic stacking of subsidies: LIHTC paid to produce 
the material and HHF paid to use it. 
Beginning in 2013, contractors have completed 13 demolitions in this section of the 
Morningside neighborhood prior to the construction of Mack-Ashland II. Towards the end of 
2016, Homrich demolished 3697 Alter. Southwest Housing Solutions paid for the demolition 
after purchasing the vacant house from the DLBA in 4/2016 for $17,750.00. In early 2017, 
Southwest broke ground on a new structure at 3697. Today, the land once occupied by the 
demolished structure is home to a yard, driveway, and garage for the new 3697. Adamo Group 
reported using 304 yd3 of material from 3697 for six non-HHF demolitions in 7/2016122. No 
records exist confirming backfill volume or quality at 3697 Alter. Consequently, the quality of 
the material used at these six demolitions cannot be verified. Records suggest 3697 may also 
have contributed backfill material to dozens more demolitions throughout 2016 and 2017. 
In 7/2016, Mayor Duggan appeared at 14097 Marlowe to celebrate the 10000th 
demolition completed by DDP (Helms, 2016). Rickman Enterprises tore down the tax foreclosed 
building for $13,500. Rickman billed MSHDA $1,486 for 200 yd3 of backfill from a single 
source drawn from addresses between 3746 Manistique and 3884 Manistique. Upon review of 
aerials from the construction at Mack-Ashland, the basement excavation for 3884 included 
 
122 3726 Clavert; 14607 Terry; 13295 Sussex; 13019 Promenade; 12304 Chelsea; 6378 Greenview 
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adjacent parcels at the corner of Manistique and Lozier. Although today the property and parcel 
number are no longer available to search on city websites, the new townhouse at 3884 occupies 
land once belonging to 3876 Manistique and 3881 Manistique. In 2013, Brown Environmental 
demolished the latter but records only exist in the city’s building permits data. At some point in 
2016, Homrich also demolished 3876 Manistique. As with 3881, the demolition does not appear 
in any current demolition records nor does 3876 appear in any backfill records. The only mention 
of the demolition is on the city’s historic building permits site. Based on this review of the 
souces, the material used by Rickman to fill the hole at 14097 Marlowe may have passed the 
AKT aerial eye-test – Google - but that only confirms the “Residential” status and not the quality 
of the material Homrich or Brown used to fill either hole. Records show Rickman mixed 3884 
dirt with five other addresses to backfill another 36 demolitions in 2016 and 2017. Rickman 
completed 26 more demolitions using 3,060 yd3 of material from the same area but listed the 
source as 14845 Mack, which has been a Marathon station since at least 2004. 
This source category may hold similar repercussions for Detroit as Speculative but 
without clear indication of those processes these sources expressed other regional imbalances. 
New construction at the periphery continues to receive the de facto HHF excavation subsidy but 
new construction within the city limits also illustrates how an attention to a history of 
interventions and transactions can illuminate the conflicts and contradictions of the DDP. By 
working backward and uncovering a record of destruction at these sources, I have shown how the 
prevailing regulatory approach to demolition sees dirt as a feature and resource rather than a 
product of prior investments, processes, and displacements. The dirt used at 14097 Marlowe was 
not a natural resource extracted and delivered. The backfill was part of present and past spatial 
relations shaping dirt it into an asset (Swyngedouw, 1997). Profit and policy produced and then 
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commanded land at 3697. A process of exchange and destruction transformed 3697 Alter into a 
site for extraction that troubles the self-evidence of Detroit’s land (Moore, 2015).  
In Concrete and Clay, Gandy writes, “The design, use, and meaning of urban space 
involves the transformation of nature into a new synthesis (2002, 2).” While Duggan stood at a 
podium lauding the efforts of his administration, the Rickman crew attached a “10,000” banner 
on the site of 14097 Marlowe. Duggan declaimed, “Every time one of these houses goes down, 
we raise the quality of life for everybody else in the neighborhood.” For the mayor and his 
coterie, the “houses go down” and the newly vacant land is ready for a future and its new 
beginning. By tracking the source of the 200 yd3 of backfill Rickman used there the question of 
importance is less where the city is headed and more where parts of Detroit have already been. 
Demolishing Detroit is not independent of the political and economic interests governing the 
DDP and backfilling Detroit is not separate from histories of the material sources used by 
contractors. The new synthesis of vacant land cannot escape the conditions of its creation. 
 Conclusion: Contaminating Soil Histories 
In 2015, Tony Kashat of AKT Peerless observed, “The problem is a lot of these sites 
have a history to them.” As I have shown, AKT’s chief may have understated how history shapes 
the backfill program. Rather than simply a history of growth’s harms – contamination from 
manufacturing, agriculture, and the hegemony of the automobile – backfilling Detroit is also 
embedded in the history and present of growth itself: the expansionist logics associated with the 
exchange and development of land. By categorizing backfill in ways sensitive to these relational 
traits – transaction, construction, and extraction – the DDP objective of demolition-dependent 
redevelopment becomes less inevitable. The EPA viewed the backfill program as too large and 
complex to fall under the purview of a public agency. From the outset, the DDP trusted 
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demolition contractors to draw on their own network of suppliers, resources, labor, and 
equipment to conduct demolitions and achieve the DDP’s blight removal goals. This in turn 
enabled a regional geography of decline’s hinterland in which property at the edges of Detroit 
became essential to the objectives of transforming the city’s landscape through demolition. 
Backfill is not a topographic or geological feature of the regional landscape or 
environment. Piles of dirt, gravel, sand, and concrete do not exist prior to their production within 
the homebuilding, aggregate, extractive, and hauling industries. Configurations of these 
industries and interests produce both the waste that becomes commodity and resource in addition 
to the market and material processes responsible for that transformation. The DDP, its boosters, 
and its contractors have stressed that sources are irrelevant if the material is deemed “clean” 
(Ferretti, 2019g)123. Treating backfill this way erases how these materials serve interests and 
benefit actors that 1) conflict with the objectives of “rebuilding” Detroit; or b) are not 
immediately visible as shapers of demolishing and backfilling Detroit. By introducing a different 
categorization approach to backfill origins I have challenged whether “clean” or “approved” are 
robust enough standards to grade sources while spotlighting the limits of an evaluative 
understanding of the intervention that makes demolition synonymous with destinations. The 
hinterland supporting the growth of Chicago in the 18th century has found a peer in the hinterland 
of dirt, sand, rock, and gravel that provides the resources to help produce decline in Detroit. 
In this extractive hinterland, dirt is not a thing out of place but a way of making and 
probing place. As McClintock (2015) writes in “A critical physical geography of urban soil 
contamination,” the study of urban soil illustrates the possibility for a “material politics of 
place.” Soil is a hybrid of “socio-historical, pedogenetic, and climactic factors” that resists 
 
123 Brian Farkas’ complete quote: “All that matters is whether it's been tested and approved.” 
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simple testing for contaminants. Rather than apprehending isolated mechanisms, he encourages a 
research that addresses “the historical political economic forces that led to a particular land use 
in a particular place and time (82).” It is in that configuration that the relationship between 
valuation and devaluation becomes discernible. By interpreting the geography of backfilling as 
regional linkages between creation and destruction, demolishing looks less like the production of 
vacant land and more of an urbanization of a regional supply chain for discharging an asset.   
The politics of place illustrated by these supply chains of backfill reveals a material 
companion for the valuation and regulatory capture of backfilling, a formation Mezzadra and 
Neilson (2019) describe as an operation, “ a process with a beginning and an end; a process that 
accomplishes something without necessarily yielding a material thing; and a process that 
impinges on others, affecting possibilities and establishing multifarious and not necessarily 
predictable connections (67).” The demolishing and redevelopment of Detroit must involve itself 
with a region of backfill sources “messed up with dirt, extraction, and exploitation (244).” This 
operation not only moves the material from source to demolition but ensures that the regnant 
regional divisions of rich and poor, white and black, urban and suburban remain untouched. The 
metropolitan operation of backfilling calls to mind Galster’s “housing disassembly line” and the 
persistent plundering of Detroit as population sprawls from core to periphery (2012). Each wave 
of construction destroying the previous. While the chain of moves building the next suburb 
drains people and resources, a parallel assembly line of demolishing ensures that even wrecking 
to rebuild Detroit still serves the interests of suburban markets and municipalities. Backfilling 
feeds this assembly line and ensures continued investment in the region’s white communities. 
Demolishing Detroit is not isolated at the house where contractors deploy excavators. A 
demolition is more than the endpoint for a pipeline of predatory lending, foreclosure, 
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speculation, and abandonment. Demolishing depends on a pipeline of backfilling shaped and 
commanded by builders, excavators, haulers, and mineral plants – producing values in places 
outside Detroit. Like the backfill transaction involving 8 N River, money, material, machinery 
and labor converge to ensure Detroit’s demolishability. Alongside the political achievement of 
demolishing there is a material achievement dependent on backfilling. The largest urban policy 
project in the US has sought to erase the history and consequences of decline. However, by 
relying on a supply chain established and commanded by contractors, the DDP has assigned even 
more weight to a past where value and prosperity are differentiated. Demolishing Detroit was not 
after or outside the process of capitalist urbanization that continues to undo the city’s built-
environment. Instead, it was a continuation of the production of decline by other means. 
Each demolition implicates its own chain of value in which contractors, excavators, 
haulers, developers, and aggregate producers position themselves to take advantage of the city’s 
distress. The urgency of demolition – framed by local, metropolitan, state, and federal leaders as 
an emergency – enables construction industry actors to approach Detroit with the orientation of 
real estate actors. Rather than serving as a technical specialist for investors and speculators, this 
decline coalition exploits the Detroit property market and maximizes values by intensifying 
destruction. The imbalanced scales of capital and value did not tilt with the advent of the DDP. 
Instead, the DDP reinforced regional asymmetries by rewarding builders, developers, excavators, 
and haulers for the suburban real estate practices that have helped determine current Detroit’s 
condition. In this particular variation of “parasitic urbanization” the suburbs continue to grow 
without limits partly dependent on a logistical mesh that transforms the waste of their expansion 
into a resource that reinforces class and race exclusion at the regional level (Beauregard, 2006).  
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Decline, then, might be more than the absence of development, a policy failure, or 
footloose capital. Growth as the sole objective of Post-Fordist development now appears 
insufficient for comprehending the conflicts and possibilities of decline in Detroit. Growth has 
depended on plural real estate interests mobilizing around the imperative of expansion to 
command a place’s economy and convert use values into exchange values (Logan & Molotch, 
1987). By shaping land use, this growth coalition wields enormous power to strip land of its 
communal character and transform it into a marketable commodity that serves accumulation and 
rentiership. But this analysis favors traditional city-builders unlocking values within mostly 
growing cities. Recognizing urban misfortunes entails defamiliarizing processes shaping and 
unlocking value through the built environment. Key among them, land is a social and material 
record transcending the last property sale or infrastructure project. In Detroit, demolishing and 
backfilling allows speculators, excavators, and haulers to generate incomes by transforming dirt 
into an asset. The dream of citybuilders buying up swathes of Detroit now relies on a terrestrial 
reality of contractors and suppliers circulating millions of cubic yards around the region.  
The conditions of creation for demolishing matter for understanding its consequences and 
contradictions. Backfilling shows how frontiers of investment depend on more than the 
production of vacant land. The asset of empty land depends on the asset of backfill, a process 
that moves between suburban subdivisions, quarries, and crushed sidewalks. The relationship 
between backfill and speculative development calls into question the self-evidence of demolition 
unlocking development in urban cores. In the next chapter, I examine how backfilling and the 
process around creating and storing material clarifies local arrangements of land, labor, and 
capital. Demolishing may not have created the developable city but that does not mean the DDP 
was unproductive. Backfilling’s relationship to property and investment goes beyond triggering 
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redevelopment and the next phase of accumulation. Destruction is not always devaluation and 
demolishing created opportunities to value abandoned buildings in new ways. Where the growth 
machine centers land use intensification to enable windfalls for developers and investors, a 
decline machine relies on land use debasement to control and extract value. The interaction of 
environment, resource, and land requires a rethinking of property in the post-crisis city.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Backfill to the City Movement: 
Land, Value, and the Properties of Demolishing 
“The capitalists will take care of the rest.” – John George, Motor City Blight Busters, 2014 
“The reason we’re tearing down is to rebuild.” – Brian Farkas, Detroit Building Authority, 2016 
In this chapter, I investigate and interpret the consequences of demolishing and 
backfilling for the built environment in Detroit’s neighborhoods. I examine how the Detroit 
Demolition Program contributed to the redevelopment of vacant land and how demolishing and 
backfilling affected land use and valuation in the city. By addressing post-demolition property 
sales, Hardest Hit Fund liens, and the existing body of research drawing associations between 
demolition and value, I reconsider the outcomes of demolishing and question the process’ 
recognized relationship to gentrification and austerity. Rather than an extension of the growth 
ideology or a strategy for rebirth, demolishing and backfilling can perform important financial, 
environmental, and logistical roles for a land regime of decline operating in Detroit. Demolishing 
may not manage decline, but it still produces landscapes and environments. In this land regime, 
occupation, ownership, use, and disposition take on new forms, objectives, and meanings. By 
focusing on backfilling as a process of land, logistics, and environment, I show how generating 
income from property is not exclusive to land-use intensification but is also a process of land-use 
debasement extracting value through decline.
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 Introduction 
Although reporters have linked Detroit to demolition for decades (Saulny, 2010; 
Wilgoren, 2002), the fanfare around the Detroit Blight Removal Task Force (DBRTF) helped 
return demolition to the national mainstream policy agenda (Trickey, 2017; Davey, 2014; 
Badger, 2014). Growing and declining cities followed Detroit’s lead and focused energy and 
resources on eliminating blight. In 2015, the city council of Jacksonville, FL established the 
Blight Initiatives Office complete with a six-figure budget, three permanent staff members, and 
Jaxcan, an anthropomorphic wastebasket donning sunglasses, a baseball cap, and a red cape 
encouraging Jaxsons to “Join the Blight Squad” (Micolucci, 2018). By the end of 2016, Lyda 
Krewson, the newly elected mayor of St. Louis City, approved the creation of a blight removal 
task force to develop a citywide plan for reducing vacant buildings (Office of the Mayor, 2018, 
5). Within months, the new Vacancy Collaborative was coordinating partnerships to improve 
how the city’s agencies approached blight removal. In 2017, Mayor Matt Pacifico of Altoona, 
PA created The Blight Task Force comprising policy officials, realtors, landlords, and 
community developers to address vacancy in a city with a 9% vacancy rate (Kibler 2017) 124.  
 
124 Observers at the time criticized Pacifico because Altoona did not have anything resembling blight problem. “But 
Altoona is better off than Johnstown at 17 percent abandoned housing, Harrisburg at 15 percent and Reading and 
York at 12 percent, city Community Development Director Lee Slusser told the commission. (Kibler 2017)” 
Figure 39: Jaxcan, mascot for Jacksonville, 
FL anti-blight initiative (Department of 
Neighborhoods, 2020) 
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Since 2015, the Center for Community Progress (CCP) reports state and local officials 
across the US have authorized 56 new land banks to transform “liabilities into assets (CCP, 
2020).” Prior to 2012, only 72 operated. Blight removal is a keystone of land bank powers. That 
year, the Cleveland City Council announced public support for citywide demolishing, 
“Removing a distressed house creates significant value,” and circulated a report including an 
infographic – Figure 40 - of a seesaw of unlocked land value (2012, 3). Demolishing abandoned 
properties appeals to both policy and development interests because it produces the raw material 
of stabilization and redevelopment: vacant land (Williams 2019; Livengood 2019). What was 
once a problem of oversupply is now a solution through innovation (Nissen 2019). Demolishing 
opens space to new investment, new possibilities, and new futures. The National Demolition 
Association (NDA) explains, “The demolition industry is making way for a better world, helping 
communities re-invent and re-imagine their future (NDA, 2019).” Whether in cartoonish or 
convenient fashion, blight removal returns “problem properties to productive use (CCP, 2020).” 
With increasing policy popularity, scholars have newly scrutinized demolition’s purpose 
in unlocking development by removing impediments to private investment (Rosenman & Walker 
,2015) or decommissioning deserted urban neighborhoods (Hackworth, 2016). In both models, 
demolition is an engineering practice regulating vacancy and building supply for redevelopment 
Figure 40: Image from "Through 
demolition...Cleveland rebuilds value" 
(Cleveland City Council, 2012, 3) 
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(Mallach, 2012). Demolishing should, then, succeed or fail at one of two goals: redevelopment or 
eradication. At the core of these approaches is demolition’s link to increasing the value of land. 
If one of Detroit’s “potentially greatest assets [is] abundant open space of undervalued urban real 
estate available for building and redevelopment (Legislative Policy Division, 2016, 3),” then 
how has the Detroit Demolition Program (DDP) contributed to transforming the city’s land? 
My research on the DDP and the backfill program suggests those scholarly approaches 
have not captured outcomes falling outside redevelopment or decommissioning. Demolishing is 
both a means for producing the raw material of redevelopment and a logistical, political, and 
environmental achievement itself. To enact and maintain the DDP, public and private interests 
have reformatted the institutional landscape to prioritize blight removal within rebuilding (Farkas 
2016). Consequently, citywide clearance narrowed the goals of revitalization. Demolishing 
expressed the priorities of public authority through a constellation of agencies, institutions, and 
actors. Moreover, the valuation and geography of backfilling enabled contractors to generate 
income through rentiership on a public anti-foreclosure program. Backfilling became less the 
production of vacant land in Detroit for new development and more a chain of construction and 
destruction that assetized dirt to grab value. The question for researchers is what kinds of land 
use, property, and environmental transformation did demolishing Detroit enable and produce? 
Regulation theory can illuminate the operations of state and capital in Detroit that have 
shifted these processes around value. Demolishing signals how decline can take an institutional 
form that provides order and meaning to production, consumption, and valuation in Detroit. An 
institutional form is a codification of social relations within a broader regime of accumulation – 
“the set of regularities that ensure the general and relatively coherent evolution of capital 
accumulation (Boyer & Saillard, 2002).” Institutional forms constrain and regulate behavior 
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within a decentralized economic system to ensure capital circulation, flow, and accumulation 
(Lipietz, 1988). Boyer (1990) defines five institutional forms125, among these is the relationship 
between state and economy. That relationship serves as one pillar for a mode of regulation that 
reproduces social relations under capitalism but also provides room for adjustment by firms. 
These institutional forms are embedded within specific political-economies and geographies and 
rely on local or regional vernaculars of income-generation (Labrousse & Michel, 2018). These 
forms can distinguish the capitalism of Detroit from the capitalism of Chicago (Boyer, 2005).  
Capital did not abandon Detroit; it only modified its accumulation strategies (Akers, 
2013). Demolishing Detroit relies upon and reproduces the conflicts, struggles, and power 
asymmetries of a historically situated political economy of decline. As Seymour (2020) has 
shown through real estate sales, decline is an active process and can establish new asset classes 
and uses for property. The production of decline, therefore, depends on iterations of land, labor, 
and capital cultivating new relations and interventions to extract surpluses (Marx, 1992). Within 
demolishing, these articulate to generate income by valuing and regulating an asset: backfill. The 
necessity of dirt to demolishing houses is a principal driver of this asset class - DDP contractors 
acquire physical sites to process aggregate material and conduct their residential demolitions.  
Less a locational seesaw in which land clearance tilts capital towards undervalued urban 
centers (Smith, 1982), the DDP and backfilling have contributed to a regional maze of supply, 
logistics, and land in which demolishing extracts value in ways inconsistent with legacies of 
footloose capital. The goals and consequences of capital’s relation to land in declining cities are 
not self-evident – new strategies need new dispositions and occupations. As I show, rules and 
routines around land enables new forms to emerge and adapt. A land regime of decline 
 
125 1) Money relation; 2) Wage relation; 3) Competitive relations between firms; 4) State-economy relation; 4) 
National economy-international economy relation (Boyer, 1986). 
237 
 
countenances those shifts in accumulation and rent extraction. Demolition’s basic relation to the 
value and use of land provides a critical point of entry into understanding the character and 
consequences of such a land regime (Weber, Doussard, Bhatta, & McGrath, 2006). By replacing 
post-hoc evaluation of demolition with an ongoing tracing of its environments, assets, and 
pathways, I illustrate how operations of demolishing can reproduce decline rather than remedy it. 
Decline – a feature of capitalism in Detroit – has supplied demolition contractors with 
space to command land in ways that fall outside class restructuring or welfare state withdrawal 
but provide institutional form to both the state’s objectives and the interests of the market. In 
earlier chapters, I illustrated how contractors performed a more substantial role than clearing 
land for private development interests. Demolishing was not outside of property relations or the 
operations of capital. Instead, it expressed them in new ways unique to the declining city. In this 
chapter, I show how demolishing Detroit has not uniformly prepared land for redevelopment or 
exploited the hopes of land-use intensification to unlock potential values. The DDP is not Urban 
Renewal by another name (Gratz, 2010b). Demolishing may not be the local response that 
triggers redevelopment in Detroit but the DDP and contractors have reshaped land and its use by 
assetizing even the former’s most basic elements, while helping sustain an uneven geography 
where suburban developments, speculative home-builders, and wrecking firms win out. 
 Gentrification, Austerity, and Post-Crisis Property: Relevant Literature 
In this section, I present the contours of scholarship addressing responses to and 
conditions within the post-crisis or declining city. The first subsection presents the state of the 
literature on gentrification, especially as it relates to Detroit, MI, and cities with similar traits of 
economic instability and depopulation. In the second section, I identify the key texts describing 
austerity and the move by public institutions to restructure, retrench, and privatize services from 
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weak neighborhoods. Finally, in the third subsection, I address how scholars have mobilized the 
concepts of property and land to make sense of transformation in post-crisis and declining cities. 
I have chosen these bodies of literature and their constituent debates because demolition has 
recurrent significance within research on urban change, capital mobility, and property relations. 
 Gentrification 
Since Glass’ (1964) initial characterization of working-class neighborhoods giving way 
to middle class residents and their consumption preferences, gentrification has grown into the 
default prism through which many researchers, policymakers, and inhabitants frame and interpret 
investment into the built environment (Hackworth, 2019). Neil Smith (1979) pushed the study of 
gentrification into political economic terrain with “Toward a Theory of Gentrification: A Back to 
the City Movement by Capital, not People.” His Neo-Marxian approach to urban political 
economy moved beyond explanations of gentrification that relied on the changing consumption 
preferences of the middle class, concentrating instead on the production side of neighborhood 
change. Capital returned to the devalued inner-city in the hopes of closing the gap between 
present and potential land values. By focusing on the demands of gentrifiers, prior economistic 
approaches had ignored “the role of builders, developers, landlords, mortgage lenders, 
government agencies, real estate agents, and tenants (540).” Critical researchers drew on Smith’s 
“simple and obvious” insight to interpret and confront how the process of gentrification remade 
neighborhoods by displacing people of color and working-class residents and also undermining 
incumbent communities (Zukin 1987; Slater 2006; Wacquant 2008; Slater 2017). In his own 
succeeding work, Smith positioned gentrification as the primary objective of public policy and 
no longer simply an effect of publicly neutral renewal strategies (Smith, 1996). These arguments 
laid bare a revanchist capital reclaiming the neighborhoods it had once abandoned and forsaken. 
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Parallel with and after these formative Neo-Marxian interpretations, housing and urban 
scholars have examined the limits of class-based explanations of gentrification. These oft-critical 
analyses problematized revitalization and depicted gentrification as a clash between identities 
and tenancies. These analyses treated economic class as one variable in the transformation of 
neighborhoods. In the last two decades, critical researchers have presented evidence linking 
gentrification and pornography puritanism (Papyanis, 2000), tourism (Gotham 2005), parks and 
greenspace (Checker, 2011), Yelp reviews (Zukin, Lindeman, & Hurson 2015), bicycling 
infrastructure (Flanagan, Lachapelle, El-Geneidy, 2016), brownfield redevelopment (Bryson 
2012), pop-up businesses (Schaller & Guinand, 2017), healthy food (Anguelovski, 2015), 
microbreweries (Mathews & Picton, 2014), steamed milk beverages (Reese, Eckert, Sands, & 
Vojnovic 2017), and Airbnb rentals (Wachsmuth & Weisler, 2018). The currents of academic 
research probing if new buildings (Davidson & Lees, 2010) or old buildings (McCabe & Gould 
Ellen, 2016) are stronger inducers of gentrification seems rivaled only by the back-and-forth pop 
urbanist debate over whether the lack of zoning (Schneider, 2018) or the presence of zoning 
(Yglesias, 2018) is more responsible for displacing incumbent working-class communities. 
The merits or rigor of the above research are not in question here, but the surfeit of policy 
and academic work serve as a strong indication of the hegemonic status of gentrification in the 
interpretation of urban change. Concomitant with this abundance of work, parties to the debate 
continue to trade blows over the benefits and consequences of gentrification in American cities. 
Think-tank fellows and policy observers have described gentrification as an exaggerated threat 
and advocated attracting wealth is the difficult - but unavoidable - choice to preventing urban 
stagnation and decline (Berube, 2015). David Madden (2013) has scolded this absolutism, “The 
leading myth is that the only possibilities for neighborhoods are gentrification or urban decay. 
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Well-meaning liberals sometimes think cities face a choice between the bad days of the past and 
a gentrified future.” In other currents, critics of gentrification have rendered it synonymous with 
white supremacy and contemporary forms of settler colonialism (Safransky, 2014; Coates, 2018; 
McElroy & Werth, 2019)126. In response, reformist scholars marginalize those conflicts and 
center improvements in quality of life and property values to justify demographic transformation 
of urban neighborhoods (Mallach, 2018c). Observers from this vantage suggest governments in 
Rust Belt cities should intentionally pursue gentrification-friendly policies to confront the more 
significant threat to neighborhoods: concentrated poverty (Grabinsky & Butler, 2015).  
Importantly, the ascendance of gentrification as the general condition for critical urban 
studies cannot be misconstrued as an absence of contemporaneous critical approaches to land 
and urban change. Even Smith suggested concentration on gentrification could be at the expense 
of focus on other forms of displacement and dispossession. As he (1987) wrote, “Not all 
neighborhoods experiencing the rent gap may experience gentrification or redevelopment; some 
economic opportunities remain unexploited and specific local conditions may discourage the 
process (464).” Akers & Seymour (2018) have shown how the prevalence of evictions in Detroit 
neighborhoods do not fit the model of gentrifying areas. Landlords and contract-for-deed sellers 
cycle tenants through moldering residential structures to extract the maximum value before 
another wave of foreclosure or condemnation. Hackworth (2020) argues for stronger attention to 
racial prejudice for understanding decline and gentrification. By drawing attention to regional 
geographies of white supremacy, he concludes critical urban studies has failed to account for the 
racist policies that reproduce economic inequality and trap black neighborhoods in a death spiral. 
 
126 The “frontier” as an unexplored territory ready for white extraction of value. 
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However, critical urbanist sniping over the use and misuse of gentrification has served to 
obfuscate a more fundamental transformation of the urban environment. Gentrification as a 
process is illustrative of uneven development under capital producing and reproducing cities. 
This inequality evident in urban space is expressive of a fundamental tendency of capital to 
valorize and de-valorize the built environment in a back-and-forth process of accumulation 
(Smith 1982). The mobility of capital is a kind of locational seesaw in which the promise of 
returns from undervalued land justifies movements away from overbuilt areas where the low rate 
of return and high development costs combine to undermine confidence in the real estate market 
(Wilson, 2005). Knuth, Potts, & Goldstein (2019) argue devaluation is the underappreciated 
dimension of value, and in the context of brownfield redevelopment may enable a kind of 
“green” gentrification. In a prior analysis, Knuth (2017) invoked creative destruction to trouble 
the growth and development schema most scholars depend on to analyze the value-nature 
relationship. By centering destruction, Knuth and others have deepened a tradition of critical 
geography that views deterioration and despoliation as features of capital mobility and 
accumulation. From the ashes of the old, a new world (and market and nature) is built. 
Notably, fixating on capital mobility in this way can serve to reproduce an illusory 
coherence to value. While the degradation of environments into wastelands may crack open new 
environments for capital accumulation, Bigger & Robertson (2017) recognize that valuation is an 
indeterminate social process that resists reduction into some simple mechanisms. Richard Walker 
(1978) elaborated on mobility as a source of uneven development that (consistent with 
capitalism’s reliance on surplus) creates a “permanent reserve of stagnant places (34).” In 
contemporary parlance, Walker’s “mosaic” of capital mobility approximates “gentrification” 
inasmuch “capital flows from place to place its components are altered in keeping with the 
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changing character of the accumulation process, the pieces…are constantly reshuffled (32).” The 
observation is not merely the province of critical planners and geographers conditioned to 
analyze the precarious city. One can scarcely keep up with whether Portland, ME is the new 
Brooklyn127 or if Brooklyn is the new Portland, OR128, or if Detroit is the new Portland, OR129, 
or the next Brooklyn130. The “reshuffling” is an artifact of capital’s devaluation-valuation 
process, but the narrow focus can reflexively make destruction a treatment for falling profit. For 
Walker, the uneven geography of capitalism is marked by the speculative “boomtown” but also 
the less mechanical, extractive “lumpengeography.” In the latter, destruction does not 
automatically realize future capital accumulation, instead it is an iterative devastation ensnaring 
communities, neighborhoods, and cities in a persistent value-mining (or grabbing) operation.  
 Austerity 
Austerity represents another process of uneven development proceeding alongside and 
with gentrification. Perhaps the most dramatic example of American urban austerity – or benign 
neglect - remains efforts by Roger Starr to implement his vision for “planned shrinkage,” first 
laid out in Urban Choices: The City and its Critics (1966) in which he derided community 
solidarity as sentimentalism. Ten years after publication, Mayor Abraham Beame of New York 
City appointed Starr to Commissioner of Housing Preservation and Development (Wallace & 
Wallace, 2001). Armed with findings and recommendations from a RAND Institute report on the 
effective and efficient provision of local firefighting services (Blum, 1971), Starr pushed Beame 
to target firehouse closures in neighborhoods of color. Those strategic cutbacks could speed up 
 
127 https://bangordailynews.com/2015/03/26/living/from-park-slope-to-munjoy-hill-is-portland-the-new-brooklyn/ 
128 https://www.wweek.com/portland/article-17831-the-portlandification-of-brooklyn.html 
129 https://www.sheknows.com/living/articles/1089521/reasons-detroit-is-the-next-hip-city-to-visit/ 
130 https://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/the-daily-need/is-detroit-the-new-brooklyn/10290/ 
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population loss and reduce city obligations to residents (Fried, 1976b)131. RAND had a receptive 
audience in NYC at a time when the scope of the city’s debt obligations and fiscal crisis was 
beginning to come into view (Tabb, 1982) and neighborhoods like the Bronx were experiencing 
“unplanned” shrinkage. Mobilizing the military language of “triage,” city hall supervised waves 
of firehouse closures throughout the 1970s in “distressed” neighborhoods (Aalbers, 2014).  
Denounced by neighborhoods, Starr resigned from his $45,000/year position in 7/1976 
(Fried 1976a). Despite his departure, firehouse closures eventuated predictable results: 120,000 
fires/year in the Bronx. Along with an enduring mention by Howard Cosell during the 1977 
World Series pitting Yankees against the LA Dodgers, the planned shrinkage agenda reduced 
schools, hospitals, and garbage services (Fowler, 1976). Cutbacks combined to destabilize 
neighborhoods and enabled the near erasure of census tracts in the Bronx (Gratz, 1989).  
Despite the disastrous effects, Starr’s theorized approach to fiscal responsibility has 
persisted as a stubbornly intuitive program for managing declining neighborhoods (Marcuse 
1982). A triage program for depleted St. Louis neighborhoods first proposed in 1975132 remains a 
powerful touchstone for inhabitants and community leaders (Cooper-McCann, 2015). What first 
served as provisional remedies in moments of crisis have grown to occupy mainstream platforms 
in market fundamentalist ideologies of urban governance. Peck (2012) has linked a new urban 
politics of neoliberal belt-tightening in American cities – “extreme economy” – with severe 
consequences for residents and workers. By slashing amenities, services, and safety nets, city 
governments respond to pressures from neoliberal think-tanks, bondholders, and tax-averse 
 
131 Wallace & Wallace (2001) lay out how RAND’s approach to available city data skewed the report towards 
reducing fire companies in the poorest neighborhoods of NYC. 
132 The “Team Four Plan” – named such because a local design firm drafted the memo – was in part informed by a 
1973 report by RAND called “St Louis: A city and its suburbs” that suggested three possible futures for the rapidly 
emptying city – all of which predicted less power, fewer resources, and continued population loss. 
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interests to reproduce the hegemony of free enterprise, unrestrained markets, and liberty (629). 
Under this mode of regulation, an efficient government is a set of lean public-private 
partnerships that prioritize private wealth accumulation and redevelopment. This ideology 
transforms government’s operating environment, grading municipal efficacy on servicing debts 
and not serving residents (Peck 2014). Proponents of austerity have installed these programs to 
rescale and restructure government’s obligations to citizens in declining cities throughout the 
American industrial Midwest (Haase, Rink, Grossmann, Bernt, & Mykhenko, 2014). 
Within the literature on austerity, demolition serves as an eraser for the areas rendered 
expendable by a narrow policy focus on stable and tipping-point neighborhoods. In Detroit, the 
Detroit Future City (DFC) framework formalized an approach in which neighborhood residential 
population determined land uses (Detroit Future City, 2013). Boosters of the approach lauded the 
unconventional zoning and regulation that would stud the city’s neighborhoods with farming, 
recreation, and industrial activity. Critics disparaged the framework as a justification for blight 
removal initiatives that would right-size Detroit by reducing infrastructural loads carried by the 
public provision of streets, sidewalks, and sewers (Kirkpatrick, 2015). DFC also proposed new 
programs relying on resident management to maintain vacant lots (DFC, 2019). The 2016 report, 
“Open Space in Detroit,” viewed vacant lots as raw material for a new kind of city (DFC, 2016). 
DFC was not the first instance of Detroit serving as a petri dish for the supremacy of real 
estate market strength to determine the fortunes of cities (Akers, 2015). As described in Chapter 
2, The Reinvestment Fund (TRF) generated a Market Value Analysis (MVA) that carved Detroit 
into discrete submarkets with coherent traits. The straightforward language of limited revenues 
and dwindling capacity promoted fiscal discipline. In Detroit and peer Rust Belt cities133, the 
 
133 TRF has conducted MVAs in St. Louis, Baltimore, and Cleveland. 
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MVA routinized the logic of austerity to inform formal targeting strategies of public resources 
(Goldstein, 2011). For the Detroit submarket category of “Reclamation,” TRF advised publicly 
funded demolition ne the city’s highest priority, and as a prerequisite to both “conditions for 
market rebirth” and “preservation investments” in more stable neighborhoods (Goldstein, 2011, 
16). This discipline towards depopulation and decline was not an abstraction. In 6/2012, Mayor 
Dave Bing announced layoffs for 164 members of the Detroit Fire Department (DFD), asserting 
“fiscal realities have made this untenable” (Click on Detroit. 2012). A week later, Bing closed 10 
engine companies and 4 ladder companies (Meloni, 2012). By the end of 2012, DFD had fought 
over 5,000 arsons in the city – investigating only 20% of the incidents (Neavling, 2013a). 
For those focused on the dangers of austerity, the rule of fiscal responsibility in times of 
economic distress has become a prevailing logic of discipline for governments (Roberts, 2009). 
Finance and banking industries privilege the urban built environment as a site of production and 
capital accumulation (Newman, 2009). Debt becomes the major vehicle for governments to 
finance services and individuals to access the trappings of the good life (Soederberg, 2014). As 
populations and revenues fall, cities accumulate bond debts to maintain barebones programs or 
sell-off assets to private interests that view airports, parks, and schools as untapped revenue 
streams (Davidson & Ward, 2014). The combination of indebted institutions and precarious 
homeowners manifests itself in financial emergencies and mortgage foreclosures. These 
strictures on public spending and the rollout of restructured services produce and aggravate 
urban inequalities that undermine tenancy and thwart neighborhood stability (Tonkiss, 2013).  
The resultant makeshift cities force inhabitants to take on the challenges of maintaining 
and securing communities through personal grit or collective activism (Kinder, 2014). As a 
regime of accumulation, austerity brings with it a mode of regulation that generates and protects 
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value for a fraction of people (Ponder, 2019). Governments seek to stabilize coffers by 
downloading fiscal responsibility to owner-occupants in the form of rising property taxes; these 
policies coerce homeowners into choices that can result in foreclosure and eviction (Dewar, 
Seymour, & Druta, 2014). Faced with the prospect of neighborhoods unattractive to developers, 
city governments attempt to manage their decline by encouraging depopulation and shutting off 
remaining services (Rhodes & Russo, 2013). In sum, austerity urbanism acts as an accelerant in 
the process of uneven development that culminates in capital flowing across regional or national 
space and positioning itself to benefit from potential land values in disinvested neighborhoods. 
As in the case of devaluation, austerity is a state-led intervention on behalf of capital to establish 
space for the next round of income generation (Kim & Warner ,2020). In this way, austerity and 
gentrification serve as interactive geographic processes of capitalism’s uneven development. 
The relationship between austerity and demolition is not obvious. Governments often do 
not hold past owners responsible for dereliction and public largesse fills the space to finance 
wrecking. As a result, and in its twisted way, this “custodial” demolition is a significant state 
investment in the urban environment. As of 12/2019, the DDP had awarded $342,595,220.10 to 
contractors for demolitions in the city. The 2013 diversion of Hardest Hit Funds (HHF) to 
demolition relied on the principle that blight removal was an investment (Mallach, 2014). A fall 
2019 push by the Duggan administration to place a demolition bond on a 2020 ballot depended 
on a similar claim about the return on investment. The city’s Chief Financial Officer argued, 
“When you look at all the different capital investments we make, no other capital has the same 
return on investment as demo, in terms of property value increase, in terms of reduction in 
number of fires in the city or in terms of the overall impact on crime that recent studies have 
shown (Frank, 2019).” Demolition breaks from austerity when it represents one of the state’s 
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most significant interventions in the built environment. On 4/20/2019, the Detroit City Council 
approved the 2020-2023 financial plan to fund city services. For 2020, the council set aside $73 
million for demolition., while the figure for all other capital improvements was $32.5 million 
(Detroit City Council, 2019). The Detroit Auditor concluded DDP had spent over $500 million 
since 2014 with anticipated goals to spend at least $1 billion before 2025 (Stafford, 2019b).134 
This review of the literature on gentrification and austerity framed and then complicated 
how these concepts are mobilized to understand the drivers of capitalist urbanization and how 
demolition relates to value. These processes are intertwined but their consequences are never 
axiomatic. I have attempted to show that the literature on gentrification and austerity do not 
provide comprehensive accounts of the decline and destruction in Detroit. In other words, neither 
austerity nor gentrification are the fait accompli of devaluation and uneven development. What 
we need is an account of decline that restores the significance of extractive processes generating 
incomes for a narrow fraction of capital. Rather than just an intervention on behalf of real estate 
capital and its return to Detroit, demolishing relies on assets, land, and regulation to extract value 
from the declining city. In cities like Detroit, surplus value within abandoned residential 
structures is converted into income through public ownership and private demolition firms. 
 Property and Land in Post-Crisis and Declining Cities 
The tensions and conflicts in property and land illustrate the ways value and power are 
expressed and reproduced in the urban built environment. Historically, the enclosure of common 
land served as the primitive accumulation enabling new landholders to generate income from 
existing and future occupants (as well as their in-situ labor) (Marx 2004). The capitalist relation 
 
134 The only comparable investment is the Capital Improvement Program of the Detroit Water and Sewerage 
Department (DWSD). DWSD has plans to invest $500 million in sewer upgrades by 2022. This program is partially 
funded by a lease agreement between DWSD and the Great Lakes Water Authority.  
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emerged from this expropriation and the subsequent imbalance between the landed and the 
landless (Thompson, 1966)135. Harvey brings the Marxian process into the present by renaming 
the ongoing historical expropriation signaled by enclosure as “accumulation by dispossession” 
(Harvey, 2003). Rather than a foundational act of capitalism, Harvey argued enclosures of land 
and wealth were vital resources of the reproduction of capitalism at a global scale (Harvey 2009). 
Land value and markets figure prominently in critical approaches to capitalist 
urbanization (Christophers, 2016). These interventions have challenged how capitalism treats 
land and nature as “free gifts.” For Marx, land was entangled within relations of fictitious capital 
because its value extends into the future without moorings to a material commodity (Marx, 
1993). Put another way, the value of land exists independent of any productive activity and is 
solely representative of capitalization on ownership – money that can be made. Polanyi extended 
the analysis to argue land – alongside labor an,d money - is not a real commodity because it is 
not produced for sale in the marketplace (Polanyi 2001). Land preexists its potential value as a 
commodity. In combination, these critiques serve to defamiliarize land as an on-demand site for 
capitalist production (Jessop, 2015). Land, labor, and capital were not raw features with purposes 
intrinsic to the presence of the market. Yet these same critical gestures to land’s status as 
fictitious (commodity or capital) rarely reflect the production of land itself – how it goes from 
available to exploitable. For Marx and Polanyi, land preceded any attempts to exploit it and as a 
result it represented a vital strategy by capital to naturalize its domination of social relations.  
Li (2014a) and Hall (2013) have wrestled with this question to varying degrees of 
success. For Hall, land is an artifact of a resource management tradition aimed at reducing 
conflicting claims in the name of effective central administration. This echoes scholarship that 
 
135 Thus, creating the “working class” 
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treats land as the political target of land grabbing governments and NGOs reproducing the 
enclosure and rent process consistent with Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession (Bakker 
2007). In less polemical terms, this might be described as accumulation-by-development in 
which the geopolitical imperative of a modern economy condemns the agrarian society to history 
(Oya, 2013). While these insights have weight for navigating land grabs and natural resource 
management, they do not afford much in the way of examining the matter of land’s materialism. 
In Li’s work on southeast Asia (2014b), the fundamental question of “what is land?” has opened 
space for consideration of maps, surveys, and grids employed by both policy and investors to 
engender land through official, administrative means. This material-discursive repertoire centers 
the contingent interactions of labor and capital to make land real for national governments and 
NGOs. She writes, “the axe, the spade, the plough, the title deed, the tax register, maps, graphs, 
satellite images, ancestral graves, mango trees – do more than simply record the presence of land 
as a resource: they are integral to assembling it as a resource for different actors (590).” 
However, in her attempt to illuminate the social fundaments of land and the multiple 
meanings users and owners draw upon to understand their relation to land, Li draws a distinction 
between her materialist account of land and one that would confront the political-economic 
pressures within land’s physical constituents. She puts bluntly, “Land is not like a mat. You 
cannot roll it up and take it away. (589)” As I have noted, Marx and Polanyi would agree with 
this assessment because land’s value as a factor of production is preserved through a kind of 
Plato’s Cave in which the performance of its productive value – potential and realized - becomes 
unquestioned. This is a sentiment shared by Harvey when he writes, “Land, unlike the 
improvements built on it, ‘does not require upkeep in order to continue its potential for use’ and 
thereby retains its potential value (Harvey, 1973, 158).” The geography and political-economy of 
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backfilling Detroit and other examples of reclamation – resort136 and logistical137 – suggest land 
is more flexible than a substrate for action or an administrated unit within spreadsheets. An op-ed 
appearing in The New York Times brought attention to a global shortage of sand that could 
prompt interstate conflict, illegal trading, and stall the global construction industry (Beiser, 
2016). Land may be fictitious, but its production is part of a chain of valuation and regulation 
and these chains rely on extraction, circulation, and maintenance to sustain environments. 
Li’s focus on the material-discursive constituents of land echoes the work of Nathan 
Blomely (2003) on law and property. Property is freighted with the histories of colonialization 
and domination that enclosed and transformed indigenous land into a private asset available to 
white newcomers colonizing the North American continent. He homes in on the violence enacted 
by settlers as they imposed their ordering devices on the frontier and constructed “civilization” to 
counter and erase native “wilderness.” Scholars have also linked the problematic association of 
property to notions of the self-possessive individual and the relationship between insider and 
outsider that gives order to the concept of citizenship or belongingness (Roy, 2003). For many 
neoliberal observers, the conversion of common use into private rights also represents the 
greatest hope for prosperity for precarious inhabitants in developing economies (De Soto, 2003). 
Despite those claims connecting property ownership to social stability, the subprime crisis in the 
US indicates the precarity of the “ownership economy” (Immergluck, 2011; Newman, 2009).  
These relations between land and property, exchange and use, real and fictitious play out 
in the political economies of cities and the consensus about the achievement of growth. In cities 
 
136 Palm Jumeirah is a palm tree-shaped island off the coast of Dubai studded by luxury hotels and villas. Jumeirah 
is flanked by two other, smaller islands. The engineering project required dredging and moving 3 billion cubic feet 
of sand. Greenpeace derided it as a “visual scar.” The islands are sinking. 2 inches per year. 
137 The Chinese military has used dredging to intensify its presence in the South China Sea. In 2016, a subsidiary of 
the Chinese Communications Construction Company initiated a multi-year “land reclamation project” creating space 
for housing, ports, and government offices. The US Military has balked at this extension of China’s influence. 
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experiencing rapid growth, developers and builders recognize the value of converting vacant 
land and property into income-generating holdings. Logan and Molotch’s (1987) growth 
machine framework homes in on the land-use intensifications through which rentiers and 
landowners produce value by shaping the urban built environment. Their analysis has become a 
default for comprehending the aims and objectives of local polities (Swanstrom 1985; Stone 
1980). Coalitions of policymakers and city-builders work to exploit opportunities for the 
conversion of use values into exchange values (Levine, 1987). As mentioned in the prior chapter, 
this entrepreneurial process strips land of its communal value as it enters a marketplace in the 
commodity form. These coalitions thrive in political-economic contexts in which the pressures of 
austerity and the possibility of planned gentrification transform the logics of government 
(Harvey, 1989). In the contemporary city, the growth machine maps onto the gentrification 
process as the potential rents encrypted in undervalued land are deciphered by speculators, 
developers, and builders intervening in and shaping the production of the built environment.  
However, the growth machine thesis has limited explanatory power in decentralized 
governing environments in which private or quasi-public entities control levers of change 
(MacLeod & Jones, 2011). In the “post-democratic” or “post-political” city, intermittent crises – 
terrorism, climate, crime, and blight – provide the grist for a splintered institutional landscape in 
which the state relinquishes or negotiates away political space to the wisdom of markets 
(Swyngedouw, 2009). Despite recent arguments to the contrary, Detroit’s bankruptcy has not 
ushered in a “degrowth machine” prioritizing resident quality of life even as population and 
wealth shrink (Schindler, 2014). The re-valuation of land remains an essential component of the 
city’s governing approach to both decline and revitalization. At the 2019 Mackinac Policy 
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Conference138, Duggan described the city’s 92,000 publicly owned parcels as a major asset 
(Aguilar, 2019). Riding both DDP and the CCP enthusiasm for land banks, Rust Belt boosters of 
market-fundamentalism encouraged local land bank authorities and other quasi-public or public 
institutions to sell abandoned properties to investors or the occasional owner-occupant to prime 
the local real estate market (Dewar, 2015). Hackworth (2014) has addressed the persistent 
dominance but limited success of these programs to return vacant land to viability in declining 
cities. The same could be said of the durability of the growth machine framework for making 
sense of the value of land and the political economic interests commanding declining cities. 
 Research Methods 
In the previous chapter, I introduced a new typology for backfill sources based on the 
tensions and histories associated with each source property. I now turn my focus to specific 
sources and how these illustrate the relationship between land use and decline in Detroit. I 
develop a three-part argument to illustrate the limits of demolition-dependent redevelopment and 
the land regimes made possible by demolition. How have demolitions in Detroit impacted the 
city’s private property market? What forms of land ownership, occupation, and disposition are 
enabled by the DDP? How does demolishing reveal different dimensions of valuation in Detroit? 
Each section of this chapter depends on a different configuration of public data and 
records. Drawing on my analysis of Detroit property sales records, county land records, and 
interviews with demolition officials at the city and state level, I show how the placing of 
MSHDA liens on sites of HHF demolished properties calls into question the process by which 
demolition would unlock development. The presence of these liens - and the scant evidence that 
 
138 The Detroit Regional Chamber organizes the annual Mackinac Policy Conference at the Grand Hotel on 
Mackinac Island. The conference is staunchly conservative and prioritizes market solutions for Michigan’s 
economy. Organizers typically hosts several major Democratic figures each year (Duggan, Gretchen Whitmer, 
Stacey Abrams). 
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demolition has refreshed investor interest in many parts of Detroit - suggests the need to rework 
some of the dominant scholarly approaches to urban change and the seesaw of capital. Rather 
than adopt the explanatory power of "the growth machine" (and the centrality of land use 
intensification as value generator) for understanding the political economy of decline, I present 
evidence of a decentralized decline ensemble that serves its income generation interests through 
both rapid and incremental destruction. The demolition process produced a value for each 
demolished property that only contractors, haulers, and backfill suppliers were able to realize. As 
I mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, I describe this process as land use debasement. 
This chapter begins with a synopsis of the HHF program - which I introduced in part in 
Chapter 2 - and then proceeds to connect the program to the city's grander redevelopment 
agenda. I show that MSHDA's application of liens on 16,000+ residential properties (and future 
properties) challenges if demolishing tilts the seesaw of capital in the city's favor. In earlier 
chapters, I argued Detroit leaders reshaped the institutional landscape to achieve demolition. In 
this chapter, I address how the institutional side and the destruction side reinforce each other to 
produce and shape the built environment. The relationship between land, capital, and value is not 
a fait accompli as prior research suggests. Finding that demolition in Detroit is a distinct 
undertaking when compared to growing cities means addressing what demolishing does 
accomplish in declining cities - not simply whether it is an effective intervention that achieves 
publicized policy goals. Despite the visuality of demolition suggesting a yes/no proposition139, 
researchers should resist flattening demolition as an intervention with binary consequences. 
I integrate previous findings on rent, regulation, and the regional geography of demolition 
with analysis of state-required HHF-demolition liens to consider the contradictions embedded in 
 
139 Yes/No: Did the demolition remove the building? 
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the landscape of redevelopment in Detroit. I address the robustness of research linking 
demolition to growth in home equity in Detroit, as well as research that links neighborhood 
quality to blight removal campaigns. While these findings appear to champion demolition, all 
three prompt concerns about study parameters and the tendency for policymakers to circulate 
research without accounting for context. I argue these studies have narrowed demolition as a 
form of land preparation where contractors serve as the muscle for city-builders, rather than part 
of a dynamic process embedded in regional economic and political space. Failing to consider 
those dimensions of residential demolition reinforces it as a transaction with either good, bad, or 
inconclusive outcomes. The evaluative approach – what demolition accomplishes – constrains 
demolishing as a technical precondition for future profits by property owners or developers. By 
shoehorning demolition to fit the judgments of these dichotomized assessments, the prevailing 
approaches flattens or conceals the operations of wreckers, builders, excavators, and haulers. 
I illustrate a land regime of decline by examining six backfill-related properties within 
Detroit. These properties each demonstrate distinct ways in which configurations of the factors 
of production – with special attention to land and capital - transform the built environments of 
declining cities in a manner that is not reducible to gentrification or austerity. In many cases, 
policy institutions and demolition contractors are neither preparing Detroit for redevelopment 
nor switching off the lights on neighborhoods; there is a middle ground in which the value of 
land is determined by the twinned process of the backfill supply chain and the removal of the 
structure. The practices, processes, and strategies of demolition contractors I demonstrate how 
firms and DDP actors drew upon and leveraged the idea of “stockpiling” to justify property 
relations that enabled and accommodated rentiership within the city’s demolition program.  
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Rather than a “rent gap” akin to uneven development by gentrification, contractors 
purchased and participated in property transactions that allowed them to use the city’s land to 
grab value by employing policies and practices of the DDP itself. While contractors might 
operate within a political economy of land, the land’s status as an exploitable commodity is not 
exhausted by its status within an idealized spectrum of use and exchange. In other words, land 
purchased, owned, occupied, or used within the DDP serves a valuation purpose beyond its 
marketability or developability. Land helped close the gap but for purposes of deintensification 
rather than redevelopment. Contractors were not building or speculating. By backfilling, 
contractors created a new capital asset class within Detroit. Occupying that land – and excluding 
others from its use – made it possible to establish bases of operation that accelerated demolishing 
Detroit and enabled backfilling to serve the income-generation interests of contractors.  
 Deconstructing Demolishing as Value-Creator 
 Stabilizing Home Values 
Local and national journalists have popularized the visual of jubilant Detroit inhabitants 
celebrating while an excavator descends upon and devours a structure (Dahl, 2016). In these 
portrayals, the lumbering bulldozer is a symbol of stability and possibility. But inhabitant 
exuberance has not been matched by the intensity of evidence. In 2015, Dynamo Metrics, a 
three-person, Detroit-based spatial econometrics firm supported by a Dan Gilbert investment, 
conducted a study - Estimating Home Equity Impact from Rapid, Targeted Residential 
Demolition in Detroit - drawing associations between Hardest Hit Fund demolitions and home 
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values Dynamo released their findings as the Detroit Demolition Impact Report. Researchers 
observed a 4.2% increase in values within 500 feet of a demolition (Dynamo Metrics, 2015).  
They concluded that each HHF dollar returned $8.35 in home equity gains. In a subsection 
labeled “Fueling the Machine,” the study authors write, “Recent efforts have shown that 
Detroit’s government is up to the task of rapid blight removal. With over 5,000 structures 
eliminated during the past 18 months, Detroit has demonstrated a capacity to remove blighted 
structures. (2015, 6)” Although policymakers and developers met these findings with 
undiminished enthusiasm, the study parameters complicate external validity and suggest a 
slightly different conclusion. Dynamo concentrated their analysis on the return-on-investment 
from the first round of HHF demolitions (HHF1), which targeted resources and rolled-out 
bulldozers into Detroit’s “strong” residential neighborhoods: Northend, Jefferson Chalmers, 
Southwest, Grandmont Rosedale, UDM/Marygrove, and Morningside/EEV/Cornerstone.  
The presence of these stable neighborhoods in Dynamo’s study is not an accident, nor is 
it representative of the city. The Hardest Hit strategy document from 2013 identifies those six 
neighborhoods as Eligible Area Targeted Neighborhoods (City of Detroit, 2013). They met the 
standard of a strong neighborhood that could be fortified by strategic residential demolitions. 
Although these neighborhoods may demonstrate home equity appreciation, these jumps in value 
Figure 41: Dynamo's theory of change in Detroit (Dynamo Metrics, 2015) 
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correspond to more generalized improvements in neighborhoods as the city emerges from the 
mortgage foreclosure hangover. Critically, HHF administrators did not choose neighborhoods at 
random but relied on an undisclosed measure of “marketability for redevelopment investments.” 
HHF1 disbursement concentrated demolitions in neighborhoods that would benefit by design. 
Put another way, the Dynamo Metrics study concluded historically attractive and already 
recovering neighborhoods in Detroit recover faster with additional resources. While Dynamo 
Metrics was not able to measure demolition impact in future HHF zones (HHF2-HHF5), findings 
from the 2014-2015 period do not have external validity for neighborhoods exhibiting greater 
housing insecurity. The HHF1 demolitions served as a smaller-scale redistribution of public 
wealth to protect private property and homeowner interests in those “desirable” areas of the city.  
HHF zone expansion has continued apace since 2014 and culminated in the inclusion of 
80% of Detroit neighborhoods. Despite conducting demolitions across the majority of the city’s 
neighborhoods, HHF and demolition administrators still covet and publicize findings from the 
Dynamo Metrics HHF1 study to justify ongoing residential blight removal. The study’s clear 
weaknesses are nudged aside by enthusiastic DDP leaders who treat the city’s structural 
challenges as artifacts of blight itself and improvements as a direct result of demolitions (blight 
flight). Concerns about the study's generalizability have not discouraged leaders and developers 
from treating the study’s limited findings as confirmation of demolition’s return-on-investment 
(Spangler, 2015). Demolition officials – in Detroit and nationally - continue to deploy the 
Dynamo Metrics analysis and share supportive inhabitant anecdotes to maintain popular backing 
for demolition even in areas that do not fit the HHF1 neighborhood profile. Questions about 
demolition’s benefits in other corners of Detroit – public safety, property values, and quality of 
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life – are expected to be addressed soon. According to MSHDA, researchers at Michigan State 
University will release an expanded study of HHF impact at the end of 2020 (MIRS, 2016). 
Table 9: Total residential demolitions by funding in Detroit, MI as of spring 2019 
Funding Source Count of Demolitions 
HHF 12338 
Non-HHF 4398 
Grand Total 16736 
 Producing Developable Land 
The parallel argument to home value appreciation is demolition serves as the production 
of vacant and developable land. In short, demolition eliminates the need for development 
interests to exhaust resources eliminating impediments to investments. Demolition reduces 
barriers and realizes cheap land that can compete with untouched tracts in peripheral 
communities. Mary Townley, a MSHDA director overseeing demolition, confirmed the agency 
applies a lien in the sum of the HHF funds used on each address after demolition. The demolition 
liens are an extension of MSHDA and Michigan Homeowner Assistance Nonprofit Housing 
Corporation policy during the initial rollout of HHF. The state allocated support for owner-
occupants of homes in which mortgages exceeded property value. By providing assistance to 
qualified homeowners in the form of interest free loans140, the state’s Step Forward Mortgage 
Assistance program aimed to maintain occupancy and stabilize neighborhoods. In order to 
prevent speculation and house-flipping, the loan repayment discounted 20% each year an owner-
occupant remained at the address. After five years, the homeowner could sell the property. The 
HHF Blight Elimination Program kept this provision in place with little revision. MSHDA places 
 
140 Up to $30,000 
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a lien on each property with an HHF-funded demolition despite the DLBA owning the property 
(and the program being an award rather than a loan). Records with the Wayne County Register 
of Deeds show MSHDA has typically applied these liens within three months of each completed 
demolition141. To codify this lien provision, MSHDA (2018) adapted the existing Department of 
the Treasury language on homeowner assistance and added Blight to the second sentence:  
Loan will be for 0%, non-amortizing, forgivable over a 5 year term at 20% per year, as 
long as covenants are met; outstanding balance of loan will be due on sale, or transfer of 
the property, to the extent of net proceeds received. Any repayment of program funds will 
be re-invested back into the Blight program allocation. Special considerations may be 
made by MHA to release lien prior to 5 year term based on merit of request and to 
promote positive economic impact to community on a case by case situation. (B-5-3) 
However, the total lien is typically larger than the demolition cost logged on the city’s public 
demolition data portal. In Table 10, a sample of HHF liens drawn from 2014-2018 demonstrates 
the city’s reported demolition price is on average 85% of the lien MSHDA places on a property 
demolished with the funds142. According to Townley, the gap between reported price and the lien 
 
141 Officially, the lien is listed as a mortgage between the Detroit Land Bank Authority and the Michigan 
Homeowner Nonprofit Housing Corporation.  
142 Wayne County Register of Deeds; www.waynecountylandrecords.com  
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amount is the sum of additional costs associated with administering demolition. These costs do 
appear in any DDP records. Table 11 shows MSHDA will be seeking repayment of the 
demolition liens applied by MSHDA until 2025. 
Address Demolition Date City Demolition Price MSHDA Lien City/MSHDA
8421 Navy 5/13/2014 $7,000.00 $8,941.00 78%
9046 Trinity 2/26/2015 $16,377.55 $18,255.55 90%
8835 Stout 9/17/2015 $8,764.00 $11,089.00 79%
15865 Fielding 9/18/2015 $21,520.00 $24,052.00 89%
19510 Heyden 10/23/2015 $13,430.00 $15,282.00 88%
3059 Townsend 3/28/2016 $12,697.00 $16,139.64 79%
9135 Bishop 5/26/2016 $18,998.00 $21,155.83 90%
3929 Field 6/1/2016 $12,170.00 $14,115.00 86%
19303 Concord 6/22/2016 $16,450.00 $18,690.00 88%
19015 Charest 6/25/2016 $13,780.00 $16,100.50 86%
2700 Blaine 7/18/2016 $13,141.00 $14,406.00 91%
6761 Auburn 7/18/2016 $13,460.00 $15,804.12 85%
14097 Marlowe 7/19/2016 $23,930.00 $25,000.00 96%
2740 Calvert 4/11/2017 $22,999.50 $25,000.00 92%
12094 Longacre 5/9/2017 $9,830.00 $12,095.00 81%
19252 Moenart 5/16/2017 $9,475.00 $11,960.00 79%
8819 Neal 6/26/2017 $17,610.00 $19,889.00 89%
11739 Abington Ave 7/27/2017 $12,530.00 $14,905.00 84%
2413 Hudson 10/10/2017 $16,743.50 $19,098.50 88%
13116 August 4/4/2018 $18,011.00 $20,902.00 86%
15273 Park Grove 8/21/2018 $16,462.00 $18,941.00 87%
20403 Omira 11/28/2018 $29,405.00 $25,000.00 118%
Table 10: Sample of city-reported demolitions at Detroit addresses as percentage of the total HHF lien placed at each property, 
2014-2018 
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  Sidelot sales are one way of bypassing the HHF lien. MSHDA allows the DLBA to sell 
these lots for $100 and extinguish the lien they place on each property. By the beginning of 
2019, the DLBA had sold 1,098 side lots for a total of $109,800. Table 12 shows sidelot sales 
based on the type of financing for the demolition. The Sidelot program is a major success of 
DLBA and represents the bulk of sales of vacant property in Detroit. However, the program also 
should not be misinterpreted as a signal of the inevitability of demolition-dependent 
redevelopment. These properties were the sites of a combined $15,753,575.43 in HHF 
demolition funding over five years. By the beginning of 2019, the DLBA had sold only 50 
Funding Source Count of Sidelot Sales 
HHF 1098 
Non-HHF 290 
Grand Total 1388 
Table 12: Sidelot sales by demolition type in Detroit, MI, 2014-2019 
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Table 11: A timeline of expiration of HHF liens on demolitions in Detroit, MI from 2014-2026 
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vacant lots to other, non-Sidelot buying parties. Twenty-four non-HHF properties are now owned 
by industrial and commercial businesses. The twenty-six remaining HHF properties were sold 
for a total of $44,563 but were the sites of a combined $388,287.18 in HHF demolition funding. 
DLBA sold most of these properties to faith-based organizations and non-profits which, 
according to both city and state demolition officials, automatically discharges the HHF lien on 
the property. Of these 26 demolitions, only one property sale fits the profile of a combined price 
of the HHF demolition lien and the “fair market value” generated by DLBA.  
Tammy Daniels, the Demolition Director at the DLBA, disclosed in an interview the 
DLBA had sold one property to a developer interest. Bernard Butris (of West Bloomfield, MI) 
purchased 20576 Syracuse on 6/20/2018 for $13,833. The demolition occurred on 12/23/2015 
and DMC completed it for $14,026.00. The contractor sourced the backfill material from 14039 
 
Figure 42: Location of sidelot sales of HHF-demolished sites in Detroit, MI, 2014-2018 
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Grand River and recorded a cost of $1,515.12 for 250 cubic yards. MSDHA placed the HHF lien 
on the property on 3/17/2016 in the amount of $17,064. If MSHDA’s discount rule applied to 
this property, then the lien discounted $3,412.80 per year. Based on this discount rate, the lien on 
20576 Syracuse at the time of sale would be approximately $10,238.40, which indicates DLBA 
estimated the fair market value of the property to be $3,594.60. In the months following his 
purchase, Butris allowed cars to park on the dirt lot. On 4/23/2019, he applied to the City 
Planning Commission to rezone 20576 Syracuse from single family residential (R1) to Open 
Parking District (P1). The rezoned lot would provide additional parking for the nearby Flavors 
Detroit marijuana dispensary owned by Butris that opened in spring 2018. The Planning 
Commission approved the rezoning in late 2020. The site is currently an empty, gravel lot.  
  These HHF liens indicate a different pattern and mechanism of income-generation is 
possible within the DDP. The presence of the liens may have slowed the classic redevelopment 
process – wreck a derelict structure and build new on the vacant site – but has not prevented the 
Figure 43: Post-Demolition Sales of Demolished Properties in Detroit to non-Sidelot buyers, 2014-2018 
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valuation of land. The lien policy has not signaled the failure of public largesse to reboot the 
property market in Detroit. Instead, it makes possible a form of income-generation outside the 
usual redevelopment process. Rather than illustrate how capital has returned to take advantage of 
newly empty land, the liens demonstrate the value grabbed by demolition contractors and their 
networks within the DDP. Evidence from these demolitions thus far does not suggest wrecking 
automatically unlocks development in Detroit. Another connection of land to value is at work.  
The DDP provides contractors with an undervalued resource in the form of vacant 
structures. Contractors process the resource through demolishing and capture surplus value 
contained within the structure. This is the difference between demolition – a discrete, technical 
intervention – and demolishing – an embedded, regional process. The MSHDA lien policy 
complicates conventional reinvestment, but it also enabled an ensemble of actors - contractors, 
haulers, excavators - positioned outside traditional real estate capital to secure a place as shapers 
of real estate. The small portion of sales post-demolition in Detroit is not a signal of failure, but a 
feature of another process. The liens encourage an analysis balancing redevelopment goals with 
contractor priorities to generate income from the uneven development of the Detroit region. 
Contrary to the publicized expectations of investment and institutional actors, Detroit’s 
demolition program has not culminated in a continuous fire sale of publicly owned vacant land to 
speculative buyers interested in parking their money in depressed property markets (Farkas, 
2016; Burke, 2013). These results also challenge critical approaches upbraiding demolition as the 
creative destruction behind gentrification and class restructuring (Jay & Conklin, 2020; 
Ehrenfeucht & Nelson, 2020). While the volume of sidelot sales into 2019 shows local interest in 
owning property in Detroit, these sales are restricted to adjacent homeowners in good standing 
with their property taxes. A series of five Land Forums in 2014-2015 organized by the Greening 
265 
 
of Detroit, an urban agriculture advocacy group, provided guidance and technical assistance to 
Detroit residents interested in purchasing vacant lots143. The workshops – in part guided by the 
DLBA - narrowed possible productive uses to home agriculture and recreation144. The Land 
Forum expected sidelot buyers to fence-in or provide frequent maintenance on their newly 
purchased lots. Organizers of the events focused their energies on supporting incumbent 
residents and owner-occupants that wanted to try their hand at cultivating cabbage, not enticing 
speculative capital. In 2014, Rosie Sharp, the founder of the Land Forum, observed, “It's about 
spending time outside with your community and being connected to the earth (Galbraith, 2014)." 
The DDP, in this way, has had a stabilizing effect on neighborhoods once studded with 
abandoned structures. These improvements are consistent with research that suggests a link 
between demolition, green infrastructure, and inhabitant confidence in the future of their 
neighborhoods (Schilling & Logan, 2008). Demolition programs that offer a menu of options for 
post-demolition vacant lots can supply neighborhoods with new recreational amenities and 
infrastructure (Nemeth & Langhorst, 2014). Policymakers and non-profit advocates promote 
these greening approaches as a shift in the fundamentals of the urban ecosystem and how 
inhabitants use or benefit from their neighborhoods (Meerow & Newell, 2017). Studies from 
public health scholars have argued vacant lot greening is associated with reductions in crime and 
improvements in resident-reported sense of safety (Branas, South, Kondo, Hohl, Bourgois, 
Wiebe, & MacDonald, 2018; Garvin, Cannuscio, & Branas, 2012). This work matches findings 
linking vacant lot greening to increased values in adjacent properties (Heckert & Mennis, 2012).  
 
143 DLBA assisted with the workshop series and provided on-site consultations with interested buyers. 
Notwithstanding their attendance, the workshop was not limited to the sale of publicly-held lots and encouraged 
residents to explore other purchasing options by contacting the owners of privately-held property. 
144 I attended a Land Forum in Southwest Detroit in 2015. 
266 
 
Despite those positives, recent research suggests Detroit will not be rewarded for its 
demolition efforts in property tax value for another 50 years. (Paredes & Skidmore, 2017). 
Moreover, this work continues the tradition of reducing blight removal to a binary evaluation 
(good/bad; success/failure) rather than addressing its political-economic and geographic 
character in the remaking of neighborhoods. In this framing, demolition is a local response to the 
negative consequences of private property and economic change, not a continuation of those 
same spatial relations that undermine cities like Detroit. For many of the regnant voices on urban 
change, demolition or blight remediation are technical responses to depleted resident morale or 
undervalued neighborhoods. In a recent opinion piece contributed to The New Yorker, Eric 
Klinenberg synopsized findings by public health luminary Charles Branas that drew a significant 
association between remediating blight and reducing incidents of violence (2018).  
Klinenberg’s summary reproduces Branas’ own exclusion of the forces and factors 
shaping the neighborhood itself. As a scholar in the neighborhood effects tradition, Branas grants 
considerable agency to neighborhoods to shape the life outcomes of residents: your zip code 
determines your health, income, and educational attainment (Sampson, 2019) In a bit of 
methodological localism, Branas and his colleagues marginalize the landlords, speculators, 
evictions, and foreclosures that produce and shape neighborhood contexts. Neither Branas nor 
Klinenberg (the more bracing act of this “localism”) refer to how the neighborhood and its visual 
blight are nested within broader policy or property practices. As such, landscaping becomes an 
“upstream” or “macrolevel” intervention simply because the neighborhood masquerades as the 
structural context of real estate, public institutions, and regional segregation. Consequently, these 
scholars have sidelined or misinterpreted the social forces that shape neighborhood conditions. 
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A richer analysis of demolishing would address how it implicates a broader ensemble of 
interests and whether these interests are participating in a shared choreography of improvement. 
For instance, in Detroit, the DDP requires contractors reconstruct sidewalks as a final step in the 
demolition process. This extra infrastructural add-on is a service that has come under scrutiny as 
a waste of public funds (Ikonomova, 2019) but also as an onerous obligation required of 
wreckers (Livengood, 2017). Moreover, the scarcity of non-sidelot sales and the lack of new 
construction on those sites illustrates how the commonsense of demolition’s virtues does not 
possess the explanatory heft to comprehend the coexisting land regimes in Detroit. As I have 
shown, research and the popular wisdom on demolition characterizes land clearance and blight 
removal as an essential step in the process of capital mobility that revaluates and refreshes the 
development potential of wastelands. In this characterization, demolition unlocks development 
by tilting the seesaw of capital towards disinvested neighborhoods. That demolishing Detroit has 
failed to uniformly enact that change gestures to the presence of other forms of value, land, and 
income-generation that have allowed demolishing to be a lucrative process. Today, demolishing 
Detroit is not synonymous with displacement, nor has it proven to be sufficient precondition for 
a regional spatial fix where capital begins to flow to a frontier with high potential incomes. 
Challenging the analytic comprehensiveness of spatial-fix or gentrification in Detroit 
does not mean real estate capital has abstained from producing and exploiting the city’s uneven 
development. The HHF liens and lack of property sales are not the final word on demolition’s 
relationship to value. But relying on the explanatory authority of austerity and gentrification can 
cloud the different dimensions of Detroit’s present condition – a condition to which demolishing 
and backfilling have made significant contributions. Class restructuring, high rents, and cultural 
transformations do appear in pockets of Detroit (Moskowitz, 2015). Downtown, Midtown, and 
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Corktown neighborhoods host blisteringly hot real estate markets apparent in breakneck 
conversions of both residential and commercial properties (Mondry 2018). Speculative steel and 
glass high-rises spring up on Woodward Avenue casting shadows on streetscapes where luxury 
national brands replace local shops (Runyan & Mondry, 2019). While gentrification is a 
condition within Detroit (Ocbazghi, 2019), it is not the condition of Detroit (Kurth, 2017a). 
Economies of non-gentrifying Detroit - evicting, foreclosing, demolishing, and backfilling - 
depend on the sustained creation of environments for value-grabbing (Seymour & Akers, 2019). 
Islands of Detroit’s decay distract from the operative surface for the production of decline. 
In the following sections, I present six examples of how decline, the DDP, and 
backfilling have yielded and relied on new configurations of land and value in Detroit. Each of 
shows ways in which institutions and industry rework the built environment without class 
restructuring or disinvestment. These configurations illustrate an economy of demolishing in 
which contractors, excavators, and haulers control land and extract value. Put another way, the 
relations exhibited by these properties show how the decline of Detroit and the uncertainties of 
its real estate market can camouflage forms of land use, occupation, and valuation that routinize 
rentiership through demolishing. These strategies for investment and intervention represent 
physical and financial extractions that conflict with demolishing as the precondition to urban 
rebirth or its demise. Demolishing was not a local response for managing and halting decline, it 
provided a way to reinforce the process of decline by creating new schemes for valuing the city’s 
built environment. The processes shaping these properties illustrates how capital produces or 
mobilizes Detroit’s vacant land to preserve its interests without contributing to redevelopment. 
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 Stockpiling the Backfill Supply 
The starting point for the DDP required reliance on an external network of actors to 
market, commodify, and haul material. Contractors dispersed across the region hunting for deals 
and discounts on backfill material. As I showed in Chapter 4, these deals and discounts often 
depended on the expansionist logics associated with speculative development, unclear origins, or 
value realization through new buildings or extraction. However, Detroit’s unstable property 
market also engendered opportunities to buy, sell, and circulate dirt through physical 
emplacement within the city’s boundaries. Contractors could locate operations within the city 
and reduce supply chain costs. By taking command of residential, commercial, and industrial 
properties, contractors found ways to establish control over what MSHDA internally termed 
“Dirt Costs” and generate incomes from the DDP (Ferretti, 2019b). Contractors and haulers used 
these properties to store, screen, and distribute backfill material to demolition sites in Detroit. 
In a 12/23/2015 report to the Detroit City Council, the LPD (2015a) staff addressed 
opportunities and challenges associated with a stockpile approach to backfill. George 
Cushingberry, then Council President Pro Tem, requested LPD explain rising demolition costs 
and provide actionable recommendations on a possible stockpile ordinance. The subsequent LPD 
report outlined how the DDP used stockpiles and opportunities for expansion, “Soil stockpiles 
have been in existence in the city of Detroit in recent years. However, these stockpiles have only 
been permitted on a temporary basis and are typically project specific (3).” At that time, the City 
Council was amenable to a set of regulations allowing “soil stockpiles” as part of a new category 
of bulk solid material that would meet the same standards as petcoke (2). By institutionalizing 
stockpiles as part of the DDP’s strategy, contractors could build reserves during slow seasons of 
construction and avoid competition for trucks. Several months earlier in 2015, DBA had applied 
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to MSHDA for HHF support to launch a pilot program of stockpile sites. MSHDA researched the 
viability of the stockpiling program “but never approved or funded.” In its 12/2015 report, the 
LPD concluded “the payment structure of the program [HHF] would not allow for the 
implementation of a strategy such as this (3).” Nevertheless, the LPD identified three stockpiles 
in use as of winter 2015: 14800 Castleton, 14039 Grand River, and 11031 Shoemaker.  
The debate on backfill ordinances appears immaterial because guidance in a 10/2015 RFP 
had already established regulations for stockpile locations (Duggan, 2015). DDP officials were 
relying on stockpiles as if they were already essential aspects of the supply chain. Owners of 
these properties must provide permission to contractors to store material. For their part, 
contractors must grant access to the owner of a stockpile site for inspection. The DBA also 
required contractors to incorporate dust control measures that included safe placement of piles 
and access to water sprayers to restrict particulate matter. The program’s consideration of 
stockpiling regulation ends there. The DDP does not require testing of these stockpile sites 
unless the material has a proven industrial origin. In 10/2015, staff at AKT Peerless stressed the 
importance of stockpiling to maintain an efficient demolition program. At that time, Tony Kashat 
remarked, “We have one stockpile location. Two others are being considered. The Shoemaker 
location on the eastside: 11031 Shoemaker. It saves times. There’s 50,000 (cubic) yards.”  
The DDP backfill records do not list 11031 Shoemaker as a source site for any of its 
demolition. However, aerial imagery shows the mounds and tire tracks consistent with frequent 
use by heavy machinery beginning in late 2014 until the middle of 2019. The City of Detroit 
owns 11031 Shoemaker and the Detroit Water & Sewerage Departments owns the adjacent 
property at 11081 Shoemaker. Detroit took possession of 11031 in the 1980s and demolished the 
on-site factory in 1998. In the early 2000s, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 
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(MDEQ) launched the Detroit Lead Assessment Project (DLAP) and focused a 2007 analysis on 
contamination in the neighborhood due to past activity involving a lead smelter (Weston 
Solutions, 2007). A ball bearings manufacturer previously owned and operated 11031 
Shoemaker. As part of DLAP, contractors collected soil samples from thirteen sites near 11031. 
Their findings identified two off-site locations with potentially hazardous levels of lead 
concentration. Because on-site concentrations were low, DLAP decided against further action. 
Even with conflicting guidance, contractors adopted the stockpile approach to lower 
transportation costs. The stockpiling took a variety of forms. Some contractors notified nearby 
residents while others simply dumped on empty lots. An WYXZ-ABC report in 5/2016 
suggested that contractors were storing backfill in Detroit neighborhoods without prior DBA 
approval (Dahl, 2016b). At the time, Farkas of the DBA went as far as calling any stockpiling of 
demolition backfill in neighborhoods a form of illegal dumping. While that may have been the 
case in spring 2016, stockpiles remained a central element of contractor and DDP approaches to 
demolishing. A review of aerial imagery of several approved backfill sources with medium to 
large volumes (over 2000 yd3) indicates contractors used stockpiles in an unofficial capacity.  
Stockpiling is not a damaging strategy for managing backfill. The practice can reduce 
bottlenecks and delivery times. However, in its efforts to establish guidelines for storing backfill 
on properties, the DDP approached backfill as a feature of the land rather than its relationship to 
environments, politics, and history. These stockpiles – large and small – were part of deceptive 
backfilling practices. Through stockpiling, the embedded elements of backfill as a resource and 
asset fell away to its present as a neutral input into the moment of demolition. Backfill’s past no 
longer matters as contractors load and leave. By dumping tens of thousands of cubic yards of 
material on these sites, the DDP rendered parts of the city’s land unusable beyond its status as 
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storage space. The benefits of stockpiling to costs remain inconclusive but controlling land this 
way has evolved from a rejected proposal to standard practice. The six properties in the next 
section are approaches to stockpiling that represent a local land regime of urban decline.  
 Dump: 14800 Castleton, Detroit, MI 
The largest backfill stockpile site by volume neighbors I-96 as it enters Detroit’s 
northwest corner. 14800 Castleton is a vacant, six-acre field encumbered by chain-link fence on 
its western and northern boundaries and abutting a parking lot and warehouse to the east. A tiny 
security trailer near a gravel road welcomes visitors in the southwest corner of the site. For most 
of its existence, Laramie Crane used 14800 to store its equipment and supplies. Laramie 
Terminals, the parent company, sold 14800 Castleton and an adjacent warehouse at 14801 
Fullerton to Kelly Holdings LLC in 10/2012 for a reported $600,000. However, Detroit property 
sales records show the transaction was a “no consideration” and “not arm’s length” sale. These 
terms of sale support an explanation that Laramie and Kelly had a preexisting relationship 
allowing the former to convey the pair of property deeds without any money changing hands.  
The terms of the sale are important because one of the properties Laramie sold became an 
official backfill source within three years. DBA records show 14800 Castleton as the source site 
for 70 HHF demolitions supported by $261,250 over the summer of 2015. Homrich, a major 
demolition contractor that moved into the residential sector with the DDP, billed MSHDA 
$3,750.00 for every backfill transaction – regardless of volume. In 5/2014, Detroit’s Buildings, 
Safety, Engineering, and Environmental Department (BSEED) granted Bert Kelly, the owner of 
14800 and the president of Kelly Holdings, a temporary land use permit to use 14800 as a 
storage yard for “clean dirt/sand.” The DBA and AKT Peerless records do not show any backfill 
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transactions involving 14800 in the subsequent time. No aerial imagery from the period confirms 
activity related to Kelly using the approved variance. The permit expired in 11/2014.  
Four months later, the BSEED issued another temporary permit at 14800 Castleton. This 
time, the permit application was jointly filed by Kelly and Carlton Taylor, the owner and CEO of 
BNA Trucking based in Pontiac, MI. The pair requested a permit allowing “Temporary use of 6 
acres of vacant land for outdoor storage of clean dirt/sand not to exceed fence height from 3-24-
2015 to 9-24-2015 as per plans.” Taylor incorporated BNA in 2006 and his state LLC application 
listed the official name as “Before and After Real Estate Development, LLC.” At no point has 
Taylor conducted real estate business under this LLC. In 2008, Taylor applied to amend the LLC 
name to its current form to reflect his trucking aspirations. In 4/2011, the US Department of 
Transportation (USDOT) granted BNA a federal ID for intrastate hauling. USDOT authorized 
BNA to operate one vehicle with one driver. However, BNA has not maintained records with 
LARA since before 2/2014. Aerial imagery confirms a large volume of material appeared and 
then disappeared in spring 2015. The temporary land use permit expired in 9/2015  
 
Figure 44: Land use permit application for 14800 Castleton (Detroit Zoning Commission, 2015) 
No records with Wayne or Oakland County illustrate a prior or ongoing relationship 
between Kelly and Taylor. Aside from a raft of property forfeiture in Oakland County, there is 
no evidence Taylor has remained active in real estate. Since the expiration of the temporary land 
use permit for 14800 Castleton in 2015, Bert Kelly has planted himself at the intersection of 
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land, policy, and infrastructure at least one other time. In 2004, Kelly purchased 6224 and 6266 
W Jefferson from Benjamin Taylor for $100,000. From 2004 to 2014, 6224 was the base of 
operations for Kelly’s Recycling Service145. In 2014, Kelly sold both properties for a combined 
$120,000 to MDOT. The former rendering facility is now a vacant lot awaiting the construction 
of the new US Point of Entry to serve traffic entering the country from the new Gordie Howe 
International Bridge. After selling to MDOT, Kelly relocated his rendering operations to 14800 
Castleton (though 14801 Fullerton is the official HQ). Today, the site at 14800 Castleton gives 
no indication Kelly and Taylor once provided Homrich with enough backfill material for 102 
transactions. At the site’s southeast corner, a wooden sign stands bearing the name Kelly Field. 
The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) has 
made 14800 Castleton a central focus of their continuing investigation of the DDP. Charlie 
LeDuff, a former reporter with The Detroit News and New York Times, provided one explanation 
for the source in an August 2018 post to Deadline Detroit. In his usual sardonic tone, LeDuff 
wrote, “Did the city intentionally create a dirt shortage so connected contractors could feed at 
your trough, Johnny? I don't want to get in the middle of battling bureaucracies, or mediate 
laboratory tests. That's your job. They're slippery around here. (LeDuff, 2018)” LeDuff claims 
contractors hid disqualified I-96 material at 14800 before using it in DDP demolitions. The 
explanation harbors serious implications for tracing the origin of the regional secondary market 
of backfill. Contractors manipulated the backfill supply to create and exploit resource scarcity. 
Kat Stafford, the government watchdog reporter for the Detroit Free Press, pursued the 
same line of reasoning in an article examining accusations of contaminated backfill (Stafford, 
2019h). She describes how the 816,000 yd3 of material excavated during the I-96 went from 
 
145 Kelly applied for a name change in 2013 from Kelly’s Rendering Service. Kelly’s Recycling Service is one of 
three businesses in Wayne County authorized by the state of Michigan to transport and dispose dead animals. 
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being the backbone of DDP’s backfilling strategy to its seedy underbelly. In 2014, the DDP 
determined the I-96 material was “not suitable for residential use” but were not able to confirm 
the time period in which an environmental consultant would have performed the soil tests 
disqualifying the material. Stafford’s investigation indicates contractors made this decision based 
on reported chloride levels that would have threatened nearby groundwater. However, based on 
backfill guidance crafted by AKT Peerless and the DDP, laboratory tests for chloride levels were 
not required in the approval process unless “located beneath parking lots only (DBA, 2014, 4)”.  
Diane Cross, a spokesperson with the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT), 
disclosed to LeDuff and Stafford that I-96 material went on to be used in infrastructure projects 
in suburban Detroit. MDOT maintains contracting records for the I-96 project under the code 
82122. Although Dan’s Excavating received the $148 million state contract to rebuild the 7-mile 
stretch of interstate, the project included at least a dozen partner firms responsible for electrical, 
hauling, concrete, and paving. Towards the end of summer 2013, Hard Rock Concrete, a 
contractor based in Westland, MI, initiated preliminary work under contract 82122-119057. State 
records report one level of subcontracting, but it is standard practice to rely on additional levels. 
  
Consequently, any number of firms could have hauled and unloaded the debris of I-96 at the 
Castleton site. Figure 45 is Google Streetview from the period with at least one hauler dumping 
Figure 45: A hauler from late summer 2013 dumping material at 14800 Castleton (Google, n.d.) 
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the material that became the approved backfill source. Figures 46-47 show the presence of a 
large pile of material in 2015 and an empty lot at the same site in 2017. Identifying the main 
actor and responsible party for using the material is difficult. Subcontracting firms often exist 
long enough to serve the immediate hauling interests of more established companies. In some 
cases, these short-lived haulers may use older equipment still bearing logos or insignia of prior 
owners. If the truck in question was owned by Taylor (and BNA), it illustrates how a company 
with one driver and one truck can participate in a $150 million state-funded project.146  
Questions about the composition or source of the material intersect with concerns about 
processes around costs. Mary Townley admitted to The Detroit News that Homrich had billed 
HHF a “self-determined average” for the backfill costs traced back to 14800 Castleton (Ferretti, 
2019b). Homrich using I-96 material is less important than the existence of unanswered 
questions surrounding it. The ensemble of Kelly, Taylor, Dan’s Excavating, I-96, and MDOT 
illustrate how treating demolition as a discrete intervention ignores the expansive supply chain – 
with its financial interests, property holdings, and income priorities – and masks the relationships 
grabbing value through demolishing. No property is simply a dumpsite for haulers or a stockpile 
site for wreckers, these properties are the outcome of histories of sales and transactions that 
implicate state agencies, contractors, haulers, excavators, and owners. 14800 Castleton provides 
a window into the invisible supply chains and property practices making the DDP possible. 
 
146 According to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, BNA Trucking is “active” and has one vehicle 
and one driver. Info is available at: https://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/SMS/Carrier/1906305/Overview.aspx?FirstView=True 
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Figure 46: 14800 Castleton, Detroit, MI, 2015 (Google, n.d.) 
 
Figure 47: 14800 Castleton, Detroit, MI, 2017 (Google, n.d.) 
Bert Kelly did not purchase the lot at 14800 Castleton for the next housing development 
or industrial campus. The land use at the site reflects the ongoing interaction of ownership, 
occupation, and obeisance. No money changed hands in the conveyance of the property, but the 
chronology of rezoning, stockpiling, and distribution illustrate how Bert Kelly mobilized 14800 
to meet his needs and those of Homrich. The material entered the regional reserves of backfill 
simply because it suddenly arrived at the site. The material at the site became “usable” and 
“approved” by virtue of BSEED accommodating Kelly and Taylor’s joint request to temporarily 
transform the industrial property into a residential material yard suited to the DDP’s own rules. 
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Dirt from nowhere became dirt from a residential material yard. Homrich then used it and 
conjured an average cost for each transaction. In the end, the quality or safety of the material 
used is peripheral to the chain of movements by agencies, occupant, and contractor to convert a 
fallow lot into space for storing and circulating the asset of backfill. 14800 Castleton became an 
exemplar of another valuable resource in the regional operations of demolishing: a somewhere. 
 Conceal: Stout Street, Detroit, MI 
On 3/2/2015, Adamo Group demolished 18410 Stout Street in northwest Detroit. Adamo 
– a regional demolition firm with a national reputation in commercial and industrial structure 
removal – made quick work of the vacant 813 square foot home. Between 1991 and 2007, 18410 
had only three owners. In the seven years prior to its HHF demolition, thirteen different owners 
held the deed. This ownership roulette allowed 18410 to ride the cresting and crashing wave of 
the Great Recession - occasionally occupied, always transferable. Banks, investors, speculators, 
and institutions each took their turn neglecting the property. In 2007, just as the first waves of 
foreclosures began to rattle the hull of the US economy, the Wayne County Sheriff seized 18410 
from Redell Salter (the owner-occupant since 2001) and sold it to Argent Securities for 
$65,064.00. Less than a year later, Argent conveyed the deed to REO Nationwide Inc., which 
proceeded to dump its inventory along with the home to Izair Skender for $3,000.  
Private ownership of the property culminated with CA-based Stone Crest Income & 
Investment Opportunity Fund 1 selling to CA-based Stonecrest Income & Investment 
Opportunity Fund 1 for $1,000 – representing a $64,064.00 loss of value in just three years. In 
2012, Wayne County Treasurer foreclosed for unpaid property taxes. From there, 18410 Stout 
entered the inventory of the Detroit Planning and Development Department where it lingered 
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until the City Council countenanced the mass property transfer to the newly invigorated DLBA. 
The DDP then placed the property into the HHF-funded demolition process in 7/2014.   
As mentioned in Chapter 3, contractors routinely skirted reporting backfill transactions. 
The absence of 18410 Stout from the record of backfill destinations should serve as the definitive 
word on its hereafter of emptiness - another casualty of neighborhood disinvestment and local 
regulatory dysfunction. A contractor tore it down and they dumped material. However, 
demolition backfill does not belong solely to destinations. In a strange turn, Adamo reported 
18410 Stout as the backfill source for two demolitions in 2016: 17147 Ferguson and 19211 
Curtis. AKT Peerless approved 18410 Stout as a source seventeen months after Adamo 
demolished the house on the site. Adamo knocked down 19211 Curtis on June 27, 2016 and 
billed $9,763.00. A day later, Adamo demolished 17147 Ferguson and billed $9,201.00. Adamo 
submitted the two transactions reporting 18410 Stout as the backfill source on August 29, 2016. 
The contractor used 72 yd3 of material to fill 17147 Ferguson and 168 yd3 to fill 19211 Curtis. 
For the backfill moved to Ferguson, Adamo billed $528.73. For the other, it billed $591.07. 
Somehow, Adamo had transformed a vacant lot into an asset within its demolition process. By 
linking the address into its supply chain, Adamo had turned 18410 Stout into a backfill source.  
Despite the transaction record and the approval, 18410 Stout was never the original 
source for demolition backfill. No evidence suggests Adamo excavated one of its 2015 
demolition sites to obtain backfill for two demolitions in 2016. DLBA never surrendered 
ownership to Adamo or an outside party, yet the DDP had approved the site as a source of 
material despite no tracking of the legitimate origin. The parcel did not need to change hands 
from public to private to generate income for the latter. Instead, Adamo used the residential 
address to comply by embedding its source in a neighborhood. As mentioned earlier, DDP and 
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AKT did not require soil testing or additional monitoring if contractors used material matching 
the residential category source standard. Rather than an origin, aerial imagery from summer 2016 
shows Adamo used 18410 Stout to stage material before hauling to Curtis and Ferguson. 
18410 is one of forty-eight Illusive backfill sources that indicate how dirt-washing is not 
an anomaly within the DDP. Whether a church parking lot or a temporary dirt pit, AKT and DDP 
demonstrated a pattern of approving a residential address despite no evidence corroborating the 
nature of its sourcing. These misleading records implicate largescale apartment developments 
and DLBA-owned vacant land like 18410 Stout. To wit, 18410 is not the only address on Stout 
turned into a logistical asset by Adamo. Seven other sources with a Stout address appear in the 
DDP backfill records. Two of these sources do not match any past or present address on file with 
the Detroit Assessor’s office. One is currently an owner-occupied home. DLBA owns the other 
four properties - all property tax foreclosures. Despite the nature of ownership and the lack of 
development, Stout Street remained integral to how contractors extracted value in Detroit. 
 On Stout Street, contractors relied on a land regime to capture the DDP regulation and 
control the valuation of backfill. In sum, Adamo claimed Stout Street addresses contributed 
2,072 yd3 of backfill to complete 13 demolitions. The contractor billed HHF $8,893.86 to cover 
the costs of material. Adamo reported using 192 yd3 from 17660 Stout to complete a demolition 
at 18424 Stout in 2016. AKT approved 18492 Stout as a source for five demolitions in June 
2016. MSHDA placed HHF liens totaling $167,814.10 on these properties. Today, all five 
remain in the DLBA inventory. On 10/15/2018, Blue Star, a suburban demolition contractor, 
finally tore down 18492 Stout. A building sat at the address the entire time Adamo reported 
using the property as a source for material. The DDP reported the cost as $14,774.60. MSHDA 
placed a $16,713.60 lien on the DLBA-owned property that will not expire until 2023. While 
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small in scale, these transactions along Stout Street are instructive for understanding how vacant 
land takes on new potency in a city facing widespread abandonment. The land’s value is not in 
its possible productivity for new property or redevelopment but in its potential value as logistical 
space occupied by backfill material enabling the mobilization of supply for other demolitions. 
 Destroy: 14411 Oakland, Highland Park, MI 
Aside from a bronze marker in front of a derelict building at the northwest edge of 
Highland Park, MI, no evidence suggests the Kahn-designed structure helped usher in the 20th 
century. At its dedication in 1910, the Highland Park Ford Plant – nicknamed the Crystal Palace 
– was the largest factory in the world and its 102-acres of offices and plants represented an 
epochal shift in factory design. But the Crystal Palace’s influence would soon surpass its campus 
design. In 10/1913, administrators at the facility instituted the first moving assembly line in 
automobile production. The (albeit primitive) assembly line accelerated production of the Model 
T car and the concomitant rise in labor productivity transformed the routines and conventions of 
manufacturing and the character of the broader economy. The Fordist mode of production would 
prove to be one of the footings upon which the American century of wealth and power was built.  
Despite several attempts at upgrading the plant, Ford chose to move production to 
modern factories and idled the facility in 1973. Ford sold a bundle of parcels to HPF Associates, 
an investment firm, for $7,000,000. HPF sat on the property for sixteen years before selling to 
Woodward-Manchester LLC for $1 in 1997. Woodward-Manchester conveyed the deed to 
Model T Plaza Phase III in 9/2000. By 2006, both entities did not exist. In 8/2006, Forman Mills, 
a discount clothing retailer, opened a 55,000 square foot location adjacent to the Highland Park 
Plant. Within two months, Oakland Avenue Properties took control of the remaining properties. 
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Today, the factory on Woodward Avenue, where hundreds of Ford workers once 
produced thousands of Model Ts (later WWII tanks and then tractors), is a landscape peppered 
with vacant lots and decommissioned factories. But all is not quiet and undisturbed. Where 
assembly lines belched out cars, conveyor belts and tractor-trailers now provide a pop and hum 
to the 70 acres as Mid-Michigan Crushing & Recycling (MMCR) processes excavated basements 
to sell as approved DDP backfill. The presence of the contemporary operation suggests the 
Crystal Palace of Detroit in the Roaring 20s might be better suited to the sobriquet of the 
Concrete Compound. Where Fordism once signaled its influence over production, a different 
style of valuation and income occupies the land. Rather than one of growth based on austere 
standardization, mass production, and mass consumption, the parcel in Highland Park depends 
on the inscrutability of the region’s land regime and the expendability of Detroit neighborhoods. 
MMCR sprang from a sequence of regulatory shifts. Early DDP backfill guidance barred 
concrete from use as demolition backfill, but Kevyn Orr’s 8/2014 emergency order allowed 
crushed basements to become official DDP policy. Although he initially rebuffed the description, 
Jon Grosshans, an USEPA staffer, confirmed Orr’s declaration of a renewed blight emergency 
and MMCR’s emergence was a “linear” process from EM order to crushing operation. Backfill 
records show MMCR – which moved its base of operations from Fenton, MI - has provided over 
500,000 cubic yards of material to HHF demolitions in Detroit worth over $2.3 million in 
billings. MMCR is by far the largest provider of backfill material for HHF demolitions in Detroit 
(>2300). Homrich completed the first demolition with crushed basements from MMCR on 
6/9/2015. The contractor wrecked 16503 Strathmoor for $15,300.00 and billed $3,750.00 to HHF 
for an unspecified volume of material147. The AKT Peerless platform shows contractors pursued 
 
147 Early on, many contractors would submit batches of transactions to DDP for review. Homrich included 12 other 
demolitions alongside 16503 Strathmoor and reported using a total of 840 yd3 from MMCR. 
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a Category 1 – Residential – approval for the backfill material created by MMCR at the Highland 
Park site. AKT approved 350,000 yd3 of backfill – designated “crushed aggregate” - for use by 
Able Demolition on 10/15/2015. Despite no evidence that Category 1 or 3 material is separated 
at the Highland Park site, MMCR also produced 8,561 yd3 of Category 3 backfill from the 
excavation for the new City Club apartments at the former Statler Hotel and another 23,576 yd3 
from City Modern, the new mixed-use, multi-family condo project at Brush Park.  
DDP backfill records list 14411 Oakland as the source of MMCR crushed material but 
the company’s online presence suggests the company operates out of an adjacent address at 
15111 Oakland. The latter is an abandoned Highland Park High School football field directly 
northwest of 14411 and a chain of empty aggregate yards and unadorned warehouses. Assessor 
records with Highland Park show MMCR storing personal property at 15111, but aerial and site 
observation are contradictory. When presented with this information, Janice Bibbs, City 
Treasurer of Highland Park, remarked, “It’s even confusing to me.” Highland Park records for 
14411 Oakland do not list an owner because the property was subjected to frequent partition into 
an archipelago of parcels with incongruent uses: storage, crushing, and commercial. However, 
WCA Assessing – a private firm handling Highland Park’s assessment – confirmed the property 
at 14411 remains in the inventory of Oakland Avenue Properties, LLC. Incorporated in 2006, 
Oakland Avenue Properties is a shell company of National Equity Corp., a developer of 
industrial, commercial, and retail property operating out of Bloomfield Hills, MI.  
Martin Ross – the owner of both National Equity and Oakland Avenue Properties – was 
at one time sympathetic to local community efforts to build a Model T-themed history center at 
the site. In a 2013 article in Crain’s Detroit (Welch, 2013), organizers with Woodward Avenue 
Action Association remarked, “There is not a week that goes by that someone from Europe or 
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Asia doesn't arrive at the (complex) guard shack and ask how they can come in to see Ford 
Highland Park." Aerial imagery of the 14411 Oakland confirms a different fate for the property 
in the period immediately after Orr suspended and shifted backfilling requirements. Figure 48 
from 2015 shows evidence of stockpiled material but no visible equipment or dense activity. 
Figure 49 from 2016 illustrates how MMCR moved its operations, obtained access to crushers 
and screening equipment, and ramped up production to take advantage of the DDP. By fall 2016, 
Oakland Avenue Properties had ditched the concept of a history center (Welch, 2016). 
In a 2018 interview, a demolition contractor familiar with MMCR’s crushing operation in 
Highland Park provided clarity on MMCR’s production at the site. MCM Management, a 
demolition contractor ousted by the DBA in late 2014, allows MMCR use of its crushing 
equipment at 14411 Oakland for an unspecified fee. The Highland Park assessor corroborates 
this with records confirming MCM stores personal property at the site. At the onset of the DDP, 
MCM was considered one of the “big three” of demolition contractors in the Detroit area and 
Figure 49: 14411 Oakland prior to MMCR 
operations, 2015 (Google, n.d.) 
Figure 48: 14411 Oakland during MMCR 
operations, 2016 (Google, n.d.) 
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participated in the controversial bid-unit negotiations that sparked a federal probe and local audit. 
MCM completed 334 HHF demolitions worth $4,400,000 between 7/2014 and 10/2014. A late-
2014 DDP review of MCM’s performance (more precisely, its lack of production) culminated in 
Duggan and the DDP terminating its contract with the wrecker, leaving the contractor on the 
outside of the largest (and most lucrative) demolition project in US and regional history. The 
exact terms of the equipment arrangement with MMCR and MCM are unclear, but the 
relationship indicates MCM remains involved financially with DDP even if it is not a formal 
partner. The occupation of land by MMCR has allowed MCM to generate income from 
demolishing without knocking down a single DLBA-owned structure since mid-2014. 
MMCR has streamlined the acquisition, production, and distribution process at 14411. 
Demolition contractors without access to their own crushing or screening equipment will haul 
excavated material to the site and waiting in a drive-up drop-off. At the same time, contractors 
and their haulers will purchase loads of approved backfill from MMCR. Every truckload in 
coincides with a truckload out. In effect, HHF allocates resources to address the same basement 
foundation twice – albeit in two very different ways. First, in the process of excavating and, 
second, by purchasing the crushed aggregate from MMCR. MMCR does not buy excavated 
materials from contractors, instead the company receives raw materials and transforms them into 
assets for the backfilling process. Orr’s emergency order waiving backfilling restrictions 
established the policy environment in which MMCR became a lucrative enterprise. MMCR’s 
Highland Park operations are representative of an emergency mode of production in which 
demolishing produces and assetizes backfill material. As Harvey argues, “Resources can only be 
defined in relationship to the mode of production which seeks to make use of them (2001, 51).” 
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 Exploit: 19499 Derby, Detroit, MI 
On 4/2/2014, Rita Robinson purchased 19499 Derby from Milton Schack for $600.00. 
Within three months, Echo Rental, LLC purchased the property from Robinson for $1,000. 
According to LARA records, Echo is based in Inkster, MI and owned by Nicholas Schubeck. 
Schubeck also owns NSS Construction, a firm specializing in excavation and concrete, and has 
his hand in at least two other LLCs. Beginning with 19200 Schoenherr on 9/29/2015, 19499 
Derby served as a backfill source exclusive to 313 Construction, LLC. Sonya Pouncy 
incorporated 313 Construction on 5/15/2014. On its website, 313 describes itself as a “go-to 
demolition service provider” that “lays the groundwork for communities and neighborhoods to 
maintain re-establish themselves (313 Construction, 2019).” Between 7/2015 and 4/2016, 313 
tore down 40 buildings in Detroit; HHF supported thirty-six and totaled $464,818.61. Aside from 
the 2,706 yd3 of material from 19499 Derby, 313 sourced 5,945 yd3 for another 37 backfill 
transactions from a mineral plant site in Northville, MI and the MMCR site in Highland Park.  
All told, 313 Construction billed MSHDA $46,733.35 for backfill during their 
involvement with DDP148. The contractor has not completed a demolition in Detroit since 8300 
House on 5/26/2016. For its part, 19499 Derby was involved in twelve of those demolitions and 
$12,000 in backfill costs. Despite the property being in arrears and forfeiture, Detroit’s Housing 
and Revitalization Department paid Able Demolition $89,299.15 on 11/7/2017 to demolish a 
commercial building on the property149. The city had determined the building was a nuisance. On 
9/18/2018, Judge Robert J Colombo ordered a demolition lien of $89,299.15 placed on Echo 
 
148 313 Construction did not return a request for an interview about the Derby source and replied to an email, “The 
DBA has a Soil Manager which developed a database that all demolition contractors use to identify approved soil 
sources.” 
149 Detroit’s building permit data portal lists this department as the property owner even though Echo Rental was 
still holding the deed. 
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Rentals and 19499 Derby. On 3/30/2019, the Wayne County Treasurer issued a final judgement 
of foreclosure on 19499 Derby for unpaid property taxes150. Echo Rental had not paid taxes on a 
consistent basis but had avoided foreclosure through sporadic redemptions with the county. 
In 11/2019, Wayne Country conveyed the deed for 19499 Derby to Derby St 19499, 
LLC, a shell company based in Grosse Point Park, MI. The new owner had operated under the 
name 19302 Blake St, LLC until 10/2019 despite never owning the property at that address. 
Currently, the Federal National Mortgage Association owns 19302 Blake as well as the property 
the LLC listed on its articles of organization (1085 W Lantz). Today, Big Dave’s Tree Service, 
previously based in Southfield, MI, has expanded operations from a nearby warehouse at 19381 
John R to include the site at 19499 Derby151. A series of site visits in late 2019 confirmed Big 
Dave’s is storing equipment and clearing the property of trees and debris. 
 Although 19499 Derby is no longer in Schubeck’s portfolio, the suburban excavator 
remains involved in Detroit real estate. In 12/2016, Schubeck moved NSS Construction from 
Inkster to 12838 Gavel in Detroit. Echo Rental, LLC purchased the warehouse from American 
Excavating Contractors for $175,000.00 (four months after AEC had redeemed unpaid property 
taxes with Wayne County for the second time). Nine days later, Echo quit claimed the deed to 
Foxtrot Properties, an LLC incorporated by Heather Taylor and Schubeck in 6/2016 and located 
at the same Inkster address as Echo Rental152. Four months later, Foxtrot conveyed 12838 to 
Taylor and then Taylor conveyed the property to Nicholas Schubeck in a land contract. On 
10/27/2016, Taylor and Schubeck sought approval from LARA for the dissolution of Foxtrot. In 
sum, Taylor and Schubeck mobilized these LLCs to disguise their own credit history and shelter 
 
150 Civil Action 17-008808-CH 
151 Kimberly Marsack conveyed 19381 to Big Dave’s in 12/2015. 
152 25907 Trowbridge 
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the real estate purchases from scrutiny or taxation. As one lawyer observed of the transactions, 
“The most likely way that they were profiting is either tax evasion or avoiding litigation. 
Possibly they were using LLCs with cleaner credit or legal histories to purchase properties and 
get loans that they otherwise wouldn't have gotten individually153.” The interlocking maneuvers 
of Echo, Foxtrot, and Taylor with Gavel demonstrates how Schubeck used 19499 to master the 
use of property sales and LLCs to take full advantage of Detroit’s real estate market. 
In late 3/2017, NSS Construction served as the contractor for the demolition of 16571 
Harper. A few months earlier, a fire of still-unexplained origin broke out at the vacant building. 
Simon Zedan, a St Clair Shores-based speculator, and frequent presence in the Wayne County 
tax foreclosure auction, contracted NSS to tear down the empty warehouse he had purchased for 
$21,000.00 in a 2011 bank sale. NSS had not completed a demolition in Detroit prior to 16571 
and has not since. At the beginning of 2019, Zedan placed 16571 on the market for $75,000. The 
listing states, “Over 10,000 SF of land available on Detroit's Eastside. Seller open to land 
contract (Realtor.com 2019).” As of September 2019, the property remains without a buyer. 
This sensitivity to the lifecycle of property and those controlling these transactions 
deepens analysis of land and value in declining cities. The transactions at Derby are redolent of 
other more routine residential transactions in Detroit. Akers & Seymour (2018) describe how 
practiced buyers in Wayne County’s tax foreclosure auction use the process to recycle their own 
tax delinquent properties. Oftentimes, the owner will purchase an REO property and then rent to 
an unsuspecting tenant in search of a deal in a tight market or arrange a contract-for-deed with a 
buyer who cannot obtain conventional mortgages. However, the tax arrears catch up, Wayne 
County forecloses, and the property goes to the annual auction. If the property is desirable, a 
 
153 Andrew Madras, JD, specializes in finance and compliance relative to real estate and accounting. 
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buyer will snatch it up during the initial round of the auction for the cost of unpaid taxes. If no 
buyer bites at that stage, Wayne County auctions the property for $500. The savviest LLCs and 
individuals use this provision to buy back their own properties for less than the taxes owed and 
frequently far less than the bank sale through which they first obtained the property. The cycle of 
tenancy then repeats. The goal of these LLCs and individual buyers is to extract the maximum 
value from a property without committing resources or keeping the property taxes current.  
The above process of exchange, enclosure, and exploiting in land contracts harbors 
insights for 19499 Derby. While the vacant parcel was never meant for inhabitance or 
development, Schubeck and Echo Rentals, LLC still used the property to extract value from the 
DDP backfilling. The $1,000 purchase in 7/2014 returned $12,000 in backfill sales to 313 
Construction. Schubeck bought vacant land, dumped valuable material, and sold the volume of 
backfill commodity without paying any of the taxes levied on 19499 Derby. By doing so, 
Schubeck illustrated how the supply chain and scarcity of backfill could be used to establish a 
new arrangement in which the land holds value as a staging ground for capitalizing on potential 
rents within the DDP. In this case, the enigmatic condition of land in the city contributed to the 
relative health of the DDP backfilling market. While Schubeck secured and enclosed the private 
property, it was by obtaining, securing, and enclosing the dirt itself as an asset within 
demolishing Detroit that enabled him and his LLC to extract value through the property. 
 Control: 14039 Grand River, Detroit, MI 
One contractor’s command of 14039 Grand River in northwest Detroit dwarfs the scale 
of efforts by Schubeck and Echo Rental. DMC Consultants, Inc (aka DMC Group USA) is a 
high-volume construction contractor based in Northville, MI, an affluent suburb of Detroit. 
Manish Chaudhary founded DMC in 2005 and continues to share executive control over the 
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firm’s daily operations. Between 2014 and the end of 2018, the firm has demolished 1,921 
residential structures as part of the demolition program. DDP has awarded DMC $29,728,469.37 
to complete these demolitions. Of the total contracts, the city allocated $19,620,773.71 in HHF 
for 1,324 demolitions154. DMC has sourced nearly half of its backfill material from one source 
located at 14039 Grand River in northwest Detroit. The site is owned by 14039 Grand River 
LLC (GRL), a Michigan-based business for which LARA records date to 4/2014. GRL 
purchased the site from Sami Alfasih for $135,000 in 9/2015. Alfasih previously obtained the 
deed during the 2013 Wayne County property tax auction, paying $26,000 in 11/2013. 
Based on aerial photography, 14039 Grand River served as storage and parking until mid-
2015 when GRL, the new owner, began “selling” backfill material exclusively to DMC. State 
incorporation records indicate Manish Chaudhary, the President of DMC, also serves as the 
owner of GRL and the two companies share an address in Northville, MI. These details confirm 
14039 Grand River is DMC’s shell company and own backfill supplier. The timeline of 
transactions raises questions about the DDP’s complicity with the property practices of Alfasih, 
DMC, and GRL. In 7/2014, GRL (14 months before owning the property) applied to BSEED for 
a “Change of use from factory/warehouse (vacant land with existing concrete slab) to outdoor 
storage of clean dirt/sand from 7-17-14 to 7-17-15 not to exceed fence height per admin hearing 
letter #12-14 as per plans (LPD, 2015a).” At that time and for the duration of the variance, 
Alfasih owned the property while GRL conducted its ongoing backfill business at the site. GRL 
and Alfasih worked out an arrangement in which the former determined the land’s use. BSEED 
approved the application for a zoning change and set out provisions for regular renewals – which 
 
154 66% of demolitions between 1/2014 and 1/2019. 
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DMC has pursued. 14039, like other sites scattered across the city, would serve as a designated 
stockpiling zone for use only by DMC in its residential demolitions for the DDP.  
DMC completed its first non-HHF demolition as part of DDP on 1/14/2014. The city paid 
DMC $11,156 to tear down the residential structure at 17338 Bradford Avenue (a 2007 mortgage 
foreclosure with four owners since demolition). DMC would continue receiving only non-HHF 
contracts until 5/1/2014 when the city awarded it an HHF contract to demolish 15874 Inverness, 
15902 Inverness, and 15922 Greenlawn for a total of $21,767.40. No backfill records associated 
with DMC exist until 9/3/2015 when DMC reported sourcing 26,150 yd3 of material from the 
14039 Grand River site. Just over three weeks later, GRL purchased the property. DMC sourced 
11,750 cubic yards from the site on 10/8/2015. Beginning with the demolition of 478 Algonquin 
on 1/16/2016, DMC sourced 78,061 cubic yards of material from 14039 Grand River in 2016 
and 2017. As part of its shell company supplier relationship to DMC, GRL (and Chaudhary) 
received a considerable payout from backfill provision. DMC used material from 14039 Grand 
River to complete over 400 residential demolitions, 354 supported by HHF. MSHDA records 
suggest that by May 2017, 14039 Grand River had supplied a total of 115,961 yd3 of backfill 
material to DMC, generating nearly $700,000 in revenue from public funds. HHF alone 
contributed $616,524. Money meant to connect backfill supplier to demolition contractor became 
a payment DMC could make within its own family of companies without raising any red flags.  
Over the last two years, DDP has scrutinized transactions involving DMC and the 14039 
Grand River source. In 2/2019, DDP identified 70 demolitions in which DMC used unapproved 
material originating from 14039 (Ferretti, 2019b). DDP suspended DMC pending confirmation 
of safe backfill. The DDP also required DMC to present an action plan to assure it was not using 
unapproved material at future demolition sites (Stafford, 2019h). Farkas remarked then, “We are 
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giving DMC an option to develop a plan for having the soil tested at each of these demo 
locations to determine whether it is safe to remain there." Testing concluded soil was safe for use 
as backfill. As of 4/2019, DDP approved DMC’s return to the program. Throughout 2020, the 
site at 14039 Grand River was an active backfill source but remained subject to scrutiny.  
 In an interview, Jon Grosshans dismissed the transaction history surrounding 14039 
Grand River LLC as just another shell company speculating on an undervalued property. 
However, Grosshans simplification neglects how DMC maneuvered 14039 to serve as more than 
a simple real estate investment. It also ignores how DMC commanded the use of the property 
prior to formally owning the land at 14039. Land is a resource for development, yes, but it is also 
a resource for demolishing. By reducing it to a redevelopment process, officials and leaders with 
the DDP have ignored what GRL and DMC have produced at the site. DDP leaders have relied 
on a heuristic in which residential demolition prepares land for development rather than 
demolishing (and decline) giving rise to its own regime of use, regulation, and valuation. Today, 
DMC has transformed 14039 into an operation serving a foundational need of demolition: create 
backfill and manage the supply chain. The address on Grand River has provided DMC with a 
somewhere to serve as an origin of its backfill but also a corporate cover that supports a circle of 
rentiership. By doing so, DMC has allowed its property to move beyond use or exchange.  
 Enrich: Dubois Street, Detroit, MI 
To the casual observer, the landscape between Chene and St Aubin in the eastside 
Poletown neighborhood shares more in common with a cratered natural satellite than an urban 
environment. Fifteen-foot mounds of rock and dirt pock vacant parcels between the handful of 
remaining occupied houses. To the north, a mass of greenhouses own by RecoverPark Farms 
stands frame-to-frame in a treeless landscape. However, the few hundred acres of land in this 
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area exemplify city’s cloudy land regime. The DBA backfill records lists three addresses on 
Dubois as sources: 5200, 5042, and 5246. These three Dubois addresses were involved in 32 
backfill transactions totaling 1,362 yd3 of material. Smalley Construction – the firm responsible 
for crushing and recycling material from the Sparton factory in Jackson, MI – handled the 19 
residential demolitions between 10/2017 and 5/2018. The DDP provided backfill cost records for 
10 of these demolitions. Those ten involved 684 yd3 of material at a cost of $8,675.00, an 
average of $12.68/yd3. The DDP recorded the nine remaining teardowns as emergency 
demolitions. Consequently, the DDP does not maintain records on costs to the same standard.  
Each of the three Dubois addresses were sites in a federal infrastructure program called 
the Great Lakes Shoreline Cities Green Infrastructure Project (GLRI). Launched during the 
Obama administration, the GLRI is an initiative with an annual $300 million budget to “protect 
and restore the Great Lakes” by assembling 16 federal agencies to plan, design, and construct 
restoration projects near Lake Michigan, Huron, and Superior (US Army Corps of Engineers, 
2019)155. In 2013, the USEPA funded the Detroit project along Dubois Street as part of its third 
focus area: “Nearshore Health and Nonpoint Source Pollution.” A year later, DWSD commenced 
constructing “two green infrastructure projects within the Detroit Water and Sewerage 
Department’s Near Eastside Drainage District (USEPA, 2019).” In the initial arrangement, the 
DLBA would retain ownership of the properties on Dubois and RecoveryPark – leading 400 
parcels from the city – would manage the infrastructure (Gallagher, 2015a)156. For the latter, the 
green infrastructure would capture rainfall that RecoveryPark would then pump through its own 
filtration system for use in a planned hydroponic facility just north at the corner of Dubois and 
 
155 Trump has threatened to reduce funding for the GLRI by 90% in every budget since arriving in office (Burke 
2019).  
156 Gallagher writes, “The operation will pay $105 per acre per year in lease payments to the city and eventually buy 
the land for about $3,500 per acre.” 
294 
 
Frederick. DWSD retained Tooles Construction to transform a chain of vacant, flat, and publicly 
owned parcels into grassy mounds surrounded by trenches that would channel the runoff. 
For much of 2017 and 2018, the GLRI project stalled because RecoveryPark struggled to 
land financial support in the local investment and philanthropic community. Despite acclaim for 
its mission (Sands 2013), Gary Wozniak, RecoveryPark’s founder and CEO, issued a public 
appeal in 3/2018 for $500,000 to provide short-term relief. He informed a reporter with Crain’s 
Business Detroit, “We're not successful enough, yet, to get regular debt funding or straight up 
equity funding (Welch, 2018a).” In 12/2018, RecoveryPark secured stopgap financing from out-
of-state sources to continue operations but decided to lay off five employees (Welch, 2018b). On 
the strength of that investment, RecoveryPark finalized the purchase of the city-leased parcels – 
including 5042, 5246, and 5200 Dubois. However, RecoveryPark’s fortunes changed in the 
middle of 2019 when three local and national investment groups provided over $4 million to 
supplement two business loans backed by a pair of federal government agencies (Welch, 2019). 
Now on stable financial footing, RecoveryPark announced plans to move forward with its two-
acre hydroponic complex at 2259 East Palmer, the site of a demolished Kroger157.  
The dirt, however, used by Smalley Construction was not from this initial construction of 
the GLRI. In late 2017, RecoveryPark contracted Smalley for additional site maintenance on the 
Dubois bioswales. Wozniak shared in an interview, “He got the soil and we got the berm 
reduction.” RecoveryPark would collect thousands of gallons of water from the earthwork; 
Smalley would collect thousands of cubic yards of material for backfilling. The 1,362 yd3 carved 
off the mounds helped Smalley complete $245,200 in demolition contracts, including three 
 
157 Welch wrote, “The hydroponics greenhouse will be located in an Opportunity Zone, but the deferment of capital 
gains tax associated with those low-income zones was not a factor in attracting the initial investments to the 
greenhouse project, Wozniak said.” 
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supported by HHF. Moreover, Smalley did not pay any material costs for the backfill. The 
$8,675.00 total Smalley billed for backfill – nine demolitions do not appear in any public records 
– does not add up as transportation costs for the few miles traveled by Smalley. 
The federal government saw the land along Dubois as an investment in sustainable 
watershed practices that would lighten the load carried by the city’s sewer system. RecoveryPark 
approached the land along Dubois as an opportunity to optimize its own resource use in service 
of its social mission to employ disadvantaged residents and establish a local food economy. 
Neither centered income-generation in their interaction with the empty lots. In contrast, Smalley 
converted the free waste of a “for-impact company” into an asset subsidized by pots of money 
provided by HHF and MSHDA. Land meant to be removed from the market – first as public 
green infrastructure and second as non-profit use-value – still produced income for Smalley as it 
wrecked vacant properties in Detroit. Demolition unlocked the value of land along Dubois, but 
only because the triad of GLRI, RecoveryPark, and DWSD combined to grant Smalley the 
opportunity to excavate and move dirt. The value was not in land’s redevelopment, but by 
assetizing its outcomes to serve Smalley’s goals and the needs of backfilling demolitions. 
 Materializing and Valuing a Land Regime of Decline 
Approaching the DDP as a phase in an ongoing development or stabilization scheme 
simplifies the process into a discrete practice with a beginning, middle, and end. I have argued 
that by engaging demolishing as a process and achievement, the political, environmental, and 
logistical relations take on significance. The above instances of land use, property ownership, 
and the command of space illustrate how applying certain frameworks on decline and value can 
leave gaps in explaining the strategies and priorities of those involved in demolishing and 
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backfilling Detroit. These operations and their processes materialize and spatialize different 
regulatory and valuation arrangements for managing the city’s land, property, and value. 
In the masterly Urban Land Rent, Haila (2015) lays out a framework that differentiates 
four historical land regimes: indigenous; feudal; capitalism, and financialization. Each of these 
regimes encompasses power relations and development modes – they represent forms of 
economic, political, and geographical power. In the indigenous land regime, land – the commons 
- represents membership in a community, members of which are obligated to sustain balance 
with nature. Feudal land regimes rely on social bonds in which tenants pay rent to landlords and 
the fragility of tenure reproduces authority and hierarchy. For Haila, this feudal land regime 
established the fundaments for early municipal police powers serving the collective good.  
The capitalist land regime - Haila’s third category - enclosed land and transformed the 
commons into commodity. She writes, “With this process the meaning of land also changed: land 
came to mean a thing.” A new class of owners used this system of enclosure to militate against 
feudal traditions, asserting liberty was an artifact of property ownership. The hegemony of the 
capitalist land regime in which property changes hands in pursuit of value enabled the 
development of a real estate market and the formation of an urban development industry. As 
Fishman (1989) illustrates, the unbridled suburban growth 20th century America relied on this 
ideology of commodity, price, and market to secure the suburb as the predominant built 
environment. Haila concludes her framework with financialization, a land regime in which land 
is indistinguishable from the financial instruments that render it an asset with securitized yields. 
The scale of property ownership balloons to include arrangements of global interests and 
vulnerable public institutions bend to exogenous economic pressures. These forces reduce cities 
to a configuration of returns on investment in which public policies hesitate to interrupt the 
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treadmill of value creation. Speculation becomes a significant structural determinant of both a 
city’s and a neighborhood’s fortunes. Proximity no longer shapes the disposition of land. 
Haila’s approach to these land regimes includes ideal types that resist easy application to 
any specific time or place158. However, the framework provides insights into the conflicts and 
contradictions that entangle land, property ownership, society, and urban development. More 
than a curve relating supply’s association to demand, urban land reflects historic and 
contemporary social and economic asymmetries and the notion of the possessive individual. Like 
Valverde’s (2012) analysis of urban zoning, land use is less about the institutionalization or 
application of the rules and more about how power – economic and social – interprets and 
applies those rules towards an income-generation goal. Haila concludes, “The land question is 
not only an economic question but also a moral, social and political question.” For planners and 
geographers, the transition from indigenous to capitalist land regimes noted by Haila also maps 
onto the tension inherent to use and exchange - the binary of struggle providing parameters for 
land use intensification and commodification in the growth machine (Logan & Molotch, 1987). 
Yet, in the land regime of decline, these tensions between private and common or use and 
exchange are clouded by public financing, regulatory capture, rentiership, and a local real estate 
market that is inscrutable at best. Land’s value is not synonymous with the intensification of use 
nor the development of housing. Occupation of land can be just as productive as formal tenancy 
or ownership. The interaction of the factors of production do not automatically culminate in 
austerity or gentrification (or even growth). But revising the growth machine to reflect the 
tensions endemic to a land regime of decline should include resisting adoption of those twin 
poles of use and exchange and including a wider spectrum of property interests. This Castor and 
 
158 She insists these are Weberian ideal types. 
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Pollux of property as identified by Logan & Molotch captures a narrow range of the potential 
rights that structure ownership and disposition. The insistence on land as the salient (fictitious) 
commodity obstructs other configurations in which land and its use serve the interests of capital.  
The question, then, is how does the integration of these other interests and agendas 
reshape the relationship between land, use, and value? What is property in a post-accumulation 
setting? By turning to the raw components of ownership, a more comprehensive typology – 
beyond use and exchange – provides a framework for probing a land regime of decline. When 
combined, these components might gesture towards the “bundle of rights” associated with 
property ownership and enjoyed by the holder. However, as legal scholar Henry Smith (2011) 
has argued, relying on this realist bundle – exclusion, possession, control, enjoyment, disposition 
– can occlude the ways, “Property as a system is marvelously multipurpose (288).” Taking his 
suggestion that our attention should be directed toward the “specialization of the parts” within 
the bundle, I have sketched a typology that accommodates these emergent links of land and use. 
This typology gestures towards a modular approach to private property in cities like Detroit. 
 Three models of use dominate understandings of property under conditions of decline: 
squatting, speculation, and service. In the first, occupants seeking housing security control vacant 
or abandoned space without the formal authorization of the property owner (Herbert 2018). In 
the second, predatory capital – often operating as a variety of LLCs - purchases and recycles land 
hoping a recovering property market will reward risk (Seymour & Akers 2019; Akers, 2013b). 
Third, owner-occupants will assume informal control of adjacent vacant lots or buildings – 
mowing, landscaping, finding responsible tenants for empty properties - to stabilize their 
neighborhood (Kinder, 2016). Although each of the three are commonplace occurrences in 
Detroit, they each fall somewhere along the growth machine continuum of use or exchange: 
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squatters and servicers operate outside the usual real estate market while speculators defer 
property maintenance or intimidate occupants with an eye on the return from future sale. Of the 
six above sites, only 14039 Grand River suggests a speculative relationship of impending 
exchange. However, its present use and ownership still gesture towards a geography of property 
in which land’s value exceeds its potential developability. As I have shown, land outside that 
continuum of use and exchange has a significant position in city-building when the privileges 
afforded by that use do not align neatly with the constructs of inhabitance and ownership. 
By disassembling the institution of ownership, three other forms of control and use 
emerge: abusus (destruction), usufructus (access), and fructus (beneficiary). In the case of 14111 
Oakland, the present owner – Oakland Ave Properties – has made a calculated decision to forego 
memorializing the property’s history (Model T production) and granted MMCR the right to 
destroy and consume the land. MMCR’s current occupation renders the land undevelopable but 
not without exchange value in backfill production. This abusus is contrasted with the usus that 
describes the social bonds of servicers and squatters. The site at Castleton and those along Stout 
Street and Dubois Street suggest how a landholder may grant an occupant the temporary right to 
derive income from the land: usufructus. In the first, Bert Kelly sought zoning permission to 
allow BNA and Homrich to convert his land into a temporary backfill stockpile – use but not 
own. In the second, the DLBA owned Stout addresses but Adamo generated income by 
employing residential space to conceal backfill origins. In the latter, Smalley Construction 
altered the Poletown as part of a public purpose but turned the spoils into income by demolishing 
buildings. Finally, Echo Rentals and Schubeck converted 19499 Derby into a sales stand for 
transforming material produced by his excavation firm into backfill for 313 Construction. This 
fructus approach only required temporary ownership then rectified by tax foreclosure.  
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I have adopted the terms abusus, usufructus, and fructus because they provide part of the 
base of Roman Law upon which contemporary property is anchored. I have deployed these terms 
to describe these unofficial property relationships – they are not legally binding arrangements 
between those with ownership, access, or income interests. While drawing benefit from a 
property must have a formalization in law to be official– only Louisiana codifies usufruct 
relations – the letter of the law in these cases is less significant than the spirit of the action within 
these land regimes of decline. Who uses and why? Who abuses and why? Who destroys and 
why? This expanded matrix of property interests illustrates how different priorities and forms of 
occupation contribute to turning demolition into demolishing – a regional and logistical process 
of land, environment, and value that becomes an exercise in shaping and controlling a city. 
Demolishing holds a formidable position in land use and value in the growth machine 
framework (Logan & Molotch, 1987). In that approach, demolitions have a Cartesian character 
in which contractors identify a point in space, arrive, intervene, and then depart. Demolition 
produces vacant land ready for the shovel and structure. Demolition’s potency is a function of its 
power to unlock development (interest or income). The city-builders take over and command the 
use in a new round of development. Upon deeper scrutiny, the operations and consequences of 
demolishing are more than eliminating an impairment. Demolishing generates incomes from the 
built environment by structuring new arrangements for valuation and regionalizing supply chains 
that capture surpluses by debasing land-use. Contractors extract value by processing buildings 
and circulating backfill material. Rather than an outcome of a policy agenda, demolishing is a 
convergence of rents, policies, landscapes, and resources – a chain of specialized parts.  
Demolishing Detroit makes valuation and incomes possible from decline. Backfilling 
casts light on the conflicts, ambitions, and tensions shaping land, value, and property in Detroit. 
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By following the backfill, a political economy of urban change emerges in which austerity and 
gentrification are strategies among many in the city’s ongoing transformation. HHF liens may 
prevent developers and speculators from accumulating properties, but another branch of 
investment has produced an economy of demolishing. The environments and operations of 
backfilling Detroit is a lens for reading the regional geography of growth, obsolescence, and 
power. By revaluing through demolishing, a decline machine has captured a surplus created by 
destruction. It is a machine extracting rents through publicly-supported and privately-delivered 
land use de-intensification. Land within backfilling is embedded in pathways, regulations, uses, 
and assets that demonstrate the limits of conventional land regimes for understanding social 
relations with the production of decline. The patterning of land and its debasement suggests the 
future of the city depends less on gentrification and austerity then it does on how uneven 
development ensures demolishing produces nothing but new opportunities for grabbing value. 
 Conclusion: From Seesaws to Labyrinths  
How do we relate demolition to land when the process may not enable valuation as 
predicted by established approaches to capitalist urbanization and redevelopment? By the end of 
3/2020, the Detroit Demolition Program had awarded $364,4440,763.00 in contracts for 20,793 
demolitions. Hopes for Detroit’s demolition-dependent redevelopment remain open to debate. I 
have used this chapter to examine dominant understandings of land and value in American cities. 
In those conceptions, decline is a stage in the process of unlocking development potential. Here, 
capital flows across space to exploit devalued land, leaving behind a trail of gentrification and 
destruction. Demolition supports this circulation by opening wasted land to new investment. As 
Smith (1982) observes of  this spatial restructuring under capitalism, “The logic behind uneven 
development is that the development of one area creates barriers to further development, thus 
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leading to underdevelopment, and that the underdevelopment of that area creates opportunities 
for a new phase of development (151).” Windfalls – like the built environments upon which they 
rely – can be unpredictable, lasting until capital destroys the value of those fixed investments. 
The succession of growth, decline, and revival maintains tremendous power for making 
sense of uneven development in a fraction of cities, but it has also penned in how urban planners, 
and researchers address the built environment and valuation in “lumpengeographies” of capitalist 
urbanization: the territories of recurrent extraction (Walker, 1979). While Smith’s 1982 
approach applies to the Detroit region and how decline has reduced values, another perspective 
from Smith (1987) proves to be more illuminating for the production of decline in Detroit. He 
remarks in a response to Ley, “Not all neighborhoods experiencing the rent gap may experience 
gentrification or redevelopment; some economic opportunities remain unexploited and specific 
local conditions may discourage the process (464).” Smith’s consideration of non-gentrifying 
spaces suggests theoretical room for circumstances in which decline is not a form of devaluation, 
nor demolishing just land preparation. Obsolescence not only allows value extraction in vacant 
space - obsolescence became a pipeline for value (Weber, 2002). Empty buildings were not a use 
value to be exploited for the next round of development; instead, contractors turned demolishing 
and backfilling into value-grabbing operations. The issue is not whether the locational seesaw or 
circuit model of capital is accurate, but how those depictions may provide only a partial 
explanation for the relationship of Detroit’s land to demolishing. Relying on the binary outcomes 
of demolition can flatten land into a commodity rather than a contingent collection of assets and 
resources, each shot through with conflicts and priorities of policymakers, contractors, and users. 
In the case of Detroit, unlocking the potential value of land through demolishing obscured other 
forms of intervention, property control, and regulation that are shaping the city’s landscape. 
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One interpretation would encourage an explanation rooted in why gentrification has not 
occurred - a survey of the unexploited opportunities. A different interpretation would seek to 
explain how these neighborhoods are shaped by an intersecting urban process under capital that 
provides a trajectory for valuation, devaluation, and revaluation without redevelopment. In 
Detroit, the DDP created value for land that depended on continued debasement rather than 
intensification. As I have shown, HHF-financed demolition transformed publicly-owned land 
occupied by houses with negative market value (such that they justified the HHF demolition 
subsidy) into overvalued properties with no substantial development interest (beyond parking for 
a dispensary). The demolition liens did not just furnish a barrier to income-generation or signal a 
policy failure; the liens became a crucial element within a parallel economy of income-
generation. It was not a traditional developer or city-builder speculating and disposing land that 
experienced these windfalls from land use change, but an ensemble of contractors, haulers, 
excavators, mineral plants, and suburban speculators. As contractors realized the possible values 
of HHF-wrecked structures, they also transformed a separate class of vacant land into a new 
resource class fundamental to moving, stockpiling, producing, and regulating backfill material. 
The demolished properties and the backfill sites combined to establish a land regime of 
decline that produced value without culminating in gentrification or the usual building frenzy 
associated with growth. But focusing on long waves leaves untouched the rearticulation of land’s 
role in Detroit. The city’s decline and subsequent demolition response has integrated land once 
considered outside the reach of capital. Whether through lease, ownership, or use, contractors 
control land in southeast Michigan to gird a valuation and rentiership process dependent upon 
destruction and unstable property markets. These are land uses and forms of exploitation where 
decline and demolition created value. Decline can serve these income generation purposes vis-a-
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vis demolishing because haulers, excavators, and contractors command and control land within 
operations to establish and increase the value of backfill. By situating themselves within a 
logistical archipelago of destruction and production, contractors turned backfill into an asset 
enabling rent extraction from the DDP. As an asset, dirt becomes concentrated within a network 
of contractors empowered to control the spatial, financial, and regulatory dimensions of its 
production and its circulation. Backfilling, in other words, serves as capital-in-disguise that the 
operations of demolishing reinvests in producing the city's decline. Demolishing was never 
outside the production of decline; the production of demolition was yet another expression. 
As I have shown in this chapter, the devalorization and valorization process of uneven 
development has configured land, labor, and capital to produce built environments in Detroit that 
are irreducible to gentrification and austerity. Capital did not return to Detroit; capital was 
shaping Detroit and valuation through new strategies, including demolishing and backfilling. 
Detroit boosters, policymakers, and developers claimed demolitions would eliminate the physical 
barriers to investment that frustrates the regeneration of the city’s neighborhood. In effect, they 
argued demolition could reduce the burdens placed on future developers to produce a new built 
environment (LPD, 2016). Demolition could conclude the devalorization process and help the 
city’s land return to a maximum potential (yet unrealized) value. However, the very process of 
Hardest Hit Funds demolition served to revalorize land. The destruction of the built environment 
– its land use debasement – established the conditions in which contractors, excavators, mineral 
plants, and haulers could extract a maximum value without resorting to ownership, speculation, 
or new construction. Demolishing turned uninhabitable structures that DLBA could not auction 
at bargain prices into parcels of land worth at most $25,000 and perhaps more when the DLBA 
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fair market value was included. The DDP converted buildings with no value into land with 
excess value and, importantly, it represented a form of value captured only through demolishing.  
I have shown how contractors embedded Detroit’s land into a regional production of 
demolition. For some policymakers, “blight costs,” and “clearing it creates value (Cleveland City 
Council, 2012).” But value may not come from redevelopment. As I have argued, occupation, 
extraction, and destruction hints at property relations extending beyond the use and exchange of 
Logan & Molotch (1987). While they addressed urban political economy as the expression of 
real estate markets in which rentiers and inhabitants battled on the pitch of use and exchange 
values, the geography, policy, and economy of demolition backfill illustrates the limits of the 
dichotomy. Property is not reducible to its use nor exchange, nor is intensification the only 
pathway renewed value. By incorporating usufructus, fructus, and abusus, I have proposed a 
complementary land regime and decline machine that extracts value outside this binary. Instead 
of a narrow notion of policed access and exclusivity, property is a process of logistical command 
in which users, controllers, and owners mobilize that land for goals beyond simple ground rent.  
At the heart of this debate is the character of land use and how to negotiate the shoals of 
confrontation and collaboration between policy and profit - as a shifting site between the public 
and private. This stance echoes calls by Wideman and Lombardo (2019) to renew the study of 
land use and its relationship to property, regulation, and intervention. For them, land use is not a 
neutral designation applied to parcels, lots, or properties. Institutions, industry, and investors 
command land to create new assets, resources, and spaces for value. Land use debasement has 
become a key outcome of the DDP and its reliance on HHF. In Detroit, properties with structures 
impeding capital mobility are not just disposable; they are overvalued. Demolishing transformed 
abandoned houses owned by the DLBA into reserves of value accessible only to contractors. In 
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turn, they controlled land to make the value grabs possible; land became part of the supply chain 
and logistical process, but its potential for income-generation was not driven by intensification. 
A decline machine secures windfalls by wrecking the city and leaving behind thousands 
of parcels following a second capture of values. First the banks, then the bulldozers. The record 
of property sales in the aftermath of demolishing suggest there is no wending and winding queue 
of new buyers waiting to purchase these cleared properties. Demolishing Detroit did support a 
redevelopment process but, as I illustrated in Chapter 4, it was suburban speculative change in 
conflict with the DDP’s own public objectives. This emergent decline machine has occupied, 
mobilized, and exhausted property to serve logistical purposes within the backfill supply chain. 
Value can be created and extracted without the mobilization of Detroit’s greatest asset: the 
inventory of vacant land. Detroit’s land regime of decline arranges uses, resources, and space to 
make this possible. Stockpiling, excavation, dirt-washing, and crushing reveal the limits of 
gentrification and austerity as frameworks for understanding how demolishing, backfilling, and 
value-grabbing serve to sustain the production of urban decline in Detroit and its neighborhoods. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Remapping the Atlas of Shrinking Cities and the Operations of Urban Decline 
 
 In 2006, Philipp Oswalt and Tim Reiniets argued their Atlas of Shrinking Cities would 
“present shrinking processes and make it possible to understand them, to see them within the 
overall context of global developments so that their status can be assessed (6).” As the first 
compendium detailing this phenomenon of shrinking cities, their collection of maps, profiles, 
and data portraits provided “a global overview” that illustrated “how these processes affect local 
conditions (6).” In the fourteen years since publishing their atlas, seeing shrinking cities is no 
longer the standard. Today, the study of shrinking cities and urban decline has evolved from 
avant-garde interest and artistic speculation to a scholarly perspective. Recent research on vacant 
land and property, greening, demolition, land banks, triage, and right-sizing indicate a maturing 
point of view and literature that insists planning and policy practice must prioritize shrinking 
cities. Despite this growthin scholarship and relevance, many of the debates in this literature 
remain oriented towards the scalar divide described in 2006 by Oswalt and Reiniets. Extralocal 
scales make decline possible while the local is a stage for responding to decline by eliminating 
neighborhoods, demolishing buildings, and retrenching services. Then and now, global economic 
processes create place particularities where growth and decline sit side-by-side. 
 While “place” remains the main site of extraction for global capital (Immergluck, 2011; 
Newman, 2009), an atlas of shrinking cities is incomplete when scale does more to conceal the 
processes of decline. In existing research on shrinking cities, demolition is placed alongside 
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other policy and technical interventions as a local response to the exogenous pressures of 
economic restructuring and its effects on investment, markets, and public policy (Weaver & 
Knight, 2018; Ryan, 2012). As I have argued and illustrated, this received distinction between 
external processes and internal practices provides uneven clarity on the environmental and 
logistical operations behind triage, demolition, and right-sizing.  
 Recently, Berglund (2020) argued the existing corpus of work attached to the Shrinking 
Cities perspective has struggled to integrate political economy perspectives into its analyses of 
urban decline and depopulation. For her, this persistent omission allows these planning and 
public policy scholars to push market-friendly responses that address decline without identifying 
structural determinants. Research examining demolition policy is an exemplar of this approach to 
shrinking cities and decline. By framing blight removal as vacancy management or 
neighborhood stabilization, these scholars have marginalized what produces blight and 
destabilization in the first place. Berglund’s challenge to the agenda of the Shrinking Cities 
literature is a welcome intervention in a body of research that often prioritizes policy evaluation.  
 This latest critique of shrinking cities literature, however, focuses on explanations for the 
absence of growth or failure of growth policies rather than the processes of decline. Despite 
highlighting more rigorous empirical and theoretical work from planning and geography that 
reconsiders decline as an active urban process under capital, the critique places public policy and 
markets firmly in the register of the growth imperative. Berglund writes, “the shrinking cities 
literature at times underestimates capitalism’s demonstrated ability to adapt to new market 
conditions and underestimates the role of the state in enabling this exploitation of the conditions 
of decline (13).” This misinterprets the political economy of decline. Capitalism and its 
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processes remain an external force on market conditions and state or government actors take a 
reactive position, siding with continued capital accumulation over the quality of life of residents.  
 Berglund is correct to identify the insufficiency of existing approaches to decline, but her 
critique reproduces the global scale manifesting decline and the local scale as the geography of 
intervention. The dialectic relationship central to political economy disappears. Decline, then, 
appears to haunt cities separate from the conditions of its production. These dichotomies 
preserve an atlas of shrinking cities in which, as Aalbers and Bernt (2019) described, cities “deal 
with the situation” of decline. But this persistent analytical schism between scales does not 
explain pipelines and pathways of social relations under capital that shape neighborhoods and 
built environments. Rather than read urban decline off a script of local actors navigating the 
consequences of global restructuring, recent research on decline has embedded capitalist 
urbanization in the processes, properties, and policies of the declining city and its built 
environment (Seymour, 2020; Akers & Seymour, 2019). No longer a mistake, the declining city 
represents the contingent outcome of strategic shifts in capital accumulation (Akers, 2013).  
 Demolishing, then, is not a way to seal off a past of decline and launch into a phase of 
new development. More than a delivered service, demolishing is productive of property 
practices, industries, resources, and land-uses that can reinforce the production of decline. 
Demolishing creates and preserves processes that extract value whether or not the DDP meets its 
stated goals. In the vocabulary of Mezzadra and Neilson (2019), demolishing is an operation that 
is “a process that impinges on others, affecting possibilities and establishing multifarious and not 
necessarily predictable connections (67).” Their insistence capital must be studied based on how 
it “hits the ground (22)” provides continued justification for research on urban decline that 
scrutinizes production of these built environments instead of derivations of scale. 
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 By focusing on demolishing as one such process, this dissertation has provided another 
way to move beyond geographies of decline that position local responses against global 
processes. I have shown how demolishing and backfilling Detroit manifested markets, assets, 
and environments that added to and complemented the production of decline. The process of 
demolishing created a regional space and “operative surface on which capital intervenes 
(Mezzadra & Neilson, 2019, 3).” Contractors, haulers, suburban homebuilders, and excavators 
generated income from the city’s built environment by capturing the remaining value contained 
in abandoned properties. Relations of capital did not adapt to the market of demolishing Detroit; 
these relations created the market and its valuation schemes alongside the administration of the 
Detroit Demolition Program (DDP). Demolishing was not a way to escape those dynamics. 
 This study contributes to a growing body of scholarship that embeds decline in property 
practices, supply chains, forms of extraction, and policy. By focusing on the environmental and 
logistical production of demolition within the context of decline, I have provided another way to 
decenter “the city” in discussions of value and destruction. The production of decline approach 
transcends the epistemological distinction between local and broader scales that has been 
foundational to arguments within the shrinking cities literature. In place of overlapping or 
stacked scales, the production of decline provides room to identify and interpret the historically 
specific relations and processes formatting a political economy of decline. Scale gives way to 
operations with “spatial, social, legal, and political formations (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2019, 3),” 
allowing for decline to be both produced and challenged locally while remaining critical of the 
broader urban processes under capital that shape the fortunes of cities like Detroit. 
 By promoting the Detroit Demolition Tracker as an undistorted gaze into the practices 
and consequences of the DDP, officials have reproduced demolition as a local response. “It’s not 
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just a map looking at demolition,” Farkas shared with a Crain’s Detroit reporter, “You can see 
where the private sector is building in Detroit (Livengood, 2018).” Tracking demolition’s 
relationship to investment is consistent with the city council’s insistence the DDP must enable 
private redevelopment of vacant land (Legislative Policy Division, 2016). Detroit’s policy sphere 
echoes two currents of recent scholarship inserting demolition between phases of accumulation 
(Jay & Conklin, 2020; Akers, Beal, & Rousseau, 2020; Rosenman & Walker, 2016) or 
institutional approaches to managing vacancy and decline (Weaver & Knight, 2018; Hackworth 
2016; Rhodes & Russo 2013). In both cases, demolition serves to start the revaluation of the 
build environment, whether through dispossessive recapitalization (Herscher, 2020; Safransky, 
2014; Mah, 2012) or green infrastructure that reuses land (Meerow & Newell, 2017; Schilling & 
Logan, 2008). But narrowing demolition as a practice of erasure or redevelopment is 
transparency by another name. Rather than grant weight to its own geographies and operations, 
these scholars have flattened demolition to privilege a relation to what preceded or followed.  
 However, by following the traces of what the tracker conceals, and the atlas omits, the 
process of demolishing comes into view and redraws the geography of the shrinking city. I have 
illustrated how this shift can recast an isolated demolition as part of the production of demolition. 
Such a move places demolishing Detroit on the map, along with its conflicts and contradictions. 
Pickles (2004) has critiqued how maps rely on strategic omissions and reductions to preserve 
power, “The world has literally been made, domesticated and ordered by drawing lines, 
distinctions,  taxonomies, and hierarchies,” he continues, “Through their gaze, gridding, and 
architectures the sciences have spatialized and produced the world we inhabit. (5)” By tracking 
the DDP to policies, regulations, valuations, environments, and supply chains driving its 
production, I colored in the map of demolishing Detroit that extended beyond the time and target 
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of demolition. Instead of binary outcomes – success or failure – I approached demolishing as the 
convergence of pathways and pipelines embedded in chains of regional valuation, rentiership, 
and accumulation. Demolishing encompassed and surpassed the contractor, the street, and the 
neighborhood. By focusing on backfilling and its potential for income-generation, I showed how 
demolishing was neither the moment of removal nor the preparation for redevelopment.   
 As one process within the production of decline, the production of demolition opens up 
analytical terrain by illuminating forms of value, logistical operations, and urban-environmental 
transformations. Analysis of demolition that grades its ability to create developable land is no 
longer sufficient for understanding its effects and relationship to blight. Linking blight to its 
production counters interpretations that hold tenants and occupants responsible for the city’s 
decline. As Alan Mallach explained, “The reason houses are still being abandoned in Detroit is 
because people either can’t maintain them or people don’t want them. The reasons for that may 
have to do with poverty or because people who have any choice don’t want to live in 
neighborhoods and just walk away from properties. (Kurth, 2017b)” Linking demolition to its 
production counters interpretations that place the DDP at the end or the beginning of 
accumulation. The process of backfilling relied on regional differentiation and property practices 
controlled and commanded by contractors and their networks. Dirt came from somewhere and as 
one contractor shared, “Dirt is a commodity. It has a price.” Redrawing the atlas of shrinking 
cities can include the full roster of interests, environments, and systems in the production of 
demolition - providing room to challenge who and what has benefited from demolishing Detroit. 
This creates analytical space for challenging those local responses aimed at addressing decline 
but that as environmental and logistical processes serve to reproduce the production of decline. 
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 Demolitions, Demolishability, and Demolishing 
The circulation of backfill material and money between suburbs and city center typifies 
over 75% of all backfill transactions between 2014 and 2018. As I have illustrated and argued, 
demolishing Detroit is more than a technical intervention that culminates in blank space for 
redevelopment, stronger inhabitant morale, or more stable real estate markets. By analyzing and 
interpreting the DDP, I have shown how it is an environmental, political, and logistical process 
reshaping Detroit neighborhoods while depending on the ongoing transformation of the region. 
In my introduction I distinguished between demolition and demolishing. The practice of 
demolition is an engineering intervention to remove an impediment to property value or 
neighborhood stability. It takes place at a specific coordinate, a point in space flattened into a 
citywide blight removal program and grafted onto a housing market. Demolitions are moments 
of activity in space where contractor rigs arrive towing heavy machinery. Excavators roar 
Figure 50: Map of completed DDP demolitions in Detroit, MI, 2014-2020 
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through walls and roofs. Laborers hose down debris to control dust. Diggers grip and rip out 
basement foundations. Bulldozers fill and grade open holes. The job is complete, grass seed 
sprouts, and a vacant lot is poised for another purpose in the next stage of accumulation. 
Demolishing may rely on those components, but it is not reducible to them nor is it 
predestined to provide land for redevelopment. The process of demolishing is an achievement of 
political, environmental, and logistical control embedded in local and regional property 
practices and forms of value. This production of demolition maintains a supply chain and 
resource-shed for staging and shaping regional real estate, commodities, and development. 
Private, public, and philanthropic interests clash in institutional skirmishes to seize and wield 
command over demolishing. In the rush to wreck the city, regulatory approaches accommodated 
contractor practices that increase and maintain demolition production. In the latter, contractors, 
haulers, excavators, and mineral plants rely on the region’s status quo of suburban expansion to 
transform dirt into a commodity, land into logistical space, and dereliction into value. But the 
production of demolition also depends on powerful parties transforming Detroit into a blight 
space – where demolishing is necessary. Detroit becomes a space where buildings are outside of 
history, neighborhoods outside of policy and investment, and the city independent of the region. 
 The Logistical and Environmental Production of Demolition  
 This dissertation analyzed the Detroit Demolition Program and demolishing Detroit 
without reducing demolition to stage one of redevelopment and reuse or a local intervention in 
quality of life for residents. I began this dissertation with a focus on the relationship between 
demolition and urban decline. I examined the political and material relations that produce 
demolition. I sketched an analytic framework to challenge the academic and policy approaches to 
demolition and its outcomes for value and revitalization. I argued a focus on production can 
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reveal the property relations and operations contradicting the flattened view of demolition as a 
local response to decline. I have focused on political, logistical, and environmental dimensions of 
demolishing Detroit and how treating it as a technical intervention or local policy conceals its 
consequences but also the conditions and contradictions of the DDP and its operations.   
In line with recent work on the production of urban decline, I approached demolition as 
part of the urban process under capital that produces decline (Akers, 2013). My focus on the 
details and micro-interactions of demolishing allowed me to ground capitalist urbanization in the 
operations and processes of contractors, excavators, haulers, materials producers, and 
homebuilders. These interactions of the economic, the logistical, and the political show 
demolishing to be a regional process that mobilizes environments of extraction and destruction to 
preserve the interests of capital, and forms of spatial differentiation within and outside Detroit. I 
have illustrated how demolition fits within the production of decline. Figure 51 shows blight and 
vacant land as part of this accumulation process. However, within this conceptualization, 
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demolition is a discrete intervention that concludes the prior period of value-extraction while 
opening space for a new round of investment and profit by stabilizing or reusing vacant land. 
Contractors deliver demolition to a site and the process of redevelopment can begin. 
In this dissertation, I push against that conceptualization by defamiliarizing demolition 
and the processes and operations that provide for its production. In Figure 52, I illustrate the 
production of demolition within the production of decline. This is the circulation of money, 
supplies, and materials, but it is also the circulation of power and control over the fortunes of 
Detroit neighborhoods. Demolition is a not a local program; it a regional process and an 
achievement by power and capital. The sources of demolition backfill are not simply found 
features of regional topography or geology; they are generated in the production of demolition. 
These 444 sources are embedded in property and policy practices of growth and decline that 
Figure 51: Demolition within the Production of Blight and the Redevelopment of Vacant Land 
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create possibilities for income generation that conflict with the DDP’s stated goal of rebuilding 
through reuse of vacant land. As Ken Buckfire, the president and managing director of 
investment banking firm Miller Buckfire & Co. told an audience of Detroit expats about vacant 
land, “I think that's the greatest strategic asset of Detroit (Livengood, 2019a).” But because 
demolishing is not an isolated local practice of engineering, its consequences for Detroit and its 
built environment extend beyond whether land is reused. Detroit's decline provides space for 
practices of rentiership and valuation that steer the DDP to maximize returns off continued land-
use debasement. In parts of Detroit, private property is less exclusion and exchange than an asset 
in a secondary market of backfill, a market upon which the DDP depends. The DDP is not 
wrecking Detroit into the redeveloped city, but demolishing Detroit into the extracted city.  
The drum beat of a blight-free Detroit plays on. In late 5/2019, Duggan appeared at the 
Mackinac Policy Conference with a new plan to realize a blight-free Detroit. Standing before a 
Figure 52: The Production of Demolition within the Production of Decline 
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swarm of reporters from across the state, he proposed a $200 million bond issue for the March 
2020 ballot dedicated to wrecking and rehabilitating vacant property in the city (Gray, 2019). 
Duggan promised this new debt was a financial necessity to achieving his goal of eradicating 
residential blight by 2024. If approved by Detroit voters, the new source of DDP funding would 
close a funding gap created by the end of HHF. The bond would take pressure off local 
congressional representation to secure federal money while also preventing a slowdown in 
demolition. Combined with a reduction of DLBA's role in managing the program, the bond 
dollars would enable greater financial independence to match Duggan's and the city council's 
intensified political command of the demolition program (Stafford, 2019). Towards the end of 
2019, the city council rejected Duggan’s proposal on grounds the DDP had not operated with 
transparency and had dodged accountability (Kaffer, 2019). Duggan vowed to get a version of 
the bond on the 11/2020 ballot (Stafford, 2020). In 7/2020, city council approved a new ballot 
measure for a $250 million bond (Guillen, 2020). New grabs surely await the contractors. 
 Notwithstanding the unmatched volume of abandoned properties and the swell of public 
dollars flowing towards removing its blight, the underlying forces and relationships suggest 
Detroit is not unique. DDP is superlative, not sui generis. As I argued in the introduction, 
research on demolition restricts the practice as the beginning or the end of a separate process of 
administration or accumulation. Although the DDP has designs to wreck over 40,000 buildings, 
spend nearly a billion dollars of public money, and excavate and circulate over 10 million yd3 of 
backfill, its decentralization and incrementalism disguises its grandness as a megaproject before 
which scholars might salivate and inhabitants may tremble. I have shown how the micro, meso, 
and macro scales of property and policy can return focus to the production of demolition.  
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 Demolishing Detroit was not incidental or peripheral to political-economic goals of 
redevelopment, authority, and value. Not only did DDP and city officials view backfilling as the 
precondition of redevelopment but the strategic urgency of backfill became an organizing 
principle for a coalition of builders, excavators, haulers, crushers, and wreckers. Backfilling was 
central to both the production of demolition, but also the perceived consensus around “the will to 
remove.” But visions of a stronger Detroit developed on the resource of vacant land converged 
with the process of demolishing. Backfilling became an opportunity and an investment to exploit 
Detroit’s landscape and capture remaining value from abandoned properties. The configurations 
of land and power that continue to produce Detroit’s decline provide a window into urbanization 
processes and accumulation strategies beyond growth. Decline is not produced globally and 
addressed locally. The political, economic, and spatial contradictions of demolishing and 
backfilling Detroit indicate how the DDP was a continuation of the production of decline. Going 
forward, planners can confront the approaches to demolishing Detroit that mystify or marginalize 
the production of decline and maintain anti-Black and anti-poor regional geographies. Planners 
must challenge these processes that extract value by preserving this differentiation. 
 Future Work on the Logistical and Environmental Production of Urban Decline 
Research on decline, its production, and its property practices remains essential to taking 
a stance that moves beyond scale to explain decline and policy responses. I am lucky enough to 
follow and work alongside scholars that have recast decline, blight, and destruction (Seymour, 
2020; Akers & Seymour, 2018; Akers, 2013a; Dewar & Thomas, 2012). My future work will 
examine the logistical and environmental dimensions of local responses to decline. I believe my 
focus on the environmental and logistical production of decline provides an opportunity to 
further ground research on cities like Detroit in strategies of accumulation, rentiership, and 
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value-grabbing. Moreover, this work can identify, by virtue of the conditions of their creation 
and, how responses to decline can serve the contradictory purposes of producing decline.  
I have three projects that build upon my dissertation. First, I will co-create and make 
available a Detroit Backfill Atlas to residents of the city’s neighborhoods. This project will 
integrate information that expands the operation of the DDP to include: funding sources, names 
of subcontractors and haulers, time to complete the demolition, presence of lead or asbestos, dust 
suppression techniques, time to fill the hole, and the quality and source material used to fill the 
hole. My goal is to conduct soil testing on 444 sites in Detroit consistent with the number of 
backfill sources approved by the DDP and AKT Peerless. I will draw on this data to collaborate 
with neighborhood residents to examine ideas of public health, value, and the potential for 
democratic redevelopment. The second current will include continued engagement with the 
consequences of demolishing Detroit on both valuation, land-use debasement, and 
intensification. What new uses, occupations, and developments has demolished enabled? 
I intend to shift my research focus onto other logistical and environmental processes 
within urban decline. One limit of this research project is the narrow focus on Detroit. 
Contributing to the future of shrinking cities research means theorizing broadly from the 
perspective of the production of decline. This requires identifying and scrutinizing supply chains, 
industries, and valuation schemes that serve important roles in the operations of capital but are 
not bound up in the usual atlas of shrinking cities that divides the local and global. St. Louis 
remains part of a national supply chain of recycled brick that has created formal and informal 
incentives to prolong the destruction of the city’s neighborhoods (Gay, 2010; Reinhold, 1978). 
Despite that image of sustainability, St. Louis supplies the majority of recycled brick in southeast 
and western residential construction in both formal and informal ways (Meyerowitz, 2011). 
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Reducing the need to manufacture new building materials has not proven itself a strategy for 
preserving or sustaining St. Louis’ neighborhoods. Today, local leaders celebrate the 
achievement of a demolishable St. Louis and reinvigorated support for demolishing St. Louis 
(Barker, 2019; O’Dea, 2019). But neither shift captures how demolishing and recycling brick 
reshapes the value and land-use in ways that produce scales of the city’s decline. Demolishing 
St. Louis is not local. Presently, St. Louis brick can resell for $1 and an average house has over 
15,000 bricks. By focusing on the logistical and environmental aspects of this brick reuse, we 
can identify supply chains linking destruction in St. Louis to expansion in the Sun Belt. 
I also hope to apply lessons from my research backfilling, regional geographies of value, 
and extraction to two other cities facing the consequences of depopulation and decline. In New 
Orleans, LA, new nuisance abatement policies around landscaping have helped establish a 
powerful regional mowing industry that extracts value by monitoring grass height and reporting 
owner-occupants. New Orleans’ Code Enforcement office applies liens on overgrown grass 
which can result in the property entering the Lien Foreclosure Program (Williams, 2019). The 
logistics of mowing and public policies meant to preserve and stabilize neighborhoods have 
targeted vulnerable residents and created opportunities for exploiting property and producing 
decline. In Cincinnati, OH, near-daily dumping of construction debris by contractors in some of 
the city’s poorest neighborhoods has prompted local policymakers and officials to form a new 
Environmental Crimes Task Force (Thompson, 2019). My research on Detroit suggests the 
regional supply chain of illegal dumping could illuminate how neighborhoods, policymakers, 
and dumpers understand land, its use, and its value. By adding environmental and logistical 
dimensions to the study of the production of decline, these research projects examine how capital 
“hits the ground” and mobilizes new pathways of extraction and destruction in shrinking cities.
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